UK Analysts' Earnings Forecasts

This paper reports the results of an empirical study of UK analysts' earnings forecasts for 126 firms for the years 1980 and 1981. Six hypotheses regarding the accuracy of these forecasts are tested, with results which both confirm and conflict with prior UK findings. In addition, evidence is found of a greater than generally attributed sensitivity of test results to the measure of accuracy used.     

Analysts' Reactions to Earnings Preannouncement Strategies

Preannouncements of earnings tend to overstate negative or understate positive news, which decreases the chance of a negative surprise when actual earnings is announced. We conduct an experiment to investigate how experienced sell-side analysts' earnings forecasts are affected by preannouncements that either understate, accurately state, or overstate the magnitude of positive or negative total earnings news, holding total earnings news constant. We find that firms with negative (positive) total news receive the highest post-earnings announcement forecasts of future earnings when the earlier preannouncement overstates (understates) the magnitude of the news. These forecasts are consistent with the analysts' perceptions about the firms' future prospects, but not their perceptions of management. While analysts expect preannouncements to be lower than actual earnings, they do not adjust their forecasts for these beliefs. These insights into analysts' responses have implications both for managers and analysts.     

Rational Expectations and Security Analysts' Earnings Forecasts

This paper investigates the rationality of security analysts' forecasts. The forecasts of analysts participating in Lynch, Jones, and Ryan's Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/BE/S) data base are evaluated relative to past values of their own forecast errors, past values of forecasted earnings per share, and quarterly percentage changes in publicly available macroeconomic and financial time series. The publicly available series include the consumer price index, unemployment rate, oil prices, stock prices, gross national product, and corporate profits. The authors conduct a generalized orthogonality test and include only information available to analysts at the time the forecasts are made. The empirical results reject analyst forecast rationality, but not without exception.     

Insider Trading Restrictions and Analysts' Incentives to Follow Firms

Motivated by extant finance theory predicting that insider trading crowds out private information acquisition by outsiders, we use data for 100 countries for the years 1987–2000 to study whether analyst following in a country increases following restriction of insider trading activities. We document that analyst following increases after initial enforcement of insider trading laws. This increase is concentrated in emerging market countries, but is smaller if the country has previously liberalized its capital market. We also find that analyst following responds less intensely to initial enforcement when a country has a preexisting portfolio of strong investor protections.     

Management of Earnings and Analysts' Forecasts to Achieve Zero and Small Positive Earnings Surprises

Abstract:  This paper corroborates the finding of prior studies that managers avoid reporting earnings lower than analyst forecasts (i.e., negative earnings surprises) and provides new evidence of actions contributing to this phenomenon. Specifically, we provide empirical evidence of both (1) upward management of reported earnings and (2) downward 'management' of analysts' forecasts to achieve zero and small positive earnings surprises. Further analysis of the components of earnings management suggests that both the operating cash flow and discretionary accruals components of earnings are managed.     

The Relevance of Analysts' Earnings Forecasts in Japan

Abstract:   This study examines the role of financial analysts in equity valuation in Japan by comparing the relevance of financial analysts' earnings forecasts, over financial statement information, to investors' decisions. We find that the value‐relevance of a set of accounting variables is very modest, but the incremental contribution of analysts' forecasts is very significant. This is in line with the expectation that the skill and expertise of analysts are more valuable in markets with poor financial disclosure, such as Japan. We also find that the importance of the financial statements increases over time while the importance of the analysts' forecasts does not change. We also provide evidence of the effect of Japanese corporate groupings, keiretsu, on the informativeness of accounting signals and earnings forecasts. The results show that the contribution of accounting variables to valuation is lower for keiretsu firms, which supports the exclusionary hypothesis that companies which are a part of keiretsu, disclose less information than do non‐keiretsu companies. The analysts' forecasts are equally important for investors in both types of firms.     

Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecast Dispersion and Intraday Stock Price Variability Around Quarterly Earnings Announcements

This study investigates the relationship between the dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts and stock price variability around quarterly earnings announcements. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the empirical analysis shows that stock price variability at the time of earnings announcements is positively related to the degree of analysts' predisclosure earnings forecast dispersion. Additionally, firms with high levels of forecast dispersion exhibit significant increases in price variability for longer periods prior to and following earnings announcements than do firms with low levels of forecast dispersion. These results suggest that there is information about the earnings announcement that becomes available to at least a subset of investors prior to the earnings release and that market participants take different amounts of time to process the information conveyed by the earnings announcement.     

