The crisis of mass integration: on the development of political repression in Federal Germany

The aim of this essay is to investigate the bases and the specific forms of the development of the political repression which can be clearly observed at the present time in West Germany. The principal fact to be explained is that this development is being implemented by a social democratic-liberal government coalition, which leaves the institutions of the bourgeois-democratic system untouched and receives backing from the Trade Unions. Current attempts to explain this phemomenon, such as the theory of a 'new fascism', have proved to be inadequate. The essay begins by providing a brief overview of the theoretical starting point adopted and proceeds to sketch the economic, social and political conditions for successful mass integration in developed capitalist societies. The increase in repressive tendencies in the state apparatus is traced back to the specific forms in which the institutions for mass integration have failed to fulfil their roles, the main basis of which is to be found in the development of the current economic and social crisis. The most important tendencies in the economic development of the FRG and the particular structures of its political and administrative system are presented in order to validate this thesis. The decisive moment of political destablization can be seen in the growth of autonomous political movements outside the sphere of established institutions. These movements constitute an increasing threat to the existing institutional system of mass integration. The development of repression which has occurred in response to this is directed at a preventive safeguarding of the existing apparatuses for mass integration and at preserving the state's apparatus for the exercise of force as a crisis-reserve. This repression, which has not yet taken the form of the open use of force against the mass of the population—in particular established workers' organizations—is primarily directed against dissident individuals and groups within the state and ideological apparatuses, and against initial steps towards autonomous political organizations and forms of economic—political representation which are not based on the acceptance or granting of concessions.     

Democracy and adaptation to economic and technological change: Is the British political system capable of adjusting?

Political systems provide the framework for organizational and technological change. Democratic systems are in some respects more open to economic and social adjustment than non-democratic systems; but the conflicting demands of entrenched interests and competition among parties for votes themselves create obstacles to adaptation.Britain's political system is the most stable in Western Europe, but it is also (after Italy) the one which is showing most signs of strain. How far is political stability a source of strength or of weakness under conditions of rapid economic and technological change? What aspects of Britain's current political difficulties are common to all democracies (as Sam Brittan argued in a classic study), or to all European social welfare economies, and what aspects are peculiar to our system alone? After five years of the most self-consciously radical government which Britain has had since 1945, how successful has our current government been in promoting economic and social change, while resisting any changes in our political system?It is argued that there has been a negative interaction between repeated efforts to transform Britain's industrial structure, and industrial relations, for example, and the obstacles to change posed by a restricted and centralised political system. Other illustrations of the interaction between political structure and policy output are taken from the evolution of Britain's relations with the European Community, from the management of industrial collaboration with other governments, and from attempts to reform the finances of local government. Britain's experience is compared and contrasted with those of the United States, France, Germany and Japan.     

Boards must take charge in new age

Rapid change demands that the traditionally passive duties of the board of directors of non-profit organizations be replaced by a more assertive role, the author says. Facing new political and economic realities, volunteer organizations will have to adjust to increasing demands for services, and reductions in government funds in which the board of directors can be a strong, guiding force.     

政府规模、政府支出增长与经济增长关系的非线性研究

本文运用面板平滑转换回归模型(PSTR),在非线性的框架下对政府规模与经济增长关系的渐进演变展开深入研究,并对可能引发两者关系结构性转变的警戒政府规模进行有效估算。研究结果表明,政府规模与经济增长之间存在着非线性关系,即随着政府规模的逐步增大,由于税负增加等因素的影响,使得政府支出增加所产生的负效应影响逐步凸显,而政府规模进一步扩大并超过警戒水平时,过度拥挤的政府支出对经济增长将由促进作用转变为阻碍作用。研究还发现,尽管我国政府支出增长与经济增长的关系参数值有所下降,但由于基础设施落后,公共物品与公共服务供给仍然相对不足,政府支出的增加仍有助于促进经济的进一步发展。     

THE POLITICAL EMBEDDEDNESS OF PRIVATE ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS*

