Inter-firm governance and structural power in industrial relationships: the moderating effect of bargaining power on the contractual safeguarding of specific assets

In the basic model of transaction cost analysis (TCA), neither market power nor power based on resource-dependence plays a significant role. In this article, we extend the TCA-perspective by combining resource-dependence theory (RDT) and TCA, and examine whether the buyer's bargaining power influences the alignment of the contractual safeguarding of buyer-specific and supplier-specific investments. Data from a survey of 160 industrial purchasing relationships provide empirical support for our theoretical predictions.The empirical findings demonstrate that the buyer's bargaining power does interfere with the safeguarding of relations-specific assets. As the buyer's relative bargaining power increases, the safeguarding of buyer-specific assets is substantially reinforced. On the other hand, the contractual protection of supplier-specific assets is significantly relaxed as the buyer's bargaining power grows.Our findings indicate that there is a tension between the alignment of contractual safeguarding arrangements and structural power in inter-firm business, and that resource-dependence considerations offer an important complement to TCA when we consider the transacting parties’ ability to provide contractual safeguards for assets at risk.Further, the findings indicate that the establishment of relational ties in long-term relationships is an important antecedent to governance structure. The empirical findings demonstrate that the longer a business-to-business relationship lasts, the more the contractual governance is relaxed.     

The interplay of governance mechanisms in complex procurement projects

Although many studies have investigated governance in inter-firm relationships, little is known about the simultaneous use of several governance mechanisms in complex procurement projects and their impact on project outcomes. In a case study about a complex procurement project in the Norwegian oil and gas industry, we investigate the interplay of contractual incentives, authority and relational governance. The project faced many problems with cost overruns and schedule delays. The study clearly illustrates the interrelationships between governance mechanisms and their effect on project outcomes. The findings suggest that relational governance (trust) is only beneficial for project outcomes when it is accompanied by contractual incentives and control systems (authority). Relational governance in itself does not guarantee an effective and beneficial interplay of all three mechanisms in a way that positive project outcomes are generated.     

供应链管理下的企业纵向边界

在阐述交易成本理论对企业纵向边界的解释的基础上,指出供应链管理影响资产专用性、不确定性和交易频率,降低了供应链上企业的交易成本,使企业纵向边界趋于缩小。然后针对企业如何结合核心能力理论进行重组提出一些建议。     

A transaction cost approach to analysing industrial districts

This article determines whether transaction cost theory can be used as a framework for analysing industrial district relationships, using the Gnosjö/Anderstorp industrial district in Sweden as a case example. Interviews with six firm owner/managers, representatives from the trade union and the local industrial development centre were conducted. Data was analysed using pattern matching in accordance to the theoretical framework. The findings indicate that interfirm relationships in the industrial district are motivated by the desire to reduce transaction costs. The article offers an alternative perspective in analysing industrial districts as current studies use network theory in explaining the industrial district phenomena.     

The effect of interfirm dependence structures on governance mechanisms

Despite recent developments regarding the study of interdependence structures, previous research has rarely investigated the simultaneous effect of both interdependence magnitude and interdependence asymmetry on governance mechanisms among exchange parties. A survey of manufacturing companies has been used to test a theory about the interactive effect of buyer dependence and supplier dependence on inter-firm governance. The analysis of the survey supported the proposition that both buyers and suppliers that are highly dependent on each other (high interdependence magnitude and low interdependence asymmetry) may choose to rely on monitoring and the norm of information sharing. However, when a buyer's dependence is low regardless of the supplier's dependence level, the buyer does not rely on the norm of information sharing (buyer's relative interdependence advantage, buyer's relative interdependence disadvantage, and low interdependence magnitude). On the other hand, when the supplier's dependence on the buyer is low, the buyer relies on monitoring regardless of its dependence level (buyer's relative interdependence disadvantage and low interdependence magnitude). However, this study did not empirically measure performance. Further research should be done on the effect of congruence between the governance mechanism and its antecedents on buying performance.     

