Effect of regulatory oversight on the association between internal governance characteristics and audit fees

We examine the relationship between internal governance, external audit monitoring and regulatory oversight for a sample comprising industrial companies and financial/utility companies subject to additional industry‐specific regulation. Our results indicate that the association between audit fees and board/audit committee independence and size are weaker for regulated companies. These observations are consistent with the notion that regulatory oversight partially substitutes the external audit as a monitoring mechanism. However, boards/audit committees with more multiple directorships demand a more extensive audit in the presence of regulatory oversight to protect their reputation capital. Our study enhances our understanding of the complex relationships among the major corporate governance elements.     

The effect of audit committee shareholding,financial expertise and size on interim financial disclosures

In recent years, corporate failures and accounting irregularities have led to concerns about the effectiveness of audit committees in the financial reporting process. In response, corporate governance committees in different countries have made specific recommendations designed to enhance the role of the audit committee in executing its financial reporting oversight duties. We investigate in this study, the effect of some of these recommendations by empirically examining the relationship between selected audit committee characteristics and the level of disclosure in interim reports of a sample of 262 UK listed companies. Specifically, the audit committee characteristics examined are shareholding of audit committee members (as a proxy for audit committee independence), audit committee size and audit committee financial expertise. Employing both a weighted and unweighted index to measure interim disclosure, the results indicate a significant negative association between shareholding of audit committee members and interim disclosure. Our results provide evidence of a significant positive association between interim disclosure and audit committee financial expertise. We find no significant relationship between audit committee size and the extent of disclosure in interim reports. Overall, however, our results suggest that audit committee characteristics have an impact on its monitoring effectiveness of the financial reporting process. These results have important implications for corporate governance policy-makers who have a responsibility to prescribe appropriate corporate governance structures to ensure that shareholders are protected.     

Corporate ownership concentration and audit fees: The case of an emerging economy

The paper investigates the effects of corporate ownership concentration on audit fees in emerging economies, using Bangladesh as a case. Prior studies have indicated that audit fees in Bangladesh are significantly low. Also, the Bangladeshi private sector is dominated by high ownership concentration. Agency theory predicts that in an efficient market, managers in a highly concentrated ownership situation will have sufficient incentives to have more rigorous audits performed. However, managers in emerging economies, where the markets are not as strong, may not have similar incentives. We test whether audit fees in Bangladesh are related to corporate ownership concentration. Our results indicate that audit fees have a significant negative relationship with sponsor and institutional ownership concentrations. This indicates that in Bangladesh, companies actually pay lower audit fees when these are dominated by sponsor and institutional shareholders. For the public shareholders, we find a negative, but statistically insignificant relationship. The results seem to suggest that corporate ownership pattern may be a major factor in explaining the low audit fees in Bangladesh.     

On the Relationship between Audit Tenure and Fees Paid to the Audit Firm and Audit Quality

Abstract

We investigate the impact of audit firm tenure, partner tenure, audit fees, fees for non-audit services and total fees on audit quality, as measured by discretionary accruals. Our sample consists of Spanish non-financial public companies for the years between 2006 and 2013. Results indicate that audit quality increases with audit firm tenure but decreases with partner tenure. Moreover, the level of fees paid to the audit firm seems to have a negative impact on audit quality, which is mainly driven by fees for audit services. In this regard, we do not observe any significant relationship between fees for non-audit services and audit quality. Our results also show that the negative relationship between either long partner tenures or high fees and audit quality does not occur when the tenure with the audit firm is long. Therefore, long audit firm tenures do not only seem to involve higher audit quality ‘per se’, but also moderate the negative effects of partner tenure and audit fees on audit quality. The results of this study, which are robust to several sensitivity checks, may be relevant for the current debate on auditor rotation and the joint provision of audit and non-audit services.     

