金融分成合约与助学贷款

金融分成合约具有良好的风险分担特性。教育有正的外部性,任何教育发展的障碍都会导致社会福利的损失,将分成制合约引入助学贷款中,使得风险在借贷双方之间进行合理的分担,风险规避型的借款人也能进入金融市场借款,可以使金融市场在一个更高的水平上达到均衡。本文首次将分成合约引入助学贷款领域并给出了一个分成合约助学贷款的模拟示例,并建议由国家开发银行在小范围试点再推广。     

将商业保险引入助学贷款的思考

在简要介绍我国助学贷款发展的历史和分析我国助学贷款新旧政策的基础上,提出了将商业保险引入助学贷款的构想,将商业保险引入助学贷款不仅可行而且十分必要,也将促进我国助学贷款工作的健康发展。     

借鉴美国助学贷款管理模式将商业保险引入我国助学贷款业务北大核心CSSCISSCI

2007年7月份,人民银行总行下发的《关于做好家庭经济困难学生助学贷款工作的通知》（银发[2007]241号）要求各银行业金融机构要加强与保险机构的合作,积极探索将商业保险引入助学贷款业务的新途径。最近,人民银行吉安市中心支行深入研究了美国助学贷款模式,建议借鉴美国助学贷款管理模式,将商业保险引入助学贷款业务,破解我国助学贷款政策性与金融机构商业性的矛盾难题。     

国家助学贷款市场化研究

国家助学贷款是高校资助体系的重要组成部分,对国家实现教育公平化,帮助贫困生完成学业起着极其重要的作用。在2009年国家发布生源地助学贷款的新政策之后,助学贷款的资助范围和力度进一步扩大。国家助学贷款走向市场化,尤其是国家助学贷款二级市场的建立和商业保险制度的引入,有助于国家助学贷款的可持续发展,是运用金融创新工具改进助学贷款制度的重要举措。本文探讨了我国助学贷款二级市场和保险制度的具体运作方式,并对国家助学贷款市场化的发展提出了自己的建议。     

当前开展生源地助学贷款面临的问题及对策

开展生源地助学贷款对于目前占高校经济困难学生比例80%的农村学生来说,无疑是一场及时雨,然而当前生源地助学贷款在发放过程中存在四大矛盾,影响生源地助学贷款的开展。可以引入贷款保证制度,控制信贷风险;建立沟通机制,确保政府贴息和风险补偿金落实到生源地贷款信用社;建立评估考核监督制度,规避寻租行为的可行性;加快助学贷款立法工作,推动生源地助学贷款健康发展。     

助学贷款政策执行效果分析

本文回顾了助学贷款政策体系的历史变迁过程,总结了各阶段政策执行效果及存在的主要问题,并利用激励理论、交易费用理论和博弈理论对助学贷款制度和执行中出现的各种问题进行了分析并对现行助学贷款政策提出改进建议。     

当前开展生源地助学贷款面临的问题及对策

开展生源地助学贷款对于目前占高校经济困难学生比例80%的农村学生来说,无疑是一场＂及时雨＂,然而当前生源地助学贷款在发放过程中存在＂四大矛盾＂,影响生源地助学贷款的开展。可以引入贷款保证制度,控制信贷风险;建立沟通机制,确保政府贴息和风险补偿金落实到生源地贷款信用社;建立评估考核监督制度,规避寻租行为的可行性;加快助学贷款立法工作,推动生源地助学贷款健康发展。     

信用保险：助学贷款政策的“安全阀”

“助学贷款信用保险”就是将商业保险机制引入大学生助学贷款工作，分担商业银行助学贷款的信贷风险，探索并建立政府主导，高校、银行、保险公司共同参与的助学贷款风险管理机制，切实发挥商业保险在构建社会主义和谐社会中的作用。从目前中国助学贷款的实践来看，积极开办“助学贷款信用保险”，不仅能提高商业银行发放助学贷款的积极性，扩大助学贷款及商业保险的覆盖面，而且还能有效解决贫困大学生上学难问题，有效推动国家助学贷款政策的顺利实施。     

商业保险助力助学贷款发展——云南省助学贷款信用保险的实践

助学贷款的实施困境,原因之一在于风险,面对高违约率和巨大的预期损失,金融机构放贷积极性大打折扣。如果要将金融机构重新纳入助学贷款体系中来,转移、分散风险则是应有之义。分散风险,正是保险的基本功能之一。将商业保险机制引入助学贷款工作,云南省作出了有益尝试。     

“贷款+保险”:国家助学贷款市场化机制研究

国家助学贷款是促进教育公平、解决贫困学生就学问题的主要资助手段。目前,国家助学贷款主要以政策性金融为主、商业性金融为辅的格局,存在生源地贷款和校园地贷款两种选择,并形成了国开行模式与商业银行模式。国家助学贷款存在空白点、效率低、贷后管理压力大以及市场化水平低等问题,在助学贷款商业银行模式中引入保险机制,以市场化的方式探索了银行、保险和教育三方紧密联结、优势互补、分工明确、高效快捷的新型助学贷款业务模式。中国社会科学院金融所课题组对此进行了调研与分析,走访了银行、高校和保险机构等,采用国际比较的方法,对国家助学贷款发展状况、运作模式、运行效果和风险情况进行梳理,认为"贷款+保险"模式成为国家助学贷款可持续发展的市场化机制的一种有益探索,同时该模式面临诸多体制机制及操作困难,深化试点和改革是必由之路。     

基于信息不对称的信贷配给均衡模型研究

本文建立了竞争和信息不对称条件下,信贷市场的信贷配给均衡模型,模型表明在为不同的借款人提供由贷款利率和贷款额度组成的相同贷款合同的情况下,信贷市场存在稳定的单合同均衡,信贷市场的均衡在信贷配给点达到,因而从信息不对称和均衡的角度解释了信贷配给现象。     

Macro Credit Policy and the Financial Accelerator

This paper studies macro credit policies within the financial accelerator model of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). The focus is on borrower‐based restrictions on lending such as loan‐to‐value (LTV) ratios. We find that the efficacy of cyclical taxes on LTV ratios depends upon the nature of the underlying loan contract. If the loan contract contains equity‐like features such as indexation to aggregate conditions, then there is little role for cyclical taxation. But if the loan contract is not indexed to aggregate conditions, then there are substantial gains to procyclical taxes on LTV ratios.     

