Foreclosure Discount: Definition and Dynamic Patterns

The lack of a consistent definition of foreclosure discount gives rise to discount rates that vary from nonexistent to sizeable across locations and time. We define the foreclosure discount as the discount of the real estate owned (REO) sale price relative to a normal‐sale estimated market value. With a dataset of 1.34 million REO sale transactions, across 16 CBSAs between 2000 and 2012, we find three noteworthy empirical findings. First, a high REO sale concentration in a market increases the foreclosure discount. Second, foreclosure discount is negatively related to recent house‐price appreciation. Third, the often reported high foreclosure discount for lower value properties is likely due to property condition.     

Optimal Pricing Strategy in the Case of Price Dispersion: New Evidence from the Tokyo Housing Market

We adopt a multistage search model, in which the home seller's reservation price is determined by her or his opportunity cost, search cost, discount rate and additional market parameters. The model indicates that a greater dispersion in offer prices leads to higher reservation and optimal asking prices. A unique dataset from the Tokyo condominium resale market enables us to test those modeled hypotheses. Empirical results indicate that a one percentage point increase in the standard deviation of submarket transaction prices results in a two‐tenths of a percent increase in the initial asking price and in the final transaction price. Increases in the dispersion of market prices enhance the probabilities of a successful transaction and/or an accelerated sale.     

Price and quality discrimination in durable goods monopoly with resale trading

We examine a durable goods monopolist’s optimal dynamic price and product quality strategy when buyers are rational and can trade used durables among themselves. In contrast to the usual credibility problem of the durable goods monopolist, intertemporal quality discrimination introduces a time-inconsistency problem of not raising prices against high-valuation consumers who delay purchase for quality upgrades. Resale trading ameliorates this time-inconsistency problem and allows the monopolist to effectively price discriminate, especially when the buyers are patient. The monopolist’s optimal price and quality offers in the new good market exhibit complex dynamic patterns, and new good prices can fall as product quality improves even in the absence of entry threats or learning economies. Initial quality distortions are followed by steady-state quality allocations that are always efficient for the high-valuation buyers, but sometimes also for the marginal consumer-types. Both the resale trading frequency and the price discount for secondhand goods are driven by the pace of strategic quality obsolescence in the new good market.     

Dual Agent Distortions in Real Estate Transactions

This article investigates price distortions in dual agent real estate transactions. Consistent with the literature, we find that, on average, dual agent has a null effect on sale price. However, dual agent distortions on sale price emerge after controlling for the ownership of the property. Dual agent is associated with a 6.35% price premium on agent‐owned properties, but a 25.10% price discount on government‐owned properties and a 5.14% discount on bank‐owned properties. In addition, market conditions also play an important role in such price distortions.     

A two-sided model of paid peering

Internet users have suffered collateral damage in tussles over paid peering between large ISPs and large content providers. Paid peering is a relationship where two networks exchange traffic with payment, which provides direct access to each other’s customers without having to pay a third party to carry that traffic for them. The issue will arise again when the United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC) considers a new net neutrality order.We first consider the effect of paid peering on broadband prices. We adopt a two-sided market model in which an ISP maximizes profit by setting broadband prices and a paid peering price. We analytically derive the profit-maximizing prices, and show that they satisfy a generalization of the well-known Lerner rule. Our result shows that paid peering fees reduce the premium plan price, increase the video streaming price and the total price for premium tier customers who subscribe to video streaming services; however, the ISP passes on to its customers only a portion of the revenue from paid peering. ISP profit increases but video streaming profit decreases as an ISP moves from settlement-free peering to paid peering price.We next consider the effect of paid peering on consumer surplus. We find that consumer surplus is a uni-modal function of the paid peering fee. The paid peering fee that maximizes consumer surplus depends on elasticities of demand for broadband and for video streaming. However, consumer surplus is maximized when paid peering fees are significantly lower than those that maximize ISP profit. However, it does not follow that settlement-free peering is always the policy that maximizes consumer surplus. The peering price depends critically on the incremental ISP cost per video streaming subscriber; at different costs, it can be negative, zero, or positive.     

Internet Auctions and Frictionless Commerce: Evidence from the Retail Gift Card Market

This study investigates the pricing of retail gift cards on eBay. We find substantially less price dispersion than previously documented in other online markets for consumer goods. As gift cards are homogenous goods with clearly defined value, this suggests that greater price dispersion found in other markets may be due to unobservable differences in product characteristics, or from lacking the competitive nature of auction environments. Additionally, gift cards for the discount retailer Wal-Mart exhibit less price dispersion than other large retailers’ gift cards, consistent with the perception that greater search by price-sensitive shoppers can lead to less friction in markets.     

ENDOGENOUS COSTS AND PRICE‐COST MARGINS: AN APPLICATION TO THE EUROPEAN AIRLINE INDUSTRY*

This paper allows for endogenous costs in the estimation of price cost margins. In particular, we estimate price‐cost margins when firms bargain over wages. We extent the standard two‐equation set‐up (demand and first‐order condition in the product market) to include a third equation, which is derived from bargaining over wages. In this way, price‐cost margins are determined by wages and vice versa. We implement the model using data for eight European airlines from 1976–1994, and show that the treatment of endogenous costs has important implications for the measurement of price‐cost margins and the assessment of market power. Our main result is that observed prices in Europe are virtually identical to monopoly prices, even though observed margins are consistent with Nash behavior. Apparently, costs had been inflated to the point that the European consumers were faced with a de facto monopoly prices.     