Governments are able to manipulate economic transactions in order to achieve foreign policy goals. This article addresses the question: can managers of multinational enterprises (MNEs) structure economic transactions in ways that will limit the costs resulting from government intervention? Using a transaction cost framework, the efficiency of alternative structures (exporting, joint ventures, licensing, or wholly owned subsidiaries) for protecting a firm's interests are assessed. We argue that the traditional focus on the dyadic relationship between supplier and buyer misses sources of transaction costs; by conceptualizing economic transactions as embedded in a political context, additional sources of transaction costs are revealed. We examine three cases of home government intervention in US MNE transactions with the Soviet Union. We find that the full range of structural alternatives is affected by government sanctions, although sanctions are imposed on exporting relationships first and removed last. We find that MNEs are, therefore, beginning to insulate international transactions by making their overseas subsidiaries more independent of US technology and supplies with the hope that the US government will be less likely to impose its will extraterritorially by intervening in foreign subsidiaries’private economic transactions.     

基于政治锦标赛制的地方官员竞争行为分析

在分析政治晋升锦标赛制度的内涵及其实施条件的基础上,通过构建我国地方官员的总效用函数,探讨了地方官员的综合利益。利用政治晋升负外部性模型,分析了中央政府主要以经济产出作为考核地方官员的政治晋升制度,必然导致竞争有余、合作不足的结果,最后有针对性总结了晋升锦标赛制度的积极性与局限性。     

转轨经济条件下战略行为选择及转换研究

非市场资源对企业的非市场策略、行为以及绩效都具有十分重要的作用。在转轨经济条件下,尽管国有企业高管人员到政府任职不是企业主动行为,不符合企业政治策略的范畴,却能帮助企业形成相对于其他竞争对手的独特优势地位。当原企业高管人员到政府任职后,特别是担任企业所处行业的主管部门负责人后,会将在企业中所形成的认知模式转换为行业的管制政策,导致其此前所任职的企业必然形成一定的先发优势。本文从非市场资源的角度,提出了转轨经济条件下国有企业战略行为选择与转换的原因,以及竞争优势来源的新解释。     

债务率、偿债压力与地方债务的经济增长效应

研究目标：中国地方政府债务对于经济增长的门限效应。研究方法：基于债务率,即债务存量与地方政府综合财力的比值的视角,利用中国30个省份2010~2014年年底的地方债务余额数据,对地方债务的经济增长效应进行了实证研究。研究发现：中国地方债务存在明显的经济增长门限效应：当债务率高于112%左右之后,原本正向显著的经济增长促进作用基本趋近于无,而其作用渠道可以明确为如下传导机制,债务率高企带来地方政府偿债压力从而影响经济发展导向的财政支出。研究创新：引入债务率指标并基于偿债压力视角分析了地方债务对于经济增长的作用机制。研究价值：对于我国地方政府债务的管控治理和风险防范,具有重要的参考价值。     

Federal Water Resources Policy and Decision-Making: Their Formulation Is Essentially a Political Process Conditioned by Government Structure and Needs

A bstract . The effects that politics, government structure , and economic standards have upon federal water resources planning are examined. Water resources policy decisions are treated as a product of political demands which, in turn, are examined as a product of the direct or indirect stakes, or perception thereof, in a policy. Government structure also affects decisions, since it affects political access and, subsequently, power as well as the administrative capacity of government. Economic standards , such as a requirement that water projects contribute to national economic development , arise within a political context. Formulation of federal water resources policy is essentially a political process that is conditioned to some extent by government structure and planning standards such as economic requirements. Thus, recommendations to improve the product of this process must take into account its essential nature. Examples are drawn from the western reclamation and water pollution experiences.     

Economic integration and government revenue from financial repression

We study a relationship between economic openness via financial and trade integration and government revenue from financial repression. An implicit budgetary saving, the financial repression revenue, as measured by the stock of government domestic debt multiplied by the difference between effective foreign and domestic interest rate, has declined significantly from the 1980s into the 2000s across the upper-income, the middle-income, and the low-income developing countries. While we find that both the financial and trade openness have a negative association with the financial repression revenue in the panel of countries, the effect of financial openness is stronger and the empirical correlations depend on the quality of governmental and budgetary management.     