分析师留学经历与盈利预测质量

基于2005-2015年期间的分析师预测数据,本文研究发现,相对于非留学分析师,具有海外留学经历的分析师的预测准确性更低,通过分组检验发现,上述结果主要存在于分析师的从业初期和分析师与企业高管之间不具有社会关系时。进一步研究发现,分析师留学越早,时间越长,其预测准确性相对越低。另外,当企业公开信息质量较高时,海外留学分析师与非留学分析师在预测准确性上的差异消失。由此可见,在我国关系型社会中,海外留学归国分析师在认知和获取私有信息方面存在相对劣势,其并没有提供更高质量的盈余预测。本文的研究发现丰富了有关分析师预测质量的研究文献,同时也为当前规范和提高企业信息披露质量的制度改革提供了资本市场的经验证据。     

Economic Value Added,Future Accounting Earnings,and Financial Analysts' Earnings Per Share Forecasts

Empirical research to date on the relative effectiveness of Economic Value Added (EVA) and earnings per share (EPS) as measures of firm performance for stock valuation has been mixed. In contrast to prior research, which primarily focuses on the correspondence of these measures with shareholder value and changes therein, we examine their relative effectiveness in predicting future earnings and their role in enhancing the accuracy of analysts' forecasts. Our results indicate that EVA contains information that is incremental to EPS in predicting future earnings. In addition, we find that despite this potential for EVA to add incremental value to analysts' forecasts of future earnings, analysts do not use the information in reported EVA appropriately, but appear rather to overweigh it.     

Ex Ante Incentives for Earnings Management and the Informativeness of Earnings

This study examines the relation between ex ante incentives of insurance managers to engage in earnings management to meet regulatory standards and the informativeness of earnings. This study extends prior research by simultaneously examining the effects of earnings management and uncertainty about earnings as suggested by Collins and DeAngelo (1990) and Imhoff and Lobo (1992). Results from a sample of 375 quarterly earnings announcements of 41 property and liability insurers during the period 1989 to 1992 support the hypothesis that when managers' incentives for earnings management are high, earnings announcements are less informative to investors (even after controlling for uncertainty associated with exposure to large-scale catastrophes). Robustness tests suggest that our results are not attributable to firm size, time period effects, firm effects, accounting estimation error, or financial distress risk. These results are consistent with investors using publicly available information to predict P-L insurance managers' ex ante incentives to manage earnings to meet regulatory standards, and that they use this information in forming their beliefs about earnings quality.     

Intangible Assets, Information Complexity, and Analysts' Earnings Forecasts

Abstract:   We examine the relation between analysts' earnings forecasts and firms' intangible assets, including technology‐based intangibles, brand names, and recognized intangibles. We predict that high information complexity of intangible assets increases the difficulty for analysts to assimilate information and increases analysts' forecast error of intangibles‐intensive firms. We find a positive association between analysts' forecast error and the firm's intangible intensity that deviates from the industry norm. We also find that analysts' forecast errors are greater for firms with diverse and innovative technologies. In contrast, analysts' forecast errors are smaller for biotech/pharmaceutical and medical equipment firms that are subject to intangibles‐related regulation.     

Relationship Incentives and the Optimistic/Pessimistic Pattern in Analysts' Forecasts

We examine whether analysts' incentives to maintain good relationships with management contribute to the optimistic/pessimistic within‐period time trend in analysts' forecasts. In our experiments, 81 experienced sell‐side analysts from two brokerage firms predict earnings based on historical information and management guidance. Analysts' forecasts exhibit an optimistic/pessimistic pattern across the two timing conditions (early and late in the quarter), and the effect is significantly stronger when the analysts have a good relationship with management than when their only incentive is to be accurate. Debriefing results indicate that analysts are aware of this pattern of forecasts, and believe that this benefits their future relationships with management and with brokerage clients. The analysts most frequently cite favored conference call participation and information access when describing benefits from maintaining good relationships with management. Our results suggest the following: The optimistic/pessimistic pattern in forecasts is in part a conscious response to relationship incentives, information access is perceived to be a major benefit of management relationships, and recent regulatory changes may have lessened but have not eliminated this conflict of interest source.     