银行治理、股权结构与审计收费——基于A股上市公司的经验证据

本文利用我国上市公司2004—2009年的数据,从债权人治理的新视角,实证研究了贷款银行的治理作用对会计师事务所审计收费产生的影响。研究发现,贷款银行的治理作用会导致审计收费降低,但这种治理作用的发挥依赖于市场机制。在国有企业中,银行治理的作用并不明显;而在民营企业中,银行治理能通过约束控股股东的机会主义行为,导致审计收费水平下降。与不存在控股股东与中小股东代理问题的民营企业相比,在存在这类代理问题的民营企业中,银行的治理作用更加显著。     

Audit Committee and CEO Ethnicity and Audit fees: Some Malaysian evidence

This study extends the literature on audit pricing by examining the relationship between ethnicity (bumiputra vs non-bumiputra), corporate governance attributes, and audit fees using data from 559 publicly-listed companies in Malaysia in 2005. Drawing from theories of ethnicity and political economy, we discuss our two hypotheses that predict positive associations between audit fees and (1) the proportion of bumiputra members on audit committees, and (2) the presence of a bumiputra CEO. The results support the hypothesis that firms with bumiputra CEOs incur higher audit fees, but we do not find an association for firms with bumiputra-dominant audit committees. In additional analysis, we find that the audit premium paid by firms with a bumiputra CEO is higher for the smaller client firms. Further, we find that firms managed by a bumiputra CEO with a fully bumiputra-composed audit committee tend to pay higher audit fees than the other firms, indicating that there is a combined ethnicity effect on audit fees.     

Audit Committees and Managerial Influence on Audit Quality: ‘Voluntary’ versus ‘Mandatory’ Approach to Corporate Governance

This study provides empirical evidence on how managerial influence to reduce audit quality is moderated by a combination of the audit committee (AC) form and compliance with AC best practice guidelines. There is a negative association between managerial ownership and audit fees; however, the association becomes positive when a voluntary AC follows best practices. Furthermore, the results are robust to the exclusion of industries with large frequency in the sample, the consideration of Korean business groups and recessionary times. The results of this study imply that a voluntary approach to corporate governance, which encourages companies to follow best practice guidelines in the form and composition of the AC, is more effective in controlling management than a mandatory approach. This study contributes to policy making aimed at improving AC effectiveness.     

融资约束、审计费用与现金持有价值

审计费用和现金持有价值是公司财务审计研究领域的两个重要话题。审计费用高低所隐含的公司风险程度影响着投资者对公司增加现金持有量将产生积极还是消极效应的判断,会导致公司股票超额回报率的变化,进而也可能影响其现金持有价值,目前尚无相关的研究。本文以现金持有的边际价值模型为基础,引入审计费用和融资约束变量,对融资约束条件下审计费用与公司现金持有价值的关系进行研究后发现,过高的审计费用会降低公司的现金持有价值,审计费用增加得越多,公司的现金持有价值越低。进一步的分析发现,相对于其面临较高程度的融资约束时,公司面临较低程度的融资约束时审计费用对其现金持有价值的负向影响更为显著。     

独立审计、公司外部治理与真实经营业绩——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

独立审计是公司治理的重要外部机制,但考察独立审计治理功能影响公司真实经营业绩的文献还较少。从减少信息不对称、提升治理效率与决策能力角度,提出了一个独立审计的公司外部治理功能影响公司真实经营业绩的理论框架。选取事务所规模、审计收费和审计意见作为审计质量的替代变量,以我国2007年-2009年上市公司为样本,实证研究发现事务所规模及审计收费均与公司真实经营业绩正相关;审计意见对公司滞后一年的真实经营业绩没有影响,这可能与我国监管及诉讼制度不完善导致＂非标＂意见未给公司及其内部人带来显著成本有关。     

Corporate lobbying: Resource-seeking or rent-seeking? Evidence from audit fees

Theory and prior research suggest that corporate lobbying is a primary means that corporations use to influence government policies either for improving firm performance (i.e., strategic decisions) or for rent-seeking activities (i.e., agency costs) but the evidence between lobbying activities and auditor assessments of audit risk remains unclear. Our results show that lobbying firms are associated with higher audit risks and fees, consistent with the idea that lobbying is related to rent-seeking and higher agency costs. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the positive association between lobbying and audit fees is weaker for firms with strong corporate governance. Further analysis shows that firm financial returns or low earnings quality mediate the relationship between lobbying and audit fees. The results suggest that practitioners, users of financial statements and regulators could benefit by recognizing that lobbying activities could signal managerial opportunistic behavior.     

