农村普惠金融发展及其福利效应研究

本文通过对农村地区经营户的问卷调查,分析了影响农村普惠金融发展的具体因素,并研究了农村普惠金融的发展对农村经济发展以及金融机构产生的福利效应。研究表明,信息通信技术的应用使得为农村边远、贫困地区以及低收入群体提供普惠金融服务成为可能,农村普惠金融的发展受到信息技术、借贷渠道、政府政策支持、户主及家庭特征、商业可持续性、消费者权益保护以及交易成本等因素的显著影响,并对农村经营户和金融机构的福利改善具有正向效应。随着信息通信技术的发展以及移动互联网与金融的深度融合,以手机银行为代表的移动金融将成为未来农村地区发展普惠金融的主要渠道。     

农户借贷的影响因素及其福利效应分析

将农户借贷行为分为是否借贷和借贷来源选择，采用辽宁568个农户家庭的随机入户调研数据，实证分析农户借贷行为的影响因素，并进一步研究农户借贷的福利效应。结果表明：社会关系不强和交易成本较低时，农户倾向于选择正规金融服务；广泛的社会关系和低的交易成本有利于农户借贷，并能提高农户借贷的消费福利效应。     

社会养老保险福利效应研究述评

提高国民福利是政府建立社会养老保险的最终目标。国外研究主要运用一般均衡方法构建代际交叠模型,从养老保险收入分配功能及其对经济增长(储蓄率和资本积累)的影响两个角度对不同养老保险模式的福利效应进行综合研究,研究成果十分丰富。然而,国内对如何在现有约束条件下实现国民福利最大化的探讨不够系统和深入。发展型福利思想为未来养老保险福利效应研究及政策改革提供了新的视角。     

农户风险性信贷配给的形成机制及其福利损失效应研究

农户风险性信贷配给是当前较为重要的农村金融问题,构建理论模型对风险性信贷配给的形成机制进行理论探析,研究表明农户自身的风险偏好特性致使风险性信贷配给自发形成。同时通过实证分析发现风险性信贷配给对农户家庭纯收入、家庭消费支出、家庭农业生产性投资支出有显著的负向影响,实证结果表明风险性信贷配给导致农户家庭福利受损,尤其对家庭农业生产性投资支出与家庭纯收入引致的损失效应比较明显。且分位数分析发现风险性信贷配给对较低与较高福利水平农户家庭产生的福利损失效应较强,特别是给福利水平较高农户家庭带来的福利损失效应最大。据此在农村金融创新深化期针对性地提出治理风险性信贷配给的政策启示,充分释放农村金融的支农惠农潜能。     

农户风险性信贷配给的形成机制及其福利损失效应研究

农户风险性信贷配给是当前较为重要的农村金融问题,构建理论模型对风险性信贷配给的形成机制进行理论探析,研究表明农户自身的风险偏好特性致使风险性信贷配给自发形成。同时通过实证分析发现风险性信贷配给对农户家庭纯收入、家庭消费支出、家庭农业生产性投资支出有显著的负向影响,实证结果表明风险性信贷配给导致农户家庭福利受损,尤其对家庭农业生产性投资支出与家庭纯收入引致的损失效应比较明显。且分位数分析发现风险性信贷配给对较低与较高福利水平农户家庭产生的福利损失效应较强,特别是给福利水平较高农户家庭带来的福利损失效应最大。据此在农村金融创新深化期针对性地提出治理风险性信贷配给的政策启示,充分释放农村金融的支农惠农潜能。     

人民币汇率波动的福利效应研究

本文以我国制造业为研究对象,基于VECM模型对人民币汇率波动的福利效应进行实证分析。结果表明,人民币贬值有助于工人福利的改善,增加进口虽然在短期内对工资有下拉作用,但在中长期发挥推动促进作用。在人民币汇率升值压力背景下,优化制造业产业和贸易结构,提升资本密集型和技术密集型行业比重,借助人民币升值时,进口能源和原材料价格相对下降的机会,增加进口以降低生产成本,提高中国制造的国际竞争力,并尽快建立起与劳动生产率相挂钩的工资增长机制是提高我国制造业工人福利的根本途径。     

中国成品油价格的非对称波动及其市场势力检验

成品油价格事关民生与经济稳定,其非对称性波动可能意味着消费者福利的非必要损失。基于2000年6月—2022年6月油价数据,用NARDL模型检验中国成品油价格波动是否存在“涨多跌少”的非对称性,用EGARCH模型检验油企的市场势力是否影响定价。结果显示,中国成品油价格非对称波动在短期不显著,而在长期显著存在“涨多跌少”的正向非对称性。进一步检验发现,零售市场竞争性明显,但炼油环节检验出了合谋引起的市场势力变化。两个模型结果相互佐证,中国成品油定价存在市场势力的不合理成分。     

