What Makes a Family Firm Innovative? CEO Risk‐Taking Propensity and the Organizational Context of Family Firms

Investigating the new product portfolio innovativeness of family firms connects two important topics that have recently received considerable attention in innovation and family firm research. First, new product portfolio innovativeness has been identified as a critical determinant of firm performance. Second, research on family firms has focused on the questions of if and why family firms are more or less innovative than other organizational forms. Research investigating the innovativeness of family firms has often applied a risk‐oriented perspective by identifying socioemotional wealth (SEW) as the main reference that determines firm behavior. Thus, prior research has mainly focused on the organizational context to predict innovation‐related family firm behavior and neglected the impact of preferences and the behavior of the chief executive officer (CEO), which have both been shown to affect firm outcomes. Hence, this study aims to extend the previous research by introducing the CEO's disposition to organizational context variables to explain the new product portfolio innovativeness of small and medium‐sized family firms. Specifically, this study explores how the organizational context (i.e., ownership by top management team [TMT] family members and generation in charge of the family firm) of family firms interacts with CEO risk‐taking propensity to affect new product portfolio innovativeness. Using a sample of 114 German CEOs of small and medium‐sized family firms operating in manufacturing industries, the results show that CEO risk‐taking propensity has a positive effect on new product portfolio innovativeness. Moreover, the analyses show that the organizational context of family firms impacts the relationship between CEO risk‐taking propensity and new product portfolio innovativeness. Specifically, the relationship between CEO risk‐taking propensity and new product portfolio innovativeness is weaker if levels of ownership by TMT family members are high (high SEW). Additionally, the effect of CEO risk‐taking propensity on new product portfolio innovativeness is stronger in family firms at earlier generational stages (high SEW). This result suggests that if SEW is a strong reference, family firm‐specific characteristics can affect individual dispositions and, in turn, the behaviors of executives. Therefore, this study helps extend the knowledge on the determinants of new product portfolio innovativeness of family firms by considering an individual CEO preference and the organizational context variables of family firms simultaneously.     

Do board chairs matter? The influence of board chairs on firm performance

Research summary : We use a variance decomposition methodology to assess the degree to which board chairs may influence their companies' performance. To isolate the board chair effect, we focus on firms in which the CEO and board chair positions are separated. Using a U.S. sample of 6,290 firm‐year observations representing 1,828 board chairs in 308 different industries, our results indicate that the board chair effect is substantial at about nine percent. Drawing on resource dependency theory, we also theorize and show how this board chair effect is contingent on the task environment in which firms operate. Our results add to the literature examining the role and influence of board chairs and the context in which chairs may have a greater impact on performance. Managerial summary : Following institutional and regulatory changes, more firms are separating the CEO and board chair positions. With an increasing number of individuals separate from the CEO serving as board chairs, a critical question becomes: What influence do these separate board chairs have on firm performance? Prior research suggests that separate board chairs can provide important resources—including advice and counsel, legitimacy, information linkages, and preferential access to external commitments and support—to their CEOs, other top managers, and overall firms. In turn, who the board chair is and the individual's ability (or lack thereof) to provide these resources may have a significant impact on firm performance. Offering support for this perspective, we find that separate board chairs explain nine percent of the variance in firm performance. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO duality,organizational slack,and firm performance in China

CEO duality, organizational slack, and ownership types have been found to affect firm performance in China. However, existing work has largely focused on their direct relationships with firm performance. Advancing this research, we develop an integrative framework to address an important and previously underexplored question: How do CEO duality and organizational slack affect the performance of firms with different ownership types? Specifically, we compare the moderating effects of CEO duality on the relationship between organizational slack and firm performance in China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private-owned enterprises (POEs). Findings suggest that there is a positive relationship between organizational slack and firm performance, and that CEO duality negatively moderates this relationship in SOEs, but positively in POEs.     

