关系资本、组织学习与研发联盟绩效关系的实证研究

研发联盟是企业获取竞争优势的重要途径。但是大量研究发现,参加研发联盟的企业的绩效却不尽如人意。对此,本文结合交易成本理论、关系资本理论和组织学习理论,利用142家企业调查数据对该问题进行了探索性的研究,并得出如下结论:关系资本和组织学习是提升研发联盟企业绩效的关键因素;关系资本构建的途径包括契约治理和关系治理,其中关系资本与契约治理具有倒U型的非线性关系,与关系治理具有线性的正相关关系;企业开展的组织学习不仅受到自身学习意图的影响,而且还受到关系资本的影响。     

The impact of outsourcing new technologies on integrative capabilities and performance

Outsourcing plays an important role for firms adopting new technologies. Although outsourcing provides access to a new technology, it does not guarantee that a firm can subsequently integrate the technology with existing business processes and leverage it in the marketplace. This distinction, however, has rarely been made in the literature. In the context of business process enhancing technologies, this study builds on the resource‐based and knowledge‐based views to study the impact of outsourcing on firms' subsequent performance in the market and their integrative capabilities, that is, a firm's capacity to use and assimilate a new technology with its business processes and build upon it. The study argues that greater reliance on outsourcing may reduce a firm's learning by doing, internal investment, and tacit knowledge applications, thereby impeding a firm's integrative capabilities and performance in the market. The study uses survey and archival data on banks' outsourcing strategies for Internet adoption to test for the performance consequences of outsourcing, which are found to be negative. However, the findings also show that outsourcing is less detrimental for firms with experience in prior related technology. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

资源外包网络的治理研究

资源外包网络作为一种特殊的资源联合体,其运作过程并非十全十美,机会主义行为和知识分享问题及其引致的网络失灵成为网络治理的主要诱因。资源外包网络的治理包含两个层面:关系治理和结构治理。机会主义行为多发生于外包商和供应商双边交易过程中,对应于资源外包网络的关系治理;知识分享问题涉及网络整体的协调与管理,对应于网络的结构治理。论文分别从关系治理和结构治理两个角度剖析了资源外包网络的治理特点、作用机制和治理对策。     

Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements?

Relational exchange arrangements supported by trust are commonly viewed as substitutes for complex contracts in interorganizational exchanges. Many argue that formal contracts actually undermine trust and thereby encourage the opportunistic behavior they are designed to discourage. In this paper, we develop and test an alternative perspective: that formal contracts and relational governance function as complements. Using data from a sample of information service exchanges, we find empirical support for this proposition of complementarity. Managers appear to couple their increasingly customized contracts with high levels of relational governance (and vice versa). Moreover, this interdependence underlies their ability to generate improvements in exchange performance. Our results concerning the determinants of these governance choices show their distinct origins, which further augments their complementarity in practice. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Choice and performance of governance mechanisms: matching alliance governance to asset type

Formal and relational governance mechanisms are used in strategic alliances to coordinate resources and mitigate the risk of opportunistic behavior. While recent work has shown that these approaches are not mutually exclusive, we understand little about when one approach is superior to the other. Using data on the governance choices and subsequent performance of alliances in the German telecommunications industry, we find that the optimal configuration of formal and relational governance mechanisms depends on the assets involved in an alliance, with formal mechanisms best suited to property‐based assets and relational governance best suited to knowledge‐based assets. Furthermore, a mismatch between governance mechanisms and asset type can harm the performance of the alliance. Our findings contribute to transaction cost economics, the literature on relational governance, and recent work studying their interaction. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effectiveness of contractual and trust‐based governance in strategic alliances under behavioral and environmental uncertainty

Research summary: We examine the interplay of behavioral and environmental uncertainty in shaping the effectiveness of two key governance mechanisms used by strategic alliances: contractual and trust‐based governance. We develop and test hypotheses, using a meta‐analytic dataset encompassing over 15,000 strategic alliances across 82 independent samples. We find that contractual governance works best under low to moderate levels of behavioral uncertainty and moderate to high levels of environmental uncertainty, while it is detrimental to alliance performance when both types of uncertainty are low or high. Trust‐based governance is most effective at high levels of behavioral uncertainty and low levels of environmental uncertainty. It suffers a large loss of usefulness at high behavioral uncertainty as environmental uncertainty increases. Managerial summary: Strategic alliances allow firms to gain greater efficiency and create value. Yet, many such alliances fail because they are not able to deal with the twin challenges posed by behavioral and environmental uncertainty. Findings from our meta‐analysis imply that under conditions of high behavioral uncertainty and low‐to‐moderate levels of environmental uncertainty, the use of trust‐based governance alongside contractual governance might enhance the latter's effectiveness. The combined effectiveness of contractual and trust‐based governance under high levels of both behavioral and environmental uncertainty is not obvious. When both behavioral and environmental uncertainty are high, contractual governance hurts alliance performance while trust‐based governance does not function at its best either. Under these conditions, it might be better for firms to turn to hierarchy or vertical integration. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Understanding the links between technological opportunism, marketing emphasis and firm performance: Implications for B2B