A transaction cost approach to a paradox in international marketing

Why do firms that make specific downstream investments as they start international operations, sometimes turn to more market-like arrangements as they gain international experience and their international sales increase? This paradox in international marketing is the key question to be addressed in this article. We use the concept of dynamic or temporary governance costs to examine the paradox. The pattern of internationalization in the Norwegian farmed salmon industry provides an example whereby Norwegian exporters established their own sales offices in several international markets in the early stages of internationalization, but subsequently disintegrated vertically and came to rely on more market-like arrangements. An analysis of the internationalization of this industry suggests that, over time, the market provided better capabilities than vertical integration. This reduced the transaction costs, thus making vertical disintegration an efficient strategy.     

企业融资交易的契约安排：一个交易费用经济学的分析框架

交易费用经济学理论将股权契约和债权契约视为对融资交易不同的契约治理结构。债权契约具有古典契约的特征,是一种按规则运作的契约治理结构;股权契约具有弹性治理的特征,是一种关系型契约治理结构。依据交易费用经济学理论关于交易与契约匹配的一般机理,可以得出融资交易的契约安排机理:低资产专用性融资交易选择债权契约,高资产专用性融资交易选择股权契约,中等资产专用性融资交易选择混合性融资契约,这既可达到交易费用的最小化,又可实现交易效率的最大化。究竟哪类契约在现实融资契约安排中占主导地位,这取决于融资交易包含的资产专用性大小。     

Learning trajectory in offshore OEM cooperation: Transaction value for local suppliers in the emerging economies

We focus on the unique role of offshore OEM cooperation as a learning opportunity for local suppliers in the emerging economies. In particular, we conceptually argue and empirically confirm the links between learning intent, capability enhancement, governance mode, and overall innovativeness from the perspective of local suppliers in offshore OEM cooperation in China as well as the influence of local business culture within these links. We address two issues: (1) offshore OEM cooperation can be a unique opportunity for local suppliers with strong intent to learn from foreign buyers for capability enhancement and (2) the moderating effects of trust and contact as two distinctive governance modes. Addressing the two issues, we make two specific contributions to the research on inter-firm cooperation, both of which derive from the often-neglected theoretical lens of transaction value. Our general contribution lies in the extension of the transaction value perspective by specifying its dual tenets of inter-firm co-specialization and shared-trust as the central theme of inter-firm cooperation to complement the transaction cost economics and also contextualize the research on inter-firm cooperation in terms of different partners’ perspectives as well as different governance modes.     

Relationship governance mechanisms and collaborative performance: A relational life-cycle perspective

Governance mechanisms protect the investments involved in transactions and thereby facilitate and promote sustainable and cooperative relationships; however, the empirical results of prior research concerning the relationship between governance mechanisms and collaborative performance are inconsistent. Based on transaction cost economy (TCE) and social exchange theory (SET), a relational life-cycle framework that considers the dynamic evolution of collaborative relationships and re-examines the relationship between governance mechanisms and collaborative performance was developed in this study. Evidence from 124 manufacturers in Taiwan indicates that the effects of governance mechanisms on collaborative performance differ according to the current life-cycle phase. In the exploration phase, contractual control exerts a positive impact on cooperative performance. In the buildup and maturity phases, relational control remains positively associated with collaborative performance, whereas the impact of contractual control is insignificant. In the decline phase, both contractual control and relational control have an insignificant impact on collaborative performance. Herein, we discuss the implications of our empirical findings and their relevance to managers.     

Examining the Conditional Limits of Relational Governance: Specialized Assets,Performance Ambiguity,and Long‐Standing Ties

abstract Despite recognition of the benefits of relational governance in inter‐organizational exchanges, factors that may erode its value have received little examination. We extend the literature by asking whether self‐interested opportunities and long‐standing ties erode the positive association between relational governance and performance. Consistent with transaction cost and moral hazard logics, exchange hazards, particularly asset specificity and difficult performance measurement, dampen the positive association of relational governance and performance. We further find, consistent with recent inquiries into the dark side of embedded ties that the performance benefits associated with relational governance decline when parties rely on repeated partnerships.     

