Investment decisions and managerial compensation design in the presence of product market rivalry

We consider an economy where firms operate in an imperfectly competitive industry and mutually affect each others’ investment opportunities. Each firm is assumed to face a mutually exclusive choice of investing in either a short‐ or a long‐term project. For example, firm i's commitment to a short‐term project cuts into firm j's market in the short‐term but frees‐up firm j's long‐term market, and vice versa. Our results show that, even in the absence of an owner–manager conflict, the owner anticipates the product market rivalry and optimally compensates their managers with short‐ as well as long‐term compensation. Although the optimal compensation design induces myopic investment decisions, it is shown to be in the owners’ best interest. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Signaling by an informed service provider

We study a service provider, who, at the time of offering a contract, is better informed than the potential client. A service provider that is hired to increase the client's chance of a gain, an “enhancer,” may be better informed of whether the client has a big or small opportunity. A service provider that is hired to reduce the client's chance of a loss, a “problem solver,” may be better informed of whether the client has a big or small problem. We show that an enhancer predominantly offers a contingent contract, while a problem solver predominantly offers a flat fee due to their signaling incentives. This explains the differences in real‐world contracts and also provides a novel explanation for the existence of low‐powered incentive contracts. We evaluate the policy intervention that limits the contingent part of the service providers' contracts.     

Estimation of patent licensing value using a flexible demand specification

A patent owner who is considering licensing its patent to a competitor faces a dilemma. By giving a license to the competitor, the patent owner stands to lose profits due to increased competition. In order to be willing to license, therefore, the patent owner must receive a royalty that at least compensates for these lost profits. The minimum acceptable royalty depends upon the competitive impact the potential licensee's product would have on the patent owner's product. We describe how to estimate econometrically this competitive impact and how a patent owner might use this information to determine the minimum acceptable royalty. We discuss the advantages of using a flexible functional form for the demand system specification that underlies the competitive analysis. Finally, using an empirical example, we illustrate the large differences that can arise between results based on flexible forms versus non-flexible forms.     

Strategic trade policy with bargaining over managerial contracts

This paper re‐examines the well‐known activist regime's inefficiency (governments set export subsidies) in a sales–delegation game with owner–manager bargaining over contracts. Contrary to the received literature, this bargaining process may (a) induce governments to set a tax if products are not too substitute or complements and (b) lead to an efficient (inefficient) equilibrium provided that products are sufficiently differentiated (not too complements). Therefore, unilateral public intervention can be optimal: in case of rival governments' retaliation, under appropriate product competition degrees, welfares are larger than under free trade even for small managers' power. Thus, managerial delegation practices are crucial also for international trade issues.     

Equity and arbitration in major league baseball

Equity theory argues that workers examine their job performance and salaries relative to workers in comparable situations. If compensation is inequitable, workers may adjust their behavior. We test the hypothesis that an arbitration‐eligible player in Major League Baseball is more likely to file for arbitration and/or proceed to an arbitration hearing if he feels he is underpaid relative to his comparison other. Bivariate probit is used to increase efficiency and correct for the sample bias in estimating decision models within the two‐step arbitration process. The results indicate that equity is a significant predictor of a player's unilateral decision to file but is an insignificant determinant of going to a hearing because of offsetting responses to equity by player and owner. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

MANAGEMENT OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVISION: An analysis of the Tele Danmark company 1990–8

The article examines the management of the telecommunications company, Tele Danmark, in the period from 1990 to 1998. Two theoretical perspectives are introduced; a rational-technical perspective and a cultural perspective. The theoretial perspectives are used in the empirical analysis of management strategies inTele Danmark. Three phases are identified: the government enterprise (1990–3); the hybrid organization (1994–7); and the private rider (1998–) when Tele Danmark is fully privatized. The management's strategy is evaluated and the challenges ahead are examined, including life under the new owner, the American company, Ameritech. The article concludes that Tele Danmark's management has achieved its objectives in transforming the company into a modern private communications company.     

The British Home Stores pension scheme: privatised looting?

On entering administration, British Home Stores owed its pension scheme £571 million—a significant employment relations issue of historical wage theft by investor–owner managers. The article locates ‘lawful’ looting of business assets in a framework that builds on Ackerlof and Romer's theory of bankruptcy for profit and connects this to an empirical narrative on business re‐structuring at British Home Stores towards administration.     