Political Variables in Cross-country Growth Analysis

The recent boom in cross-country growth analysis has renewed the empirical interest in political sources of economic growth. A large number of studies have tested political variables in growth regressions and a very heterogenous set of variables has been proposed to measure economically relevant differences in the political systems of countries. This paper distinguishes five categories of relevant political variables: democracy, government stability, political violence, policy volatility, and subjective perception of politics. For each of these categories, the specification, testing method, and results of the most relevant studies are presented and are critically discussed. The paper concludes that measures of democracy are least successful and measures of policy volatility and subjective perception of politics most successful as explanatory variables in cross-country growth regressions.     

Decomposing real and deflator-based government growth: an application to the American states

In recent years the question of how the size of government should be measured has been an unresolved issue in the research program on government growth. Employing the simple ratio of government spending to total economic output in their measures, most scholars have failed to recognize the different inflation rates which characterize the public and private sectors, as well as the fact that observed government growth may be attributable both to the effects of differential deflators and to increases in the scope of government activity. In this paper I present a simple geometric formulation for decomposing government growth into real growth and deflator-based components. Although the utility of this method is illustrated using data from two American states (New York and Florida), the technique has broad applicability for decomposing government growth into real and deflator components for a wide range of political systems for which data are available.     

Europe: single market or political union?

The choice is between single market and political union over-simplified. Even an effective single market requires some political integration. So too does the management of a single currency, advantageous in itself. Neither requires a 'European economic government.' Beyond this, the peoples of Europe increasingly question the need for further supra-nationalism.'Political union,' in the form which frightens people, will not happen. Britain must play a full part in shaping the EU and its unique institutional structures, and prepare to join the euro-zone as soon as sensibly possible.     

Sounding the alarm: Impact of political instability on growth and fiscal health of the Indian economy

A noticeable change evident in the Indian political scenario since the eighties has been a sharp rise in the frequency with which governments have been ousted out of power. This augurs well for Indian democracy as it reflects a ‘political awakening’. Such changes in government, after an election reflect ‘orderly’: transfer of power and are inherent to the democratic form of governance. However, a close scrutiny of the political scenario at the state government level shows that there have been very frequent changes in government between elections. A high frequency of changes in government could be expected to result in frequent reversals or modifications in policy decisions and have a destabilizing effect on the economy. The present study is an empirical exercise undertaken at the level of state governments. It makes a first attempt to examine the impact of political instability on growth and on the fiscal health of the Indian economy. Received: September 25, 2000/Accepted: January 11, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" Sincere thanks to Professors Ajit Karnik and Abhay Pethe for their comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank the two anonymous referees for their insightful comments and suggestions, which have been of great help. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Sterling and the Euro

The question of whether and when sterling should join Economic and Monetary Union is likely to be one of the key battlegrounds in the next election campaign. In this article, Erik Britton and Scott Livermore argue that there is no clear economic case in favour of sterling's entry to EMU. However, if as the government asserts – the political will to join exists, steps could be taken now, adjusting the mix of macroeconomic policy, to ensure that convergence was likely shortly after the next election.     

General Election: How would the parties' plans impact the outlook?

