The impact of transportation cost uncertainty on urban structure

Under an uncertain transportation cost, residential choice is made before the actual state of the world reveals itself. Formally, this resembles the theory of saving under uncertainty. Exploring this resemblance, we investigate the effect on urban structure of introducing uncertainty in transportation cost. Our main conclusion is that risk does not necessarily have the same effect on the city that an increase in transportation cost does in the deterministic case. If the utility function obeys the ‘principle of decreasing risk aversion to concentration’, introducing risk causes the urban area to contract (as in the case of an increasing transportation cost), but the equilibrium utility level may either increase or decrease. If, on the other hand, utility does not satisfy the above principle, introducing risk causes the utility level to decline (as if the case of an increasing transportation cost), but the urban area may either expand or contract.     

Market structure and the value of growth

In line with theory suggested by Miller and Modigliani (1961), this paper finds generally positive and statistically significant effects of growth on the current market value of the firm over the 1974–90 period. This intuitive result is not surprising, but the lack of a simple link between the valuation effects of growth and market structure considerations is noteworthy. Importantly, the value of future growth options appears to be closely tied to the firm's ongoing investment in advertising and R&D intangible capital. On the other hand, high current market share does not appear to offer any clear advantage in terms of a firm's ability to expand upon current success. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

不确定性视角下战略联盟治理结构的选择

随着后危机时代的到来,不确定因素日益增多,如何有效应对各种不确定性成为众多企业关注的焦点。战略联盟就是一种能有效缓冲不确定性的中间组织,而联盟治理结构的选择又是战略联盟研究中的重要问题。本文从不确定性的视角出发,通过分析联盟内外部不确定性和不同治理结构的特点,从不确定性、企业态度和企业行为三个层面展开,提出战略联盟治理结构选择的分析框架。最后以中国平安保险公司银保合作模式的演变进行印证,研究结果具有较强的理论和现实意义。     

Market structure determinants of performance for independent supermarkets

We create a novel dataset by merging Nielsen TDLinx data with the results of a survey of supermarket managers. We study the determinants of store performance for independent supermarkets, as measured by sales per square foot, paying particular attention to local market structure. The results show a negative and significant impact of market concentration on independent supermarket performance, which is robust to model specification. We also identify a number of format‐specific impacts and performance drivers such as store characteristics, all of which motivate future research.     

Quantity and price controls by the firm under demand uncertainty and welfare implications

A monopoly facing an uncertain demand can affect its profit distribution through the choice of ex ante controls. This paper compares two modes of behavior - price-setting and quantity-setting - in the context of a mean-variance model. The main results are: (a) With nonlinear cost, the monopoly will not be indifferent between the two modes. In the particular case of quadratic cost, conditions for the dominance of price-setting over quantity-setting behavior are derived. (b) Whereas it is well-known that the risk averse, quantity-setting monopoly will produce less under uncertainty than under certainty (or risk neutrality), the price-setting monopoly increases its expected output when faced by uncertain demand, possibly exceeding even the competitive output under uncertainty. (c) Using expected social surplus as a welfare criterion, price-setting emerges as the welfare-dominant behavior when there is a conflict between the privately and the socially preferred modes. (d) Finally, there exist conditions where price-setting monopolies welfare-dominate a competitive industry facing the same random demand.     

The construction of a firm's governance structure in a setting of uncertainty

Why does the firm look the way it does? Why does it have the structures it has? In particular, what is the function of the board of directors? Many papers have tried, and failed, to link the board's structure to the performance of the firm. Might the board have an alternative rationale for existence? In this paper, I explore the possibility of the board being used as a signaling device. The management, having information about the state of the world the investor does not, constructs a signal (the board of directors) to promote efficiency in an uncertain world. The construction of the board signals the state of the world to the investor, reducing the uncertainty, and thereby attracting necessary capital to the firm. I then examine the size of the signal with respect to other key firm characteristics. I find that the size of the signal diminishes as investors become more concentrated. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Economic policy uncertainty and capital structure choice: Evidence from China

This paper studies how economic policy uncertainty affects corporate capital structure for Chinese listed firms from 2003 to 2013. We show that as the degree of economic policy uncertainty increases, firms tend to lower their leverage ratios. However, firms that are from regions with lower degrees of marketization, are state-owned or have prior bank-firm relationships mitigate the negative effect of policy uncertainty. Moreover, we provide consistent evidence that this negative effect is sourced from the deterioration of the external financing environment. We also find that firms adjust their financing structures by using more trade credit when economic policy uncertainty increases. Our results are robust to sample selection, data frequency, model specification and endogeneity.     

Market domain and structure in regional manufacturing instability

A decomposition of regional sectoral manufacturing employment variances is used as a basis for allocating instability to the markets in which the instability originates, including national, regional and internal. The effects of such attributes of industry structure as market power and economies of scale upon manufacturing sector instability is also investigated. Using data for Arizona over the years 1965–1985, 43% of Arizona's manufacturing instability is attributable to instability in national markets. The hypothesis that Arizona's instability can be attributed to market power differentials is rejected, but the effect of scale economy differentials is supported.     

Manufacturer collusion: Strategic implications of the channel structure

We investigate how the structure of the distribution channel affects tacit collusion between manufacturers. When selling through a common retailer, we find—in contrast to the conventional understanding of tacit collusion that firms act to maximize industry profits—that colluding manufacturers strategically induce double marginalization so that retail prices are above the monopoly level. This lowers industry profits but increases the profit share that manufacturers appropriate from the retailer. Comparing common distribution with independent (exclusive) distribution, we show that the latter facilitates collusion. Despite this result, common retailing leads to lower welfare because a common retailer monopolizes the downstream market. For the case of independent retailing, we also demonstrate that contract offers that are observable to the rival retailer are not necessarily beneficial for collusive purposes.     