Credit derivatives, capital requirements and opaque OTC markets

In this paper we study the optimal design of credit derivative contracts when banks have private information about their ability in the loan market and are subject to capital requirements. First, we prove that when banks are subject to a maximum loss capital requirement the optimal signaling contract is a binary credit default basket. Second, we show that if credit derivative markets are opaque then banks cannot commit to terminal-date risk exposure, and therefore the optimal signaling contract is more costly. The above results allow us to discuss the potential implications of different capital adequacy rules for the credit derivative markets.     

银行信贷合同中的利息法律实务问题探讨

本文从实践中的问题出发,以合同法及银行监管规则为基础,以商业银行的市场化发展为趋向,探讨了银行信贷合同中的利息法律问题,以供审判实务参考。     

Loan commitments and the management of uncertain credit demand

We provide an explanation for loan commitments unrelated to borrower creditworthiness. In our model, banks can use loan commitments to reduce uncertainty regarding their own future funding needs. Given a cost advantage to banks that can acquire such information, there exists an equilibrium demand for commitments by riskneutral firms. The purchase of the loan commitment and the choice of contract terms reveals the buyer's private information regarding future credit needs. In order to ensure the sorting of the a priori indistinguishable applicants according to their private information, we show that a usage fee applied to the commitment holder's unused credit line is necessary.     

The effect of information sharing between lenders on access to credit,cost of credit,and loan performance – Evidence from a credit registry introduction

Using a rich dataset from a commercial bank in Albania, we utilize the introduction of a public credit registry by the Albanian central bank in January 2008 as a natural experiment to analyze the effect of information sharing between lenders on (1) access to credit, (2) cost of credit, and (3) loan performance. Our results suggest that information sharing by means of a credit registry does not affect access to or cost of credit, but improves loan performance. Specifically, loans granted after the introduction of the credit registry are 3% points less likely of turning problematic, representing a 35% reduction of the overall sample average arrear probability. We further find that the effect is more pronounced for repeat borrowers and in areas, where competition is weak. This indicates that information sharing among lenders improves loan performance mainly by disciplining borrowers to repay in their concern about future access to credit.     

The economics of loan commitment contracts: Credit pricing and utilization

Our purpose is to examine the circumstances under which enduring customer relationships (such as revolving credit agreements) will become predominant. We compare loan commitment contracts, under which borrowers may take down funds at fixed marginal mark up, to spot lending, under which funds are priced in consideration of customers' leverage. Under the first arrangement, insurance against default risk is priced as a fixed front-end fee. Under the second arrangement, it is priced under a rising leverage-specific markup schedule. We show that when default risk is independent of take down, the loan commitment contract will always dominate spot loans. When default risk increases with credit use, spot loans may become dominant.     

Resaleable debt and systemic risk

Many debt claims, such as bonds, are resaleable; others, such as repos, are not. There was a fivefold increase in repo borrowing before the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Why? Did banks’ dependence on non-resaleable debt precipitate the crisis? In this paper, we develop a model of bank lending with credit frictions. The key feature of the model is that debt claims are heterogenous in their resaleability. We find that decreasing credit market frictions leads to an increase in borrowing via non-resaleable debt. Such borrowing has a dark side: It causes credit chains to form, because, if a bank makes a loan via non-resaleable debt and needs liquidity, it cannot sell the loan but must borrow via a new contract. These credit chains are a source of systemic risk, as one bank’s default harms not only its creditors but also its creditors’ creditors. Overall, our model suggests that reducing credit market frictions may have an adverse effect on the financial system and even lead to the failures of financial institutions.     

How do lending relationships affect access to credit and loan conditions in microlending?

A key problem facing microlenders is the high level of information asymmetry between them and their borrowers. In this paper, we analyze whether the relationship intensity between microlenders and borrowers helps to overcome existing information asymmetries and how this impacts access to credit and loan contract terms. Using a rich loan-level data set provided by a microlender in Mozambique for the years 2000-2006, we find that access to credit improves and that the loan approval process takes less time when relationships become more intense. Borrowers further profit from a more intense relationship through lower guarantee requirements. All effects are more pronounced the more opaque the borrowers are. These results suggest that longer lending relationships indeed help to reduce information asymmetries and that this is beneficial for microborrowers.     

A model for credit rationing by international banks

The theory of credit rationing asserts that commercial banks tend to underprice the nominal interest rate and, in addition, adjust other factors of the loan contract. These various risk adjusters constitute a `price vector'. A model is provided which demonstrates discrete tradeoffs between the interest rate and non-price adjusters such as loan size, maturity, compensating balances, and up-front loan fees. The model utilizes a modification of the asset pricing model to adjust for loan size. In addition, it observes the term structure of interest rates to develop a method of converting interest rates to years of maturity. Derivations are provided for adjustments in compensating balances and loan fees. A simulation is shown to demonstrate the operationalization of the model for international commercial banks lending to foreign government-guaranteed corporations.