• Our modelling suggests that, based upon the three main parties’ economic and fiscal plans, the outcome of the General Election would have a modest, but not immaterial, impact on the UK's economic and fiscal outlook. The Liberal Democrat plans would deliver the strongest GDP growth, followed by Labour, but both would also involve higher debt servicing costs and a higher level of government debt than the plans of the Conservatives.
• In our view these premiums on debt and borrowing costs are so small that it is very difficult to argue that the UK should pursue a more austere fiscal policy and reject the opportunity of stronger growth. But with the latest opinion polls suggesting that it is likely that the next government will be either a minority administration, or a coalition consisting of three or more parties, it is most likely that we will ultimately see some combination of the main parties' plans enacted.
• The experience of 2010 suggests that such political uncertainty could mean that we see several bouts of market nervousness between now and May 7th, particularly in equity markets. However, such turbulence is likely to be short‐lived, providing that the resulting government is perceived to be strong and durable. Even a multi‐party coalition may not be such a bad thing, particularly if it watered down the more contentious policies of the main parties. The worst‐case scenario would be a weak minority government which is both unable to pass any meaningful legislation and unable to seek a fresh mandate. Such a scenario could seriously undermine confidence amongst investors and firms.

     

秦虹:未来十年房地产随城市化重质减速

未来十年中国政府主动调整经济增长速度,有意识地控制货币发行总量,城市化进展的速度会有所下降。中国没有了房改扩张市场的制度安排,以及大量建设保障性住房分流市场需求,所以未来十年中国房地产企业有空间、会增长,但是增速会放慢,开发企业需要适应政策和市场变化,积极的自我调整和转型。     

Managing change strategically: the technical, political, and cultural keys.

Managing strategic change is increasingly a way of life for organizations faced with the turbulent economic, political, and cultural forces of the 1980s. To manage such change, organizations and their managers will have to confront basic questions regarding the organization's technical, political, and cultural foundations. The technical questions include: What business(es) should we be in? How should we be organized to accomplish our strategy? What kinds of people do we need, and how will they be acquired, developed, and rewarded? The political questions include: Who gets to influence the mission and strategy of the organization? How is power allocated both vertically and horizontally across the organization? Who gets promoted to what key positions? The cultural questions include: What values and beliefs are necessary to support the organization's strategy? What subcultures are desirable, and should there be an overarching corporate culture? How should the human resources system shape and mold the culture?     

地方政府政绩诉求、政府控制与国有企业税负

以我国2004—2012年A股非金融类地方国有上市公司为研究样本,在区分了省级政府与市级政府控制的基础上,实证检验了各级地方政府不同的政绩诉求对国有企业控制程度是否存在差异及该控制程度对国有企业税负的影响。研究发现：地方政府的政绩诉求（包括财政盈余、相对经济增长率、失业率等）显著影响地方政府对国有企业的控制程度,且省级政府更注重相对经济增长率及失业率,市级政府更关注财政盈余水平;三个政绩诉求中相对经济增长率对政府控制的影响最为显著;地方政府对国有企业的控制程度与企业税负显著正相关;与省级政府相比,市级政府控制的国有企业税负更重。这表明,增加地方国有企业税负是市级地方政府实现其政绩诉求的重要途径。     

The earnings of state government employees in the United States

This paper has presented a theoretical and empirical analysis of wage determination in the state government sector. The theoretical model is based on the assumption that the state government's objective is to maximize its political support. This objective function leads to predictable behavior regarding how state government employment policies react to changes in the state's wealth, income inequality, composition of constituency groups, and voting behavior.The empirical analysis, conducted on the 1970 U.S. Census Public Use Sample, showed that the wage of state government workers shifts as a result of changes in these political factors. In fact, the results indicated that over three-fourths of the interstate variation in the state government wage rate could be explained by the relatively small vector of political variables introduced in this paper.It should be clear, however, that the analysis conducted in this paper is but a first step in the systematic study of state government behavior. There are several areas where further research may lead to useful results. For example, an important determinant of state government behavior is the composition and power of the various constituency groups. In this paper, the empirical analysis concentrated on three obvious constituencies and ignored the power coalitions in the rest of the population. A more complete accounting of all constituencies may uncover additional results regarding the nature of the income redistribution policies conducted by state governments. Such an accounting could, of course, use the large volumes of available data which divide the state budgets into particular functions. Thus a more general framework could match the data available on the composition of the various constituencies with the data available on expenditures in specific functions. It is not unreasonable to expect that such generalizations of the analysis conducted in this paper will lead to important insights into the labor economics of political markets.