The effect of cost management knowledge on the relationship between budgetary participation and managerial performance

This study investigates the relationship between budget participation (BP), cost management knowledge and managerial performance. It draws on relevant previous research in the theory of work performance and accounting to formulate the research questions. Eighty-three managers from Finnish companies participated in the study. Data were collected from the managers using a mail questionnaire. The results indicate that managers’ cost management knowledge, and especially the balanced perspective of cost management knowledge, moderates the effect of BP on self-perception of managerial performance. It was specifically found that the effect of BP on perceived managerial performance becomes more positive when managers’ cost management knowledge increases. High perception of managerial performance is obtained when both the BP and managers’ cost management knowledge are high. Our results suggest that organizations should improve the cost management knowledge of managers who participate in the budgeting process.     

Effects of budgetary participation conflict on job performance of Mexican and US managers

This study extends the stream of participative budgeting literature by introducing a new variable, Budgetary Participation Conflict (BPC). BPC occurs when the level of budget participation experienced by a manager differs from a desired level. We propose a model where BPC is the independent variable to further evaluate the effect of budget participation on job performance. Using path analysis, we measure the direct effect of BPC on job performance, and the indirect effects between BPC and performance that run through job satisfaction and job tenure in two countries, Mexico and the US.While the results do not indicate that BPC either directly or indirectly affects the performance of US managers, the results indicate that BPC negatively affects the job performance of Mexican managers indirectly through the effects of BPC on job satisfaction and job tenure. The relationship between tenure and performance is much stronger among the Mexican managers than among their US counterparts, which is the largest single difference between the Mexican and US results.     

How Top‐down and Bottom‐up Budgeting Affect Budget Slack and Performance through Social and Economic Exchange

This paper investigates the effects of a top‐down (TD) versus bottom‐up (BU) orientation in different stages of the budgetary target‐setting process on slack and managerial performance. We use social exchange theory to explain the outcomes of these alternative budgetary arrangements, and complement the traditional focus on budgetary participation in target setting with a process‐oriented perspective. We develop hypotheses predicting that TD and BU orientations in the subsequent stages of the budgeting process have different effects on managers’ exchange relationships with the firm, and their behavioural responses. Using survey evidence from German managers across 127 firms we find that a TD orientation in the issuance of guidelines enhances economic exchange and that a BU orientation in the development of the initial budget proposal enhances social exchange, which in turn are associated with reduced slack and higher performance, respectively.     

The effect of comprehensive performance measurement systems on role clarity,psychological empowerment and managerial performance

This study examines how comprehensive performance measurement systems (PMS) affect managerial performance. It is proposed that the effect of comprehensive PMS on managerial performance is indirect through the mediating variables of role clarity and psychological empowerment. Data collected from a survey of 83 strategic business unit managers are used to test the model. Results from a structural model tested using Partial Least Squares regression indicate that comprehensive PMS is indirectly related to managerial performance through the intervening variables of role clarity and psychological empowerment. This result highlights the role of cognitive and motivational mechanisms in explaining the effect of management accounting systems on managerial performance. In particular, the results indicate that comprehensive PMS influences managers’ cognition and motivation, which, in turn, influence managerial performance.     

The effect of performance feedback on prior budgetary participative research using survey methodology: An empirical study

Prior research examining the relation between budgetary participation and job performance explicitly or implicitly posits budgetary participation and intervening variables such as role ambiguity, motivation, job satisfaction, and job-relevant information as independent variables; job performance as the dependent variable. However, these studies are often based on correlated data in which the direction of causation is unknown. This paper uses attribution theory to examine whether job performance affects perceptions of budgetary participation and/or intervening variables (e.g. role ambiguity). Using a laboratory experiment and multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), the findings of this study show that knowledge of performance, obtained through performance evaluations and/or external cues, affects individuals’ perceptions regarding budgetary participation, job satisfaction, role ambiguity, motivation, and job-relevant information. The results of the study may undermine correlations between self-reported data on individual characteristics (e.g. motivation) and performance data, as well as correlations between self-reported data on organizational variables (e.g. budgetary participation) and performance data. The study provides suggestions how researchers could overcome problems associated with causal directions in future budget participation studies that link self-reported individual and organizational characteristics to job performance.     

