When time is (not) money: preliminary guidance on the interchangeability of time and money in laboratory-based risk research

The familiar adage that ‘time is money’ may not be entirely accurate according to research involving hypothetical choice: People’s decisions are less sensitive to temporal expenditures and outcomes than monetary ones. We provide a novel examination of whether similar patterns of risky choice are found for time and money when choices are consequential (i.e. monetary outcomes are obtained and temporal outcomes are experienced) – both for one-shot and repeated choices, over gains and losses. On the aggregate, across decision contexts (described and experienced), choices are similar for time and money. However, on the level of the individual, little relationship between risk preferences for time and money are observed. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings.     

Traders,managers and loss aversion in investment banking: a field study

The paper examines the management of traders in financial markets from the perspectives of agency and prospect theory. Using interview data from a sample of traders and managers in four investment banks, the paper argues that managers focus on avoiding losses rather than making gains. This focus emerges from the characteristics of managers and the nature of their role. The implications for agency and prospect theory, together with the policy issues for managers, are discussed.     

Political cost influences on income smoothing via extraordinary item classification

Until 1990, Australian managers could classify recurring gains and losses outside the normal operations of the firm as either operating or extraordinary items. The results of this study indicate that managers of companies with highly unionised workforces, and therefore subject to labour-related political costs, attempted to affect the probability of wealth transfers by smoothing reported net operating profit via the classification of those recurring gains and losses. The degree of management ownership is associated with classificatory smoothing but interest coverage is not, indicating differential contracting influences.     

The role of negative associations and trust in risk perception of new hydrogen systems

In this study the moderating role of trust and negative affective associations on the inverse relationship between risk and benefit judgements is investigated. A survey (N = 406) was held in the Netherlands on the public perception of new hydrogen systems, during the time that a demonstration project with hydrogen buses was being undertaken. The data of the survey show that for the group of respondents with a negative evaluation of trust in actors involved, an inverse relationship between risk and benefit judgements can be observed. Furthermore, for the group of respondents that had elicited negative affective spontaneous associations with hydrogen in general, the inverse relationship was also found. The inverse relationship between risk and benefit judgements was not observed in the group not making these spontaneous associations. The strongest negative correlation between risk and benefit judgements was found for those who had a negative evaluation of trust and had elicited negative affective spontaneous associations. In all cases the general affective evaluation of hydrogen systems was the mediating factor in this inverse relationship between risk and benefit judgements. These findings provide evidence for the moderating role of trust and negative affective associations on the observed inverse relationship between perceived benefit and perceived risk.     

Behavioral Biases and Investment

We investigate the way investors react to prior gains/losses. We directly examine investor reactions to different definitions of gains and losses (i.e., overall wealth, paper gains and losses, and realized capital gains and losses) and investigate how gains and losses in one category of wealth (e.g., real estate) affect holdings in other categories (e.g., financial assets). We show that investors change their holdings of risky assets as a function of both financial and real estate gains. Prior gains increase risk-taking, while prior losses reduce it. To interpret our results, we consider and compare three alternative hypotheses of investor behavior: prospect theory, house money effect and standard utility theory with decreasing risk aversion. Our evidence fails to support loss aversion, pointing in the direction of the house money effect or standard utility theory. Investors consider wealth in its entirety, and risk-taking in financial markets is affected by gains/losses in overall wealth, financial wealth, and real estate wealth. We appreciate the helpful comments of: O. Bondarenko, F. De Jong, B. Dumas, H. Hau, P. Hillion, R. Jaganathan, M. Lettau, P.Maenhout, M. Huang, S. Mullanaithen, T. Odean, J. Peress, R. Shiller, P. Sodini, M. Suominen, A. Subrahmanyan, B. Swaminathan, R. Thaler, L. Tepla, P. Veronesi, M. Weber and the participants of the Summer Financial Markets Symposium at Gerzensee and the NBER Behavioral Finance Meeting, Fall 2002. We are grateful to Sven-Ivan Sundqvist for numerous helpful discussions and for providing us with the data. Financial support from Inquiry Europe is acknowledged. Andrei Simonov also acknowledges financial support from the Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation. Any remaining errors are our own.     

