The Role of Information in Building Reputation in an Investment/Trust Game

This article analyses the role of information in building reputation in an investment/trust game. The model allows for information asymmetry in a finitely repeated sender–receiver game and solves for sequential equilibrium to show that if there are some trustworthy managers who always disclose their private information and choose to return a fair proportion of the firm's income as dividend to the investor, then a rational manager will mimic such behaviour in an attempt to earn a reputation for being trustworthy. The rational manager will mimic with probability 1 in the early periods of the game. The investor, too, will invest with probability 1 in these periods. However, in the later periods, the rational manager will mimic with a certain probability strictly less than 1. The probability will be such that it will make the investor indifferent between investing and not investing, and he, in turn, will invest with a probability (strictly less than 1) that will make the rational manager indifferent between mimicking and not mimicking; that is, the game will begin with pure-strategy play but will switch to mixed-strategy play. There is one exception, though: when the investor's ex ante beliefs about the manager's trustworthiness are exceptionally high, the game will continue in a pure strategy, and the switch to mixed-strategy play will never occur. Identical results obtain if the manager's choice of whether to share his private information with the investor is replaced by exogenously imposed information sharing.     

Optimal Loyalty‐Based Management

We study an agency model in which an entrepreneur selects a manager from a candidate set. The selected manager's effort improves the project's potential environment, and is a hidden action. The realized project environment is the entrepreneur's private information. A manager's utility has two components—(i) loyalty, with which the manager values the organization's profit, and (ii) selfishness, with which the manager values the monetary transfer he receives from the entrepreneur. We find that if the manager's task is easy enough, it is optimal to use a purely loyal manager. Otherwise, it can be optimal to use a manager with mixture of loyalty and selfishness—the manager's mixed motivation alleviates the entrepreneur's misrepresenting incentive, and as a result, the output distortion in the optimal contract can be reduced. In addition, when it is optimal to use a manager with mixed motivations, the entrepreneur selects someone who is more selfish than loyal.     

‘We have never been Post-modern’: On the Search of Management Accounting Theory

This paper considers the value that aldermen in Dutch municipalities, who are elected politicians, attach to quantitative output information. The paper especially focuses on the way in which aldermen evaluate the performances of their professional top managers. In the paper the Hopwood evaluation styles, which originally refer to the private sector, are further developed for the public sector. Exploratory field research was conducted in the municipalities of Groningen, Leeuwarden and The Hague. The research shows that the aldermen paid much attention to a manager's activities and the organization's operations and relatively little to outputs. Aldermen did not use an ‘output-constrained’ or an ‘outcome-conscious’ evaluation style. Rather, most of the politicians evaluated the performances of their top managers in a style that is here called an ‘operations-conscious style’. This evaluation style focuses on the activities of managers and the processes of their organization. Quantitative output information plays some part in this evaluation style, but the main question is whether a manager acts as a good ‘facilitator’, i.e. ensures that his organization is functioning well. Besides, important criteria are the way in which a manager deals with short-term problems and with the politicians' opinions and personal wishes.     

Capital allocation to alternatives with a multivariate ladder gamma return distribution

This paper considers investment decision making when returns have a multivariate gamma distribution which has the particular correlation structure of Furman’s ladder gamma distribution. With an exponential utility function It is shown that there is a subset of the candidate investment opportunities to which investment should be allocated. This subset can be readily identified in a two step process that results in a list of candidate investments that is ranked in sequence of decreasing risk. The last investment opportunity on this list will be no risk cash. Investments are then selected from this list in sequence up to a cutoff point that depends on the investors capital and degree of risk aversion. If capital and degree of risk aversion are sufficiently large so that it is optimal to allocate some to no risk cash, then the capital allocated to each risky investment is a constant fraction of the total capital allocated to risky investments irrespective of how risk averse is the investor.     

Information asymmetry,sentiment interactions,and asset price

We develop an asset pricing model with sentiment interactions between institutional and individual investors under the condition of information asymmetry. Our model considers private information and investor sentiment, two imperfections in securities markets, and integrates them into a theoretical model to investigate the role of the interaction between information asymmetry and investor sentiment in asset pricing. We show that the joint effect of private information and investor sentiment deviate the price of risky assets and efficiently explains anomalies in the stock market. Investor sentiment changes the effect of information on the equilibrium price relative to a world where all investors are completely rational. Private information changes the effect of investor sentiment on the equilibrium price in comparison with a scenario with symmetric market information. In addition, the individual investors’ learning and the disclosure of information both allow private information to be better integrated into the price and simultaneously changes the effect of investor sentiment on the equilibrium price.     

