创业板上市公司高管薪酬与应计、真实盈余管理关系的研究

本文从委托代理、高管薪酬契约有效性、信息不对称三个理论角度探讨公司高管薪酬激励对盈余管理水平的影响机理,并以2011—2017年创业板上市公司作为实证样本,考察高管薪酬与应计、真实盈余管理这两种行为的关系。结果显示,高管薪酬越高,其应计、真实盈余管理水平越低。进一步地,考虑高管持股的调节作用,研究发现高管持股弱化了高管薪酬的正向激励作用。并且,高管持股比例增加,对应计盈余管理行为的偏好要强于对真实盈余管理活动,这可能是高管考虑到后者对企业长期价值的损害较高。     

Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud in China

This study investigates the relation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud in China. We document a significantly negative correlation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud using data on publicly traded firms between 2005 and 2010. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that firms penalize CEOs for fraud by lowering their pay. We also find that CEO compensation is lower in firms that commit more severe frauds. Panel data fixed effects and propensity score methods are used to demonstrate these effects. Our results also indicate that corporate governance mechanisms influence the magnitude of punishment. We find that CEOs of privately controlled firms, firms that split the posts of CEO and chairman, and CEOs of firms located in developed regions suffer larger compensation penalties for committing financial fraud. Finally, we show that CEOs at firms that commit fraud are more likely to be replaced compared to those at non-fraud firms.     

A Model Capturing Ethics and Executive Compensation

This article develops and applies a knowledge-based framework for understanding and interpreting executive compensation under the rubric of ethical consideration. This framework classifies six major ethical considerations that reflect issues in compensation design. We emphasize that these six ethical considerations are influenced by liberty and equality concepts. This framework helps to highlight areas where executive compensation has not been well spelled out.     

管理层权力、TMT网络与高管薪酬

文章基于管理层权力理论和社会网络理论,以2010〖KG-*4〗-〖KG-*6〗2014年我国A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了管理层权力对高管薪酬的影响,并考察TMT网络的调节作用。研究发现：管理层权力显著提高了高管薪酬水平,但显著降低了高管薪酬业绩敏感度;而TMT网络显著增强了它们之间的相关关系。研究为管理层权力与高管薪酬之间关系的研究提供了增量证据,为完善我国高管薪酬激励制度、抑制管理层权力、规范高管之间的兼任行为提供了参考和借鉴。     

上市公司高管薪酬指数研究

高管薪酬问题是公司治理理论的核心,如何科学、客观、准确地评价高管薪酬是理论界和实践界共同关注的焦点。通过计算2008年1 581家上市公司的高管薪酬指数,提出基于公司业绩的高管薪酬指数,并分行业、地区和所有制性质分析了上市公司高管薪酬指数的特点,本文认为对高管薪酬的评价不能简单地使用高管薪酬绝对值,而应充分考虑高管薪酬与企业业绩的匹配程度。     

高管薪酬、董事会治理与分类转移

本文研究了高管薪酬和董事会治理对分类转移的影响。研究表明,货币薪酬会诱使高管向上转移利得,股权激励和缺乏区分度的薪酬制度会诱使高管同时向下转移费用和向上转移利得;而勤勉、独立和两职分离的董事会能够在一定程度上识别并抑制这两种不同方式的分类转移;但董事会对分类转移的抑制程度小于高管薪酬对分类转移的诱发程度。进一步地,良好的市场、法制和媒体监督环境能够有效缓解高管薪酬对分类转移的诱发作用,而董事会能够有效弥补法制建设和媒体监督不足导致的分类转移治理缺陷,并在较高质量的审计环境下对分类转移发挥更强的抑制作用。本文首次结合制度背景和媒体监督研究了公司核心治理机制对不同分类转移方式的影响和原因,并创新性地对向上转移利得的程度进行了衡量,为监管部门及公司治理机制、会计准则的制定者提供经验证据。     

What’s Wrong with Executive Compensation?

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) comprise the sector of society that attempts to hold business and other institutions accountable for their social responsibility. Yet NGOs rarely have established governance mechanisms whereby their members and supporters can hold them accountable for their activities. In contrast, other major actors in the society – notably governments, corporations, and unions – maintain long established albeit imperfect instruments of governance and responsibility. This article presents a variety of ways in which NGOs could voluntarily strengthen their internal governance and thus become more accountable to their members and supporters as well as society at large. In the process, these important civil society organizations would enhance their effectiveness in achieving improvements in key areas of public policy.     