Managing budget emphasis through the explicit design of conditional budgetary slack

Budgetary slack plays an important role in the functioning of budgets in organizations. While theory has found negative as well as positive elements associated with its presence, the empirical literature has interpreted it as being dysfunctional to organizations. In this paper, we present empirical evidence on how a company purposefully budgeted additional financial resources with a motivation intention (Lukka. Budgetary biasing in organizations: Theoretical framework and empirical evidence. Accounting, Organizations and Society 13 (1998) 281–302) to facilitate the managers’ task in achieving the goals of the company. Using quantitative and qualitative data from four logistic sites of a disk drive manufacturer for 24 months, we examine how the company accepted more slack as the demand on business processes increased and goals other than budget targets––in particular, service quality––became harder to achieve. By allowing this practice, headquarters made it clear to local managers that product quality and service were at least as important as meeting budget objectives. We also find that not only was budgetary slack purposefully built during the budgeting process but also in the budgeting system itself through the underlying cost accounting assumptions. The results of this paper provide empirical evidence on the positive aspects of budgetary slack and on the role of cost accounting models used in the budgeting system to facilitate managerial work.     

Multiple facets of budgeting: an exploratory analysis

This paper investigates four potential reasons for budgeting in organizations (operational planning, performance evaluation, communication of goals, and strategy formation), their antecedents (e.g., organizational strategy and structure), and several budgeting characteristics (e.g., target difficulty and budget emphasis) that potentially influence these reasons-to-budget's performance. While the idea of multiple uses of budgets in organizations is not new, the rationale for this study is that prior research has tended to look at the same (one) reason for budgeting (primarily performance evaluation), or at only one reason in isolation. Based on survey data from 57 managers responsible for preparing the budget for their organizational unit, our analyses suggest that while the four reasons-to-budget exhibit overlap, they are also substantively unique in their own use. Moreover, we demonstrate that the reasons-to-budget arise in different circumstances and that each reason-to-budget's performance is associated with different budgeting characteristics. We also demonstrate a link between the performance of the individual reasons-to-budget and overall budget satisfaction and organizational unit performance.     

A survey of budget-related planning and control policies and procedures

This article reports the results of a survey of budgeting practices of American manufacturing firms. It is based on the responses (27.4% response rate) from a systematic, random sample of all manufacturing firms listed on the files of Compustat. The survey instrument covered six sections: preparation of the planning budget, cost control procedures, performance reporting and communication, budget related procedures for overall company planning and control, administration of the budgeting system, and time dimensions of the planning process. Fifty variables were surveyed. While respondents generally indicated that they use recommended budgeting techniques, there were instances where the responses indicated otherwise. There appears to be significant resistance to incorporating such matters as statistical techniques and to developing feedback channels to get information from line managers regarding their feelings about the role they play in the budgeting process. On the other hand, formalization of the budgeting process is common. It might be concluded that a significant lag time exists between development and implementation of such ideas as statistical control procedures and the tools of human relations.     

Budgeting—the Role of Trust and Participation: A Research Note

Prior studies have found a combination of an evaluative style with high budget emphasis and high participation to be associated with better behavioural outcomes (e.g., lower job-related tension) than all other combinations of budget emphasis and participation. Yet there has been little research to investigate the theory on why this particular combination of budget emphasis and participation is associated with better behavioural outcomes. A path analytical model, which investigates the intervening effects of trust and participation on the relationship between budget emphasis and job-related tension, was used. Senior Norwegian managers were selected as subjects for this study. The results indicate that budget emphasis has an insignificant direct effect on job-related tension but a strong indirect effect through trust and participation. Trust also has an intervening effect on the relationship between budgetary participation and job-related tension. It is therefore possible to conclude that high budget emphasis is associated with high budgetary participation and high trust. High trust, in turn, is associated with reduced subordinates' job-related tension.     

Decentralisation as a Moderating Factor in the Budgetary Participation-Performance Relationship: Some Hong Kong Evidence

This study tests the contingency or ‘fit’ hypothesis that the effects of budgetary participation on managerial performance will be positive in decentralised organisations and negative in centralised organisations. The responses of 37 managers from a cross-section of Hong Kong manufacturing companies to a questionnaire survey designed to measure the variables were analysed by examining the interaction term in a multiple regression equation. The results supported the interaction hypothesis and found that at high levels of decentralisation there is a positive relationship between budgetary participation and managerial performance but at low levels of decentralisation this relationship is negative. These findings have implications for the design of effective control subsystems.     