Political connections in the land market: Evidence from China's state‐owned enterprises

This study examines whether political connections lead state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) to behave differently from privately owned enterprises (POEs) in acquiring land parcels at auctions and explores the underlying mechanisms that drive the price premiums paid by SOEs. We find that SOEs pay 11.9% more than POEs for observably comparable land parcels at auctions, and the price premiums SOEs pay are mainly driven by wholly state‐owned enterprises (WSOEs). In particular, we provide evidence that SOEs have advance access to information about the development of land parcels in 134 state‐level special economic zones, and land parcels purchased by SOEs lead to positive stock market performance. We also show that an anti‐corruption campaign that weakens political connections and reduces the information advantage leads to a decrease in the price premiums paid by SOEs.     

Discount Brokerage in Residential Real Estate Markets

Transaction costs are thought to affect asset prices and market liquidity, but the direction and magnitude of these effects continue to be the subject of debate. In the single‐family residential market, discount brokers offer to list a house for a lower price and thus reduce the transaction costs associated with obtaining a match. In this article we obtain empirical estimates of the price and liquidity impact of a seller selecting a discount broker to market a single‐family residential property. The unique data set allows for the identification of residential properties that were listed by a discount brokerage firm. The empirical results confirm the predictions of our theoretical model. Using a sample of 318,221 listings and 243,625 sales, we find that houses listed by discount brokers sell at prices similar to non‐discount brokerage listings, but are less likely to sell, and when they do sell, take approximately three days longer to sell. The results indicate that lower transaction costs do not impact housing prices in this market, but that they are related to asset liquidity.     

Price staggering in cartels

In this paper we investigate the optimal organization of staggered price increases in cartels. Staggered price increases impose a cost during cartel formation as the price leader initially loses sales. We show that for intermediate discount factors, staggered price increases can only be sustained when the increase is neither too small nor too large. When a cartel executes two consecutive price increases, the choice between using the same leader or alternating leadership depends on the initial price level in the industry. We also discuss the choice between simultaneous and staggered price increases with an exogenous antitrust detection function, the allocation of price leadership with cost asymmetry, and the effect of product differentiation on price staggering.     

Waterfall Versus Sprinkler Product Launch Strategy: Influencing the Herd

A seller decides the price and sequence in which a product of unknown value is introduced to consumers. Consumers inspect the product before consumption and observe past prices and sales. Consumption at a high price is informative for later consumers as it indicates that the product is likely to be of high value. I show that on an average prices decrease over time. However, expected revenue on an average rises over time. For a high enough discount factor, I find that for extreme beliefs the firm introduces the product to all consumers but for intermediate values the product is introduced only to one consumer.     

THE ROLE OF COST IN DETERMINING WHEN FIRMS OFFER BUNDLES*

We model competitive bundling and tying, allowing for marginal cost savings from bundling, fixed costs of product offerings, and variation in customer preferences. Pure bundling can arise either because few people demand only one component or because, with high fixed costs, a single product efficiently satisfies customers with diverse tastes. We conclude by analyzing empirically the bundling of pain relievers with decongestants. The discount for the bundled product is large. We argue that our model provides a simpler, more compelling explanation for the size of the discount than the demand‐centered approach to bundling by a monopolist.     

The component procurement problem for the loss-averse manufacturer with spot purchase

This paper studies the purchasing behaviour of a loss-averse engineer-to-order manufacturer, who purchases a key component for his final product from a supplier under a single-wholesale-price contract with spot purchase opportunities, where both the product demand and the component spot price are uncertain. Through newsvendor type of models, we analyze several key issues, including the effects of the manufacturer's loss aversion, and the effects of demand and spot price uncertainties on the manufacturer's decision behaviour. We find that the purchasing behaviour of the loss-averse manufacturer differs from those of the risk-neutral and risk-averse ones. Specifically, we identify some sufficient conditions under which the loss-averse manufacturer may purchase a larger order quantity in advance when demand becomes more uncertain or when the price becomes more uncertain. We also discuss the two-wholesale-price contract and show that fixing the emergency supply price may lead to a smaller order quantity.     

