Exchange-Rate Uncertainty and Economic Performance

Some models support the notion that exchange-rate uncertainty promotes economic growth while others suggest that exchange-rate uncertainty slows growth. Most empirical work supports the latter hypothesis, leading policymakers to strive for more stable exchange rates. The authors question the appropriateness of the methodology usually employed, and variables constructed to measure the impact of exchange-rate uncertainty on growth. They use an alternative approach and find no discernable impact of exchange-rate uncertainty on economic performance as captured by production.     

Strategic Trade Policy Under Uncertainty*

This paper extends the Brander-Spencer (1985) model by considering market uncertainty, exploring nonlinear policy, and examining firms' choices of strategic variables. By investigating the interrelationship between trade policy and market conduct, we find that unlike the often-studied linear policy, a nonlinear policy can influence the domestic firm's choice of strategic variables and hence alter the market conduct in favor of the domestic country. Therefore, a nonlinear policy proves strictly superior to a linear one.     

Efficiency Gains Under Exchange-Rate Emission Trading

In the case of emission of non-uniformly dispersed pollutants such as SO2 the negative effects depend on the location of the sources. A unit increase at one source must be compensated by either a larger or smaller reduction at another source to keep the negative effects at the same level. Emission trading between countries is possible under the Second Sulphur Protocol. Exchange rate trading and third party problems are studied within a simultaneous model facilitating impositions of various environmental constraints. Simulations based on the negotiated emission quotas are offered. Results indicate potential cost savings of 19%.     

International Trade, Bargaining and Efficiency: The Holdup Problem

In the presence of product market imperfections and holdup, we identify allocative and productive efficiency gains resulting from international trade. Under a bilateral monopoly in a closed economy, inefficiencies arise in both input and output markets. Trade in final goods has a procompetitive effect in the product market. This in turn triggers an increase in output, which raises incentives for the upstream firm to invest and helps reduce the hold-up problem.
JEL classification: F 12; F 13; F 15     

Endogenous Choice of Trade Instrument Under Uncertainty *

This Paper endogenizes the choice between import tariffs and quotas of two policy active countries in a duopsonistic world market. Without uncertainty, import quotas are welfare superior to import tariffs in equilibrium. If two importers can precommit to a type of instrument before deciding the level of the instrument to use in a future period, an import quota equilibrium emerges. We introduce asymmetric risk in the import demand schedule of the two importers. There exists a range of parameters in which a mixed equilibrium emerges, i.e. one country uses a tariff while the other restricts trade with an import quota. The likelihood that both importers choose a different trade instrument in equilibrium is increasing with the correlation coefficient of the two random shocks. [F13]     

Currency Quandary: The Choice of Invoicing Currency under Exchange-Rate Uncertainty

Recent studies have derived optimal invoicing strategies for an exporting firm when exchange rates are uncertain. However, these studies fail to explain trade transacted in a third currency (vehicle currency). In this study, we extend existing models to include the possibility that trade occurs in a vehicle currency. We find that under conditions stipulated by existing models, vehicle-currency invoicing is not preferred. The presence of a competing exporter under imperfect competition, however, can induce vehicle-currency pricing. This is consistent with trade in many primary commodities dominated by few exporters with many importers but where commodities are not perfectly homogeneous.     

Equilibrium Tariff Schedules In Commercial Policy Games Under Uncertainty

Abstract A partial two country equilibrium model is built in which two different exogenous random shocks may occur. the governments simultaneously choose tariff functions relating their specific tariff to the level of an observable variable (volume of trade or international price). In the case of a “volume of trade shock” the Nash equilibria of this game are more protectionist the larger the possible trade swings and autarky is always an equilibrium outcome. In the case of a “terms of trade shock”, constant tariffs, at their Nash equilibrium in specific tariff levels are the only sensible equilibrium outcome.     

Multidimensional Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information

A buyer with private information regarding marginal valuation bargains with a seller to determine price and quantity of trade. Depending on parameter values, a high‐valuation buyer wants either to reveal information to create value or to conceal it to capture value. In the first case, equilibrium trades are efficient. In the second case, the low‐valuation buyer purchases less than her efficient quantity, and there can be a one‐period delay in trade. The quantity distortion is the only inefficiency that persists when time between offers approaches zero. There exist equilibria that are independent of the seller's prior beliefs.     

Trade Negotiations under Alternative Bargaining Structure

We build a bargaining model, in which a country (leader) decides whether or not to form a free trade agreement with other nations (followers), either through a sequential or a multilateral bargaining procedure. Unlike Aghion et al. ( 2007 , Journal of International Economics, 73, 1–30), in our specification of multilateral bargaining, the leader can collude with all those follower countries who agree to its offer. This has important implications for the choice of sequential and multilateral bargaining by the leader in presence of coalition externalities. Moreover, this bargaining procedure ensures that “stumbling block” equilibrium will never occur.     