The impact of signal dependence and own ability awareness on herding behaviour: a tale of two managers

This model examines the case of managers whose signals, when informative, are perfectly correlated as in the Scharfstein and Stein model [1990. The American Economic Review 80(3): 465–479]. This has a herd increasing impact as it introduces a positive reputation externality. On the other hand, it is also assumed that managers have perfect knowledge of their own ability, an assumption with herd reducing implications. Combining these two offsetting, in terms of herding, assumptions, it is found that a smart manager who plays first will sometimes, but not always, truthfully announce his/her private information. On the other hand, a smart manager who plays second will always report his/her true signal, while a dumb manager who plays second may herd, either on the first manager's action and/or on the prior. It is also found that the more likely a dumb manager who plays second is to herd on the first manager's action, the less likely is a smart manager who plays first to herd on the prior. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Investing in private higher education in developing countries: recent experiences of the International Finance Corporation

Higher education, which provides mainly‘private goods,’is being opened to private investment in many parts of the world. The paper describes the pioneering efforts of the International Finance Corporation in this field. The IFC has approved investments in nine universities, two specialised training centres and two student loan programmes. It is too early to draw firm conclusions about the case for this form of investment, but the paper deals with some of the issues which have arisen and provides some‘guideposts’for evaluating future investments.     

Debt finance and the cost of management ownership: Some elementary results

Increased debt reduces a company's equity base, which reduces the dollar investment a manager must make to hold a given proportion of stock. Therefore, it is often argued, managers' effort incentives are improved by high leverage. This paper shows that while risky debt reduces the cost of providing managers with substantial equity ownership, the cheaper equity captures less of the fruits of the manager's effort. Managers' effort incentives are improved by high debt levels only under quite restrictive conditions. These conditions are more plausible when agency problems are due to a managerial propensity to expand size by investing in negative net present value projects. The results also imply that when debt is increased to reduce the agency costs of free cash flow, the accompanying covenants should allow for substantial cash distributions to shareholders even before bondholder claims are satisfied.     

Private Equity Investments and Disclosure Policy

In the current study, we dynamically analyze unlisted firms' voluntary disclosure decisions around private equity (PE) participation. First, we disentangle the role of disclosure in attracting PE investments. In addition, we examine the extent to which a firm's disclosure policy is affected by the changing corporate setting and intensified corporate governance after having received PE. We find no evidence that firms would employ increased disclosure to signal their quality in the years preceding the PE financing. However, we document a significant switch to increased financial disclosure from the PE investment year onwards, consistent with the hypothesis that PE investor presence positively affects portfolio firms' disclosure decisions. Further, we show that the proportional PE ownership stake is positively related to increased disclosure, but only at very high ownership levels. We explain these results in that both internal and external information demands call for higher public disclosure in PE firms. We conclude that the changing information environment resulting from a PE investment stimulates increased public financial disclosure. Our results contribute to illustrate how an indisputable change in governance resulting from a PE investment affects inter-temporal corporate disclosure decisions in unlisted firms.     

Manager's occupational stress in state-owned and private enterprises in the People's Republic of China

Privatization that has taken place in the People's Republic of China has brought about improved profitability and effectiveness of enterprises. However, it is not known whether employees' occupational stressors and strains in private enterprises would differ from those in state-owned enterprises. This study aims to examine the major sources of manager's occupational stress in private and state-owned enterprises, and comparing the intensity of these stressors and strains. The relationships between stressors and strains were also investigated in both economic sectors. The questionnaires were completed by 234 managers in state-owned enterprises and 179 managers in private enterprises from eight cities of the PRC. The questionnaires were used to measure sources of stress, job satisfaction, and physical and psychological strain. The results showed that managers in private enterprises experienced higher levels of occupational stressors (mainly ‘Organizational structure and climate’ and ‘Relationship with others’) and psychological strains than those in state-owned enterprises. Moreover, ‘Organizational structure and climate’ was also found to be a major stressor when predicting both psychological and physical strain in both economic sectors.     

