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1.
Summary. In this note we show that if in the standard Rubinstein model both players are allowed to leave the negotiation after a rejection,
in which case they obtain a payoff of zero, then there exist a continuum of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes, including
some which involve significant delay. We also fully characterize the case in which, upon quitting, the players can take an
outside option of positive value.
Received: February 27, 1996; revised version: March 28, 1997 相似文献
2.
We consider an extension of the standard Rubinstein model where both players are randomly allowed to leave the negotiation
after a rejection, in which case they obtain a payoff of known value. We show that, when the value of the outside opportunities
is of intermediate size, there exist a continuum of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes, including some with delayed agreements.
Considering outside opportunities of significant value, we prove that efficient delays arise caused by the bargainers' aspirations,
in waiting for their outside, option rather than by threats. Moreover, if taking the outside option decreases the probability
that the opponent receives an outside option in the future, then it is possible that exactly two equilibrium payoffs coexist.
In this latter case, inefficiencies may be created by agreeing too early. 相似文献
3.
Summary. We consider a k-player sequential bargaining model in which both the cake size and the identity of the proposer are determined by a stochastic process. For the case where the cake is a simplex (of random size) and the players share a common discount factor, we establish the existence of a unique stationary subgame perfect payoff which is efficient and characterize the conditions under which agreement is delayed. We also investigate how the equilibrium payoffs depend on the order in which the players move and on the correlation between the identity of the proposer and the cake size.Received: November 5, 1996; revised version: December 31, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date. 相似文献
4.
Summary. We study the least core, the kernel and bargaining sets of coalitional games with a countable set of players. We show that
the least core of a continuous superadditive game with a countable set of players is a non-empty (norm-compact) subset of
the space of all countably additive measures. Then we show that in such games the intersection of the prekernel and the least
core is non-empty. Finally, we show that the Aumann-Maschler and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets contain the set of all countably
additive payoff measures in the prekernel.
Received: June 6, 1996; revised version: March 1, 1997 相似文献
5.
Mehmet Bac 《Economic Theory》2000,16(1):227-237
Summary. I study the first-round separating equilibrium of a buyer-seller bargaining game, extended to allow for asymmetric information,
strategically delayed offers and offers restricted to a portion of the good. When bargaining is over a consumption good, in
equilibrium the “strong” buyer uses a restricted offer if his optimal consumption path is conservative relative to the “weak”
buyer. A pure restricted offer may even be a costless, efficient signal. When the good is durable, a pure strategic delay
is involved in signaling a strong bargaining position if the discount factor is high.
Received: June 24, 1998; revised version: May 30, 1999 相似文献
6.
John Wooders 《Economic Theory》1998,11(1):215-224
Summary. We show that the equilibrium of a matching and bargaining model of a market in which there is a finite number of agents at each date need not be near the equilibrium of a market with a continuum of agents, although matching probabilities are the same in both markets. Holding the matching process fixed, as the finite market becomes large its equilibrium approaches the equilibrium of its continuum limit.Received: January 22, 1996; revised version: September 24, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date. 相似文献
7.
Keith Waehrer 《Economic Theory》1999,13(1):171-181
Summary. In the model presented, a buyer uses competitive bidding to facilitate her purchase of a good (the primary good of the exchange). Not included in the original purchase is the possible procurement of a good related to the original
purchase: the supplementary good. The primary and supplementary goods are closely related; knowing a bidder's cost of producing the primary good implies
that the buyer can infer the bidder's cost of producing the supplementary good. I show that a bidding mechanism for the primary
good will fail to ensure an efficient allocation if the buyer learns the bid of the winner and the price of the supplementary
good is determined through sequential bargaining.
Received: August 22, 1996; revised version: June 23, 1997 相似文献
8.
Prabal Ray Chaudhuri 《Economic Theory》1997,10(2):335-360
Summary. We consider a generalized assignment model where the payoffs depend on the number of matchings that take place. We formulate
a simple non-cooperative game and look for subgame perfect equilibrium of this model. Existence is established for a wide
class of games. We also look at a refinement criterion which, for the standard assignment model, selects the -optimal outcome as the unique equilibrium. We then apply these concepts to a model of technology transfer between domestic
and foreign firms.
Received: June 24, 1994; revised version October 12, 1995 相似文献
9.
Summary. Given a map whose roots are the Nash equilibria of a game, each component of the equilibrium set has an associated index,
defined as the local degree of the map. This note shows that for a two-player game, every map with the same roots induces
the same index. Moreover, this index agrees with the Shapley index constructed from the Lemke-Howson algorithm.
Received: May 30, 1996; revised version June 25, 1996 相似文献
10.
A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Anastassios Kalandrakis 《Journal of Economic Theory》2004,116(2):294-322
We analyze an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar bargaining game with an endogenous reversion point. In each period a new dollar is divided among three legislators according to the proposal of a randomly recognized member—if a majority prefer so—or according to previous period's allocation otherwise. Although current existence theorems for Markovian equilibria do not apply for this dynamic game, we fully characterize a Markov equilibrium. The equilibrium is such that irrespective of the discount factor or the initial division of the dollar, the proposer eventually extracts the whole dollar in all periods. We also show that proposal strategies are weakly continuous in the status quo that equilibrium expected utility is not quasi-concave, and the correspondence of voters’ acceptance set (the set of allocations weakly preferred over the status quo) fails lower hemicontinuity. 相似文献
11.