Red,blue, and purple firms: Organizational political ideology and corporate social responsibility

Research summary : Why do firms vary so much in their stances toward corporate social responsibility (CSR )? Prior research has emphasized the role of external pressures, as well as CEO preferences, while little attention has been paid to the possibility that CSR may also stem from prevailing beliefs among the body politic of the firm. We introduce the concept of organizational political ideology to explain how political beliefs of organizational members shape corporate advances in CSR . Using a novel measure based on the political contributions by employees of Fortune 500 firms, we find that ideology predicts advances in CSR . This effect appears stronger when CSR is rare in the firm's industry, when firms are high in human capital intensity, and when the CEO has had long organizational tenure . Managerial summary : Why do firms vary in their stances toward corporate social responsibility (CSR )? Prior research suggests that companies engage in CSR when under pressure to do so, or when their CEOs have liberal values. We introduce the concept of organizational political ideology, and argue that CSR may also result from the values of the larger employee population. Introducing a novel measure of organizational political ideology, based on employees' donations to the two major political parties in the United States, we find that liberal‐leaning companies engage in more CSR than conservative‐leaning companies, and even more so when other firms in the industry have weaker CSR records, when the company relies heavily on human resources and when the company's CEO has a long organizational tenure . Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of reference point in CEO restricted stock and its impact on R&D intensity in high‐technology firms

Prior work based on agency theory and behavioral agency model has focused on how absolute pay values affect firm outcomes. Departing from this traditional approach, we draw from behavioral decision theory to explain how relative pay levels influence firm risk taking. We investigate how CEO restricted stock value relative to reference point influences R&D intensity in high‐technology firms. We propose that negative deviation increases are related to R&D increases and positive deviation increases lead to R&D decreases, while negative deviation has greater effect than positive deviation. We establish theoretical boundary conditions by considering CEO duality and board vigilance as moderators. Drawing from agency theory, we predict the main effects will be enhanced under duality and weakened under high board vigilance. Our hypotheses are largely supported. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why do some outside successions fare better than others? The role of outside CEOs' prior experience with board diversity

Research summary: We develop a theory to explain why new outside CEOs can better manage their relationship with the board if they previously served on boards that were more diverse than the focal board. We predict that a new outside CEO's prior experience with more diverse boards not only reduces the likelihood of post‐succession CEO turnover and director turnover, but also improves firm performance. Results from an analysis of 188 outside CEOs in a sample of Fortune 500 companies provide support for our theory. This study contributes to upper echelon theory and research by identifying outside CEOs' prior experience with board diversity as an important aspect of their background that influences a range of major organizational outcomes, including CEO turnover, director turnover, and firm performance. Managerial summary: It is challenging to be a new CEO who comes from outside of the organization. Our study examines why some new outside CEOs fare better than others. We suggest that a positive relationship with the board of directors is a key factor in a new outside CEO's success. A new outside CEO can better manage the relationship with the board if he or she has prior experience working with other demographically diverse boards. In contrast, when the focal board is more diverse than the other boards on which the new CEO previously served, the new CEO tends to struggle in managing his or her relationship with the board, experiencing a higher likelihood of turnover and delivering worse financial performance. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An empirical examination of vacillation theory

Research summary : Since Nickerson and Zenger (2002) proposed how vacillation may lead to organizational ambidexterity, large‐sample empirical tests of their theory have been missing. In this paper, we empirically examine the performance implications of vacillation. Building upon vacillation theory, we predict that the frequency and scale of vacillation will have inverted U‐shaped relationships with firm performance. We test our hypotheses using patent‐based measures of exploration and exploitation in the context of technological innovation and knowledge search. Managerial summary : Firms often shift their focus on technological innovation and knowledge search from seeking new and novel knowledge (i.e., exploration) to extending and refining existing knowledge (i.e., exploitation) or vice versa. We examine how the frequency and scale of firms vacillating between exploration and exploitation may affect their performance. We find that both too infrequent or too frequent changes and a too small or too large scale of changes are not desirable. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Always play against par? The effect of inter-team coopetition on individual team productivity

Current research lacks a deeper explanation of inter-team coopetition as a potential source of improved organizational performance on a micro-level. To fill this gap, our paper explores how inter-team coopetition influences individual team productivity. Building on social identity theory, we hypothesize that inter-team competition and inter-team coopetition both have a positive influence on individual team productivity with inter-team competition having a stronger influence. We further argue that organizational identification has a positive moderating effect on the link between inter-team coopetition and individual team productivity. To test our hypotheses, we conducted a laboratory experiment with 240 university students in which we simulated team scenarios using the puzzle board game Ubongo. Our findings confirm a positive effect of inter-team competition and coopetition on individual team productivity. In case of a high organizational identification, inter-team coopetition will boost individual team productivity further. Our paper improves the understanding of coopetition within the boundaries of the firm and the circumstances under which inter-team coopetition enhances individual team productivity and ultimately organizational performance. We also advance the literature on social identity theory by applying it to the organization’s micro-levels in the context of inter-team coopetition.     