市场势力、收入多元化与商业银行绩效

本文利用中国商业银行2003~2011年的相关数据,考察商业银行市场势力和收入多元化与银行绩效水平的关系。结果表明,市场势力对商业银行绩效有显著正效应,高市场势力带来的溢价提高了商业银行的经济效益,这在一定程度上支持相对市场力量假说;商业银行在严格控制营业费用的前提下,提高收入多元化程度对商业银行的绩效水平有积极促进作用。中国银行监管机构需要逐步放松行政管制,使银行将收入多元化纳入银行长远发展的经营战略中,以提高其绩效水平;同时要高度重视并合理控制商业银行收入多元化风险。     

产品市场势力、公司治理与股票市场流动性

本文实证研究了我国股票市场的流动性问题。结果表明,产品市场势力能够促进信息传递,提高股票的流动性。这种影响即使控制了公司治理因素依然显著,同时随着信息不对称程度的提高而更为明显。另外,在对股票流动性的影响上,产品市场势力与董事会规模、高管薪酬激励之间存在替代关系。同时,股权分散能增强产品市场势力的影响,但是产品市场势力会削弱股权分散的积极作用。     

中国存贷款市场势力的运动趋势及内在演进规律

本文基于中国13家商业银行1996-2008年的存贷款数据,采用Monti—Klein模型测度其勒纳指数,并在分析存贷款市场势力演进路径和内在关系后发现：（1）存款市场势力与人均存款呈复合U型,并存在反向转置的三个拐点;贷款市场势力与人均贷款整体呈现弱Logistic增长趋势,只存在局部U型。（2）寻找市场势力的影响因...     

中国商业银行市场势力对其效率和稳定性的影响

文章运用随机边界模型估算了中国商业银行近十年来的成本、利润效率,并分别以勒纳指数和Z指数代表市场势力和稳定性,考察了市场势力对银行经营效率和稳定性的影响。结果表明:内地商业银行整体的效率逐年上升,但仍落后于香港的银行;四大商业银行的效率低于中小银行。市场势力与效率呈反向关系,而与稳定性的关系要区别对待:市场势力一方面增加了中小银行和香港银行的稳定性,另一方面也增加了四大商业银行和交通银行的经营风险。因此,继续深入金融自由化和银行业改革,恰当地引入一些竞争,会对中国商业银行经营的效率和稳定性起到积极的作用。     

Changes in the Financial Market: Welfare and Price Effects and the Basic Theorems of Value Conservation

This paper analyzes the impact, on both welfare and equilibrium prices, of changes in the financial market in a general equilibrium, two-period context. Previous papers have focussed on the “securities effect,” tending to essentially ignore the equally important “endowment effect” that arises when market structure changes are implemented. Two forms of endowment neutrality and market structure changes which either preserve, expand, or shift allocational feasibility differentiate the main theorems, which are based on arbitrary preferences and beliefs and substantially extend and modify extant results; in particular, earlier statements identified with value conservation are sharply moderated. Very roughly, the paper yields the following implications for some of the more common changes in the market: nonsynergistic corporate spinoffs and the opening of option markets have, on balance, strongly positive welfare effects; nonsynergistic mergers tend to have strong negative welfare effects, while the welfare effects of alternative risky debt structures tend to be ambiguous. All of the preceding, however, may under plausible conditions be redistributive.     

Explaining Welfare Reform: Public Choice and the Labor Market

This paper seeks to identify factors which could plausibly have led to the contractionary welfare reform initiatives begun at the state and federal levels in the U.S. in the 1990s, initiatives concentrated on the AFDC program. A review of aggregate time series evidence, cross-section regression research, and studies of attitudes toward welfare spending and toward welfare recipients suggests a role for three types of factors. First, a major expansion of the U.S. welfare system in the late 1980s in terms of expenditures and caseloads may have led voters to desire to retrench by cutting back on the AFDC program, even though that program was not primarily responsible for the expansion. Second, declines in the relative and absolute levels of household income, wages, and employment rates among the disadvantaged population may have driven up caseloads and costs, increased the social distance of voters from the poor, heightened concern with work incentives, and may have led, more generally, to a decrease in the perceived deservingness of the poor. Third, a surge of births to unmarried mothers in the 1980s is suggested, by cross-sectional and attitudinal evidence, to have led to a reduction in voter support for the AFDC program.     

Limited Liability and Market Power

This paper evaluates the welfare effects of limited liability on firm behavior when market power is present. A risk-neutral monopolist facing uncertain demand (with constant returns to scale technology) produces higher output, yielding higher expected profits when costless exit is induced by limited liability. The higher output may increase social welfare (monopolist profit plus consumer surplus) even though the monopolist may overproduce relative to the quantity that maximizes social welfare. When no market power is present, the overproduction resulting from the provision of limited liability results in loss of social welfare. Appropriate use of liability limitation laws can thus provide policy makers an additional policy instrument with which to mitigate the effects of market power.JEL Classification: D24, D41, D42, G32, G38     

Welfare Effects of Timely Reporting

A principal-agent model is examined in which a manager acquires private cost information sequentially. All possible communication schemes are equivalent to one of two: (1) timely reporting, where the manager reports as soon as possible, and (2) delayed reporting, where the manager delays the report of the first of two signals. In the primary case identified, timely reporting is shown to be owner valuable. However, the manager is better off under delayed reporting. Finally, total expected surplus is shown greater under delayed reporting. The owner's benefit from timely reporting is less than the manager's loss.     

