Assurance payments on the coordination of threshold public goods provision: An experimental investigation

We investigate the assurance payment mechanism (APM) in a single-unit threshold public good game. APM offers an assurance payment ($AP$) as compensation to would-be contributors if the group fails to provide the good and individual contributions reach a pre-determined price. We characterize the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for APM under complete information and show that assurance payments substantially reduce the multiplicity of equilibria and eliminate the set of non-provision equilibria in a general setup. We find strong evidence that APM improves upon the baseline provision point mechanism without assurance in lab experiments. Assurance payments act as a coordination device and induce more contributions concentrated on $AP$, especially for agents with values above $AP$, leading to more frequent successful provision, higher group contributions, and an overall welfare improvement. Our experimental findings highlight the non-equilibrium mis-coordination as the main reason for the non-provision of threshold public goods and indicate that the format of assurance payments plays a key role in successful coordination even when provision is the unique equilibrium outcome.     

One-sided bargaining over a finite set of alternatives

I consider a bargaining game in which only one player can make proposals and the space of proposals is finite. Thus, the game is like a situation where: (i) a CEO suggests a possible hire, who must be okayed by a board of directors, or (ii) the US president nominates a potential judge, who must be okayed by the Senate. My main result is an algorithm that finds the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. The number of steps in the algorithm is on the order of $n$, the number of possibilities (e.g., applicants to a job) that the bargainers may consider. By contrast, if one uses backwards induction to solve the game, then the number of steps is on the order of $n!$. A corollary of the main result, similar to some results of previous bargaining models, is that the wait costs of only one player, the non-proposer, is relevant to the outcome. The wait costs of the proposer are irrelevant, provided that they are positive. Applied to the nomination process specified by the US Constitution, the corollary suggests that only the Senate's wait costs are relevant to the outcome—the president's wait costs are irrelevant. As I argue, this result may explain a little-noticed regularity of American politics. This is that the Senate seems to have much influence in the selection of lower-court judges but relatively little influence in the selection of Supreme Court justices.     

Kantian equilibria of a class of Nash bargaining games

We study Kantian equilibria of an $n$-player bargaining game, which is a modified version of the well-known divide-the-dollar game. We first show that the Kantian equilibrium exists under fairly minimal assumptions. Second, if the bankruptcy rule used satisfies equal treatment of equals, and is almost nowhere proportional, then only equal division can prevail in any Kantian equilibrium. On the other hand, we show that an “anything goes” type result emerges only under the proportional rule. Finally, using hybrid bankruptcy rules that we construct in a novel fashion, we can characterize the whole equilibrium set. Our results highlight the interactions between institutions (axiomatic properties of division rules) and agents' equilibrium behavior.     

A noncooperative model of contest network formation

In this paper we study a model of weighted network formation. The bilateral interaction is modeled as a Tullock contest game with the possibility of a draw. We describe stable networks under different concepts of stability. We show that a Nash stable network is either the empty network or the complete network. The complete network is not immune to bilateral deviations. When we allow for limited farsightedness, a stable network immune to bilateral deviations must be a complete $M$-partite network, with partitions of different sizes. We provide several comparative statics results illustrating the importance of the structure of stable networks in mediating the effects of shocks and interventions. In particular, we show that an increase in the likelihood of a draw has a nonmonotonic effect on the level of wasteful contest spending in the society. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to model weighted network formation when the actions of individuals are neither strategic complements nor strategic substitutes.     

Manufacturing output and extreme temperature: Evidence from Canada

This paper analyzes the effects of extreme temperature on manufacturing output using a data set covering the universe of manufacturing establishments in Canada from 2004 to 2012. Extreme temperature can affect manufacturing activity directly through its impact on labour productivity and indirectly through a change in demand for products. Using a panel fixed effects method, our results suggest a non-linear relationship between outdoor extreme temperature and manufacturing output. Each day where outdoor mean temperatures are below $-18$ °C or above 24 °C reduces annual manufacturing output by 0.18% and 0.11%, respectively, relative to a day with mean temperature between 12 ° and 18 °C. In a typical year, extreme temperatures, as measured by the number of days below $-18$ °C or above 24 °C, reduce annual manufacturing output by 2.2%, with extreme hot temperatures contributing the most to this impact. Given the predicted change in climate for the mid- and end of century, we predict annual manufacturing output losses due to extreme temperature to range between 2.8% and 3.7% in mid-century and 3.7% and 7.2% in end of century.     