Executive succession: The importance of social capital in CEO appointments

Research Summary: Firm performance and corporate governance have been shown to influence CEO selection, but our understanding of the role of social capital is more limited. In this study, we seek to provide further insight into the role of social capital by examining the influence of both “bonding” and “bridging” forms of social capital on CEO appointments. We find that candidates who have relational social capital, in terms of overlap with the CEO in organizational tenure, board tenure, and CEO tenure are more likely to be appointed as CEO. We also find that candidates who have external linkages to the CEO in the form of geographic, prestigious university, and prior employment affiliations are more likely to be appointed CEO. Managerial Summary: The appointment of a new CEO has significant and widespread implications for the firm’s future strategic direction and performance, the relationship between the board and CEO, and perceptions by investors, employees, and other key stakeholders. Our study finds that candidates who have shared connections and experiences with the CEO in terms of geographic, prestigious university, or prior employment affiliations as well as overlap in terms of organizational tenure, board tenure, and CEO tenure are more likely to be appointed CEO. Given the enormous impact that executive appointments have on the strategic direction and performance of the company, it is important to recognize that social factors such as shared experiences and connections influence how candidates are perceived, and thus, may affect appointment decisions.     

How CEO hubris affects corporate social (ir)responsibility

Grounded in the upper echelons perspective and stakeholder theory, this study establishes a link between CEO hubris and corporate social responsibility (CSR). We first develop the theoretical argument that CEO hubris is negatively related to a firm's socially responsible activities but positively related to its socially irresponsible activities. We then explore the boundary conditions of hubris effects and how these relationships are moderated by resource dependence mechanisms. With a longitudinal dataset of S&P 1500 index firms for the period 2001–2010, we find that the relationship between CEO hubris and CSR is weakened when the firm depends more on stakeholders for resources, such as when its internal resource endowments are diminished as indicated by firm size and slack, and when the external market becomes more uncertain and competitive. The implications of our findings for upper echelons theory and the CSR research are discussed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Shareholder perceptions of the changing impact of CEOs: Market reactions to unexpected CEO deaths, 1950–2009

Research summary : Despite a number of studies highlighting the important impact Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) have on firms, several theoretical and methodological questions cloud existing findings. This study takes an alternative approach by examining how shareholders' perceptions of CEO significance have changed over time. Using an event study methodology and a sample of 240 sudden and unexpected CEO deaths, we show that absolute (unsigned) market reactions to these events in U.S. public firms have increased markedly between 1950 and 2009. Our results indicate that shareholders act in ways consistent with the belief that CEOs have become increasingly more influential in recent decades. Managerial summary : With Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) facing increased scrutiny and receiving ever‐increasing pay packages, substantial debate exists about their overall contribution to firm outcomes. While prior research has sought to calculate the proportion of firm outcomes attributable to the CEO, this study takes an alternative approach by using the “wisdom of the crowds” to assess how shareholders think about the importance of CEOs. Our study finds that shareholders, perhaps the most financially motivated stakeholder, view CEOs as increasingly important drivers of firm outcomes, good and bad, versus their peers from decades earlier. Notably, market reaction to the unexpected death of a CEO has increased steadily over the last six decades, highlighting the importance of succession planning and supporting, at least partially, the increased compensation given today's top executives. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reassessing board member allegiance: CEO replacement following financial misconduct

Research summary: We examine how board members' reactions following financial misconduct differ from those following other adverse organizational events, such as poor performance. We hypothesize that inside directors and directors appointed by the CEO may be particularly concerned about their reputation following deceptive financial practices. We demonstrate that directors more closely affiliated with the CEO are more likely to reduce their support for the CEO following financial misconduct, increasing the likelihood of CEO replacement. Enactment of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act similarly alters governance dynamics by creating a greater expectation for sound corporate governance. We demonstrate our findings in U.S. public firms that restated their financial earnings during a 12‐year period before and after the passage of Sarbanes‐Oxley. Managerial summary: Given past concerns about lack of oversight by boards of directors leading to firm financial misconduct, we examine how the relationship between directors and CEOs may be altered in the face of such misconduct. We argue that directors most closely tied to the CEO (inside board members and board members appointed by the CEO), typically the most supportive of the CEO, may become most concerned about their own reputation following financial misconduct. We find that CEOs receive less support from these directors, a finding in contrast to past studies demonstrating that such board members tend to shield CEOs following poor performance. These findings are accentuated following the passage of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act, which places greater responsibility on the CEO for the accuracy of financial reports. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Performance consequences of new CEO ‘Outsiderness’: Moderating effects of pre‐ and post‐succession contexts