Niels Anthonisen 《Economic Theory》1999,13(1):143-169
Summary. The paper introduces a version of rationalizability that ignores strategies that are supported by negligible sets of beliefs,
where a negligible set is one whose Lebesgue measure is zero. The theory is developed solely for the special case of point
rationalizability; conditions are then derived under which point rationalizability entails no loss of generality. When these
conditions obtain, the predictions yielded by this approach are often (although not always) a significant reduction over what
is predicted by rationalizability.
Received: September 10 1996; revised version: July 18, 1997 相似文献
12.
Robert Wilson 《Economic Theory》1998,12(2):433-440
Summary. The sequential equilibrium of an ascending-price auction of a single item is derived explicitly for the case of log-normal
distributions and a multiplicative valuation model comprising both common and private factors, and allowing asymmetries. If
the prior distribution on the common factors is diffuse, or of the form obtained by Bayesian updating from a diffuse prior
distribution, then the equilibrium strategies are log-linear with coefficients obtained by solving a set of linear equations.
A similar construction applies to normal distributions and additive terms in the valuation model. An example illustrates the
predictions derived from the model.
Received: December 11, 1996; revised version: July 15, 1997 相似文献
13.
We consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have instantaneous preferences represented by continuous, concave and single-peaked utility functions, and they are impatient. Decisions arise from a bargaining game with random proposers and (super) majority approval, ranging from the simple majority up to unanimity. We provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the existence of a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium, and we provide its explicit characterization. The uniqueness of the equilibrium permits an analysis of the set of Pareto optimal voting rules. For symmetric distributions of peaks and uniform recognition probabilities unanimity is the unanimously preferred majority rule. 相似文献
14.
We study the property of additivity in bankruptcy problems and in allocation problems. In bankruptcy problems we use this
property to characterize the Talmudic rule proposed by Rabbi Ibn Ezra. Moreover we generalize this rule to every bankruptcy
problem. Again, using additivity we characterize the rights egalitarian solution in allocation problems. 相似文献
15.
This paper analyses the effects of partially revocable endogenous commitments of a seller in a negotiation with a deadline.
In particular, we examine when commitment is a source of strength, a source of inefficiency and when it does not affect the
bargaining outcome at all. We show that when commitment possesses a minimum amount of irrevocability this crucially determines
the bargaining outcome. In the bilateral bargaining case, commitment becomes a source of inefficiency since it causes a deadline
effect. In the choice of partner framework, however, the deadline effect disappears and there is an immediate agreement and,
moreover, commitment becomes a source of strength since it increases the seller's equilibrium payoff by triggering off competition
between the buyers. 相似文献
16.
Axiomatic characterizations of the Choquet integral 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Summary. The Choquet integral is an integral part of recent advances in decision theory involving non-additive measures. In this article
we present two new axiomatic characterizations of this functional.
Received: January 27, 1997; revised version: April 28, 1997 相似文献
17.
Paulo Klinger Monteiro 《Economic Theory》1999,13(1):221-227
Summary. In this paper I prove that a quasiconcave separable utility function defined on an atomless space is concave.
Received: August 11, 1997; revised version: October 2, 1997 相似文献
18.
Julio Dávila 《Economic Theory》1998,12(1):213-223
Summary. It is shown in this note that in an incomplete markets economy with uncountably many states of the world there may be uncountably
many isolated equilibria as well as uncountably many non-isolated equilibria. Moreover, both subsets can be simultaneously
of second category. Therefore, none of the subsets can be considered negligible with respect to the other, neither from a
cardinality point of view nor from a topological one. Unfortunately, this fact prevents from claiming that these economies
may have “typically” determinate equilibria – even though uncountably many of them – as would have been desirable for comparative
statics exercises.
Received: May 19, 1995; revised version: March 24, 1997 相似文献
19.
Summary. In the social learning model of Banerjee [1] and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [2] individuals take actions sequentially
after observing the history of actions taken by the predecessors and an informative private signal. If the state of the world
is changing stochastically over time during the learning process, only temporary informational cascades – situations where
socially valuable information is wasted – can arise. Furthermore, no cascade ever arises when the environment changes in a
sufficiently unpredictable way.
Received: December 5, 1996; revised version: February 11, 1997 相似文献
20.
Akira Okada 《Games and Economic Behavior》2011,73(1):227-235
We consider a non-cooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers in a general situation for which players differ in recognition probability and time preference. We characterize an efficient equilibrium as the generalized Nash bargaining solution that belongs to the core. The model is applied to wage bargaining between an employer and multiple workers. Although involuntary unemployment may occur in equilibrium, full employment emerges as players become sufficiently patient. 相似文献