Win Some,Lose Some: The Effect of Chronic Losses on Decision Making Under Risk

Losses, including those that are chronic in nature, are a fact of life. The research reported here was designed to examine, using a controlled experiment, the effect of chronic losses in a given contextual domain on subsequent decisions with uncertain outcomes that take place in the same and in unrelated domains. Randomly selected adult subjects who took part in the experiment were randomly assigned to one of three treatment groups: One group, chronic losers, was exposed to chronic financial losses as part of a controlled, multi‐round gambling simulation. Groups two and three were exposed to chronic wins and random outcomes, respectively, as part of the same gambling simulation. Results from the experiment revealed that chronic losses, in contrast to random outcomes and chronic wins, had clear effects on decision making in the domain where the initial losses were incurred. Subjects who were exposed to the chronic loss induction demonstrated a significantly higher level of risk aversion when compared with subjects who were exposed to either random outcomes or chronic wins. Subjects exposed to chronic losses also displayed a depressed affective state and a tendency to accept less as an outcome of future decisions, and still consider it to be a satisfactory result, when compared to subjects in the two control conditions. There appears to be no spillover, however, of a similar degree of risk aversion when considering similar kinds of decisions in unrelated contextual domains. These results seem consistent with prospect theory and the theory of learned helplessness, and have implications for risk communication and management in a variety of contexts.     

The Power of Voice: Managerial Affective States and Future Firm Performance

We measure managerial affective states during earnings conference calls by analyzing conference call audio files using vocal emotion analysis software. We hypothesize and find that, when managers are scrutinized by analysts during conference calls, positive and negative affects displayed by managers are informative about the firm's financial future. Analysts do not incorporate this information when forecasting near‐term earnings. When making stock recommendation changes, however, analysts incorporate positive but not negative affect. This study presents new evidence that managerial vocal cues contain useful information about a firm's fundamentals, incremental to both quantitative earnings information and qualitative “soft” information conveyed by linguistic content.     

Communication of risk assessment information to risk managers

This article describes the results of a two-phase study of risk communication between risk assessors and risk managers (including policy makers). The first phase consisted of telephone interviews with 30 air quality risk managers from all levels (18 from local, state, and regional offices, and 12 from national offices). The second phase involved a focus group with 11 senior EPA risk managers representing a broad range of EPA national offices and programmes. The two-hour focus group elicited responses from the risk managers to specific examples of videotaped risk information created by agency risk assessors. The risk managers indicated their interests in hearing both qualitative and quantitative information about risk and emphasized the importance of discussing other information about the decision context. Similar responses to the videotaped risk information were elicited from a class of students at the Harvard School of Public Health. This exploratory work suggests that to better inform risk managers, risk assessors must also appreciate and present the broader context of the decision, and they must convey how uncertainties and weaknesses in the assessment may influence stakeholder perceptions of risk and the effectiveness of different risk management options. Further research on how to communicate risk information to risk managers is recommended.     

Risk-taking in new project selection: Additive effects of bonus incentives and past performance history

The goal of this study is to investigate how past project performance history and bonus incentive pay schemes affect managers' propensity to select more or less risky projects. Performance history is manipulated via past positive outcomes (i.e. beating a target profit rate) and negative outcomes (i.e. missing a target profit rate). Two types of bonus incentive pay schemes (hurdle bonus and graduated bonus) were employed in the study. The findings are consistent with prospect theory that predicts that prior bad outcomes (negative performance history) motivate greater risk-taking than prior good outcomes (positive performance history). In addition, we find evidence that hurdle and graduated bonus incentive schemes also affect risk taking. Overall, we find an additive effect of these two factors, such that the greatest (least) risk taking occurred when participants had negative (positive) prior experience coupled with a graduated (hurdle) bonus scheme.     

