The licensing dilemma: understanding the determinants of the rate of technology licensing

The licensing of technology entails a trade‐off: licensing payments net of transaction costs (revenue effect) must be balanced against the lower price–cost margin and/or reduced market share implied by increased competition (profit dissipation effect) from the licensee. We argue that the presence of multiple technology holders, which compete in the market for technology, changes such a trade‐off and triggers more aggressive licensing behavior. To test our theory, we analyze technology licensing by large chemical firms during the period 1986–96 for 107 chemical products. We find that the rate of technology licensing displays an inverted U‐shaped relationship with the number of potential technology suppliers and is negatively related to the licensor's market share and to the degree of technology‐specific product differentiation. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Exclusivity in licensing alliances: using hostages to support technology commercialization

We examine why exclusivity provisions are used in licensing alliances, and when restrictions in licensing scope (e.g., by product or geography) accompany these exclusivity provisions. We find broad support for the proposition that these features are associated with the contractual challenges of allying with licensees when they contribute valuable complementary capabilities toward the commercialization of licensed technologies. Evidence from our data suggests that exclusivity is used as a contractual hostage to safeguard licensee investments in complementary assets and to enable contracting over early stage technologies. Scope restrictions are employed to balance the tradeoffs between the value creation made possible by licensee complementary capabilities and the transactional hazards entailed in working exclusively with licensees. Our results also suggest that scope restrictions and other formal safeguards may be substitute mechanisms for managing similar transactional concerns in licensing alliances. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mind the gap: The interplay between external and internal actions in the case of corporate social responsibility

Research summary : We explore the effect of the interplay between a firm's external and internal actions on market value in the context of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Specifically, drawing from the neo‐institutional theory, we distinguish between external and internal CSR actions and argue that they jointly contribute to the accumulation of intangible firm resources and are therefore associated with better market value. Importantly, though, we find that, on average, firms undertake more internal than external CSR actions, and we theorize that a wider gap between external and internal actions is negatively associated with market value. We confirm our hypotheses empirically, using the market‐value equation and a sample comprising 1,492 firms in 33 countries from 2002 to 2008. Finally, we discuss implications for future research and practice. Managerial summary : Companies often accumulate intangible assets by taking internally and externally oriented CSR actions. Contrary to popular beliefs, the data show that they undertake more internal than external ones: firms do more and communicate less. How does a potential gap (i.e., a misalignment) between internal and external CSR actions affect a firm's market value? We find that although together (the sum of) internal and external actions are positively associated with market value, a wider gap has negative implications. In other words, firms do not realize the full benefits of their internal actions when such actions are not externally communicated to key stakeholders, and to the investment community in particular. This negative association with market value is particularly salient in CSR‐intensive and the natural resources and extractives industries. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

RETRACTED: Integrated knowledge exploitation: The complementarity of product development and technology licensing

In light of increasing licensing, we challenge the common assumption that product development and technology licensing are substitutes. We develop a resource‐based framework, which distinguishes a firm's technological resource base and technology exploitation processes. We further combine survey, patent, and financial data of 228 medium‐sized and large industrial companies to examine the interactions of firms' product development processes and technology licensing processes in order to explain heterogeneity in new product revenues, licensing performance, and firm performance. The results underscore that product development, which indicates innovative capacity, and technology licensing, which indicates desorptive capacity, are complements rather than substitutes in integrated knowledge exploitation in medium‐sized and large firms. This complementarity is particularly pronounced in firms with an emphasis on cross‐licensing and with a strong patent portfolio. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

First-mover advantages from pioneering new markets: A survey of empirical evidence

Market pioneers can develop first-mover advantages that span decades. The most general first-mover advantage that helps explain higher pioneer market share levels is a broad product line or brand proliferation. In markets for experience goods, pioneers tend to shape consumer tastes and preferences in favor of the pioneering brand. While the preliminary results vary by industry, they indicate that market pioneers donot tend to perish more often than later entrants. Accounting profits for market pioneers generally are lower in the first four years of operation, but higher thereafter. Overall, market pioneers follow innovative strategies that have high initial costs and risks, but yield high potential returns.     