The capability of firms to sense and respond to changes in technologies, called technological opportunism, is of growing importance to managers as a source of competitive advantage. However, exactly how technological opportunism impacts firm performance is still not clearly understood. Furthermore, the role of marketing in this relationship, if any, has yet to be examined. Understanding this relationship is critical for marketing managers not only for determining strategic investments of resources but also for demonstrating marketing return on activities. This paper explores the links between technological opportunism and firm performance. The results show that technological opportunism has a strong positive impact on key measures of performance such as firm sales, profits and market value. Importantly, marketing emphasis is the mechanism through which the technological opportunism-performance relationship is achieved. Finally, the impact of marketing emphasis on B2B firms is different than that for B2C firms, highlighting the importance of these activities for B2B marketing managers.     

Concurrent sourcing,governance mechanisms,and performance outcomes in industrial value chains

We examine transaction governance in the context of concurrent sourcing, where a manufacturer relies on sourcing from external suppliers and in‐house production simultaneously. Our focus is on (1) a buyer's use of particular safeguards or governance mechanisms vis‐à‐vis an external supplier and (2) how the effects of these mechanisms on various performance outcomes are influenced by the joint presence of an internal manufacturing branch. We conduct two studies in the apparel industry and show that performance outcomes are a joint function of (1) the individual governance mechanisms that are deployed in a particular relationship and (2) the larger sourcing context (concurrent or singular). Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Formal governance mechanisms, relational governance mechanisms, and transaction-specific investments in supplier-manufacturer relationships

This study addresses the question of how to design governance mechanisms so that local suppliers are encouraged to make transaction-specific investments in foreign manufacturing firms. Suppliers' transaction-specific investments can increase the efficiency of production for foreign manufacturing firms operating in a host country. However, it can be difficult to induce suppliers to make specialized investments, because of the numerous hazards associated with such investments. Basing its conclusions on the results of a survey of Taiwanese firms using Chinese suppliers, this study examines the effectiveness of both formal governance mechanisms (i.e., contractual agreements and financial commitments) and relational governance mechanisms (i.e., calculative and benevolent trust) in inducing suppliers to make specialized investments. We find that both formal governance and relational governance mechanisms affect suppliers' tendencies to make specialized investments. Additionally, we find that calculative trust acts as a moderating factor in the relationship between formal governance mechanisms and transaction-specific investments.     

Relational governance as an interorganizational strategy: An empirical test of the role of trust in economic exchange

We develop a model of relational governance as a specific form of interorganizational strategy that is distinct from the traditional modes of markets and hierarchies. We conceptualize this form of strategy in terms of structural and processual dimensions and derive a model of its determinants through arguments drawn from transaction cost economics and the sociological exchange literature. Hierarchical regression modeling is employed to test the theoretical model on data collected from a sample of 329 independent insurance agencies. We include the relational variable of trust and demonstrate that the combined model explains relational governance better than a model with the traditional determinants of governance form alone. Further, we observe that governance structure and process are related and discuss implications of the dynamic link between them. Directions for extensions are developed for strategic management research and practice.     

The impact of formal control and guanxi on task conflict in outsourcing relationships in China

The purpose of this study is to explore how manufacturing firms manage task conflict with their outsourcing suppliers in the context of China. Using survey data collected from manufacturing firms operating in China, we found that when implementing R&D and manufacturing outsourcing, both formal control and Chinese guanxi are useful governance mechanisms for suppressing outsourcing task conflict. We also observe that Chinese guanxi moderates the impact of formal control on task conflict, especially when implementing R&D outsourcing. By investigating the roles of formal control and Chinese guanxi in outsourcing practices in China, this study contributes to a better understanding of how to manage task conflict effectively.     

Portfolio of controls in outsourcing relationships for global new product development

Due to increasing globalization and technological discontinuities, firms strive to develop new product capabilities and flexibilities by engaging in outsourcing activities and adopting modular systems. However, these strategies contain risks of opportunistic expropriation of tacit knowledge and costs related to monitoring sourcing partners who are geographically and culturally distant. This study examines the antecedents of control mechanisms through which firms manage the risks and costs associated with outsourcing relationships in global technology-intensive markets. Modularity in design is hypothesized as a moderator of model relationships because it can serve as a substitute for formal or informal controls in a “controls portfolio”.     

A dyadic approach to the impact of differences in organizational culture on relationship performance

The authors extend previous research on relationship management by investigating the potential effect of differences in organizational culture on relationship performance among 124 dyads. Theory suggests that partner similarity may improve the feeling of we-ness thereby contributing to the perceived success of inter-firm cooperation. The findings reveal that differences in organizational culture are larger in less successful inter-firm relationships, but do not influence the perceived relationship success significantly. Our results suggest that relationship managers should not confuse compatibility with similarity; personal chemistry is important for relationship atmosphere but does not solely depend on similarities. Future research in this area may wish to concentrate on a more complete measure of organizational (sub)culture(s), the different levels of analysis (personal, organizational, dyad), relationship life cycles (stage models) and the role of organizational identity.     

