Entrepreneurial failure: Statistical and psychological explanations

Research summary : Entrepreneurial start‐ups suffer high rates of business failure. Previous research on entrepreneurial failure has focused on two kinds of explanations: statistical and psychological. Statistical explanations attribute excess entry to random errors made by boundedly rational entrepreneurs attempting to estimate business opportunities in risky markets. Psychological explanations focus on entrepreneurial overconfidence and competition neglect. These explanations emerged independently and have not been tested or compared in the same study. In this experimental study, we distinguish entrepreneurial markets from other types of markets and test statistical and psychological hypotheses for all market types. We find that excess entry is significantly greater in small, risky markets than in other market types, and that confidence levels account for excess entry, over and above the effects of unbiased statistical errors. Managerial summary : How can we explain the fact that most entrepreneurial ventures fail within five years? Market risk, inadequate capital and inexperienced management certainly play a role. However, from an economic point of view, it seems odd that inexperienced, under‐funded people continue to engage in risky behavior that is widely known to fail. We conducted experiments that tested two explanations of entrepreneurial failure. The first explanation – the statistical hypothesis – argues that entrepreneurship involves high uncertainty, so random errors are inevitable and can produce excess entry (or under‐entry). The second explanation – the psychological hypothesis – says that entrepreneurs' mistakes are not random but skewed heavily toward excess entry; hence, their decisions are distorted by psychological factors such as overconfidence. Our experiments found support for both of these explanations. Random errors under uncertainty explained 60% of the excess entry in our experiments. However, the overconfidence hypothesis correctly predicted that excess entry exceeds under‐entry, and our psychological measures of overconfidence found support in the data. We also found that the markets that most often attract entrepreneurial investment – emerging markets with high uncertainty – were the markets most conducive to excess entry, due to a combination of psychological and market factors. Hence, we conclude that potential entrepreneurs should pay less attention to their own abilities and aspirations, and more attention to the external realities of competition in the marketplace. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Competing with complementors: An empirical look at Amazon.com

Research Summary : Platform owners sometimes enter complementors' product spaces and compete against them. Using data from Amazon.com to study Amazon's entry pattern into third‐party sellers' product spaces, we find that Amazon is more likely to target successful product spaces. We also find that Amazon is less likely to enter product spaces that require greater seller efforts to grow, suggesting that complementors' platform‐specific investments influence platform owners' entry decisions. While Amazon's entry discourages affected third‐party sellers from subsequently pursuing growth on the platform, it increases product demand and reduces shipping costs for consumers. We consider the implications of these findings for complementors in platform‐based markets. Managerial Summary : Platform owners can exert considerable influence over their complementors' welfare. Many complementors with successful products are pushed out of markets because platform owners enter their product spaces and compete directly with them. To mitigate such risks, complementors could build their businesses by aggregating nonblockbuster products or focusing on products requiring significant platform‐specific investments to grow. They should also develop capabilities in new product discovery so that they could continually bring innovative products to their platforms.     

Surviving the gales of creative destruction: the determinants of product turnover

Innovative industries are often characterized by rapid product turnover. Product longevity may be driven by both a product's position within a market as well as its position within a firm's larger product portfolio. However, we have little understanding of the relative importance of these factors in determining product turnover and how they interact as an industry evolves. Although researchers have invested substantial effort in analyzing firm survival and turnover, there are far fewer studies of the determinants of product survival and turnover. We use hazard rate models and count regression models to describe the behavior of firms and their products with a new and detailed database on the laser printer industry. We show, first, that competition and market structure variables have a large impact on both speeding product exit and delaying product entry. Second, there is some evidence that firms that have maintained a high market share for a number of years keep their products on the market longer than those with lower market share. Finally, firms with high innovative capacity tend to enter markets frequently, but withdraw their products at average rates. Firms with strong brands tend to introduce few products and withdraw their products slowly. With these findings, the paper links product entry and exit decisions to the broader literature on firm strategic and product management. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Making the same mistake all over again: CEO overconfidence and corporate resistance to corrective feedback

Firms often make mistakes, from simple manufacturing overruns all the way to catastrophic blunders. However, there is considerable heterogeneity in the nature of corporate responses when faced with evidence that an error has taken place, and, therefore, in the likelihood that such errors will reoccur in the future. In this paper, we explore an important but understudied influence on firms' responses to corrective feedback—a CEO's level of overconfidence. Using multiple distinct measures of overconfidence and the empirical context of voluntary corporate earnings forecasts, we find strong, robust evidence that firms led by overconfident CEOs are less responsive to corrective feedback in improving management forecast accuracy. We further show that this relationship is moderated by prior forecast error valence, time horizon, and managerial discretion. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Uniform Pricing as a Barrier to Entry

This paper considers an entry game in which an incumbent firm operates in a number of markets and a potential entrant can enter multiple or all of the markets. While price discrimination has usually been thought of as a barrier to entry, in our model it is not and instead, charging a uniform price across the markets can discourage entry. Partial entry occurs when the two firms' products are highly substitutable. In this case, uniform pricing raises the profits of both the incumbent and the entrant but reduces consumer and total welfare relative to price discrimination.     

