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Drawing upon contingency theory, we analyze the antecedents and performance consequences of chief strategy officer (CSO) presence in top management teams (TMTs). We argue that strategic and structural complexity affects the decision to have a CSO in the TMT and its effect on firm performance. The results of a sample of S&P 500 firms over a five‐year period reveal that diversification, acquisition activity, and TMT role interdependence are positively associated with CSO presence. However, we also find that the structural choice to have a CSO in the TMT does not significantly affect a firm's financial performance. This first systematic analysis of CSO presence informs research on CSOs and contributes to the emerging literature on TMT structure. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Yasemin Y. Kor 《战略管理杂志》2006,27(11):1081-1099
This paper examines why firms differ in levels of R&D investment intensity by developing and testing a theory of direct and interaction effects of top management team and board outsider composition on R&D intensity. The theory is tested in a longitudinal sample of technology‐intensive firms that completed an initial public offering. The results indicate that both top management team composition and board composition have direct and additive effects on R&D investment intensity. Also, monitoring by outsider directors does not constitute a universally effective governance mechanism with regard to a firm's R&D investment strategy. Firms opt for lower levels of R&D investment intensity when their outsider‐rich board interacts with a team of managers who have high levels of (1) firm tenure, (2) shared team‐specific experience, or (3) functional heterogeneity. When a firm's competitiveness relies on sustained R&D investments, it is important to note these interaction effects and make adjustments to promote a healthy dialogue between managers and the board. Adjustments could be made to the management team composition (e.g., initiating management turnover to reduce firm tenure) or to the bundle of governance mechanisms (e.g., partially substituting board monitoring with other mechanisms). Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Don Knight Craig L. Pearce Ken G. Smith Judy D. Olian Henry P. Sims Ken A. Smith Patrick Flood 《战略管理杂志》1999,20(5):445-465
This study integrated concepts from upper echelons, group process and social cognition theories to investigate how demographic diversity and group processes influence strategic consensus within the top management team (TMT), where strategic consensus is defined as the degree to which individual mental models of strategy overlap. Data from 76 high‐technology firms in the United States and Ireland were used to examine three alternative models. The results showed that while demographic diversity alone did have effects on strategic consensus the overall fit of the model was not strong. Adding two intervening group process variables, interpersonal conflict and agreement‐seeking, to the model greatly improved the overall relationship with strategic consensus. For the most part, TMT diversity had negative effects on strategic consensus. The model with superior fit showed both direct and indirect effects of diversity on strategic consensus. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Adam L. Steinbach Tim R. Holcomb R. Michael Holmes Jr. Cynthia E. Devers Albert A. Cannella Jr. 《战略管理杂志》2017,38(8):1701-1720
Research summary : We develop and test a contingency theory of the influence of top management team (TMT) performance‐contingent incentives on manager–shareholder interest alignment. Our results support our theory by showing that although TMTs engage in significantly higher levels of acquisition investment when their average incentive levels increase, investors' responses to those large investments are generally negative. More importantly, however, we further find that within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity conditions that effect, such that investors evaluate TMTs' large acquisition investments more positively as the variance in those top managers' incentive values increases. Thus, within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity appears to increase manager–shareholder interest alignment, in the context of large acquisition investments. Managerial summary : We find that as the average value of TMTs' incentives increase, relative to their total pay, they invest more in acquisitions and investors' respond negatively to the announcement of those deals. However, we further show that investors respond more positively to acquisitions announced by TMTs whose members' incentive values vary (some TMT members hold higher incentives and others hold lower). Results imply that when TMT members hold differing incentives levels, they approach investments from divergent perspectives, scrutinize those investments more heavily, and make better decisions, relative to TMTs with similar incentives. They also suggest that boards seeking tighter manager–shareholder interest alignment may benefit from introducing variance into TMT members' incentive structures, as doing so appears to create divergent preferences that can improve team decision making. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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We use contingency theory to examine, for the first time, the incidence and effectiveness of CEO/COO duos. We argue that industry dynamism, extraordinary organizational task demands, and the CEO's own professional limitations will influence the decision to have a COO, as well as its effect on performance. Based on a large 10‐year sample, we find some support for the contingency view in explaining the presence of COOs; we particularly find that CEOs who lack experience in operational activities and in managing the focal firm are relatively likely to have COOs. We find, however, essentially no support for the contingency view in explaining when COOs are most beneficial. Instead, we find strong evidence of a very substantial negative main effect: CEOs who have COOs deliver lower organizational performance than those who do not. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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In this study, we hypothesized that relationships among top managers' goals consensus, means consensus, demographic homogeneity and firm performance would be positive and stronger in a stable industry environment than in a dynamic one. Utilizing a more rigorous methodology, the significant findings of earlier studies could not be replicated. Although the questions remain interesting and important ones, we believe pursuing this line of inquiry further will yield results inconsistent at best and fruitless at worst. Therefore, we urge future researchers to cautiously tread the perilous methodologic minefield that led to our nonfindings. 相似文献