Board gender diversity,power, and bank risk taking

Having female board members brings ethical/societal perspectives and new resources to decision making. However, there is lack of evidence on whether it mitigates bank excessive risk-taking; hence, this paper addresses this question. It complements the normative corporate governance literature by combining agency theory and approach/inhibition theory of power from social psychology. For a sample of 195 U.S. commercial banks during 2002–2018, banks invest in more risky assets when female directors perceive the positive rewards of risky investments (in banks that have larger regulatory capital ratios and/or are well-capitalized) and when power shifts away due to CEO equity ownership. On the other hand, banks invest in less risky positions when female directors perceive the penalties inherent in a risky investment during the financial crisis. This paper provides novel evidence on the effect of gender diversity, as a governance mechanism, on risk taking in a social-psychology context. It offers insights on the effect of gender diversity on bank riskiness.     

ON THE LINKAGE BETWEEN FINANCIAL RISK TOLERANCE AND RISK AVERSION

We explore the linkage between financial risk tolerance (FRT) and risk aversion. To do this, we obtain FRT scores from a psychometrically validated survey and conduct a battery of online lottery choice experiments involving the same nonstudent participants. We contrast: real and hypothetical payoffs, low and high stakes, decisions involving gains and losses, and order effects. Our key finding is that the two approaches to analyzing decision making under uncertainty are strongly aligned. We present evidence that this is particularly the case for the female participants in our sample and when high‐stake gambles are employed.     

A REGRET-THEORETIC EXPLANATION OF CORPORATE DIVIDEND POLICY

This paper uses Regret Theory to explain some survey results on managers' dividend policy decisions under uncertainty. Regret Theory suggests that when an individual chooses an action from a number of uncertain alternatives, his decision is influenced by the potential post-decision regret (pride) he feels on his inabilty (ability) to select the option with the best outcome. Based on this premise, we argue that (1) the decision to pay dividends and simultaneously raise venture capital from external sources is attributable to managerial aversion for regret at the failure of a risky investment opportunity implemented with internal funds generated by a conservative dividend policy; and (2) the decision to support dividends with borrowed funds when earnings are declining is motivated by the prospect that an improvement in the firm's financial condition will make the managers proud that their judgment has helped avert a potential crisis for the firm without any wealth loss to its shareholders.     

Communicating production outcomes as gains or losses,operator skill and their effects on safety-related violations in a simulated production context

In this study, violation-producing conditions from an organizational and individual point of view are investigated. In concrete terms, framing effects of production outcome displays in relation to production goals, the risk of a technical accident, as well as person-related variables and their impact on violations are investigated based on the theoretical assumptions of prospect theory and risk-taking. It is assumed that violations are more likely when performance is below the aspiration level associated with an anticipated loss. A 2?×?3 factorial experimental design (n?=?118) was selected in accordance with the ‘Asian Disease’ decision scenario in the form of a computer-simulated task environment Simulation Waste Water Treatment. Participants acted out the role of a production supervisor running a plant. Experimental conditions were (1) the framing of individual performance outcomes in relation to the production goals in terms of losses or gains, and (2) the risk (20, 35, and 5%) with which an accident (a deflagration) might occur through using a corner-cutting procedure. A significant main effect of the framing conditions and no effect of risk conditions or interaction effect emerged. An additional path analysis shows the influence of risky decision-making and acquired skills in terms of knowledge of the safety-related procedure on a violation. In summary, violations are strongly affected by (a) framing effects of production outcomes when the performance is below the aspiration level and (b) person-related variables, in particular risky decision-making and skill. Results strongly emphasize that we found violation-producing conditions over and above what has so far been proposed and give rise to our claim that communicating production outcomes as gains and the increase of skill increases the likelihood of compliance with safety-related procedures.     

Evaluation Periods and Asset Prices in a Market Experiment

We test whether the frequency of feedback information about the performance of an investment portfolio and the flexibility with which the investor can change the portfolio influence her risk attitude in markets. In line with the prediction of myopic loss aversion (Benartzi and Thaler (1995)), we find that more information and more flexibility result in less risk taking. Market prices of risky assets are significantly higher if feedback frequency and decision flexibility are reduced. This result supports the findings from individual decision making, and shows that market interactions do not eliminate such behavior or its consequences for prices.     