电力市场环境下电网经营企业的风险管理

介绍了在电力市场环境下电网经营企业所面临的一系列不确定性因素,以及这些不确定性因素所带来的诸如经营风险,输电阻塞风险、电网规划风险、体制风险等等各种风险,并对各种风险的应对提出了相应的策略。     

Licensing Innovations with Exclusive Contracts

We analyze licensing contracts specifying an exclusive territory clause and a fixed fee as a form of payment. While commonly observed, the effects of such licensing contracts have not been investigated in the licensing literature. We find that they can generate revenues for an innovator equal to those that would be obtained by a monopolist using the cost-reducing innovation that is being licensed. This result, however, depends on three factors: The size of the market relative to the pre-innovation marginal cost, the quality of the innovation, and the degree of substitutability between the goods being produced in the market.      

Technology transfer issues in licensing pharmaceutical products

The discovery and development of a new therapeutic agent may take five to ten years, cost in excess of £90m with a significant risk of product failure, due either to lack of safety or efficacy. Pharmaceutical companies require a new product every three to five years in order to sustain growth. This need is often met by licensing a product from a competitor. The evaluation of a potential licensing opportunity is a complex task in technology transfer since firstly, the time frame for decision taking is markedly foreshortened compared with the usual time involved when developing a drug from within the company. In addition the therapeutic field may be unfamiliar to the company personnel. The evaluation process involves a parallel but closely linked activity involving pharmacologists, toxicologists, pharmacy, pharmaceutical physicians, strategic marketing, legal experts as well as representatives from the major territorial international markets. This paper attempts to identify some problems in technology transfer which include organisational, attitudinal and behavioural factors. Possible topics for future research are identified.     

Constraints in acquiring and utilizing directors' experience: An empirical study of new‐market entry in the pharmaceutical industry

In this study we provide evidence that firms considering entering new markets are more likely to appoint directors with experience in those markets; and subsequently, we show that directors' market experience increases the likelihood of new‐market entry. Moreover, we explore the presence of constraints in both, acquiring experienced directors and utilizing their experience. Specifically, we find that experienced directors are less likely to join firms with financial restatements in the recent past as well as firms with a lower status than the firms where they currently serve. In addition, we find that interlocking directors' experience is less likely to lead to new‐market entry for firms that lack new‐product development experience and that exhibit a high level of market overlap with interlocked firms. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Growing with the market: How changing conditions during market growth affect formation and evolution of interfirm ties

Research Summary: Market conditions are known to matter for firm performance and growth. This study explores how changing levels of uncertainty and competition affect interfirm ties of entrepreneurial firms as markets transition from nascent to growth stage. Tracing six entrepreneurial game publishers during the growth stage of the U.S. wireless gaming market, the findings reveal that in a growth stage market, as uncertainty decreases, certain ties of entrepreneurial firms are terminated. First, existing partners may cut ties and become competitors after entering the market directly. This is a “winner's curse” as more successful firms are more likely to entice their partners to enter the market directly. Second, ties may be terminated as prominent firms that are “overwhelmed” with too many partners cut ties with low to mediocre performance, while their remaining partners enter a positive spiral of tie strength and performance. Finally, as uncertainty decreases, new firms may enter the market as competitors to prominent firms. While entrepreneurial firms with high‐ and low‐performing ties to prominent partners may find ties with these new entrants attractive, those with mediocre ties to few prominent partners find this move too risky and wait for a first mover to legitimate it. Overall, the findings show that changing levels of uncertainty and competition in growth stage markets can have different consequences for firms due to heterogeneity in their ties and power relative to partners. The findings provide several contributions to literature regarding the relationship among interfirm ties, firm performance, and market evolution. Managerial Summary: Based on interviews at six entrepreneurial game publishers in the United States and their partners, this study shows how changing levels of uncertainty and competition in growing markets can have different consequences for firms based on the different types of alliances in their portfolio and their power relative to partners. The findings highlight the importance of managing partners differently based on alliance type and goal of the partner. They advocate remaining flexible in alliance management as information asymmetries, intentions and bargaining power of partners can change and lead to abrupt alliance dissolution. They show that alliance portfolio management goes beyond a firm's capability of managing individual alliances, and provide a tool for managers to evaluate their alliance portfolios and take the necessary precautions.     

