Piercing the Veil of Uncertainty in Transboundary Pollution Agreements

This paper addresses the question of how uncertainty in costs and benefits affects the difficulty of reaching a voluntary agreement among sovereign states. A measure of difficulty is constructed related to side-payments necessary to make an agreement a Pareto-improving move. Using a simple model, it is shown that uncertainty actually makes agreement easier.JEL classifications: Q5, H4, D7, D8An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference on Risk and Uncertainty in Environmental and Resource Economics, Wageningen, The Netherlands, June 2002.     

Transboundary Pollution in the Black Sea: Comparison of Institutional Arrangements

This paper analyses the transboundary pollution between Romania and Ukraine, coastal states along the Black Sea, and studies the welfare consequences of institutional arrangements for controlling this problem. To achieve this goal, we use a dynamic and strategic framework. We compare in terms of total welfare for two countries a first-best case with three different institutional arrangements: the non-cooperative game of countries, the uniform emission policy and the constant emission policy as proposed by the Black Sea Commission. Our findings indicate that the non-cooperative game provides a better level of total welfare than the other rules.     

Effects of Technology Transfers on the Provision of Public Goods

In this paper, we examine the viability ofcooperative policies oriented to the resolution oftransboundary pollution problems using the theory ofprivate provision of public goods in a two-countrymodel. We analyze the effects on economic welfare ofvoluntary technological transfers oriented to reducingthe emission of pollutants.Our analysis shows that when the atmosphere istaken as a pure public goods, ``a strong paradox' emerges:the advanced country, in spite of the transfer, seesits economic welfare improved while the developingcountry sees it worsen. Moreover, if both a technicaland an income transfer occur, this paradox mightnot be solved. Furthermore, ``a paradoxicalimprovement' occurs when the advanced country does nottake any policy towards the environment but thedeveloping country does: an improvement in the levelof technology in the developing country allows for anexpansion of the level of utility in both countries.On the other hand, in the case where the atmosphere istaken as an impure public goods, when both countriespursue an abatement policy, the transfer of technologyleads to an improvement in welfare in bothcountries.     

Transboundary Environmental Problems with Mobile but Heterogeneous Populations

Most of the literature on transboundaryenvironmental problems treats population ineach country or region as constant, ignoringpopulation mobility. We showed previously thatif there is perfect population mobility betweenregions, and populations are homogeneous, asocially efficient outcome can be supported asa Nash equilibrium of the game of uncoordinatedpolicy setting, even without any internationalenvironmental agreement. In the present paperwe introduce heterogeneous population, and showthat when people differ, a non-cooperativeoutcome is generally inefficient. We alsodemonstrate that for a particular set ofobjective functions for the regionalgovernments, there is an equilibrium of thegame of uncoordinated policy setting that isefficient. Finally, we give an example wherethe decentralized outcome is efficient whenthere is no population mobility, butinefficient when there is population mobility.     

Transboundary Externalities in the Environmental Transition Hypothesis

The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) is a hypothesis which implies that it is possible to grow out of environmental degradation. Most theoretical models of the EKC relation have not accounted for transboundary and intergenerational externalities nor have empirical studies provided evidence that validates an inverted U shaped relation between environmental degradation and economic growth for pollution problems where the effects are far-displaced or are long-delayed.This paper integrates the theory of transboundary externalities into the most common theoretical framework applied to the EKC hypothesis. It shows that where a significant proportion of the environmental impacts of economic activity occurs outside the territories in which those activities take place, the de-linking of growth and environmental degradation is less likely to happen. This proposition is demonstrated by assuming that decisionmakers have a Nash-type non cooperative strategic behavior.     

发展中国家对外直接投资、逆向技术转移与母国技术提升

近年来越来越多的研究发现,处于技术劣势的发展中国家跨国公司正逐渐把对外直接投资作为在国际上寻求技术优势的有力工具和手段.发展中国家跨国公司通过对发达国家的对外直接投资,可以利用东道国的技术资源优势获得逆向技术转移,并向母国返流和传递,进而促进母国企业、产业和国家整体技术水平的提升.积极利用技术寻求型对外直接投资进行技术学习和逆向技术转移,是发展中国家跨国企业在经济全球化形势下的一种适宜选择.     