EXISTENCE OF STATIONARY EQUILIBRIUM IN AN INCOMPLETE-MARKET MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS LABOR SUPPLY

In this article, I first study an income fluctuation problem with endogenous labor supply. Let β be the agent's time discount factor and be the constant gross rate of return on assets. For , I show that the agent's wealth either approaches infinity almost surely or converges to a finite level almost surely. For , I prove the existence, uniqueness, and stability of the stationary distribution of state variables. I then show the existence of the stationary general equilibrium in an incomplete-market model with endogenous labor supply.     

Marginal Subsidies in Tullock Contests

In a general Tullock contest, we examine a situation where a limited resource can be used to provide marginal subsidies to either player (weak or strong), or to increase the prize directly. We show that to maximize total effort, subsidizing the weak/strong player is preferred when the contest is sufficiently accurate/inaccurate. This result generalizes to n‐player lottery contests. In a lottery contest (Tullock contest with ), we derive the optimal scheme for a full range of resource: when the resource is small, it is optimal to only subsidize the weak player; when it is large, both players should be subsidized simultaneously.     

Score manipulation,density continuity and intent-to-treat effect for regression discontinuity

Regression discontinuity (RD) is widely used in many disciplines of science to find treatment effect when the treatment is determined by an underlying running variable (‘score') crossing a cutoff or not. The main attraction of RD is local randomization around , which is, however, often ruined by manipulation on . To detect manipulation, the continuity of score density function at is routinely tested in practice. In this paper, we examine how informative is for RD, and show the following. First, for incumbency effect in election to which RD has been heavily applied, may have no information content. Second, for RD in general, the continuity is neither necessary nor sufficient for RD validity. Third, if the treatment cannot be implemented without manipulation of , then the manipulation had better be considered as part of the treatment effect, much as in ‘intent-to-treat effect’ for clinical trials. These findings call for relying less on continuity tests and, instead, thinking more about how subjects react to the treatment to modify their , how to design the treatment to lessen manipulation, and what to take as the desired treatment effect.     

Do Rising Top Incomes Spur Economic Growth? Evidence From OECD Countries Based on a Novel Identification Strategy

We investigate the causal relationship between the growth rate of top income shares and economic growth in 12 OECD economies for the period 1950–2010. To analyze patterns of short- and long-run causality, we build upon recent advances in structural-vector autoregressive modeling of non-Gaussian systems. This framework allows us to discriminate between rival transmission channels by means of dependence tests, since independent shocks are unique for a particular causation pattern. We consider the share of income accruing to the top 1 percent (1), to the next 9 percent (9), and to the top decile (10). While structural models display considerable heterogeneity across countries, mean group and pooled results strongly favor a specific transmission pattern. In particular, 1 has a long-run positive impact on economic development. This result, which is also confirmed by identified impulse-response functions, is particularly evident for the post-1980 period.     

Strategy-proof size improvement: is it possible?*

The number of assigned agents (i.e., size) is an important parameter in object allocations. While size maximality clashes with individual rationality and strategy-proofness, it can still be possible to increase the size over a mechanism while keeping these properties. To pursue this research, we devise a size comparison criterion to investigate the possibility of size increase. A mechanism $\psi$ size-wise dominates another mechanism $\varphi$ if the latter never assigns more agents than the former, and at some problem, $\psi$ assigns more agents than $\varphi$. We obtain arguably mild conditions for a mechanism to not be dominated size-wise by an individually rational and strategy-proof mechanism. Moreover, whenever there are at least as many objects as the total number of agents, we find conditions, different from those previously mentioned, for a mechanism to not be dominated size-wise by an individually rational and group strategy-proof mechanism. These results have implications for deferred-acceptance, top trading cycles, efficiency-adjusted deferred-acceptance, serial dictatorship, and Boston mechanisms.     

Reworking wild bootstrap-based inference for clustered errors

Cluster-robust inference is increasingly common in empirical research. With few clusters, inference is often conducted using the wild cluster bootstrap. With conventional bootstrap weights the set of valid $P$-values can create ambiguities in inference. I consider several modifications to the bootstrap procedure to resolve these ambiguities. Monte Carlo simulations provide evidence that both a new 6-point bootstrap weight distribution and a kernel density estimation approach improve the reliability of inference. A brief empirical example highlights the implications of these findings.     

Updating Beliefs Under Risk and Uncertainty

It is possible to represent decision makers’ beliefs on the algebra , rather than alone. Doing so allows us to represent decision makers’ perceptions of risk on one part of the algebra, and their perceptions of uncertainty on the other. This paper shows that such beliefs can be updated in a ‘Bayesian’ manner and that the resulting representation of beliefs is reasonable relative to some other approaches. The model of belief formation and decision making is then used to explain some instances of anomalous economic behaviour.