Employers' hiring practices,employment protection,and costly search: A vacancy-level analysis

An employer with a vacancy may respond to high search costs by lowering hiring requirements. While such an adjustment increases the employer's chances of filling the vacancy, it also more likely results in a match that terminates when the match is hit by match-specific productivity shocks. Drawing on a novel Slovenian vacancy dataset, we find that employers who are searching to fill temporary positions are more likely to hire underqualified workers when search costs are high. We find that search costs are taken into consideration when employers are searching to fill permanent positions in some specifications but not all. These findings suggest that for employers who are searching to fill a permanent position, the benefits of lowering hiring requirements when search costs are high are likely outweighed by: a) high firing costs if an under-qualified worker is hired on a permanent contract or b) the costs of undertaking a new search later if an under-qualified worker is hired on a temporary contract. These are novel findings about the employers' hiring practices in the presence of employment protection laws and costly search.     

A Test for a Functioning Market Economy: Seton'S Eigenprices of Turkey

We use Seton's eigenprices to see if some evidence can be found in support of the European Commission's official statement that the Turkish economy can be considered as a functioning market economy. Given an input–output flows matrix, there is a unique set of prices for outputs and production factors compatible with final demand, generating demand for factors. The findings based on Turkey's most recent I–O table and comparable I–O matrices for Romania and Poland (two EU members) in 2005 show that price distortions were on average five times larger in Turkey. Hence, based on price distortions alone, there was no solid evidence in support of the statement that Turkey had a functioning market economy.     

External bargaining versus internal manipulation: A theory of managerial delegation

Does the competition mode influence the delegation decisions of the firm owners? By constructing a vertical negotiation game model, we find that under Cournot competition in the downstream market, the downstream firm's owner will not choose delegation, whereas under Bertrand competition, the downstream firm's owner will choose delegation. If the product substitution is relatively large, the adoption of delegation management by the owners of downstream firms under Bertrand competition will bring higher profits. It further shows that compared with the situation of no delegation, delegation management may reverse the social welfare ranking under Bertrand and Cournot competitions.     

Bargaining over Managerial Contracts in Delegation Games: The Generalized Oligopolistic Case

The main purpose of this paper is to disclose the properties of the equilibrium outcomes in the differentiated‐products model with two stages: (i) owner‐shareholders negotiate managerial compensation with their managers that comprises their profits and sales (sales delegation) and (ii) they engage in their market competition. The other purpose of this paper is to study the differentiated goods model in which an owner bargains the managerial compensation with her/his manager that comprises her/his profit and her/his rival's profit (relative performance delegation). We further investigate the situation wherein the firm with sales delegation and the firm with the relative performance delegation coexist. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Virtual IELab – an exercise in replicating part of the EXIOBASE V.2 production pipeline in a virtual laboratory

ABSTRACT

We explore options to replicate the EXIOBASE2 multi-region input–output (MRIO) database in the Virtual IELab cloud-computing laboratory environment. Whereas EXIOBASE2 is constructed using a multi-process reconciliation procedure, we present an alternative compilation technique that uses EXIOBASE2's pre-processed data and final tables in reconciling the IELab MRIO with conflicting raw data information. This approach skips the labour-intensive step of detailing and harmonising country tables. Adherence metrics reveal the EXIOBASE2-based IELab table to be considerably less balanced than the original but with stronger adherence to other constraints data. However, these metrics are not comparable to the original EXIOBASE2 statistics due to the distinctive implementation of constraint sets in the two platforms. IELab's main value-added is its flexibility in tailoring EXIOBASE2-based MRIOs beyond the original recipe. Finally, IELab's global carbon, water and material footprints are shown to be comparable with previously reported resource footprints. In contrast, deviations in land footprints warrant further investigation.     

Questions about the equivalence of market rents and user costs for owner occupied housing

For modern nations, it is recognized as important that temporal and spatial variations in costs for comparable dwelling services are carefully measured. The costs of owner occupied as well as rental housing have important roles to play in both the consumer price index (CPI) and the System of National Accounts (SNA). The 1993 System of National Accounts (SNA93) specifies that a rental value of the housing stock should be included as part of the aggregates for personal consumption, personal income, income of proprietors and value added for the real estate industry. Yet, little attention has been devoted to an underlying commonality of practice: the implicit assumption that housing cost information for either renters or owner occupiers can be used for assessing movements over time and spatial differences in the cost of housing for both renters and owners, after allowing for differences regarding payment for taxes and certain ongoing expenses such as insurance and utilities. But in the real world, are the services that renters and owner occupiers get from their dwellings comparable? Also, for both renters and owner occupiers, are there place-related differences in the services they derive from their dwellings? And if so, what are the implications for official statistics making? These are the questions raised by the empirical results presented in this paper.     