Free speech and the challenge of efficiency

Radical transformation has come to speech platforms in the Information Society 2.0, typified by the migration from newspapers to social media. The change has been spurred by disruptive efficiencies in digital platforms. First, information distribution has been altered by near-costless electronic reproduction. Second, traditional bundles -- packaging editorial content of publications or broadcast networks with general-interest advertising messages -- have been eclipsed by competitively superior news aggregation hubs. Third, specialized content, including advertising, has become more easily targeted and better supplied via “long tails.” Fourth, the democratization of “publishing” has transformed “editing” into “platform mediation.” The resulting changes in market organization have made vastly higher volumes of news and public affairs information – from exponentially more sources – easily available to mass market consumers. In so doing, they have rendered the “Walter Cronkite” consensus obsolete, creating social controversy and considerable backlash. Demands to regulate, or re-regulate, are frequently voiced across the political spectrum. Such policies as “public interest” licensing, public utility regulation, and the Fairness Doctrine are here evaluated.     

Infrastructure investment and optimal access regulation in the different stages of telecommunications market liberalization

In this paper, we compare the optimal access regulation under three different market configurations that approximate the different stages of telecommunications market liberalization. We show that in the first stage of market liberalization the regulator has to balance between static efficiency and investment and that the optimal access price may be above marginal cost. In the second stage, two different outcomes are possible. If entrants tend to underinvest, the regulator balances between static efficiency and investment. If entrants tend to overinvest, the regulator sets the access price as low as possible in order to prevent or limit infrastructure duplication. Interestingly, we find that in the third stage of market liberalization the regulator may decide to promote infrastructure duplication and to set the access price above the price in the first stage of market liberalization, even if telecommunications network operators tend to overinvest in infrastructure duplication.     

The role of incubators in overcoming technology ventures’ resource gaps at different development stages

Although incubation is considered important for overcoming resource challenges in technology ventures’ early life, there is a doubt about its relevance in later development stages, when the initial idea is commercialized and the venture tries to grow. Building on the resource‐based view of the firm and on a stage‐based perspective of venture development, this study argues that the resource gaps facing technology ventures differ between different development stages, and that the support provided by incubators therefore needs to be adapted to the venture’s development stage. We study the interaction between the iMinds incubator, located in Flanders, and eight technology ventures in its portfolio. In the Conception and Development stage, we observe resource gaps in terms of technical knowledge and access to end users, which the incubator addresses by offering direct technical support and access to its research and end user network. The subsequent Commercialization stage is dominated by business knowledge gaps, which the incubator amends through direct coaching and trainings. In the Growth stage, ventures typically lack the necessary team members, market players, and follow‐up financiers to grow their firm. The incubator addresses these resource gaps by providing access to its network. In all development stages, the incubator’s internal knowledge base, networking capabilities, and matching focus/selectivity are crucial in order for ventures to benefit from the incubator’s support. Our study suggests that these underlying capabilities can either be developed organically, or through the merger of different research institutes. Moreover, it points to the importance of local embeddedness for the geographical extension of these capabilities. These findings contribute to the literature on incubation and on venture development. They have important implications for policy makers, incubation managers, and entrepreneurs seeking incubation support.     

Licensing Requirements as a Coordination Mechanism for Entry

Cheap talk, side payments, and arbitration are limited in their ability tocoordinate asymmetric entry among symmetric potential entrants.Externally imposed licensing requirements may provide a viablemechanism to attain the desired asymmetric outcome in equilibrium.     

The cost of integrating external technologies: Supply and demand drivers of value creation in the markets for technology

A classic question faced by technology suppliers and buyers is whether to compete in the product markets or to cooperate through licensing. We address this question by examining an important, demand‐side barrier to licensing—the buyers' cost of integrating a licensed technology. We argue that this cost can be affected by suppliers' knowledge transfer capabilities, buyers' absorptive capacity, and the cospecialization between R&D and downstream activities in the buyers' industries. Following this argument and a stylized bargaining model, we hypothesize that the supplier's knowledge transfer capability stimulates licensing. Moreover, the importance of this capability increases when licensing to industries where potential buyers have weak absorptive capacity or R&D and downstream activities are cospecialized. We find support for our hypotheses using a panel dataset of small ‘serial innovators.’ Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The licensing of telecommunication suppliers: Beyond the EU’s Directive