Ownership,corporate governance and industrial relations in the banking and telecommunications sectors: the case of Greece

The article examines how changes in ownership and corporate governance have affected industrial relations systems by drawing on the recent experience of Greece in two sectors: banking and telecommunications. The findings show that despite the seeming institutional stability in industrial relations arrangements, substantive change has taken place in the aforementioned sectors, which has resulted in the decentralisation of bargaining procedures.     

Antecedents of trust in industrial districts: an empirical analysis of inter-firm relations in a Turkish industrial district

Structural features and institutional settings of industrial districts, rather than contracts as a co-coordinating mechanism, promote trust in exchanges between firms in industrial districts. Based on this assumption, the paper explores the antecedents of trust in a Turkish industrial district at three levels: institutional environment; institutional arrangements; and inter-firm exchanges. In relation to institutional environment, dominant institutions of the Turkish economy – mainly state and finance – and their policies that undermine the role of SMEs in economic development are studied. In this context a third institution, the ‘district association’ that has a vital role in promoting trust-based governance has been analysed. At the second level, formal and informal institutional arrangements that govern the web of exchanges between firms are surveyed. The third level of analysis is directed at entrepreneurs and their attitudes towards family, friendship, expertise and reputation are studied. The research site is the Merter textile district in Istanbul. Data for second and third levels of analysis has been collected through structured interviews and is analysed quantitatively. For institutions and institutional environment, data has been collected mainly by in-depth interviews and is supported by secondary data. Research findings show that informal institutional arrangements are more important than formal arrangements and reputation and expertise of the other firm is more important than family-friendship connections as antecedents of trust.     

Antecedents of vertical integration: Transaction cost economics and resource-based explanations

This article focuses on antecedents of vertical integration. A model of vertical integration derived from transaction cost economics and the resource-based view is tested empirically with data from the mechanical maintenance services market in the hydroelectricity industry. The results show that asset specificity and closeness to present competence are positively related to vertical integration, while tacit knowledge is negatively related to vertical integration. The positive interaction effect between asset specificity and closeness to present competence on vertical integration is also supported, indicating that the decisions on insourcing and outsourcing can benefit from using transaction cost economics and the resource-based view in tandem.     

基于RCA法的供应链企业间成本核算研究

文中对作业成本法在供应链成本核算中的应用提出质疑,提出适用于供应链成本核算的资源消耗会计方法。具体核算流程为先对企业成本项目中的材料成本和管理费用进行细分,再对明细项目进行资源消耗种类的分析,为每一种资源类型建立资源结集点,将消耗同种资源的成本归入同一结集点,最终实现企业间成本的核算目的。     

Transaction costs, relational contracting and public private partnerships: a case study of UK defence

This paper is concerned with the economics of public private partnerships (PPPs)/private finance initiative (PFIs) and in particular the role of transaction costs and the importance of trust in relational contracting. The discussion is illustrated by reference to the UK defence sector. The paper begins by discussing the nature of PPPs/PFIs before moving on to consider how the economics of contracting literature can shed light on their strengths and weaknesses. The transaction cost literature is reviewed alongside a resource-based perspective of procurement decisions. The concepts of trust and reputation are then considered in the context of minimising procurement transaction costs. The theoretical framework developed is then applied and illustrated through a case study of UK defence contracting, in an attempt to assess whether the use of PPPs will necessarily lead to improved economic efficiency. The case study highlights both the scope of PPPs/PFIs and their potential transaction costs in defence procurement, with the normal perils in terms of contracting given information asymmetry, asset specificity and the resulting scope for opportunistic behaviour.     