Short‐Term Expectations in Listed Firms: The Effects Of Different Owner Types

We report empirical evidence in line with the disciplining role of different institutional and other owner types in reducing managerial myopia. Using data from a large Nordic survey, we find that companies, to a reasonably high degree, feel that external pressure for a good result in the short‐term generates conflict with the company's long‐term goals. We test for the effect of different ownership types and find that especially in firms with a large and non‐transitory activist or fund as an owner, the perceived pressure for short‐term actions is reduced. In addition, we observe a negative association between firm profitability and short‐term pressure, and we find that younger managers feel significantly more pressure. Firms subject to greater pressure engage in more actions to accommodate that pressure. Again, the impact of a large activist owner is especially beneficial because such firms significantly less often undertake actions that have the potential to destroy value, such as deprioritizing their long‐term investments or R&D.     

R&D spillovers and strategic delegation in oligopolistic contests

Considering oligopolistic contests with R&D spillovers and strategic delegation three results can be obtained: (1) There exist multiple asymmetric equilibria where one owner highly favors sales as a basis for his manager's incentives which drives the other firm out of the market. (2) If R&D spillovers are zero, a managerial firm will have a strong strategic advantage when competing with an entrepreneurial firm. If both owners endogenously decide about delegation, each owner's dominant strategy will be to delegate, given that the manager's reservation value is not too large. (3) If R&D spillovers are maximal, collusive market outcomes become very likely, which makes strategic delegation less important. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

公司管理层权力与银行信贷融资决策

运用中国上市公司2010—2013年相关数据,考察公司管理层权力与公司融资结构及银行信贷资源配置,结果显示：公司的管理层结构及高管层权力是公司融资政策选择和银行信贷资源配置的重要动因,公司管理层权力越大,管理层向银行借入短期借款越多,公司管理层权力与短期借款结构正相关。在债务约束效应下,管理层可能会出于个人任期和控制权私利的原因做出影响公司融资决策的行为,在公司银行信贷融资中表现为银行信贷融资规模与公司管理层权力呈现负相关关系,即管理层权力越大,公司配置的银行信贷资源越少;同时,公司管理层权力中结构权力与所有者权力对公司信贷决策有重要影响。     

Global managers: no longer men alone

The reasons companies give for choosing to include women along with their male managers, how they expect women to contribute once hired, and the levels at which women managers are invited to contribute have been changing rapidly, but subtly, over the last fifty years. Companies' expectations have varied depending on their assumptions about the value to the company of diversity, the value to the company of men's and women's unique contributions, and to belief, or lack thereof, of the possibility of positive synergies. This article explores these issues in the context of global management.     

Study on human resource management in Korea's chaebol enterprise: a case study of Samsung Electronics

Korean chaebol firms have taken advantage of the owner–management system and to date are still enjoying its strength. I discuss the characteristics of human resources management (HRM) systems in the context of Samsung Electronics, Korea's largest chaebol following the Asian crisis of 1997, explaining why the SEC HRM system should be changed and what recent changes have been made, as perceived by both respondents and HR manager interviewees. The study of SEC HRM practices can provide real value to Western companies because it incorporates firm-specific advantages such as network strength, emperor-like power over group-wide management, and an agile decision-making process.     

MNCs in Central,Southern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union: investment decisions and the regulation of employment

This article explores the relationship between the regulation of employment and the decisions of multinational corporations (MNCs) to invest in Central, Southern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. Building on La Porta et al.'s work on legal origin, and its assumptions as to the incompatibility of owner and worker rights, the World Bank's Doing Business reports held that countries with stronger protection for worker rights represented poor destinations for investors. However, is it the case that investors are really deterred by employee rights? Our study investigates actual trends in foreign direct investment (FDI) through an analysis of UNCTAD World Investment Reports. We find that the level of individual and collective rights and social security legislation is not significantly associated with FDI.     

Small businesses and the environment: turning over a new leaf?

Previous studies on the environmental practices of small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) in the UK and beyond have portrayed owner‐managers as laggards who underplay their firm's environmental impacts and resist environmental management due to its perceived cost. Yet a recent cross‐sector survey of 220 UK SMEs suggests that this intransigent stance may be slowly changing. Responses indicate a high percentage of owner‐managers actively involved in recycling, energy efficiency, responsible buying and selling, and efforts to reduce their carbon emissions. Owner‐managers saw it as their responsibility to help solve environmental problems and were reportedly willing to accept the costs of tougher environmental regulations and taxation. Business owners were motivated not just by the ‘push’ of legislation and environmental concern but by the ‘pull’ of potential cost savings, new customers, higher staff retention and good publicity for their firms. The survey also found that owner‐managers had resonance with the Stern Review's (2006) conclusions that the benefits of strong early action on climate change outweigh the costs, and that a transition to a low‐carbon economy will bring opportunities for business growth. This indicates that SMEs may be coming round to the idea that there is a business case for sustainability, although there is still some scepticism on the overall profitability of environmental action. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.