The WTO agreement on basic telecommunication services does not provide detailed guidance for giving effect to member country commitments, especially in regard to the licensing reform which will be required to permit easier market access. This is where the EU’s recent Licensing Directive takes on special significance beyond its application to Europe since it is likely to be closely examined as a potential model for multinational licensing reform. For this reason, it is important to draw attention to the shortcomings of the EU directive to help ensure that they are not transported into any model/principles of licensing reform developed to give effect to the WTO Agreement.     

Does pre‐entry licensing undermine the performance of subsequent independent activities? Evidence from the global aerospace industry, 1944–2000

We study how firms' use of in‐licensing for their initial entry to a business domain can detract from the performance of their subsequent autonomous endeavors in the domain. We argue that in‐licensing produces high levels of causal ambiguity about factors that drive the performance achieved with the licensed product. In turn, the experience that firms gather through pre‐entry licensing is likely to generate superstitious learning and overconfidence that undermine the performance of licensees' subsequent independent operations. The biases will be particularly strong in the face of contextual dissimilarity. We find consistent evidence in a study of firms that entered the global aircraft industry between 1944 and 2000. The research helps advance the understanding of the benefits and costs of markets for technology. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The quest for expansive intellectual property rights and the failure to disclose known relevant prior art

Expansive patent portfolios may be used by firms to fence off technological space for commercialization, impede the commercialization efforts of competitors, and enhance bargaining power in cross‐licensing negotiations. Low quality patents with claims that overlap those of other patents contribute to these portfolios and patent strategies. By failing to disclose known relevant prior art during the patenting process, inventors and their firms may be granted low quality patents with intellectual property claims which would not otherwise have been granted. We find that the failure of inventors to disclose known relevant prior art increases as they gain experience with the patenting process. Such failure is also greater among inventors employed by relatively small, poorly performing firms that rely on outsourced legal counsel during the application process. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A systematic small group approach to creativity and innovation: A case study

The paper reports a longitudinal study of the result of applying systematic creative problem-solving techniques in a particular multinational firm. The first section of the paper describes the way the system was applied to the five stages of an innovation from conception to implementation. Fifteen different techniques were used, the choice varying with the stage. The paper then describes three examples of actual innovations (disguised), stage by stage, giving a judgment of the value of the techniques used, the frequency of success or failure of all the sessions undertaken, the relative success of the techniques used, and the usage of the techniques by stage of innovation.
Two further points are made; firstly, creative thinking is needed and manifested at all stages of a project and not just in the early stages; secondly, although Synectics was shown to be rather effective it gradually lost ground to a less successful technique because the managers concerned did not like its seeming inconsequentiality and abandonment of logic.     

Patent pools in 5G: The principles for facilitating pool licensing

Patent pools collect patents from multiple patentees and license them out as a package. They offer one-stop-shop licensing efficiencies, reduce transaction costs, and increase the predictability of the licensing environment for the benefit of innovation diffusion. However, pools failed to take off for previous cellular standards. This article analyses both retrospectively the reasons for such failures and prospectively what makes the 5G environment more conductive to pool formation and licensing. Avanci, a patent pool for licensing cellular standards in the Internet of Things (IoT), is a significant development but has limited licensing coverage so far. The article then recommends five policy principles to facilitate pool licensing in the IoT. They include recognising that only enough upstream SEP owners need to join the 5G pool to create a market signalling effect. Some vertically integrated SEP owners may remain outsiders, and some bilateral licensing may co-exist without damaging the pool's success. To encourage upstream SEP owners to join the pool, they should be allowed to set ‘high enough’ royalty rates and divide pools' royalties among members under value proportionality rules. 5G pools must also be flexible and adopt different licensing programs that consider the specificities of each IoT market. Finally, pool administrators should consult with IoT implementers before establishing licensing programs for them and have infringement legal standing if everything else fails. These principles would go a long way in spurring the broader use of 5G pool licensing for a more efficient, straightforward, and predictable IoT licensing environment.