International Variation in Accounting Measurement Rules and Analysts' Earnings Forecast Errors

We theorize that accounting systems affect analysts' forecast accuracy through changes in earnings variability. We argue that the matching and historical cost principles reduce earnings variability, and hence, reduce analysts' earnings forecast errors. We also argue that restricting the choice of accounting methods can result in larger forecast errors. We argue that more informative disclosure environments should reduce forecast errors. We test whether variation in these factors across countries explain variation in analysts' earnings forecast bias and accuracy. Our results indicate that these characteristics of financial accounting systems are complements, and that they affect financial analysts' earnings forecast errors.     

中国上市公司自愿业绩预告动机研究

随着业绩预告制度的实施和演进,我国资本市场上逐步出现了越来越多的上市公司自愿业绩预告,这对于缓解管理层与投资者、机构投资者与中小投资者之间的信息不对称具有重要意义。那么,是什么因素激励上市公司管理层自愿披露业绩预告?通过借鉴西方的自愿信息披露理论,并结合我国转轨经济的制度背景,本文提出了我国上市公司自愿业绩预告的三类动机:资本市场交易、管理层股票收益和管理层能力信号传递,并以2001-2008年我国上市公司业绩预告数据为研究样本对此进行了检验。研究结果显示,融资需求高、管理者利益协同程度高、会计业绩好的上市公司更有动机自愿披露业绩预告,并且国有相对于非国有上市公司自愿披露动机更弱。     

Earnings Surprises in Analysts' Forecasts,Mandatory Disclosure,and Share Repurchases

This paper examines the impact of forecast errors and the mandatory disclosure of repurchase transactions required by 2003 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations on share repurchases. We define forecast errors as the difference between analysts' forecasted earnings and actual earnings. We argue that firms with positive forecast errors imply greater information asymmetry, which may induce them to signal through share repurchases. We show that both the repurchase target and analysts' forecast revision are positively related to forecast errors. Furthermore, these associations are more pronounced in the low disclosure period (1989–2003) where greater information asymmetry between managers and outside investors is found, while increased transparency in the high disclosure period (2004–2006) leads to more significant improvement in long‐term performances for firms with positive forecast errors. The results are consistent with our expectations that the information asymmetry implied in forecast errors, along with a shock change from the introduction of the 2003 SEC regulation, affect both corporate and analysts' behaviour.     

Improving the Precision of Analysts' Earnings Forecasts by Adjusting for Predictable Bias

This research demonstrates that publicly-available information can be used to develop estimates of analysts' optimistic bias in earnings forecasts. These bias estimates can be used to produce more accurate forecasts, resulting in significant reductions of both cross-sectional mean forecast error and error variance. When bias estimates are based on past observations of forecast error alone, however, reductions in mean forecast error are smaller, and forecast precision is unimproved. Further tests provide evidence of a significant association between returns and the bias predictable from contemporaneously-available information, suggesting that predictable bias is only partially discounted by market participants. This study has significant implications for researchers and investors. The pricing of predictable bias in analysts' forecasts may add error toinferences which are based on the association between returns and analyst forecast errors, and knowledge of the market's partial discounting of predictable bias may help investors to make more efficient resource allocations.     

年报风险信息披露有助于提高分析师预测准确度吗?

年报风险信息披露既可能提高信息质量而对分析师预测行为产生积极影响,又可能因增加分析师的风险感知而对分析师预测行为产生消极影响。本文通过文本分析法量化年报风险信息披露,进而探讨其对分析师预测准确度的影响。基于公司层面的证据表明:风险信息披露频率越高,分析师预测准确度越高,而且这种积极影响主要体现在非国有企业、盈余质量较高及公司治理较好组。基于分析师层面的证据表明:风险信息披露频率越高,分析师预测准确度越高,这种积极影响主要体现在非明星、行业专长较低、对公司追踪时间较少的分析师中。这说明我国年报风险信息异质性较弱,有助于提高分析师预测准确度,从而支持了风险信息披露的信息观。本文结论有助于丰富信息披露以及分析师预测文献。