Venture capital firms’ lead orientation,network position,and selection of familiar syndicate partners

This study explores how a venture capital (VC) firm’s lead orientation (i.e., acting more as a lead investor rather than a follower investor in past syndication investments) influences its selection of familiar syndicate partners. By conducting empirical research that uses detailed information of 11,219 investment deals in China from January 1999 to June 2016, we find that a VC firm’s lead orientation has an inverted U-shaped relationship with its propensity to select familiar syndicate partners. In other words, as a VC firm’s lead orientation increases, its familiarity degree with the partners in the subsequent syndicated investment will first increase and then decrease. In addition, a VC firm’s network centrality and network constraint imposed by the VC network structure both weakens the inverted U-shaped relationship between its lead orientation and the selection of familiar partners. Robustness checks with different measures and samples, together with the instrumental variable approach and the Heckman selection model that address potential endogeneity problems, show the reliability of our findings.     

Does organization capital matter? An analysis of the performance implications of CEO power

Chief executive officer (CEO) power reflects the ability of the CEO to influence the firm's decision-making. Whether the CEO of the firm could manage the firm’s investment assets to support maximizing the efficiency of resource allocation is an important issue. As previous studies found, organization capital is a key intangible asset that improves the firm’s production efficiency and affects long-term performance. This study explores how CEO power affects organization capital investments and how it further affects the efficiency of firm resource allocation. We use the following three variables to measure CEO power: CEO founder, CEO-only insider and CEO duality. Our results indicate that the level of CEO power can influence a firm’s value by controlling the organization capital. When the firm’s CEO is also the founder, the CEO will attempt to increase investments in organization capital to create growth opportunities for the firm, which will therefore increase the firm's value. Specifically, when the company is in financial distress, the powerful CEO's increasing in organizational capital investment will expose the company to greater risk of loss of intangible assets. This result may further increase the company's price volatility.     

Optimal Hedging Strategies and Interactions between Firms

This paper studies corporate risk management in a context of financial constraints and imperfect competition in the product market. The paper shows that interactions between firms affect their hedging strategies. As a general rule, firms’ hedging demands decrease with the correlation between their internal funds and investment opportunities. Moreover, when a firm’s hedging demand is high in the case where investments are strategic substitutes, its hedging demand is low in the case where investments are strategic complements and vice versa.     

The influence of managerial satisfaction on corporate environmental performance and reputation

Organizational studies have widely debated the relationship between job satisfaction and job performance. Some papers have dealt with managerial satisfaction and businesses' performance adopting agency theory to interpret the results. However, no studies have yet considered the relationship between the satisfaction levels of an environmental manager and corporate environmental performance. This paper thus analyses the role played by the environmental manager's satisfaction in enhancing corporate environmental performance and reputation. The paper uses data from a survey of 412 Eco Management and Audit Scheme registered organizations. The results show a positive relationship between managerial satisfaction and environmental performance, whereas no such positive relationship was found when considering eco‐innovation performance. In addition, the environmental manager's satisfaction has a positive and indirect influence on the corporate environmental reputation. These results contribute to the literature on agency theory and aim to extend the debate between job satisfaction and job performance to the sustainable business field.     

‘I Like How You Think’: Similarity as an Interaction Bias in the Investor–Entrepreneur Dyad

Investigating the factors that influence venture capital decision‐making has a long tradition in the management and entrepreneurship literatures. However, few studies have considered the factors that might bias an investment decision in a way that is idiosyncratic to a given investor–entrepreneur dyad. We do so in this study. Specifically, we build from the literature on the ‘similarity effect’ to investigate the extent to which decision‐making process similarity (shared between the investor and the entrepreneur) might bias or otherwise impact the investor's evaluation of a new venture investment opportunity. Our findings suggest venture capitalists evaluate more favourably opportunities represented by entrepreneurs who ‘think’ in ways similar to their own. Moreover, in the presence of decision‐making process similarity, the impacts of other factors that inform the investment decision actually change in counter‐intuitive ways.     