An experimental investigation of valuation change due to commonality in vertical product line extension

Commonality in product line design refers to using identical product features or modules in multiple products. The use of commonality in product line extensions is a growing practice in many industries. We consider vertical product line extensions to lower- and higher-end products, and study the effects of identical feature levels on consumers' evaluation of original products. Using a between-subject experimental design, we examine the effect of commonality using the bicycle as the example product. This experiment is then extended to eight different service and manufactured products. Results show that in many cases identical feature levels increase the perceived similarity between original and extension products. This influences the valuation of original products: valuation of the original low-end product increases while valuation of the original high-end product decreases. However, the amount of valuation change is not necessarily the same for the original low- and high-end products. This valuation change occurs regardless of buyers' knowledge level of the product and is sometimes moderated by a large difference in a differentiated feature.
This study suggests the importance of accounting for the demand-side effect of commonality in product design decisions. Change in customers' valuation may call for an adjustment in price—the price of a high-end product may have to be lowered due to valuation discount, and the price of a low-end product could be raised to take advantage of valuation premium. This change in valuation does not occur for every feature in every product. Therefore, by properly selecting the features that are identical, a firm may be able to take advantage of valuation premium without sacrificing valuation discount and enjoy the economies of scale in manufacturing and logistics due to commonality.     

Optimal pricing and order quantity for the newsvendor problem with free shipping

To attract and keep customers, companies, especially those in e-business, are increasingly offering free shipping to buyers whose order sizes exceed the free shipping quantity. In this paper, given the supplier offers free shipping and the retailer faces stochastic demand, we determine the retailer's (i.e., the newsvendor's) optimal order quantity and the optimal selling price simultaneously. We consider two different ways in which price affects the demand distribution, namely price only affects the location or scale of the demand distribution. We explicitly incorporate the supplier's quantity discount and transportation cost into the models. The transportation cost function is very general, which includes those most commonly used in the literature. We numerically examine the impacts of free shipping, quantity discount, transportation cost, and demand variance on the retailer's optimal order quantity and pricing decisions. We find that even though the retailer faces uncertain demand, free shipping can effectively encourage the retailer to order more of the good and can benefit the supplier, the retailer, and the end customers. An increase in transportation cost or a decrease in purchase price will induce the retailer to order more of the good and decrease the retail price. With increasing demand variance, the retailer should order more of the good. We also find that the newsvendor can cope with demand variance by taking advantage of free shipping.     

Price Dispersion in Mortgage Markets

Using transaction‐level data on Canadian mortgage contracts, we document an increase in the average discount negotiated off the posted price and in rate dispersion. Our aim is to identify the beneficiaries of discounting and to test whether dispersion is caused by price discrimination. The standard explanation for dispersion in credit markets is risk‐based pricing. Our contracts are guaranteed by government‐backed insurance, so risk cannot be the main factor. We find that lenders set prices that reflect consumer bargaining leverage, not just costs. The presence of dispersion implies a lack of competition, but our results show this to be consumer specific.     

Estimating the House Foreclosure Discount Corrected for Spatial Price Interdependence and Endogeneity of Marketing Time

Most previous empirical research estimates a greater than 20% discount associated with the sale of foreclosed properties. Under the assumption that the real estate market is somewhat efficient, such a large discount would be counterintuitive. We argue, and empirically show, that the estimated foreclosure coefficients in most of the previous research are upward biased because they do not control for variables such as the physical condition of the property and the relationship between marketing time and price. Accounting for these factors and correcting for two types of spatial price interdependence, our results show that estimates of foreclosure discount reported by previous studies are about one-third higher than the true discount caused by foreclosure per se .     

Coordination in a retailer-led supply chain through option contract

This paper develops a model to study channel coordination and risk sharing in a retailer-led supply chain. Such chains are characterized by a dominant retailer who aims to coordinate the upstream production quantity. We investigate a coordinating contract based on an option with two parameters. An option price is paid by the retailer for each additional unit of product reserved beyond the initial order. An exercise price serves as the unit purchasing price when the retailer sets a second order if realized demand is more than the initial order. A successful coordination needs two conditions. One condition is to maintain a negative correlation between exercise price and option price. Particularly, we draw the functional form. The other is that the firm commitment must be lower than the optimal production quantity in a centralized system. In a risk sharing mechanism, we prove that such a contract brings benefit to each party.     

Optimal Selling Mechanism,Auction Discounts and Time on Market

This article examines the optimal selling mechanism problem in real estate market using mean‐variance analysis and downside risk analysis. When sellers can choose between accepting the first offer above a reservation price or auctions (waiting an optimal and fixed time), sellers having higher risk aversion choose auctions and wait a fixed time while sellers having lower risk aversion choose an optimal reservation price and wait a random time. Positive auction discounts are compensated by reduced risks, and there exists a connection between liquidity risk and conditional auction discount. More (Fewer) sellers will choose to sell their houses through auctions in a hot (cold) market or when holding cost increases (decreases). When sellers choose auctions, sellers having higher risk aversion who have lower holding cost wait longer and obtain higher sale price. Loss‐averse sellers unanimously choose the mechanism of setting an optimal reservation price.     

The Role of Retail Prices and Promotions in Determining Cigarette Brand Market Shares

Over the past two decades, two forms of price competition have emerged within the cigarette industry: the introduction and spread of discount and deep discount cigarettes and the increased use of price-related promotions. In this paper, we use quarterly market-level, scanner-based data on cigarette prices, promotions, and sales for 50 US markets over the period from 1994-IV through 2002-II to examine the impact of price and promotions on market shares for premium, discount, and deep discount brand cigarettes. Our estimates indicate that changes in relative prices, including those resulting from promotions, account for much of observed changes in market shares.