Optimal property taxation in the presence of interregional capital mobility

A single region's optimal property tax policy is examined in a model with interregional capital mobility. In this model, property taxation is used to finance local public expenditures. Different tax rates may be imposed on property used to produce goods which are traded between regions and property used to produce nontraded goods (e.g., residential property). The key determinants of the difference between the optimal tax rates are identified, and it is argued that there exists a bias towards relatively low tax rates on property used to produce traded goods. The role of labor mobility is also investigated.     

(2) Assumptions

We continue to make our best guesses about likely policy developments which at this time broadly corresponds to "unchanged policy". Compared with our October projections we estimate that public expenditure is running at a higher level than previously expected and we assume that the higher level will be maintained in the future. As a result, there will be no space for tax reductions in the coming Budget and so we now assume that the National Insurance Surcharge is unchanged. All other tax rates also remain unaltered, except for the indexation of tax allowances and bands and revalorisation of indirect taxes.     

Tax Competition and Revelation of Preferences for Public Expenditure

This paper considers a federal country composed of local jurisdictions that differ in their inhabitants' tastes for public goods, and which finance local public expenditure through a source-based tax on capital income. The taste for public goods is the private information of local governments. The central government seeks an optimal policy, in which grants to local governments are conditioned on local tax rates. The uninformed central government seeks both to allocate capital efficiently among jurisdictions, and to induce jurisdictions to provide an efficient mix of private and public consumption. It is shown that there persist at this constrained optimum both some misallocation of capital and some violation of the Samuelson rule for optimal public good provision in every jurisdiction.     

Sooner or Later? – Paradoxical Investment Effects of Capital Gains Taxation under Simultaneous Investment and Abandonment Flexibility

This paper analyzes the impact of capital gains taxation on investment timing decisions for risky investment projects with entry and exit flexibility under differential tax rates for ordinary income and capital gains. We investigate whether capital gains taxation influences immediate and delayed investments asymmetrically, given the optimal abandonment decision. If capital gains taxation induces a lock-in effect, this effect is anticipated in the investment timing decision. In contrast to prior research, our numerical simulations show that this lock-in effect of capital gains taxation can induce normal as well as paradoxical effects on investment timing under simultaneous entry and exit flexibility. A paradoxical timing effect, i.e., investment accelerated by capital gains taxation, especially emerges for high liquidation proceeds or, more conservative tax accounting, low interest rates, and low volatilities. In these cases, capital gains taxation reduces the value of the option to invest and hereby increases the propensity to invest immediately. As a second paradoxical tax effect, capital gains taxation may favor delayed real investment over financial investment. Facing these results, tax legislators should not use capital gains taxation as a short-term tax policy instrument to influence investors' timing decisions.     

Implications of productive government spending for fiscal policy

The standard assumption in macroeconomics that government spending is unproductive can have substantive implications for tax and spending policy. Productive government spending introduces a positive feedback between the tax rate, the productive capacity of the economy, and tax revenue. We allow marginal tax revenue to be optimally allocated between productive subsidies to human capital and utility-enhancing government consumption and calculate Laffer Curves for the US. Productive government spending yields higher revenue-maximizing tax rates, steeper slopes at low tax rates and higher peaks. The differences are particularly pronounced for the labor-tax Laffer curve. The use of tax revenue is an important determinant of the actual revenue that a tax rate increase generates.     

Fiscal centralization versus decentralization: Growth and welfare effects of spillovers, Leviathan taxation, and capital mobility

This paper develops an endogenous growth model with spillovers of public goods, Leviathan taxation, and mobile capital to examine the relative merits of centralized and decentralized fiscal systems for economic growth and social welfare. We show that a decentralized system dominates a centralized system in terms of economic growth; however, the difference in social welfare between a decentralized and a centralized system is non-monotonic and displays a hump-shaped relationship with respect to capital mobility. Since higher capital mobility induces stronger tax competition, this finding implies that there is an optimal degree of tax competition; some tax competition is desirable, but fierce tax competition may be harmful. We also show that there is a critical level of spillovers of public goods above which centralization dominates decentralization in terms of social welfare, as in previous studies; however, if spillovers are below this critical level, capital mobility also matters in the welfare comparison between centralized and decentralized systems.     