Collusion at the extensive margin

We augment the multi-market collusion model of Bernheim and Whinston (1990) by allowing for firm entry into, and exit from, individual markets. We show that this gives rise to a new mechanism by which a cartel can sustain a collusive agreement: Collusion at the extensive margin whereby firms collude by avoiding entry into each other's markets or territories. We characterise parameter values that sustain this type of collusion and identify the assumptions where this collusion is more likely to hold than its intensive margin counterpart. Specifically, it is demonstrated that where duopoly competition is fierce collusion at the extensive margin is always sustainable. Finally, we provide a theoretic foundation for the use of a “proportional response” enforcement mechanism.     

Host country executives' assessments of international joint ventures and divestitures: An experimental approach

A large body of research examines the modes by which multinational firms enter foreign markets, yet little work has considered how host country executives evaluate alternative modes of accepting inward foreign direct investment (FDI). This study adopts the host country firm's perspective to investigate the factors that affect Chinese executives' assessments of international joint ventures (IJVs) and divestitures as different modes for engaging inward FDI opportunities. We use an experimental approach to test our argument that executives' preferences for IJVs versus divestitures are driven by multinational firms' resources as well as potential transaction hazards and available remedial mechanisms. This study complements extant research on firms' entry mode choice by offering a direct test of comparative economic organization by explicitly comparing the attractiveness of alternative modes. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Explaining Asset Mispricing Using the Resale Option and Inflation Illusion

We investigate the overconfidence theory and inflation‐illusion hypothesis of asset mispricing. Both concepts address subjective asset valuation but place the impetus on differing explanations within the standard dividend‐growth model. We find that one of the theoretical outcomes of overconfidence—asset turnover—consistently explains mispricing in U.S. housing markets. Further, we find that asset turnover subsumes expected inflation in certain specifications, suggesting that dispersion in investors' beliefs is a better explanation of asset mispricing than the investors' inability to properly discount future cash flows.     

Choosing between Order‐of‐Entry Assumptions in Empirical Entry Models: Evidence from Competition between Burger King and McDonald's Restaurant Outlets

We demonstrate how a non‐nested statistical test developed by Vuong [1989] can be used to assess the suitability of alternate order‐of‐entry assumptions used for identification purposes in empirical entry models. As an example, we estimate an entry model of McDonald's and Burger King restaurant outlets in United States. The data set focuses on relatively small ‘isolated’ markets. For these markets, the non‐nested tests suggest that order‐of‐entry assumptions that give Burger King outlets a first‐mover advantage are statistically preferred. Last, a Monte Carlo experiment provides encouraging results suggesting that the Vuong‐type test yields reliable results within the entry model framework.     

Equity stakes and exit: An experimental approach to decomposing exit delay

Research summary : Exit delay is an important problem for entrepreneurs and managers alike, yet relatively little is known about its causes. We conduct a laboratory experiment in which optimal exit is well defined, and in which a treatment group with equity stakes—the actual cash flows of a firm and decision rights over its continuation—is compared to a control group whose compensation is based solely on its assessment of the firm's profitability. While treatment group participants make exit decisions that are nearly optimal given their beliefs, their beliefs are significantly distorted relative to the control group. The pattern of distortion is consistent with confirmatory bias and motivated reasoning. A fundamental finding of our study is that incentives may not only affect behavior, but belief formation as well. Managerial summary : Managers and entrepreneurs frequently destroy significant value by failing to shut down underperforming businesses in a timely manner. To address this problem, we must understand the mechanisms causing exit delay. We examine behavioral mechanisms causing delay through a laboratory experiment in which subjects make decisions about when to exit a failing venture. We find that “equity stakes”—receiving the firm's cash flows and having decision rights over exit—cause participants to discount negative performance information, retain overly optimistic beliefs, and delay exit. By contrast, participants without these high‐powered incentives exit nearly optimally. Our findings suggest ways to reduce exit delay in managerial settings, including implementing automated decision rules, removing equity‐based compensation, and recruiting managers less susceptible to knowledge overconfidence, a trait associated with exit delay. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does pre‐entry licensing undermine the performance of subsequent independent activities? Evidence from the global aerospace industry, 1944–2000

We study how firms' use of in‐licensing for their initial entry to a business domain can detract from the performance of their subsequent autonomous endeavors in the domain. We argue that in‐licensing produces high levels of causal ambiguity about factors that drive the performance achieved with the licensed product. In turn, the experience that firms gather through pre‐entry licensing is likely to generate superstitious learning and overconfidence that undermine the performance of licensees' subsequent independent operations. The biases will be particularly strong in the face of contextual dissimilarity. We find consistent evidence in a study of firms that entered the global aircraft industry between 1944 and 2000. The research helps advance the understanding of the benefits and costs of markets for technology. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Location choices under strategic interactions