Economic Growth and Transboundary Pollution in Europe: An Empirical Analysis

The existing empirical evidence suggests that environmental Kuznets curvesonly exist for pollutants with semi-local and medium term impacts.Ansuategi and Perrings (2000) have considered the behavioral basis for thecorrelation observed between different spatial incidence of environmentaldegradation and the relation between economic growth and environmentalquality. They show that self-interested planners following a Nash-typestrategy tend to address environmental effects sequentially: addressingthose with the most immediate costs first, and those whose costs aredisplaced in space later. This paper tests such behavioral basis in thecontext of sulphur dioxide emissions in Europe.     

International Cooperation Behind the Veil of Uncertainty – The Case of Transboundary Acidification

The complexities of international environmental problems are only poorly understood. Hence, decision makers have to negotiate about abatement measures even though they do not know the 'true' model of the ecological system and have only a rough idea about the costs and benefits of their action. It will be analysed to what extent this kind of 'model uncertainty' – where players do not only have incomplete information about the payoff functions of the other players, but also about their own payoff function – affects the prospects of international cooperation. Using a simple game-theoretic model, it is shown how countries can use the veil of uncertainty to hide their distributional interests. The arguments are based on a deviation from the common prior assumption, which seems particularly questionable in a setting comprising various countries with different cultural and scientific backgrounds. Finally the model will prove useful to quantitatively and qualitatively illustrate the central role of model uncertainty in the negotiations of the first Sulphur Protocol signed to combat transboundary acidification.     

Transboundary air pollution and soil acidification: A dynamic analysis of an acid rain game between Finland and the USSR

Transboundary air pollution is analysed as a dynamic game between Finland and the nearby areas of the Soviet Union. Sulphur emissions are used as the environmental control variables and the acidities of the soils as the state variables. Acidification is consequently considered to be a stock pollutant having long-lasting harmful effects on the environment. The state dynamics consist of two relationships: first, of a sulphur transportation model between the regions and, second, of a model describing how the quality of the soil is affected by sulphur deposition. The countries are assumed to be interested in maximizing the net benefits from pollution control as measured by the impacts on the values of forest growth net of the abatement costs. Cooperative and noncooperative solutions of the game are compared to assess the benefits of bilateral cooperation. Using empirical estimates of abatement costs, acidification dynamics and impacts on forest growth it is shown that cooperation is beneficial to Finland but not to the Soviet Union. Consequently, Finland has to offer monetary compensation to induce her neighbor to invest in environmental protection.     

风险投资融合高新技术的转让体系研究

本文提出了利用我国高新技术产业开发区、科技企业孵化器的集聚环境,建设直接服务于促进风险投资与高新技术双方融合的技术转让体系的思路。即将各园区的信息、技术产权交易连通,先区域后全国。针对风险投资几乎可进入所有的技术领域的现实,对供应性产品与服务、应用性产品与服务、复杂系统产品与服务、科学前沿产品与服务等不同的领域,提出了不同的风险投资刺激政策和技术转让服务重点。     

Multinational Firms and Technology Transfer

We construct an oligopoly model in which a multinational firm has a superior technology compared to local firms. Workers employed by the multinational acquire knowledge of its superior technology. The multinational may pay a wage premium to prevent local firms from hiring its workers and thus gaining access to their knowledge. In this setting, the host government has an incentive to attract FDI due to technology transfer to local firms or the wage premium earned by employees of the multinational firm. However, when FDI is particularly attractive to the multinational firm, the host government has an incentive to discourage FDI.
JEL classification : F 13; F 23; J 41; L 13; O 14; O 33; O 38     

环境壁垒在处理跨界污染问题中的运用

由于缺乏能够有力约束各国政府的组织存在,而各国仅从自身利益最大化来考虑污染排放,故如何让各国自愿并积极地参与环境保护协议以解决跨界污染一直是环境经济主要研究的问题之一。另外,环境壁垒一直被认为是新贸易保护主义所采取的一种贸易保护政策的新形式,其阻碍了贸易自由化的发展。然而,本文从另一角度重新审视环境壁垒,通过把它引入跨界污染博弈中形成关联博弈,最终得出环境壁垒有助于解决国家间的跨界污染问题的结论。     

Trade Structure, Transboundary Pollution and Multilateral Trade Liberalization: The Effects on Environmental Taxes and Welfare

This paper considers a trade situation where the production activities of potentially heterogeneous countries generate pollution which can cross borders and harm the well-being of all the countries involved. In each of those countries the policy maker levies pollution taxes on the polluting firms and a tariff on imports in order to correct that distortion. The purpose of the paper is to investigate the effect of a reduction in the tariff on equilibrium pollution taxes and welfare. The existing literature has investigated this problem for trade between two identical countries. This paper analyzes the problem in the more realistic context where countries are not necessarily identical and trade can be multilateral. It becomes possible to show what bias is introduced when those two realities are neglected. I find that a tariff reduction can actually lower output; it can also lower welfare even if pollution is purely local.     