经理人报酬与公司业绩之间的相关性检验

以我国上市公司2000、2001、2002年年报数据为主要分析对象,运用线性回归的方法对经理人报酬与公司资本成本及公司业绩之间的相关性进行实证研究,并得出如下结论:经理人报酬与ROA呈显著的线性相关性,与ROE、△SMVA非线性相关,与SEVA存在较强的线性相关性。通过实证研究,还发现经理人报酬主要激励当前业绩和未来业绩,当期激励效果直接影响下期业绩水平。     

盈余波动性与IPO回报:基于风险补偿视角的解释

在资本市场中,IPO回报是关系到多方市场参与主体利益的重要问题之一.基于风险.补偿的视角,以1991-2015年中国A股IPO公司为研究样本,检验盈余波动性对IPO回报的影响.结果 发现,盈余波动性越高,投资者基于风险补偿所要求的IPO回报越高.作用机制检验结果表明,经营风险在盈余波动性对IPO回报的影响中发挥显著的中介效应,而信息风险的中介效应较弱.异质性检验结果显示,IPO制度变迁、投资者构成均会对盈余波动性与IPO回报之间的关系产生影响.此外,盈余波动性也会在较长时期影响IPO回报.研究结果表明:公司的盈余波动性增加了投资者利用盈余信息进行决策的风险,进而促使IPO回报有所提升;公司可以通过提升持续稳定的经营能力降低盈余波动性,进而在一定程度上降低投资者对IPO回报的风险补偿要求.研究结论可以为上市公司有效降低融资成本以及监管机构加强IPO异象监管提供重要的参考.     

The Effect of Ethical Fund Portfolio Inclusion on Executive Compensation

This paper divides firms in the Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) into two groups based on inclusion in or exclusion from the Domini Social Index (DSI). Inclusion in the DSI is interpreted as a positive indicator of ethical status. Using data for the 1992–2003 period, I provide evidence that chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, other executive compensation, and director compensation tend to be lower in DSI firms than in other firms in the S&P 500. This applies to the unconditional group averages (and medians) and is particularly striking given that DSI firms as a group had better financial performance than the other firms. This finding is also true in a regression framework that controls for other influences on compensation, including firm size and financial performance. In a regression context, the estimated discount for CEOs of DSI firms is approximately 12% for both current compensation (salary and bonuses) and total compensation (including the value of options). These results are consistent with the expectation that some senior executives require a “compensating differential” to accept positions in firms with less attractive ethical status. It is also consistent with the expectation that some firms with positive ethical status might use more restraint in setting executive compensation.James Brander is the Asia-Pacific Professor of International Business in the Sauder School of Business at the University of British Columbia. An economist, his research areas include international trade, industrial organization and finance. He is a former editor of the Canadian Journal of Economics and has published widely, including the textbook “Government Policy Toward Business”.     

制造业上市公司高管薪酬对成本粘性的影响

企业管理者的行为对成本粘性现象的产生具有直接影响,与管理者息息相关的薪酬是否会影响成本粘性成为值得思考的问题。本文以2007-2013年沪深两市制造业上市公司的相关数据为样本,研究高管薪酬水平对成本粘性的影响。研究发现高管薪酬水平与企业成本粘性水平负相关,即较高的高管薪酬会降低企业的成本粘性水平;相对于国有企业,非国有企业中这一影响更为明显。因此,企业有必要制定合理的薪酬水平以降低管理者自利行为,国有企业的监管制度和薪酬体系有必要进一步完善和提高。     

职业经理人薪酬实证研究述评

职业经理人薪酬是近年来国内外理论界关注的热点问题.本文对职业经理人薪酬的实证研究进行了全面回顾,并对今后我国职业经理人的薪酬研究作出了展望.     

我国上市公司经理报酬水平的制度特征研究

本文在回顾我国上市公司经理报酬制度的基础上,对我国上市公司总经理现金报酬水平及趋势作了分析,并比较了不同股权性质的上市公司经理报酬水平的差异和变化趋势。此外,本文对我国上市公司经理现金报酬的类型及特征作了分析,发现业绩型报酬在上市公司中的使用逐步增加,且该类型的报酬水平比非业绩型的报酬水平要高。最后,我们分析了上市公司确定经理现金报酬水平的参照标准,发现它们主要参照同行业或同地区企业的薪酬水平和业绩。     

高管薪酬结构对债务期限的影响研究

本文在文献梳理的基础上,基于委托代理理论和信号传递理论,研究了不同的高管薪酬结构对企业债务期限的影响,最后主要从企业角度,对优化高管薪酬结构提出了相应的对策建议。