Some behavioral aspects of budgeting for control: An empirical study

The research reported in this article empirically evaluated the relationships between perceived participation in the budget process, perceived reward dependency of budget performance, and perceived attainability of the budgeted goals, and the dependent variable of motivation to achieve the budget. The results indicated that there were two dimensions to a manager's effort expended (motivation) to achieve the budgeted goals for which he is responsible; they are a goal-directing effort and an evaluative effort. It was found that perceived participation had the most significant relationship with the goal-directing effort, whereas perceived reward dependency had the most significant relationship with the evaluative effort. The relationships between perceived attainability and both dimensions of effort expended (motivation) were either not significant or only moderately significant.     

Vertical information sharing in the budgeting process

This study develops a model of vertical information sharing between superior and subordinate in the budgeting process. Upward information sharing involves the revelation of private information by subordinate to superior. Its proposed antecedents are budget participation and organizational commitment while job performance is a proposed outcome. Downward information exchanges from superior to subordinate are also examined by including role ambiguity in the model. Survey results suggest that vertical information sharing is an important intervening variable in understanding the performance effects of budget participation and organizational commitment.     

Paying People to Lie: the Truth about the Budgeting Process

This paper analyzes the counterproductive effects associated with using budgets or targets in an organisation's performance measurement and compensation systems. Paying people on the basis of how their performance relates to a budget or target causes people to game the system and in doing so to destroy value in two main ways: (a) both superiors and subordinates lie in the formulation of budgets and, therefore, gut the budgeting process of the critical unbiased information that is required to coordinate the activities of disparate parts of an organisation, and (b) they game the realisation of the budgets or targets and in doing so destroy value for their organisations. Although most managers and analysts understand that budget gaming is widespread, few understand the huge costs it imposes on organisations and how to lower them. My purpose in this paper is to explain exactly how this happens and how managers and firms can stop this counter‐productive cycle. The key lies not in destroying the budgeting systems, but in changing the way organisations pay people. In particular to stop this highly counter‐productive behaviour we must stop using budgets or targets in the compensation formulas and promotion systems for employees and managers. This means taking all kinks, discontinuities and non‐linearities out of the pay‐for‐performance profile of each employee and manager. Such purely linear compensation formulas provide no incentives to lie, or to withhold and distort information, or to game the system. While the evidence on the costs of these systems is not extensive, I believe that solving the problems could easily result in large productivity and value increases – sometimes as much as 50–100% improvements in productivity. I believe the less intensive reliance on such budget/target systems is an important cause of the increased productivity of entrepreneurial and LBO firms. Moreover, eliminating budget/target‐induced gaming from the management system will eliminate one of the major forces leading to the general loss of integrity in organisations. People are taught to lie in these pervasive budgeting systems because if they tell the truth they often get punished and if they lie they get rewarded. Once taught to lie in this system people generally cannot help but extend that behaviour to all sorts of other relationships in the organisation.     

The effect of participative budgeting on job satisfaction and performance: Role ambiguity as an intervening variable

The results of studies into the effects of participative budgeting have been equivocal. This study seeks to explain the process by which participation in budget setting affects managers' performance and job satisfaction. A model is developed to show how role ambiguity acts as an intervening variable in the link between participation and outcome criteria. Empirical results indicate that budgetary participation acts indirectly, via role ambiguity, to influence job satisfaction and performance.     

Testing a Model of Cognitive Budgetary Participation Processes in a Latent Variable Structural Equations Framework

Previous accounting research has suggested that subordinate participation in the budgetary process has two cognitive aspects: (1) participation enhances budget quality, and hence the utility of budgets, by allowing subordinates to introduce private knowledge into the budgetary process, and (2) participation enables subordinates to obtain information that is relevant to performing their jobs. This study tests a model that encompasses both cognitive aspects of budgetary participation. Data were gathered with a questionnaire distributed to managers from a variety of different national origins who were working in many different global locations. The data were analysed with latent variable structural equation modelling, which provides several advantages over more conventional analytic methods generally used in budgetary participation and other behavioural accounting research. The results indicated that participation enhances budget quality and that budget quality, in turn, has a positive effect on budget utility. Participation was also found to have a direct and positive effect on job-relevant information. The results failed to support a proposed indirect effect of participation on job-relevant information through the enhancement of budget quality.     

