Proper scoring rules for general decision models

If a decision maker whose behavior conforms to the max-min expected utility model is faced with a scoring rule for a subjective expected utility decision maker, she will always announce a probability belonging to her set of priors; moreover, for any prior in the set, there is a scoring rule inducing the agent to announce that prior. We also show that on the domain of Choquet expected utility preferences with risk neutral lottery evaluation and totally monotone capacities, proper scoring rules do not exist. This implies the non-existence of proper scoring rules for any larger class of preferences (CEU with convex capacities, multiple priors).     

Some general results on the metric rationalization for social decision rules

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, to provide a transparent characterization of the family of metrizable social decision rules. Second, to provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for a reasonable metric rationalization. Theorem 1 establishes that the class of metrizable social decision rules is uniquely characterized by a variant of the well-known Pareto condition. Theorem 2 establishes that positional rules can be characterized in terms of a special class of additively decomposable quasi-metric rationalizations. Theorem 3 characterizes strong positional rules in terms of reasonable metric rationalizations.     

The structure of coalitional power under probabilistic group decision rules

The paper extends the work of S. Barbera and H. Sonnenschein on probabilistic social welfare functions by permitting quasi-transitive and/or acyclic probabilistic social preferences. Allowing for quasi-transitivity it is shown that the social decision rule is characterized by a subadditive veto power structure. Gibbard's result on oligarchy is shown to be a special case. Similarly, Sen's theorem on Paretian Liberals is shown to be implied by the power structure in the acyclic case.     

Choice under complete uncertainty: axiomatic characterizations of some decision rules

Summary. We provide characterizations of four new rules for individual decision-making under complete uncertainty. They are what we call the min-max rule, the max-min rule, the lexicographic min-max rule and the lexicographic max-min rule. These rules provide orderings of the sets of possible outcomes associated with uncertain prospects. They provide significant alternatives to commonly-used rules that focus on worst outcomes or best outcomes only, and lexicographic versions of those rules. Received: August 20, 1998; revised version: November 3, 1999     

Cost-benefit rules in general disequilibrium

The consequences of imbalances in markets for goods and factors are the prime issues in many project evaluations. This is so in evaluations of measures like migration, manpower training programmes and plant locations. In the present paper a general disequilibrium model of a small open economy is used to generate evaluation rules to be used when markets do not clear through price adjustments.     

Redistribution Policies under Capital Market Imperfection

We establish the existence and stability of the long‐run wealth distribution in a credit constrained economy by applying the monotonicity condition developed by H. Hopenhayn and E. Prescott. There should emerge an egalitarian society in which all families experience upward and downward mobility, although a society of persistent inequality may occur in which rich entrepreneurs and poor lenders remain immobile between classes. The speed of transition from the latter to the former is shown to depend on the design of redistribution policies. Simulation results show that this occurs more rapidly when the government favours relatively rich lenders. JEL Classification Numbers: D31, G33, O12.     

Understanding the decision rules for 3D printing adoption

ABSTRACT

While 3D printing is a radically different manufacturing method based on advanced technologies, it has not been adopted to-date with as much alacrity as was originally expected. A variety of hidden rules may influence the broad adoption of this novel technology. The purpose of this study is to explore the decision rules for 3D printing adoption from an organisational perspective. Hybrid approaches are proposed to integrate the technology-organisation-environment (TOE) framework and the rough set theory (RST) in order to generate the decision rule and the determinants for 3D printing adoption. An empirical study on manufacturing enterprises in Taiwan is subsequently carried out, with the results revealing a considerable amount of meaningful information that may therefore be useful in the context of management.     

Multi-valued decision rules and coalitional non-manipulability: Two possibility theorems

In this paper we show that under the restriction that the individual's sincere preference orderings are linear (strict), there exists a fairly wide class of coalitionally non-manipulable democratic decision rules. These positive results are established without any restriction on the pairwise choice. It is also shown that the possibility of manipulation even by a single individual arises once he adopts a pessimistic approach in comparing two different sets of outcomes which reflect his attitude to risk.     