We explore a fundamental aspect of firms' location choices largely overlooked in the literature: strategic interaction. We formalize the notion that strategic interaction renders collocation less appealing by fostering competition, which erodes firms' profits. Strategic interaction also impacts location choices across time. Specifically, because firms learn by doing in markets, location choices are shaped by two novel effects: entrenchment benefits from entering early in a market and improving capabilities relative to rivals, and opportunity costs from postponing entry to other markets where rivals enter and learn. When learning is local, firms collocate more: rivals are preempted from improving relative capabilities in higher‐value markets. However, when learning is global, firms collocate less: they can transfer capabilities from lower‐value to higher‐value markets, blocking rivals from achieving entrenchment benefits. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What doesn't kill you makes you stronger: The evolution of competition and entry‐order advantages in economically turbulent contexts

We examine the evolution of competition and entry‐order advantages in markets under macroeconomic distress. Through formal modeling of early‐mover advantages along industry life cycles subjected to economic shocks and based on simulation findings, we propose that such shocks exogenously induce temporary industry discontinuities that shift the relative value of distinct asset endowments, thereby switching the bases for competitive advantages vis‐à‐vis those found in stable contexts. A vital trade‐off then emerges between a firm's financial flexibility and its pace of investments in isolating mechanisms, such that the former operates as a contingency factor for the latter. As such, flexibility superiority boosts early‐entrants' advantages, while it alternatively gives laggards a much desired strength to out trump first‐mover rivals. Our study informs entry‐order advantage theory and management practice in economically turbulent contexts. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How to balance like an academic

The academic's tasks are usually succinctly described as research, teaching, and service. To be successful in one's career, each of these must be kept in balance, and prioritized correctly. This is challenging, as the tasks usually are running in parallel, all are time demanding, and any one task can become overwhelming as deadlines approach. We first take a deeper look at the various tasks that must be balanced by the academic. Following that discussion, we provide a series of suggestions for how junior academics can become good at prioritization and other skills that help them achieve the desired balance between the tasks of research, teaching, and service, and between work and personal life.     

Little Fish in a Big Pond: Legitimacy Transfer,Authenticity, and Factors of Peripheral Firm Entry and Growth in the Market Center

Research summary : How do peripheral firms compete and secure future growth? Building on literature in strategy and organizational theory, we test a model of peripheral entry and growth in the mainstream market segment. Using data from 289 craft breweries over 11 years, we find evidence that niche producers are increasingly entering the mainstream market and competing with market‐center firms. We identify two mechanisms contributing to these actions: legitimacy transfer and cognitive claims of authenticity. As hypothesized, imitation of niche products by macro breweries facilitates craft beer entry into mainstream markets. Moreover, two authenticity‐based identity codes are found to reliably influence craft brewery growth: a local identity (i.e., operating in one's local market) and a product proliferator identity (i.e., offering a more diverse set of products) . Managerial summary : How can small niche firms compete with larger, more established organizations? By examining the rapidly expanding craft beer industry, this study explores how craft breweries are able to both enter the market space of these larger competitors and secure sustained patterns of growth. Specifically, we highlight two factors influencing the success of craft breweries. First, as major beer producers mimic niche products (i.e., faux craft beer), smaller niche firms are allowed to enter the market by exposing the typical consumer to the tastes of craft beer. Second, craft breweries enjoy increased success if they (a) emphasize the local elements of their company, and/or (b) offer a larger number of products . Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Constraints in acquiring and utilizing directors' experience: An empirical study of new‐market entry in the pharmaceutical industry

In this study we provide evidence that firms considering entering new markets are more likely to appoint directors with experience in those markets; and subsequently, we show that directors' market experience increases the likelihood of new‐market entry. Moreover, we explore the presence of constraints in both, acquiring experienced directors and utilizing their experience. Specifically, we find that experienced directors are less likely to join firms with financial restatements in the recent past as well as firms with a lower status than the firms where they currently serve. In addition, we find that interlocking directors' experience is less likely to lead to new‐market entry for firms that lack new‐product development experience and that exhibit a high level of market overlap with interlocked firms. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Impact of Product Portfolio Strategy on Financial Performance: The Roles of Product Development and Market Entry Decisions