This study seeks to reconcile inconsistent findings on the performance consequences of new CEO origin. Drawing on five decades of empirical research on CEO succession outcomes, I develop a more refined theoretical conceptualization and a finer‐grained measurement of the underlying construct of the insider vs. outsider CEO, and build and test a more comprehensive and nuanced framework of the succession context. A longitudinal investigation of the U.S. airline and chemical industries (1972–2002) indicates that new CEO ‘Outsiderness’, conceptualized as a continuum raging from new CEOs who have a greater combination of firm and industry tenure to those who have no experience in the firm and the industry, has no main effect on post‐succession firm performance. However, significant moderating effects are found when environmental munificence, pre‐succession firm performance, and concomitant strategic and senior executive team changes are considered. Together, these findings highlight the need to consider both pre‐ and post‐succession contextual factors for evaluating the performance effects of new CEO outsiderness. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Follow the leader (or not): The influence of peer CEOs’ characteristics on interorganizational imitation

Research Summary: We argue that because charisma and narcissism represent widely held prototypes of effective and ineffective forms of leadership, respectively, the likelihood that a focal firm will imitate the practices of its peer firms is affected by these peer firms’ CEO characteristics. We theorize that peer firm CEO charisma enhances the focal firm’s imitation of peer firms’ behaviors, while peer firm CEO narcissism diminishes it. We further posit that the uncertainty of the context affects these imitation processes: industry dynamism and prior experience in a given strategic domain, respectively, strengthens and dampens focal firms’ susceptibility to these peer CEOs’ attributes. We test and find support for these ideas using a longitudinal sample of Fortune 500 firms in two distinct domains, corporate strategy and corporate social responsibility. Managerial Summary: When companies are uncertain about the costs and benefits of strategic actions this may lead them to imitate the actions of peer companies. But given the uncertainty, the challenge for executives is: which companies to emulate and which to ignore? In a sample of Fortune 500 companies, we find that the charisma or narcissism of a peer company’s CEO positively or negatively influences, respectively, the degree to which the peer company’s strategic actions are imitated. We reason that this is because these particular CEO attributes are widely believed to drive leadership effectiveness or ineffectiveness, respectively. We also find that the effects of these CEO characteristics on imitation are stronger in dynamic industry environments and weaker for companies that already have experience with the given strategy.     

How stigmatized are dismissed chief executives? The role of character questioning causal accounts and executive capital in dismissed CEO reemployment

Research Summary: Despite the prevalence of CEO dismissal, theory only briefly explores its consequences. Past research indicates few fired CEOs regain employment. We suggest dismissal stigmatizes executives; however, stigmatization is greatest when character questioning causal accounts exist, which affect the likelihood of regaining a CEO position. Furthermore, we argue that reputational and social capital provide signals of executive quality that moderate the level of stigmatization experienced when character questioning causal accounts exist. Following 280 dismissed CEOs, we find that social capital increases the likelihood of rehiring for those with character questioning causal accounts, but negatively impacts those without causal accounts. Alternatively, we find reputational capital positively influences those without causal accounts, while having a slight negative relationship for those with causal accounts. Managerial Summary: Dismissed CEOs often desire second chances to run companies; however, few are ever afforded the opportunity. We explore what allows some dismissed CEOs to regain employment as a CEO. We find that reasons surrounding a CEO's dismissal influence such prospects depending on the CEO's prior reputation and social capital. In particular, social capital through elite education increases the likelihood of regaining a position when the CEO's character is called into question. Alternatively, a strong reputation increases the likelihood of regaining a CEO position when a CEO's character has not been called into question. These findings suggest that dismissed CEOs can regain a CEO position; however, this likelihood is strongly influenced by how others perceive the executive and their concerns about prior behavior.     

The differential effects of CEO narcissism and hubris on corporate social responsibility

Research Summary: While prior studies have predominantly shown that CEO narcissism and hubris exhibit similar effects on various strategic decisions and outcomes, this study aims to explore the mechanisms underlying how narcissistic versus hubristic CEOs affect their firms differently. Specifically, we investigate how peer influence moderates the CEO narcissism/hubris—corporate social responsibility (CSR). With a sample of S&P 1500 firms for 2003–2010, we find that the positive relationship between CEO narcissism and CSR is strengthened (weakened) when board‐interlocked peer firms invest less (more) intensively in CSR than a CEO's own firm; the negative relationship between CEO hubris and CSR is strengthened when peer firms are engaged in less CSR than a CEO's own firm. Managerial Summary: Some CEOs are more narcissistic while others may be more hubristic, but these two groups of CEOs hold different attitudes toward the extent to which their firms should engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR). Our findings with a large sample of U.S. publically listed firms suggest that narcissistic CEOs care more about CSR, but hubristic CEOs care less. Interestingly, when narcissistic CEOs observe their peer firms engaging in more or less CSR than their own firms, they tend to respond in an opposite manner; in contrast, hubristic CEOs will only engage in even less CSR when their peers also do not emphasize CSR. Our findings point to a fundamental difference between CEO narcissism and hubris in terms of how they affect firms' CSR decisions based on their social comparison with peer firms.     