Optimal fishery harvesting rules under uncertainty

This paper derives the optimal fishery harvest policy in a real-option model with a stochastic logistic growth process, harvest-sensitive output price, and both fixed and variable harvesting costs. The policy specifies the harvest trigger and harvest size, while outputs from the model include the value of the fishery and the risk of extinction. The optimal policy is illustrated with data from the Pacific Halibut Fishery. For this particular case, the optimal policy recommends harvesting when the fish stock rises to about three-quarters the environmental carrying capacity, and the amount harvested should be approximately a quarter of the prevailing stock. This harvesting policy maximizes the value of the fishery, and importantly, the resulting risk of extinction is negligible. We also carry out some sensitivity analysis to see how the optimal policy (and the resulting fishery value and risk of extinction) change when the input parameters are varied, particularly the ecological parameters intrinsic growth rate and volatility of the stock, and also the economic parameters that have been ignored in previous papers (price sensitivity and fixed cost). If the optimal policy is followed, the risk of extinction will be negligible, except for very low growth rate and high volatility.     

Voting for Redistribution under Desert‐Sensitive Altruism*

We endow individuals who differ in skills and tastes for working, with altruistic preferences for redistribution in a voting model where a unidimensional redistributive parameter is chosen by majority voting in a direct democracy. When altruistic preferences are desert‐sensitive (i.e., when there is a reluctance to redistribute from the hard‐working to the lazy), we show that lower levels of redistribution emerge in political equilibrium. We provide empirical evidence that preferences for redistribution are not purely selfish, and that desert‐sensitive motivations play a significant role. We estimate that preferences for redistribution are significantly more desert‐sensitive in the US than in Europe.     

《2010通则》项下FOB、CFR、CIF三种贸易术语的比较及选用

国际贸易是不同国家和地区之间商品和劳务的交换活动,贸易术语则是国际贸易发展到一定历史阶段的产物。贸易术语是签订合同的基础,是可以明确国际货物买卖的交货条件和价格构成的专门用语。FOB、CFR、CIF是当今贸易实务中运用最广泛的三种主要贸易术语,所以,引入案例剖析《2010通则》项下三种术语的异同,并在此基础上提出具体的术语选用策略。     

Structure of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules with quasi-transitive individual preferences

The paper investigates the structure of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules with unrestricted domain under the assumption that individual weak preference relations are reflexive, connected, and quasi-transitive. Among other results, neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules on this domain are characterized for alternative social rationality assumptions.     

Identification of decision rules in experiments on simple games of proposal and response

Experimental economics shares with econometrics the objective of inference on decision processes from data on observed behavior. However, experimentalists and econometricians have gone about their research in different ways, the former mainly using exploratory modes of analysis and the latter stressing formal inference on the distribution of decision rules that yield observed choices. An important concern of econometric research has been to determine the identifiability of agents’ decision rules when choice data are combined with various forms of other information. This paper examines the identifiability of decision rules from experimental data on choices in simple games of proposal and response.     

Sequentially consistent rules of choice under complete uncertainty

This work analyzes the problem of individual choice under complete uncertainty. In this context, each alternative action consists of a set of different possible outcomes with no associated probability distribution. The work examines and defines a class of rules such that: (a) the evaluation of sets (actions) follows a certain procedural pattern; and (b) an assumption of sequential contraction consistency, which is an adaptation of Sen's α condition, is satisfied. In this framework, some results of characterization show that several well-known rules for comparing sets of outcomes can be reinterpreted in procedural terms.     

Optimal money supply rules under asymmetric objective criteria

This paper examines the derivation and properties of optimal money supply rules when such rules are chosen to minimize a loss function with asymmetric properties. Optimal money supply rules derived under symmetric and asymmetric objective criteria are compared under alternative expectations scenarios. When shocks have no impact on variables in the loss function, the optimal rule under a symmetric objective criterion is then also optimal under an asymmetric objective criterion. When shocks have some impact on variables in the loss function, the optimal policy rule will be different under the alternative criteria.Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the Seventh Analytic Economics Workshop, Australian National University, to the Australasian Meetings of the Econometrics Society, University of New England, and to seminars at the University of Waikato, the University of Canterbury at Christchurch, and the University of Guelph. The author is grateful to participants in those sessions for helpful comments. Particular thanks go to Louis Christofides, John Fender, Rod Maddock, Adrian Pagan, John Pitchford, and Larry Taylor for helpful discussions. The author is also grateful to the editor and two anonymous referees of this Journal for their constructive comments and criticisms. Of course, any remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the author.