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A wealth of research indicates that both executive characteristics and incentive compensation affect organizational outcomes, but the literatures within these two domains have followed distinct, separate paths. Our paper provides a framework for integrating these two perspectives. We introduce a new model that specifies how executive characteristics and incentives operate in tandem to influence strategic decisions and firm performance. We then illustrate our model by portraying how executive characteristics interact with a specific type of pay instrument—stock options—to affect executive behaviors and organizational outcomes. Focusing on three individual‐level attributes (executive motives and drives, cognitive frame, and self‐confidence), we develop propositions detailing how executives will vary in their risk‐taking behaviors in response to stock options. We further argue that stock options will amplify the implications of executive ability, such that option‐heavy incentive schemes will increase the performance of talented executives but worsen the performance of low‐ability executives. Our framework and propositions are meant to provide a starting point for future theorizing and empirical testing of the interactive effects of executive characteristics and incentive compensation on strategic decisions and organizational performance. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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This research reexamines the equivocal relationship between top management team (TMT) diversity and firm performance. Combining upper echelons theory with insights from institutional theory, we establish a new, timely dimension of TMT diversity—nationality diversity—and develop an integrated multilevel framework explaining how its performance implications vary across contextual settings. We find that nationality diversity is positively related to performance; and this effect is stronger in (a) longer tenured teams, (b) highly internationalized firms, and (c) munificent environments. More generally, our research demonstrates that the consequences of TMT diversity depend on the (1) specific attributes of diversity being considered and (2) firm and industry conditions under which strategic decisions take place. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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In this research we discuss the relationship between CEO and top management team (TMT) member compensation, and explore the implications of TMT pay for firm performance. Specifically, we suggest that firm performance may benefit due to agency and group behavioral issues when top management team member pay is aligned—alignment is defined as the degree to which TMT member pay reflects (1) shareholder interests and (2) key political and strategic contingencies within the firm. In support of our theorizing, we found CEO pay to be related to TMT pay; TMT compensation, in turn, predicted performance (i.e., return on assets and Tobin's q) when aligned with shareholder interests and internal contingencies. Moreover, the effect of CEO pay on future firm performance was dependent on top team pay. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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A new venture team is a particular type of top management team neglected by the literature. This study investigated the effects of team inputs and processes on team members' perceptions of team viability and satisfaction in nascent ventures. These outcomes are important as they may be antecedents of team perseverance. The study of 51 new venture teams showed that the presence of a distinct leader was positively related to team satisfaction, while member diversity in educational backgrounds was positively related to perceived team viability. Intrateam processes of social integration and open communication were positively related to both perceived team viability and member satisfaction. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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This study combines elements of the upper echelons and agency perspectives to resolve some of the ambiguity surrounding how corporate elites affect corporate strategy. We propose and test the notion that while differences in individual characteristics of corporate elites may imply different preferences for particular corporate strategies such as diversification and acquisitions, these basic preferences, when situated in different agency contexts (e.g., CEO, outsider director, non‐CEO top management team member), generate very different strategic outcomes. Our detailed empirical findings, based on extensive longitudinal governance and corporate strategy data from large U.S. corporations, also highlight the pitfalls of using aggregate units of analysis (e.g., board of directors or top management team) when studying the influence of corporate elites on corporate strategy. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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One of the fundamental problems in strategic management is to map a heterogeneous set of firms in an industry into subsets of firms within which firms are homogeneous in their conduct and performance. The strategic group concept provides an answer to this intriguing question. Researchers in strategic group theory argue that firms within the same strategic group are behaviorally similar and thus tend to compete more fiercely within the group than across groups. In this paper, we focus on the question whether firms within the same group show similar decision‐making characteristics. Strategic‐choice theorists argue that top management teams in firms have substantial discretion in determining the future strategic contour of firms. Upper‐echelon theorists also argue that top managers are the strategists who set the direction of firms and the pace of competition in the industry. Further, they argue that top management team characteristics are an important element that determines the market niche in which a firm competes and the strategic direction a firm follows. Based on these arguments, we expect that there will be a significant link between grouping of firms by the patterns of competitive interactions and grouping of firms by top management team heterogeneity. Moreover, we argue that the closer the TMT heterogeneity of a firm is to the dominant heterogeneity in the competitive interaction group, the better it performs. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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This study adds to current explanations of executive fate following a merger or acquisition by examining how executives' perceptions of merger events determine whether they stay or leave. Results indicate that executives' perceptions of the merger announcement, interactions with the acquiring firm's top managers following the merger, and long-term effects of the merger significantly influenced their decision to stay or leave. These perceptions could be used to correctly distinguish between stayers and leavers in almost 80 percent of the cases. In addition, perceptions created when the target company was acquired by a foreign multinational made it more likely that the executive would leave. This finding demonstrates that foreignness continues to be an important determinant of executive perceptions in cross-national mergers and acquisitions. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Steven J. Hyde;Eric Bachura;Jonathan Bundy;Richard T. Gretz;Wm. Gerard Sanders; 《战略管理杂志》2024,45(1):66-112
Organizations are punished by analysts and investors when material deceit by their CEO is uncovered. However, few studies examine analysts' responses to deceptive CEOs before their deceit is publicly known. We use machine learning (ML) models to operationalize the likelihood of CEO deception as well as analysts' suspicion of CEO deception on earnings calls. Controlling for analysts' suspicion of deception, we show that analysts are prone to assigning superior recommendations to deceptive CEOs, particularly those deemed as All-Star analysts. We find that the benefits of CEO deception are lower for habitual deceivers, pointing to diminishing returns of deception. This study contributes to corporate governance research by enhancing our understanding of analysts' reactions to CEO deception prior to public exposure of any fraud or misconduct. 相似文献
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Research summary: Despite abundant anecdotal evidence that many top executives experience anxiety in their jobs, the upper echelons literature has remained largely silent on the organizational implications of executive job anxiety. In this study, we theorize that job anxiety will cause executives to (1) create a social buffer against threats by surrounding themselves with supportive decision‐making teams, and (2) pursue lower‐risk firm strategies. We further argue that these effects will vary depending upon whether strategic decisions occur in gain versus loss contexts. We test our ideas using a novel multisource, multimethod approach that includes data from 84 top executives of large organizations, their decision‐making teams, their friends and families, and archival sources. Results from an analysis of 154 major strategic decisions provide general support for our theory. Managerial summary: Although many top executives experience anxiety in their jobs, some struggle more with anxiety than others. Our paper is the first to focus on how job anxiety affects executives' decisions. We analyze 154 major strategic decisions made by 84 top executives of large organizations in a range of industries, collecting data from personal interviews with executives and surveys of their decision‐making teams, spouses, and friends. We find that anxious executives take fewer strategic risks, especially when things are going well. We further argue that anxious executives focus more on “buffering” themselves from threats, and find that they surround themselves with close supporters when times are tough. Our results demonstrate a pattern through which anxiety causes top executives to focus more heavily on avoiding potential threats. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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This study examines the impact of complementary top management teams (defined as differences in functional backgrounds between the acquiring and acquired firm managers) on post-acquisition performance. Based on a sample of 147 acquisitions completed during 1986–88, we find that complementary backgrounds have a positive impact on postacquisition performance in both related and unrelated acquisitions. Another major finding is that complementarity is negatively related to top management team turnover among acquired managers, suggesting that differences in functional backgrounds are more easily integrated into the new organization. Finally, top management team turnover among acquired managers is negatively related to postacquisition performance. These findings highlight the importance of examining complementarity in terms of differences, and reinforce the notion that differences have the potential to create unique value for the organization. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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