汽车备件物流的市场结构与前景

近年来,随着中国汽车保有量的急剧增长,中国汽车后市场也进入快速发展时期。所谓汽车后市场,是指汽车销售形成以后,围绕汽车使用过程中的各种服务,它涵盖了消费者买车后所需要的一切服务。也就是说,汽车从售出到报废的过程中,围绕汽车售后使用环节中各种后继需要和服务而产生的一系列交易活动的总称。有统计数据显示,2010年,仅中国汽车售后配件市场规模预计已经达到     

Market structure,common ownership,and coordinated manager compensation

We study oligopolistic competition in product markets where the firms' quantity decisions are delegated to managers. Some firms are commonly owned by shareholders such as index funds, whereas the other firms are owned by independent shareholders. Under such an asymmetric ownership structure, the common owners have an incentive to coordinate when designing the manager compensation schemes. This implicit collusion induces a less aggressive output behavior by the coordinated firms and a more aggressive behavior by the noncoordinated firms. The profits of the noncoordinated firms are increasing in the number of coordinated firms. The profits of the coordinated firms exceed the profits without coordination if at least 80% of the firms are commonly owned.     

Investment and capital structure decisions of foreign subsidiary with international debt shifting and exchange rate uncertainty

This paper examines the impact of international debt shifting and exchange rate uncertainty on investment and capital structure decisions of foreign subsidiary. We find that debt shifting induces earlier investment, earlier default, higher leverage, and larger ex ante firm value of foreign subsidiary. When debt shifting is not so costly, the optimal leverage of foreign subsidiary increases as the tax rate differential increases. Moreover, when the correlation between exchange rate and foreign cash flow uncertainties is positive (negative, respectively), foreign investment advances as exchange rate uncertainty increases (decreases) as well as the correlation increases. These results reveal that the impact of debt shifting and exchange rate uncertainty on investment and capital structure policies cannot be ignored, supporting existing empirical findings.     

Market structure,countervailing power and price discrimination: The case of airports

A number of interesting policy questions have arisen regarding airport landing fees. For example, what is the impact of joint ownership of airports? Does airline countervailing power stop airports raising fees? Should airports be prohibited, as an EU directive intends, from charging differential input prices to airlines? We set out a model of upstream airports and downstream airlines with varying countervailing power and pricing structures. Our major findings are: (a) an increase in upstream concentration or in the degree of differentiation between airports always increases the landing fee; (b) the effect of countervailing power, via an increase in downstream concentration, lowers landing fees, but typically does not pass through to consumers; (c) with Cournot competition, uniform landing fees are always higher than discriminatory fees.     

Global financial uncertainty

We estimate a novel measure of global financial uncertainty (GFU) with a dynamic factor framework that jointly models global, regional, and country-specific factors. We quantify the impact of GFU shocks on global output with a VAR analysis that achieves set identification via a combination of narrative, sign, ratio, and correlation restrictions. We find that the contraction in world output during the Great Recession would have been 13% milder in absence of GFU shocks. We also find support for a global finance uncertainty multiplier: the more global financial conditions deteriorate after a GFU shock, the larger the world output contraction is.     

Multibidding game under uncertainty

This paper considers situations in which a group of agents has to decide whether to carry out a given public project or its alternative when agents hold private information. I use the budget-balanced multibidding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein in Am Econ Rev 5:1577–1587, 2002) according to which the game to be played by participants has only one stage and simple rules that can be applied in a wide range of situations. It is shown that the symmetric equilibria of the multibidding game deliver ex-post efficient outcomes if the number of agents is two, for any underlying symmetric distribution characterizing uncertainty, or is very large.     

Consistent choice under uncertainty

Suppose ex post preferences are defined upon prizes and ex ante preferences are defined upon lotteries. Then the consistent choice of decision rules reigns whenever ex post optimality is equivalent to ex ante optimality. This essay provides a necessary and sufficient condition for consistent choice in terms of revealed preferences. Indeed, ex ante revealed preferences must be induced from ex post revealed preferences in a manner which requires them to satisfy the independence axiom from expected utility theory.     

Market structure and spells of employment and unemployment: Evidence from the construction sector in Egypt

This paper investigates the links between market structure and spells of employment and unemployment in the construction sector in Egypt using an augmented job search framework. Two key features of the model are the reservation frontier which allows for a trade-off between wages and expected duration of employment, and the dependency of unemployment durations on expected employment durations and expected wages. These, as well as conjectures concerning the influence of demand-side forces obtained from the expressions for the transition rates out of employment and unemployment, are examined using Weibull, log-logistic and generalized gamma parameterizations of the hazard rate. The parametric assumptions are exploited to resolve problems associated with selectivity and use of generated regressors.     

The uncertainty challenge of contingent collaboration

Contingent knowledge workers will play an increasingly important role in organisational success as workers transition in and out of project‐based innovation teams with more frequency. Our research finds that collaborators in the contingent, high‐skill workforce face uncertainty challenges to their work that are unique from the independent, contingent professionals more often studied. The article proposes a theoretical framework of uncertainty to guide us in understanding collaborative contingent knowledge workers’ work experience. Interviews with postdoctoral researchers reveal four findings about the influence of these highly uncertain work environments on collaborative contingent knowledge workers – collaboration isolation, frustrated independence, performance anxiety and internalised blame. Perhaps most concerning is that the workers internalise the negative impacts as personal failings instead of recognising them as consequences of a poorly designed work environment. This study argues for the need to manage and mitigate different sources of uncertainty to avoid creating an unnecessary burden on contingent knowledge workers, and to enable a sustainable, contingent knowledge workforce.