科创板需充分发挥市场力量

<正>制度变革要取得预期的效果还需要市场相关主体行为模式的改变,并在市场主体的相互博弈中形成新的均衡2018年11月5日,国家主席习近平在首届中国国际进口博览会开幕式上宣布设立科创板,并在该板块内进行注册制试点。经过不到一年的准备,科创板于2019年7月22日正式启动。回顾科创板从筹备到正式运行一年来的情况,在肯定取得成绩的同时,需要看到一些不足,并秉持市场化的初心和坚持注册制的核心,努力建设更具包容性的科创板。强制型制度变迁有力地打破了路径依赖著名经济史学家道格拉斯·诺思认为,制度是"一个社会的博弈规则,更正式地说,是人为制定的用以规范人们互动行     

Bank Capital Standards for Market Risk: A Welfare Analysis

We propose a simple model that is suitable for evaluating alternative bank capital regulatory proposals for market risk. Our model formalizes the conflict between bank objectives and regulatory goals. Banks' decisions represent a tension between their desire to exploit the deposit-insurance put option and their desire to preserve franchise value. Regulators seek to balance the social value of deposits in mediating transactions against the deadweight costs of failure resolution. Our social welfare criterion is standard: a weighted average agents' utilities.We demonstrate that banks do not incrementally alter their portfolio risk as the economic environment changes. Rather, banks either choose the minimal feasible risk or the maximal feasible risk. This pattern, in turn, drives regulatory decisions: The first goal of the regulator is to induce banks to choose the minimal risk level. For all nontrivial cases, unregulated banks fail to choose the first-best allocations. Traditional ex-ante capital requirements can induce banks to choose the socially-optimal level of portfolio risk, but the required capital is often inefficiently high. In contrast, variants of the Federal Reserve Board's precommitment proposal imply far smaller efficiency losses, and achieve allocations at or near the first-best for most reasonable model specifications. The ex-post penalties required for the optimal implementation of precommitment are not excessively large. The welfare gains from precommitment are even higher when the precommitment penalty function is precluded from sending banks into default. We conclude that state-contingent regulatory mechanisms, of which the precommitment approach is an example, offer the possibility of substantial gains in regulatory efficiency, relative to traditional state non-contingent regulation.     

Bank Capital Standards for Market Risk: A Welfare Analysis

We propose a simple model that is suitable for evaluating alternativebank capital regulatory proposals for market risk. Our modelformalizes the conflict between bank objectives and regulatorygoals. Banks' decisions represent a tension between their desireto exploit the deposit-insurance put option and their desireto preserve franchise value. Regulators seek to balance thesocial value of deposits in mediating transactions against thedeadweight costs of failure resolution. Our social welfare criterionis standard: a weighted average agents' utilities. We demonstrate that banks do not incrementally alter their portfoliorisk as the economic environment changes. Rather, banks eitherchoose the minimal feasible risk or the maximal feasible risk.This pattern, in turn, drives regulatory decisions: The firstgoal of the regulator is to induce banks to choose the minimalrisk level. For all nontrivial cases, unregulated banks failto choose the first-best allocations. Traditional ex-ante capitalrequirements can induce banks to choose the socially-optimallevel of portfolio risk, but the required capital is often inefficientlyhigh. In contrast, variants of the Federal Reserve Board's precommitmentproposal imply far smaller efficiency losses, and achieve allocationsat or nearthe first-best for most reasonable model specifications.The ex-post penalties required for the optimal implementationof precommitment are not excessively large. The welfare gainsfrom precommitment are even higher when the precommitment penaltyfunction is precluded from sending banks into default. We concludethat state-contingent regulatory mechanisms, of which the precommitmentapproach is an example, offer the possibility of substantialgains in regulatory efficiency, relative to traditional statenon-contingent regulation.     

Market Access and Welfare under Free Trade Agreements: Textiles under NAFTA

The effective market access granted to textiles and apparelunder the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is estimated,taking into account the presence of rules of origin. First,estimates are provided of the effect of tariff preferences combinedwith rules of origin on the border prices of Mexican final goodsexported to the United States and of U.S. intermediate goodsexported to Mexico, based on eight-digit Harmonized System tariff-linedata. A third of the estimated rise in the border price of Mexicanapparel products is found to compensate for the cost of complyingwith NAFTA’s rules of origin, and NAFTA is found to haveraised the price of U.S. intermediate goods exported to Mexicoby around 12 percent, with downstream rules of origin accountingfor a third of that increase. Second, simulations are used toestimate welfare gains for Mexican exporters from preferentialmarket access under NAFTA. The presence of rules of origin isfound to approximately halve these gains.