Lowering the Marginal Corporate Tax Rate: Why the Debate?

In an effort to attract new investors and retain existing producers, governments use corporate tax rates as a policy tool for industrial recruitment, resulting in inter‐state tax competition. Foreign direct investment (FDI) growth and GDP growth are the two policy outcomes gauged in inter‐state tax competition. The assumption is that lower corporate taxes lead to increases in FDI, which results in capital formation that generates GDP growth. This 60‐nation panel study tests that assumption through examining economic indicators contingent on taxation, such as FDI and mergers and acquisitions among multinational corporations between 1999 and 2009. The results suggest that reduced corporate tax rates can increase FDI but decrease annual GDP growth. The main policy implication is that tax competition may attract investment, but may not promote overall economic growth, offering support for value‐extraction theories.     

The effects of taxes and dividend policy on capital accumulation and macroeconomic behavior

This paper analyzes the macrodynamic effects of changes in various tax rates in an intertemporal optimizing framework. Two aspects emphasized include the role of dividend policy and the behavior of the stock market. Both permanent and temporary tax changes are considered, with the transitional adjustment paths being characterized in detail. The contrast between the short-run and long-run effects is highlighted. In particular, an increase in any of the tax rates will cause short-run employment to fall, and with the capital stock fixed instantaneously, the capital-labor ratio immediately rises. Over time, as the capital stock declines, the capital-labor ratio falls.     

Mobile Labor, Multiple Tax Instruments, and Tax Competition

The tax competition literature shows that local governments keep property tax rates inefficiently low to prevent capital outflows, thereby underproviding local public goods. This paper adds mobile labor and an alternative tax instrument to the model. Jurisdictions have access to a property tax levied on land and capital, plus either a head tax or a labor tax. Scale economies in public good provision create incentives to use the property tax, but these incentives are not accompanied by increased incentives to underprovide public goods. In contrast, underprovision is associated with the use of a distortionary labor tax.     

Is corporate payout taxation a long run phenomenon? Evidence from international data

This paper examines whether dividend and capital gains taxation influences corporate payout policy using the country level data of 21 countries in panel versions of time series models. We find that dividend relative to capital gains tax penalty is cointegrated with corporate payouts (dividends and share repurchases) i.e. corporate payout taxation may be a long run phenomenon. Further, the cointegrating vector estimates are largely consistent with the traditional view of dividend taxation whereby the tax penalty discourages dividends, while the estimates give limited support to the premise that firms substitute dividends for share repurchases in response to an increase in dividend tax penalty. Long run causality also operates between the tax penalty and payouts in the error correction models. Additionally, dividend tax appears to be more influential than capital gains tax on dividend payout decisions. Lastly, taxation affects dividends more significantly in countries with high investor protection.     

Proposals to Tax Life Insurance Savings as Personal Income

A bstract . Proposals to tax the realized net increment built up in life insurance policies amount to suggestions that we tax rewards to suppliers of capital. As tax policy it would tend to discourage capital accumulation. Many types of income and of capital gains are not taxed as a matter of social policy. Taxing the "inside buildup" would obstruct the building up of a capital base for the family and the economy. Economists recognize that there are alternatives, e.g. , a consumption based tax. In a time of great need for capital, a time of capital shortage, this tax policy would be retrogressive.     

A theory of interregional tax competition

A general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition, where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels. An exact definition of tax competition is provided, and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible. It is argued, however, that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions. Inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled. The amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms.     

The timing of residential land development: A general equilibrium approach

A formal model of the development process is constructed in order to arrive at a better understanding of the land development process, the change in land prices over time, and the effects of public policy on these variables. The relationship between the rate of interest and the rate of price appreciation on land is shown to depend upon development costs, agricultural opportunity costs, market structure, and the level of Ricardian rents on land. The effects of a land tax and a capital gains tax on the rate of development are also analyzed.     