Going short‐term or long‐term? CEO stock options and temporal orientation in the presence of slack

Research summary: We draw on behavioral agency theory to explain how decision heuristics associated with CEO stock options interact with firm slack to shape the CEO's preference for short‐ or long‐term strategies (temporal orientation). Our findings suggest CEO current option wealth substitutes for the influence of slack resources in encouraging a long‐term orientation, while prospective option wealth enhances the positive effect of slack on temporal orientation. Our theory offers explanations for non‐findings in previous analysis of the relationship between CEO equity based pay and temporal orientation and provides the insights that CEO incentives created by stock options (1) enhance the effect of available slack upon temporal orientation and (2) can both incentivize and de‐incentivize destructive short‐termism, depending upon the values of current and prospective option wealth. Managerial summary: We explore how compensation design can play a role in affecting the CEO's preference for short‐ or long‐term strategic projects. When the CEOs have accumulated option wealth, they are more likely to invest in the long term. Yet when they have a large number of recently granted options with the potential to generate significant wealth in the event of successful risk taking, the CEO is more likely to prefer the short term in order to achieve personal wealth gains more quickly. The more liquid assets the firm holds, the weaker both of the aforementioned effects. An implication for boards is that they should anticipate CEO short‐termism if the CEO has been granted new options, underlining the potential negative consequences of option compensation. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ceo selection,succession, compensation and firm performance: A theoretical integration and empirical analysis

This study seeks to extend and unify a set of research issues relating to CEO selection, succession, compensation, and firm performance. The study offers a model of these issues from a combined agency and organizational perspective, and tests the model using archival data and perceptual data from survey responses from 118 CEOs of the largest U.S. corporations. The results suggest that several CEO issues are significant predictors of variation in firm performance, supporting the paper's arguments for (1) a reinterpretation of the insiderfoutsider CEO distinction, (2) the relevance of CEO succession planning, and (3) the importance of CEOs' perceptions of the linkage between their personal wealth and firm wealth.     

Being the CEO's boss: An examination of board chair orientations

Research summary: Scholars have traditionally conceptualized board leadership as a dichotomous construct. A combined CEO and board chair position is interpreted as reflecting a more collaborative approach to corporate governance, whereas separate positions are interpreted as ensuring greater board control. I challenge this conceptualization and posit that a separate board chair can be oriented toward collaboration as well as—or in place of—control. I analyze newly available data from corporate proxy statements to identify these two board chair orientations and test competing perspectives on how they impact profitability growth in a sample of S&P 500 firms. The results indicate that board leadership is a more nuanced phenomenon than the extant literature would suggest . Managerial summary: What is the role of the board chair when not the CEO ? Corporate governance experts assert the board chair's role is to monitor and control the CEO . Yet, board chairs often play another, more collaborative role. Board chairs frequently provide advice and guidance to CEOs and relieve CEOs of board leadership burdens, enabling the CEOs to focus on their primary responsibilities. In this study, I examine the effect of board chair orientations on financial performance and find that, as with separating or joining the CEO and board chair positions, the profitability implications of the selected orientation are far from universal. Board chairs must consider their firm's performance context in order to get the most out of a particular approach to being the CEO 's boss . Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Who's in charge here? Co‐CEOs,power gaps,and firm performance

At the pinnacles of organizations, comparative tests of unity of command and shared command are nearly impossible because only one individual sits atop most organizations. In organizations led by co‐CEOs, however, such a test is possible because co‐CEOs can truly share power. But do they? Our research pits the unity‐of‐command principle against the shared‐command principle and finds overall support for the former, even within the co‐CEO context. Our sample of 71 co‐CEO pairs at publicly traded U.S. firms shows that increasing power gaps between co‐CEOs are positively associated with firm performance. This positive association wanes and turns negative, however, as power gaps become very large. We conclude that whatever benefits the co‐CEO structure might offer likely lie outside the shared command paradigm. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.