Age-dependent investing: Optimal funding and investment strategies in defined contribution pension plans when members are rational life cycle financial planners

A defined contribution pension plan allows consumption to be redistributed from the plan member's working life to retirement in a manner that is consistent with the member's personal preferences. The plan's optimal funding and investment strategies therefore depend on the desired profile of consumption over the lifetime of the member. We investigate these strategies under the assumption that the member is a rational life cycle financial planner and has an Epstein–Zin utility function, which allows a separation between risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. We also take into account the member's human capital during the accumulation phase of the plan and we allow the annuitisation decision to be endogenously determined during the decumulation phase.We show that the optimal funding strategy involves a contribution rate that is not constant over the life of the plan but is age-dependent and reflects the trade-off between the desire for current versus future consumption, the desire for stable consumption over time, the member's attitude to risk, and changes in the level of human capital over the life cycle. We also show that the optimal investment strategy during the accumulation phase of the plan is ‘stochastic lifestyling’, with an initial high weight in equity-type investments and a gradual switch into bond-type investments as the retirement date approaches in a way that depends on the realised outcomes for the stochastic processes driving the state variables. The optimal investment strategy during the decumulation phase of the plan is to exchange the bonds held at retirement for life annuities and then to gradually sell the remaining equities and buy more annuities, i.e., a strategy known as ‘phased annuitisation’.     

Is Bitcoin a better hedging and safe-haven investment than traditional assets against currencies? Evidence from the time-frequency domain approach

Many studies have discussed hedges and safe havens against stocks, but few studies focus on the hedging/safe-haven performance of assets against the currency market over different time horizons. This paper studies the connectedness, hedging and safe-haven properties of Bitcoin/gold/crude oil/commodities against six currencies across multiple investment horizons, placing a particular focus on the performance of these assets during the recent COVID-19 outbreak. Our findings suggest that the overall dependence between assets and the currency market is the strongest in the short term, and Bitcoin is the least dependent across all investment horizons. The dynamic relationships between the four assets and the currency market vary with timescales. Bitcoin offers better hedging capability in the long term and commodities emerge as the most favorable option for the optimal portfolio of currency over all time horizons. Further analysis shows that assets are better at helping investments reduce risk in the initial stages of the pandemic, and gold is an effective and robust safe haven for currencies.     

Disagreement with procyclical beliefs and asset pricing

We consider a pure exchange economy with incomplete information in which the expected growth rate of endowment is unobservable. The economy is populated by two investors, one is rational, but the other irrationally believes that the dynamics of endowment exhibit procyclical feature. Such different opinions about the dynamics of endowment process produce persistent disagreement between the investors. We show that model-implied riskfree rate is procyclical. Further, the procyclical beliefs not only explain the excess volatility puzzle, but also help to explain the mixed results about the relationship between the investors’ belief dispersions and stock return. Moreover, we uncover that the rational investor prefers to short stock positions in good times as the degree of the other investor’s irrationality increasing.     

Price impact,strategic interaction and portfolio choice

This paper studies the portfolio choice of two large investors who act strategically because their trading affects interest rates. Each investor chooses her optimal portfolio conditional on the portfolio of the opponent. Equilibrium portfolios and their performance depend on the investor’s characteristics (risk aversion and return impact) and on the characteristics of the opponent (risk aversion and return impact). Depending on the interplay among these characteristics, strategic interaction can (i) increase or decrease risk taking incentives, as compared to the Merton-style portfolio, (ii) induce the more risk-averse investor to invest relatively more in the risky asset and (iii) change the role of inflation-linked bonds from hedging instrument to borrowing opportunity.     

Why More Forward-Looking Accounting Standards Can Reduce Financial Reporting Quality

A premise of standard setters and of much empirical research is that improving the quality of accounting standards and their implementation increases information in capital markets. This paper challenges this premise and shows that there are situations in which ‘better’, that is, more forward-looking, accounting standards reduce the information content of financial reports. The reason is that a forward-looking accounting standard affects the smoothness of reported earnings, which can conflict with the manager's smoothing incentive and her willingness to incorporate private information in the financial report. Although the manager could eliminate the effect by earnings management, it is too costly to do so. As a consequence, the capital market's ability to infer the financial and nonfinancial information in reported earnings declines. This finding should increase the awareness that an ‘improvement’ in accounting standards, without considering incentives and other information residing in firms, can adversely affect the quality of financial reporting.