The new view of the property tax A reformulation

The ‘new view’ of the property tax is reformulated within the context of a model with interjurisdictional competition, endogenous local public services, individuals who are segregated into homogeneous communities according to tastes for local public services, a simple form of land use zoning, and a political or constitutional constraint on the use of head taxes by local governments. Expressions for the ‘profits tax’ and ‘excise tax’ effects of the property tax are derived. The effects of a ‘consumption distortion’ away from government services due to local reluctance to tax mobile capital are also examined.     

不同资本账户开放程度下的中国财政货币政策效果分析

研究目标：分析不同资本账户开放程度下的中国财政货币政策效果及福利效应。研究方法：将内生化的政府支出（税收）政策以及包含汇率的价格（数量）型为主的混合货币政策一并纳入一个小型开放的DSGE模型。研究发现：随着资本账户的逐步放开,财政政策方面,减税政策刺激经济增长和促进就业的效果越来越好,政府支出政策刺激经济增长和促进就业的效果越来越差;货币政策方面,国内货币政策的调控效果及利率上升的跨期替代效应减弱。从社会福利损失的角度分析表明：无论是与内生化的政府支出（税收）政策组合还是与财政赤字政策组合,价格型为主的混合货币政策始终优于数量型为主的混合货币政策。研究创新：考察在高、中和低三种资本账户开放背景下中国不同财政货币政策组合的相互作用和经济效应。研究价值：为资本账户放开过程中合理地使用财政货币政策组合提供理论参考。     

Local business taxation and competition for capital: the choice of the tax rate

A theoretical model describes the local choice of the tax rate on capital income. It establishes preferences and various fiscal conditions — including the tax rates of competing jurisdictions — as determinants of the tax rate. The empirical implications are tested using a large panel of jurisdictions in Germany, which have discretion in setting the local rate of the business tax. Tax competition is identified by means of instrumental variables techniques. Despite significant competition effects between local neighbors, where tax rates are strategic complements, jurisdictions are found to have some leeway in using the tax rate as an instrument of their policy. In particular, large jurisdictions set higher tax rates in interjurisdictional competition.     

Stability and efficiency from a Neo-Keynesian viewpoint

This paper raises once more the Keynesian challenge of the classical doctrine that an unguided market economy has a natural tendency towards optimal employment of resources. By means of a simple macromodel, we show that if quantity expectations are incorporated into the Walrasian model, then it is no longer generally true that the ‘invisible hand’ leads the economy to Walrasian equilibrium. Instead, it may lead the economy to a kind of Keynesian equilibrium in which the firms' sales expectations constitute a binding constraint on production. Moreover, while Pareto optimum is unstable and hence unattainable in our model, a ‘second-best’ optimum among stable equilibria exists and requires a public sector. Accordingly, a trade-off between efficiency and other policy aims occurs only at tax rates above the positive tax rate in optimum     

Assumptions

We continue to make our best guesses about likely policy developments rather than assuming 'unchanged policies'. For the present financial year, 1983-4, we have assumed that fiscal policy will be as set out in the Budget of 15 March and that, where monetary conditions permit, the authorities will continue to push for lower interest rates rather than see sterling appreciate.
In future years we assume that policy will be guided-though not completely determined -by the Medium-Term Financial Strategy (extended in next year's Budget to 1986-7). As in 1983-4, on the basis of our projections of public expenditure and forecasts of output, this implies that there will be scope in future Budgets for further tax cuts. We have assumed that a prioriv for 1984-5 will be the abolition of the national insurance surcharge and that progress will also be possible in this Parliament towards lowering the standard rate of income tax.     

Why is there so little tax coordination? The role of majority voting and international tax evasion

It is a striking feature of EU tax policy that countries find it difficult to agree on capital tax coordination. This is in conflict with the prevailing theoretical view, according to which tax coordination is beneficial. This paper develops a political economy argument which may help to explain this puzzle. We consider a model of tax competition where fiscal policy decisions are taken via majority voting and tax evasion is possible but costly. It turns out that tax coordination agreements may fail to generate political support because middle income groups may lose from tax coordination, even if their capital income is below average.