国际贸易中的两国关税博弈--兼论加入WTO后我国的关税对策

本文主要利用博弈论中纳什均衡的原理讨论在完全信息情况下，两国在国际贸易中的关税对策问题，并给出了关税对策的最优解。根据最优解讨论了关税增减对两国关税收入的影响，通过案例分析说明了我国加入WTO以后应采取的关税对策。     

International Trade and Collective Bargaining Outcomes: Evidence from German Employer–Employee Data

In theoretical trade models with variable mark‐ups and collective wage bargaining, exposure to international markets might reduce the exporter wage premium. We test this prediction using linked German employer–employee data covering the years 1996–2007. To separate the rent‐sharing mechanism from assortative matching, we exploit individual worker information to construct profitability measures that are free of skill composition. Our results show that rent‐sharing is less pronounced in more export‐intensive firms or in more open industries. The exporter wage premium is highest for low‐productivity firms. In line with theory, these findings are unique to the subsample of plants covered by collective bargaining.     

知识经济时代国际贸易的发展趋势及对策

知识经济是建立在知识和信息的生产、分配和使用基础之上的经济形态。在知识、技术和全球化力量的推动下，全球国际贸易出现了新的发展趋势和特点。为迎接知识经济的挑战，我国必须调整对外贸易战略，加大科技创新，大力发展知识型服务贸易，推行网络贸易及实施“走出去”战略。     

Efficient Environmental Taxation Under Worker-Firm Bargaining

We study an economy with free firm entry and unemployment due to firm-worker bargaining over each firm's surplus, and where firms cause pollution that can be reduced by initial investments. An uncompensated increase in the pollution tax reduces pollution but increases unemployment, implying a tradeoff between the two. When tax revenues are used to subsidize either firms' hiring or investments, employment may also increase, creating a double dividend from the pollution tax. A pollution tax increase used to subsidize current employment is always less effective than a hiring subsidy, and is totally ineffective when subsidies equal pollution tax revenues for each individual firm. We show that the (hypothetical) pollution tax implementing the first-best solution exceeds the Pigouvian tax. The second-best tax exceeds this first-best tax when we have a double dividend, and is below it when we do not.     

Bargaining under Uncertainty and the Monotone Path Solutions

Uncertainty with respect to the feasible set of utility vectors is introduced in an axiomatic bargaining model. Given a criterion for nonprobabilistic decision-making under uncertainty, a natural efficiency requirement can be imposed on a bargaining solution. Using the maximin ordering, thestrictly monotone pathsolutions (generalizations of theegalitariansolution) to the bargaining problem are characterized as the only continuous solutions that satisfy this efficiency axiom. If the maximin criterion is replaced by the maximax ranking or a strict convex combination of the maximin and the maximax criterion, imposing our efficiency axiom and continuity leads to thedictatorialsolutions.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C78.     

WTO体制下国际服务贸易的新视野

从WTO体制下国际服务贸易的可持续发展，经济全球化，理念全球化角度，论证了经济全球化对人们理念更新的客观要求，并揭示了人类视野拓新对社会进步的价值所在。     

Trade and Environment: Bargaining Outcomes from Linked Negotiations

Some recent literature has explored physical and policy linkages between trade and the environment. This paper explores linkage through leverage in bargaining, whereby developed countries can use trade threats to achieve improved developing-country environmental management, while developing countries can use environmental concessions to achieve trade discipline in developed countries. A global numerical simulation model is used to compute bargaining outcomes from linked trade and environment negotiations. Results indicate joint gains from expanding the trade bargaining set to include the environment. However, compared with bargaining with cash side-payments, linked negotiations on policy instruments provide significantly inferior outcomes for developing countries.     

On Endogenous Growth Under Uncertainty

This paper incorporates uncertainty in two distinct models of endogenous growth. In both models the representative agent is uncertain about the productivity of knowledge creation, as represented by a probability measure over the relevant parameter. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of risk or volatility in productivity of knowledge creation on the decision variables and the expected long-run growth rate. Both the first and the second models may explain part of the observed negative link between volatility and growth.     

Money and Prices Under Uncertainty

We study whether monetary economies display nominal indeterminacy: equivalently, whether monetary policy determines the path of prices under uncertainty. In a simple, stochastic, cash-in-advance economy, we find that indeterminacy arises and is characterized by the initial price level and a probability measure associated with state-contingent nominal bonds: equivalently, monetary policy determines an average, but not the distribution of inflation across realizations of uncertainty. The result does not derive from the stability of the deterministic steady state and is not affected essentially by price stickiness. Nominal indeterminacy may affect real allocations in cases we identify. Our characterization applies to stochastic monetary models in general, and it permits a unified treatment of the determinants of paths of inflation.