The e-integration dilemma: The linkages between Internet technology application, trading partner relationships and structural change

The evidence from an empirical study involving 281 Australian organizations suggests that the availability, open nature, and (comparative) ease of implementation of Internet technologies for integration with trading partners, whilst on the one hand providing the means by which organizations can integrate processes and systems in a cost effective way, can amplify the need for both structural change and closer collaboration with trading partners. The relationships proposed and tested in the model are justified and explained based on a number of theoretical perspectives. These include Transaction Cost Economics, Socio-technical Systems, Resource Dependency, Knowledge Based View, Stakeholder Theory and Organizational Learning. The implications of the findings for Transaction Cost Theory are noteworthy firstly because they support the appropriateness of the inter-organizational governance structure in the context of this study, and secondly because although application of these technologies may reduce information search and related costs, whether this necessarily leads to reduced coordination costs is problematic. The potential benefits from improved coordination may be constrained by the perceived costs, and risks, of transition to new structural forms. The implication for practice is that increased use of Internet technologies creates substantial pressure to invest in organizational change. The attractiveness of investing in technologies that place managers in a position where they need to promote organizational change in order to extract adequate returns creates a significant dilemma. On the one hand Internet technologies enable extensive sharing and integration of data among trading partners, but at the same time they create conditions requiring managers to embrace fundamental organizational change in order to leverage the potential of such integration.     

影响建设项目合同不完备性的因素分析

从交易成本理论角度分析建设项目合同设计和选择逐渐成为项目研究中的重要课题。合同不完备性作为交易成本理论的关键合同分析维度,与交易属性密切相关。建设项目合同不完备性选择同样受到资产专用性、不确定性、复杂性和项目工期等交易属性的显著影响。本文在交易成本理论治理逻辑下,构建了一个简化的建设项目合同不完备性分析框架,并在此基础上探讨了影响建设项目合同不完备性选择的因素及其影响作用。     

Revisiting agency and transaction costs theory predictions on vertical financial ownership and contracting: electronic integration as an organizational form choice

This paper provides an organizational economics foundation to guide managers in matching the comparatively more efficient organizational mode with transactional characteristics such as: (1) the degree of (human capital) asset specificity involved in the transaction, (2) the degree of uncertainty surrounding the transaction, and (3) the number of trading partners (suppliers and buyers) in the vertical supply chain. The key role of technology, and more specifically the e‐business infrastructure and its effects on organizational mode choice, is highlighted. The main results from this analysis suggest that changes in information technology are changing the nature of transaction costs leading to more efficient management through an electronic integration solution thus favoring contracting and outsourcing than would have been technologically possible when Williamson's Markets and Hierarchies (Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. Free Press: New York, 1975) was published. It is emphasized that the transaction cost economics principles are durable but that the breathless advances in information technology, especially in the past decade, have comparatively favored lower transaction costs of markets over hierarchies. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

公司治理、契约安排与税务筹划

在委托代理分析框架下,税务筹划作为一种理财行为,不可避免地受到契约安排和公司治理的制约和影响。本文从公司治理、契约安排角度深入分析了税务筹划的治理机制与供给机制,提出了诱导性契约安排与激励相结合的公司治理模式,设计了履约成本最低化的契约安排模型,为税务筹划治理效率的提高奠定了基础。     

Does relationship learning lead to relationship value? A cross-national supply chain investigation

In global business-to-business markets, shared resources between buyers and suppliers often result in competitive advantages and enhanced relationships between firms. Unfortunately, there is a paucity of research regarding learning capabilities between business partners in a cross-border setting. This study takes the approach to integrate customer value literature into interorganizational learning theory and adopts the often-neglected theoretical perspective of transaction value by contextualizing inter-firm collaboration in terms of relationship learning and value co-creation viewed by both the buyers and sellers in one single study. Through the development of a conceptual framework that examines how global environmental and inter-organizational conditions influence learning capabilities, the study investigates how relationship learning influences relationship value for both supplying and buying firms. Using a survey of 126 cross-border dyads in the industrial chemical, packaging, consumer durable, and apparel industries, the authors show how relationship learning is valued by both buyers and suppliers, and how it is critical when viewing the “supplier as a customer.” The results indicate the strategic nature of relationship learning in maintaining cross-border business-to-business relationships. Simultaneously, the findings provide evidence that cultural distance is not a significant influence on the firm's propensity to share knowledge with its global partners. It helps advance our understanding of the significance of cultural-pollination in the era of globalization.