Innovation is one of the most important issues facing business today. The major difficulty in managing innovation is that managers must do so against a constantly shifting backdrop as technologies, competitors, and markets constantly evolve. Managers determine the product portfolio through key decisions about product development and market entry. Key strategic questions are what portfolio strategies provide the greatest reward. The purpose of this study is to understand the relative financial values of each component of a product portfolio. Specifically, the paper examines the short‐term and long‐term financial impacts of product development strategy and market entry strategy. These strategies reflect two critical tensions that must be balanced in product portfolio decision making and essentially determine a firm's product portfolio. In doing so, the paper also investigates how a firm's capabilities drive each component of a product portfolio. From the empirical analyses in the context of the biomedical device industry, the paper found important insights regarding product portfolio strategies. First, a large product portfolio helps a firm's financial performance. In particular, the pioneering new products have strongest impacts on short‐term performances, and nonpioneering mature products do not provide significant contribution. Second, the results indicate a persistent first‐mover advantage. The first‐to‐market new products yield not only an immediate effect, but also persistent long‐term effects, suggesting that it is important to be first in the market even though there may be short‐term losses. Third, the results suggest the need to balance between “mature” and “new” products. Also, firms need to balance “first‐to‐market” and “late‐entered” products. Because a new or pioneering product requires more resource, it may hurt other products in the portfolio. Thus, without support from mature or follower products, new products and pioneering products alone may not increase firm sales or profit. Fourth, from a long‐term perspective, the paper found that the financial market only rewards a firm's overall capability to deliver new products first in the marketplace. Thus, short‐term performance is mainly driven by product‐level innovativeness, whereas firm‐level innovativeness enhances forward‐looking long‐term performance. Fifth, the paper also found that pioneering new products are driven by integrating both primary and complementary technological capabilities. And nonpioneering new products are mainly driven by the capabilities in primary technology domain. These results provide important insight into the relative value and timing of return on investment in radical versus incremental innovation and alternative market entry strategies. By understanding the performance trade‐offs of these different factors in the short and long term, one can develop better guidelines for optimizing innovation strategies, and their dependence on both external and internal environmental conditions.     

Stakeholder value appropriation: The case of labor in the worldwide mining industry

Research Summary : We evaluate how the value appropriated by employees varies in response to an exogenous shock to the price of the firm's product and how this variation depends on institutional and ownership structures. Institutional and ownership structures that favor employees can influence firms’ location decisions and shareholders’ incentives to invest. Using data from the main copper mines in the world, we show that the value appropriated by employees rises in response to an exogenous increase in the price of minerals. Our results indicate that the magnitude of the increment in the value captured by employees is larger in stated‐owned companies, when labor regulations promote productivity‐based payments, when wages are determined through a centralized bargaining process, and when regulations associated with hiring and firing are more flexible. Managerial Summary : We show how labor regulations and state ownership affect the value appropriated by employees when there are exogenous changes in the price of the firm's products. Since the value generated by a firm is distributed among different stakeholders, a higher appropriation of value by employees results in lower appropriation by another party. Therefore, by changing the distribution of value, managerial decisions about location and entry could be affected. For instance, shareholders of firms with positive future expectations about the prices of their products might prefer to enter markets in which salary negotiations are not centralized or where partnership with the local government is not mandatory. Overall, our analysis calls for the consideration of the external environment when evaluating value appropriation by different types of stakeholders.     

Why Do Firms Enter a New Product Market? A Two‐Dimensional Framework for Market Entry Motivation and Behavior

What are the energetic forces that induce established firms to enter new product markets? While most previous research has explained the economic profits expected from a new product market as firms' distinctive motivation for market entry, some recent studies also emphasize interfirm competition and benchmarking activities as another important factor that motivates firms' new market entry. To explain the established firms' diverse new product market entry behaviors, this study presents a two‐dimensional scheme of entry motivation in terms of the degrees of target market profit focus and competitor focus. The first dimension captures the economic motivation of firms' new market entry that ranges from focusing on the direct expected profits from the target market to considering more strategic/indirect benefit incentives. The second dimension captures the degree of firms' external motivation for entry affected by competitors that ranges from independent entry decisions to fully competitor‐oriented entry decisions. Using multiple‐industry survey data, the current study empirically verifies that these two entry motivation dimensions explain a great portion of actual firms' new product market entry behaviors and that they are independent of each other. Subsequently, this study validates that firms' operational size and their environmental factors like perceived technological uncertainty and competitive intensity upon new market entry affect the degrees of the two dimensions of firms' new product market entry motivation. More specifically, large firms less emphasize target‐market profits than small firms, and when perceived technological uncertainty is high, potential market entrants become less target market profit focused but more competitor focused. Under a highly competitive new market condition, firms focus on both target‐market profits and competitors. Based on the analysis of new market entry motivation dimensions, the current study proposes a new typology of established firms' market entry behaviors. The suggested typology represents the four different types of new product market entrants and examines specific characteristics and entry strategies for each type of potential entrants. This entry‐motivation framework should provide a deeper understanding of the backgrounds of entry behaviors and assist firms in developing appropriate entry strategies and in advantageously responding to rival firms' actions with regard to entry.