THE INTERVENING EFFECTS OF PARTICIPATION ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE

Prior studies have suggested that the subordinates’ perception of fairness in their organizations’ procedures is related to improvements in the subordinates’ performance. However, the positive relationship between perception of justice and performance may not be a direct one, but is indirect via the intervening variable of participation. It is likely that the importance of maintaining procedural fairness in the organization will lead senior managers (superiors) to select procedures that allow their subordinates more participation privileges in the organization’s affairs because high participative procedures are perceived to be fair. This increase in participation, in turn, is likely to improve the subordinates’ performance. The results, based on a path analytical model and a sample of 83 senior managers, indicate that procedural justice has an indirect effect on performance via participation. On the basis of these results, it is possible to conclude that the importance of procedural fairness in the organization leads to the selection of procedures with high subordinates’ participation, which, in turn, leads to high managerial performance.     

Perceptions and Attitudes of Different User-groups to the Role of the Budget,Budget Pressure and Budget Participation

This paper examines the perceptions and attitudes of three distinct user-groups to three important budget-related issues. The three user-groups are: accountants, senior non-financial managers and first line managers, each of which has direct contact with budget data in their normal work. The issues, which have been examined by questionnaire and interviews in thirteen medium or large UK companies, are: (a) the perception of the role of the budget in medium and large companies; (b) the use of the budget as a control device, the pressure that may be felt when this occurs and the behavioural consequences of such pressure; (c) the degree of participation in budget setting and whether there is any desire for increased participation. In some instances there were important differences between the user-groups; in particular concerning budget pressure and participation. The general textbook picture of the budget-setting process was not confirmed in certain important aspects. These results raise issues concerning the budgetary control process, including the effects of self-generated pressure, and the desire among accountants for greater participation in the budget process.     

Budgeting in Catholic Parishes: An Exploratory Study

In this paper an aspect of accounting, namely budgeting, has been studied in an organizational context. According to Booth (1993) churches represent 'extreme cases' in which to study the impact of accounting. Following on from Laughlin (1988) Booth considered the sacred and secular divide to be a significant element in the use of accounting by church organizations. The parishes of the Catholic Archdiocese of Melbourne form the context of this study in which evidence is sought for the sacred and secular divide by studying the role of budgeting in the parish. Questions were asked regarding participation in the budgetary process and the development and use of the budget. It was found that there was little consultation or participation in the budgetary process and that the use of the budget was restricted. These findings suggest that the sacred and secular divide operates at the parish level.     

The impact of subjectivity in performance evaluation practices on public sector managers’ motivation

We conduct an explorative study to investigate the effect of subjectivity in performance evaluation practices on managerial motivation in public sector organisations. Increased subjectivity can enhance motivation if supervisors are able to provide better informational feedback. However, subjectivity is likely to reduce motivation if it reduces perceived mission clarity or negatively affects relations between supervisors and subordinates. Our analysis is based on a survey among 94 public sector managers in the Netherlands. We predict and find that subjectivity in performance evaluation practices reduces perceived mission clarity, which in turn decreases motivation. We also find that subjectivity negatively affects subordinate managers’ trust in their supervisor, which also reduces motivation. Jointly, these results indicate that the negative effects of subjectivity in performance evaluation practices outweigh its potential positive consequences, suggesting that New Public Management's focus on more objective performance measures can indeed be beneficial. By itself, however, this does not automatically imply that more objective systems in general are optimal in all public sector organisations as such systems may have dysfunctional side effects such as distortion of performance measures, gaming or manipulation. In addition, we find that the effects of subjectivity are moderated by organisational characteristics.     

The expectancy–valence theory revisited: Developing an extended model of managerial motivation

This empirical study examines the relationship between managerial perceptions of elements of the performance measurement, evaluation and reward system (PMERS) and motivation. An extended version of the traditional expectancy–valence (E–V) model is developed to conceptualise the process of motivation at the middle management level. Based on this model, the direct effect of and interplay between the value of rewards, the attainability of targets, the accuracy of measures used to gauge achievement, the transparency of the performance–rewards relationship and managerial motivation are examined. Using structural equation modelling (SEM), the perceptions of 200 plus middle managers in a large, successful company in the financial services sector are analysed. The observed data generally provide a good fit with the structural model. The findings indicate that both extrinsic and intrinsic rewards have a significant positive impact on managerial motivation. However, the value of extrinsic rewards is significantly affected by other elements of the PMERS design, namely the accuracy of the performance measures and the transparency of the performance measures–rewards link. This has important implications for the design of extrinsic reward schemes, and the utilisation of alternative motivational drivers potentially present in the middle manager's job environment.