The antecedents and innovation effects of domestic and offshore R&D outsourcing: The contingent impact of cognitive distance and absorptive capacity

This paper analyzes differences in the antecedents and performance consequences of domestic and offshore R&D outsourcing. Offshore outsourcing is characterized by larger cognitive distance. We find that absorptive capacity from internal R&D allows for more offshore outsourcing and that offshore outsourcing leads to more positive innovation outcomes, especially product innovation.     

The determinants of relational governance and performance: How to manage business relationships?

It is the aim of this study to assess the influence of the determinants of the transaction, dyadic, and business environment level on relational governance and ultimately performance. We build an integrated framework for relationship management drawing from literature of transaction cost economics, marketing channels, and business networks. Dutch suppliers of potted plant and flower products (N=174) provided data for the empirical analysis. Our results show that joint planning, one of the constructs of relational governance, is positively influenced by interorganizational trust, information obtained from the network, physical transaction-specific investments (TSIs), and by fixed lines as the exchange mode. Joint problem solving, the other construct of the governance, is solely influenced by the two dimensions of trust. These two constructs of relational governance effect positively our performance measures. Managers should consider carefully each of the determinants of relational governance for the management of a relationship. As shown in our study, the success is dependent on some of the determinants of the three analytical levels of our integrated framework.     

The dual effects of perceived unfairness on opportunism in channel relationships

Opportunism has long-term negative consequences for channel relationships. The extant research has traditionally focused on economic forces in studying opportunism. However, social exchange theory stresses the role of social forces in shaping opportunistic behavior. In this study, we integrate transaction cost economics and justice theory to theorize and examine the impact of ‘perceived unfairness’ on distributor opportunism. We uncover the ‘dual’ effects of perceived unfairness on opportunism, i.e., 1) directly enhancing opportunism and 2) aggravating (positively moderating) the effects of economic forces on opportunism. Matched data on 247 supplier-distributor dyads in India provide empirical support for our theoretical model and research hypotheses. We find differential effects of the three dimensions of perceived unfairness (distributive, procedural, and interactional) on opportunism. We discuss the implications of our findings for theory and practice and present avenues for future research.     

The relationship between network governance and unilateral governance in dynamic consumer demand

An important question for retailers is the extent to which control over suppliers should be maintained when there is uncertain consumer demand. This paper proposes that the level of network governance (high or low) affects retailers' level of unilateral control in uncertain consumer demands. The empirical results indicate that when there is a low level of network governance, retailers tend to increase the level of unilateral control over suppliers as consumer demand uncertainty increases. On the other hand, retailers who feel a high level of network governance may rely on unilateral governance to a lesser extent regardless of consumer demand uncertainty.     

Board reform versus profits: The impact of ratings on the adoption of governance practices

Research summary: External stakeholders frequently attempt to influence organizations' adoption of new practices through the creation of public ratings. Based on the insights of performance feedback theory, we develop the theory of organizational reactions to external ratings to explain how firms' behaviors depend on their rating scores and their profitability. A central issue in our theory is the conflict between established internal goals and goals introduced by public ratings, with public ratings receiving lower priority than established profitability goals. Our theory suggests that, contrary to the expectations of the external stakeholders, firms targeted for criticism by ratings become less likely to adopt corresponding practices when their profitability is below aspirations. These arguments are supported in data on the diffusion of corporate governance practices in Canada. Managerial summary: Firms and their products are rated and ranked by external agencies ranging from Consumer Reports to magazine rankings of admired, environmental, or well‐governed companies. We investigate whether such ratings affect firm behaviors, and especially whether they can incentivize poorly rated firms to improve their ranking when these firms' profitability is also low. Using the leading corporate governance ranking in Canada, we find that rankings could have adverse effects: when firms have both poor governance ranking and poor profitability they are less likely to adopt governance practices, contrary to the ranking creators' intentions. The findings show that there is a hierarchy of firms' goals, where the goal of profitability comes ahead of other goals imposed by external agencies through ratings and rankings. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does technological modularity substitute for control? A study of alliance performance in software outsourcing

Although control is presumed to be necessary to curb opportunism, its implementation in alliances can be costly and challenging. Paradoxically, some contemporary firms have counterintuitively developed successful alliances without extensive formal control. A widespread but untested assertion that might help reconcile this contradiction is that technological modularity reduces the need for alliance control. The objective of this study is to develop and test this assertion. Using data from 120 software outsourcing alliances, we show that, process control, outcome control, and modularity independently enhance alliance performance. However modularity and control are imperfect substitutes: modularity lowers the influence of process control but not of outcome control on alliance performance. Our theoretical development and empirical testing of the interactions of alliance control with modularity has significant implications for strategy theory and practice, which are also discussed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.