共查询到17条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
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无论是出口还是内销,纺织服装企业将面对越来越多的“标准”。当企业为对付各种标准而增加成本的同时,不妨想想,标准本身就是产品通往更高层次的门槛。迎接更多标准的检验,是中国纺织品实现升级的重要方式。同时,达标之后的产品,将进入更广阔的市场。[编者按] 相似文献
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CÉDRIC ARGENTON 《The Journal of industrial economics》2010,58(3):690-716
In the case of vertically differentiated products, Bertrand competition at the retail level does not prevent an incumbent upstream firm from using exclusivity contracts to deter the entry of a high‐quality rival. Indeed, because of differentiation, the incumbent's inferior product is not eliminated upon entry. Due to the resulting competitive pressure, a retailer who considers rejecting the exclusivity contract expects to earn much less than the incumbent's monopoly rents. Thus, in equilibrium, the incumbent can always offer high enough an upfront payment to induce all retailers to sign the contract and achieve exclusion. This is true under linear pricing for intermediate levels of entry costs, and with two‐part tariffs even in the absence of entry costs. 相似文献
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Enrico Pennings 《The Journal of industrial economics》2004,52(4):569-589
This paper examines the price and quality choice of a single product, risk-neutral monopolist who can delay irreversible investments required for market entry. It is shown that the price and quality she chooses at entry increase with uncertainty about the size of future demand. In a Stackelberg leader-follower game, the leader and follower pre-commit immediately up to a certain level of uncertainty. In this case the leader produces the higher quality good. When uncertainty is higher than this threshold, the follower will wait and enter the market later with a higher quality good. 相似文献
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We analyze costly quality disclosure with horizontally differentiated products under duopoly and a cartel, and characterize the effect of competition on disclosure and welfare. We show that expected disclosure is higher under a cartel than under duopoly, and the welfare comparison depends on the level of disclosure cost: when the disclosure cost is low, welfare is higher under a cartel than duopoly, but when the disclosure cost is high, welfare is higher under duopoly. In either market structure, disclosure is excessive in terms of total surplus, but insufficient in terms of consumer surplus. 相似文献
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伴随着经济的复苏以及市场需求的进一步扩大,中国童年行业已呈现出一片勃勃生机,新时期下的童车企业大多已摒弃过去一味抄袭,仿冒等恶性竞争手段,转而将竞争意识渗透于设计创新。 相似文献
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Do larger markets offer better products? The question has implications for theories of cities and theories of market organization. We document that in the restaurant industry, where quality is produced largely with variable costs, the range of qualities on offer increases in market size. In daily newspapers, where quality is produced with fixed costs, the average quality of products increases with market size, but the market does not offer much additional variety as it grows large. These results are consistent with IO theories of endogenous product quality and with theories that emphasize the consumption advantages of cities. 相似文献