Emotion,affect, and risk communication with older adults: challenges and opportunities

Recent research suggests that emotion, affect, and cognition play important roles in risk perception and that their roles in judgment and decision‐making processes may change over the lifespan. This paper discusses how emotion and affect might help or hinder risk communication with older adults. Currently, there are few guidelines for developing effective risk messages for the world's aging population, despite the array of complex risk decisions that come with increasing age and the importance of maintaining good decision making in later life. Age‐related declines in cognitive abilities such as memory and processing speed, increased reliance on automatic processes, and adaptive motivational shifts toward focusing more on affective (especially positive) information mean that older and younger adults may respond differently to risk messages. Implications for specific risk information formats (probabilities, frequencies, visual displays, and narratives) are discussed and directions for future research are highlighted.     

The Effects of Liquidity Shocks on Corporate Investments and Cash Holdings: Evidence from Actuarial Pension Gains/Losses

This paper investigates how anticipated liquidity shocks affect corporate investment and cash holdings by examining the impacts of actuarial pension gains/losses that do not reduce current internal resources but will reduce those available in the future. Using a sample from Japanese manufacturing firms in which pension deficits had a huge impact on the internal resources of sponsoring firms, I show that pension losses significantly decrease the capital expenditures of sponsoring firms. Pension losses also increase corporate cash holdings, suggesting precautionary demands for cash prepared for future pension contributions. Overall, the results indicate that managers consider anticipated liquidity shocks in determining current investment and cash‐saving policies.     

How prior realized outcomes affect portfolio decisions

Investors have been shown to have particular preferences when it comes to the characteristics of stock they hold in their portfolios, while prior gains and losses have been shown to impact on individuals’ economic decisions, both in an investment context and more widely. This paper is the first to investigate how prior gains and losses affect investors’ preferences for particular stock characteristics and so shape their portfolio compositions. Using a rich dataset combination from China, we conclude that prior realized outcomes play an important role in shaping portfolio composition through their impact on the characteristics of stocks that investors choose to hold. We find that positive prior realized outcomes encourage investors to select stocks with a variety of characteristics broadly consistent with higher risk taking (for example, higher betas and higher levels of idiosyncratic risk), though there are some differences across investor classes. While our empirical results are in line with what one would expect from the existing literature on the disposition and house money effects, we also consider other possible interpretations of the results.     

Fund ownership,wealth, and risk-taking: Evidence on private equity managers

Private equity (PE) managers are required to invest their own money in the funds they manage. We examine the incentive effects of this ownership on the delegated acquisition decision. A simple model shows that PE managers select less risky firms and use more debt, the higher their ownership. We test these predictions for a sample of Norwegian PE funds, using managers’ wealth to capture their relative risk aversion. As predicted, the target company’s cash-flow risk decreases and leverage increases with the manager’s ownership scaled by wealth. Moreover, the overall portfolio risk decreases with ownership, mitigating widespread concerns about excessive risk-taking.     

Managerial Incentives for Short-term Results

Of late, concern has been expressed that American managers tend to make decisions that yield short-term gains at the expense of the long-term interests of the shareholders. In this paper, we have attempted to investigate managerial incentives for such decisions. We find that, when the manager has private information regarding his or her decisions, there exist situations wherein the manager has incentives to make decisions which yield short-term profits but are not in the stockholders best interests. This incentive for suboptimal decisions arises because the manager, by taking decisions yielding short-term profits, hopes to enhance his reputation earlier, thus boosting his wages. We also find that this incentive is inversely related to her experience, the duration of her contract, and the risk of the firm.     

On reaching for yield and the coexistence of bubbles and negative bubbles

We develop a model of financial intermediation wherein bank managers “reach for yield” – by overinvesting in risky assets and underinvesting in safer assets – provided they do not face much cost from liquidity shortfalls. The managers follow a pecking order in which their first preference is to invest in risky assets; their second preference is to hoard liquid assets; and their last preference is to invest in safer assets. This behavior is conducive to the formation of bubbles and “negative” bubbles in the market for risky and safer assets, respectively. Monetary loosening, by reducing the cost of liquidity shortfalls, induces further reach for yield and amplifies the bubbles.