出口管制与高技术国际转让

当前，虽然高技术国际转让呈现增长趋势，但是我们不能寄希望太高，高技术国际转让仍受到一些因素的限制，如受主要发达国家出口管制的限制。在这种情况下，发展中国家难以得到所需要的高技术。所以，发展中国家发展自己的技术以及从其他来源引进技术以面对挑战，是非常重要的。     

经济增长背景下浙江省城乡工业污染转移特征及动因

利用2012年7月我国环境保护部公布的重点环境整治行业信息数据及2001—2010年《浙江统计数据》,对浙江省城乡工业污染转移存在的问题及动因进行系统考察。研究结果表明:浙江绝大部分重点污染企业都分布在乡村,且呈分散独立经营状态,这增加了工业污染源整治的难度;政府对乡村地区的环保投入较少,导致城乡工业污染转移态势加剧、农村生态环境持续恶化;以污染密集产业为主导的经济增长模式与城乡二元结构下的污染天堂效应是浙江城乡工业污染转移的最根本原因。     

International Technology Transfer and Welfare

We investigate the welfare effect of international technology transfer in a quality model. A foreign innovator with a new quality product can license its innovation to the domestic firm(s) via a fixed fee. Findings show that the foreign innovator will license exclusively to the high‐quality firm under Bertrand competition, whereas it may exclusively license to the high‐quality firm, the low‐quality firm, or non‐exclusively to both firms under Cournot competition. Non‐exclusive licensing is necessarily welfare‐enhancing whereas exclusive licensing is welfare‐reducing if the quality of the new technology is not sufficiently superior to that of the domestic ones.     

外商直接投资对华技术转移效应的冷思考

外商直接投资对华技术转移的加强和深入,在增强中国产业竞争力的同时,一方面带来了产业集中度较高的市场垄断局面,中国本土企业产生依赖心理,导致本土研发的挤出效应,另一方面对促进和改善中国的知识产权保护效果也不明显。因此,在后危机时代,中国需要对外商直接投资对华技术转移效应进行冷静思考,以更有效地利用外商直接投资并提高中国企业的国际竞争力。     

韩国的技术转移与产业化

近年来,为了促进科技成果的技术转移与产业化,韩国政府实施了一系列的计划措施,并制定了相关的制度。本文从韩国政府在技术转移方面的宏观组织、国家创新体系中的技术转移机构、以大德研究开发特区为代表的产业技术园区的技术转移及韩国科学技术研究院（KIST）的技术转移现状等4个方面对韩国的技术转移与产业化的相关情况进行论述,以供从事技术转移相关工作人员参考。     

Cooperation in a Stochastic Transboundary Fishery: The Effects of Implementation Uncertainty Versus Recruitment Uncertainty

This paper examines how non-binding cooperative agreements on fisheries management can be sustained when the management plans in participating countries are implemented imperfectly, and compares the effects of implementation uncertainty and of recruitment uncertainty on the potential for cooperation. The model developed assumes two countries that share a fish stock. Reproduction depends on how much fish each country leaves behind after harvesting and hence on random variation in each country’s achieved abandonment level. A self-enforcing agreement is proposed that accounts for the random variation. The agreement is illustrated with a numerical example. A self-enforcing cooperative solution can only be sustained when uncertainty is not pronounced and when the two countries control close to equal shares of the fishery. Even when a cooperative agreement can be achieved, frequent phases of reversion to non-cooperative harvest levels are needed to support the agreement. A comparison of the effects of recruitment and implementation uncertainty on implicit cooperation indicates that implementation uncertainty is more likely to hamper cooperation.     

欧盟促进农业科技成果转化的做法和经验

促进农业技术推广和成果转化是提高农业创新能力的重要环节。长期以来,欧盟一直在大力扶持农业研发成果的推广、技术转移和转化。一方面,通过实施共同农业政策的价格补贴等措施保护农民利益,鼓励农民采用新技术和新成果,促进成果转化;另一方面,通过欧盟框架研发计划,实施农业技术平台计划、联合项目计划等,建立包括农民和农业企业在内的利益攸关方(Stakeholder)共同体,推进农业技术转移和成果转化。通过对欧盟农业技术平台等促进成果转化的做法进行研究和分析,得到启示:农业科技成果转化,要注重农民的参与,注重发挥农业企业的作用,要强调顺应市场规律。