The empirical relationship between ownership characteristics and audit fees

The present study examines the empirical relationship between ownership characteristics and audit fees. The basic premise is that the level of ownership sophistication and the extent to which ownership is large and substantial impact the effectiveness of stockholder monitoring on corporate affairs including the financial reporting process. Furthermore, high managerial ownership firms may experience a decline in agency problems in financial reporting due to a decrease in managerial propensity to misreport financial results. By employing a cross-sectional least squares regression analysis for a sample of 358 New York Stock Exchange-listed firms audited by the Big Five auditors, we find evidence of a significantly positive relationship between diffused institutional stock ownership (i.e., having less than 5% individual shareholding) and audit fees, and a significantly negative relationship between institutional blockholder ownership (i.e., having 5% or more individual shareholding) and audit fees. Finally, we document that managerial stock ownership is negatively associated with audit fees. We do not, however, find evidence of any relationship between noninstitutional blockholder ownership (with at least 5% individual stock ownership) and audit fees. The study's main results hold in various specification tests including when the effects of board-related and audit committee variables are factored in the analysis. Based on the observed relationship between the ownership variables and audit fees, we suggest that the ownership characteristics of a firm as a part of its governance mechanism constitute an important determinant of audit fees.

The Role of Risk Management and Governance in Determining Audit Demand

Abstract:  Most prior research into audit fees has been based on a theoretical model which treats audit fees as the by-product of a production function ignoring potential demand forces that may drive the level of the audit fee. Inspired by prior 'anomalous' results, we take a different perspective by focusing on demand factors that may affect the level of the audit fee. Using data collected from a sample of listed companies in Belgium, we consider both disclosures about risk and risk management and actual decisions about corporate governance to examine whether audit fees are higher when these demand forces exist. In general, we expect that external auditing will increase in situations where there are multiple stakeholders with individual risk profiles who can shift some of the cost of monitoring to other stakeholders. Consistent with our theory and expectations, our results indicate that audit fees are higher when a company has an audit committee, discloses a relatively high level of financial risk management, and has a larger proportion of independent Board Members. Audit fees are lower when a company discloses a relatively high level of compliance risk management. The latter result indicates that controls are only complementary as long as they are voluntary, as mandated controls act as substitutes for non-mandated controls.     

Corporate governance,capital structure and firm performance: Evidence from Thailand

We examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance for a panel sample of 493 firms of non-financial firms in Thailand during the period 2001–2014. We find that for the full sample, corporate governance is not associated with financial leverage and firm performance. Leverage has a positive effect on firm performance. When we split firms into small and large firm subsamples, we observe some influence of corporate governance. The negative effect of audit committee size on firm performance is evident for large firms while the effect of audit reputation on firm performance is evident for small firms only. Furthermore, financial leverage mediates the effect of audit committee size on firm performance for the large firms.     

The effect of general counsel prominence on the pricing of audit services

We investigate the effect of corporate general counsel (GC) ascension to the senior management team on the pricing of audit services. Prior research suggests that the GC position may have a significant influence in setting the tone at the top by promoting corporate integrity, ethics, and serving as a governance and monitoring mechanism, but also recognizes that prominent GCs may face ethical dilemmas, causing them to disregard professional responsibilities to curry the favor of the CEO and other executives. Using audit fees to proxy for audit engagement risk, we find a negative association between GC ascension to top management and audit fees. We investigate the mechanisms behind this relation and find GC ascension is associated with a reduction in both default risk and financial misstatement risk, which supports auditors’ perceived reduction in client business risk and audit risk, respectively.     

The Effect of Corporate Status on External Audit Fees: Evidence From the UK

Abstract:  This paper simultaneously examines, for the first time, the determinants of external audit fees of UK companies drawn from the quoted sector (Main Market, the Alternative Investment Market and Ofex), and the unquoted sector (public and private limited companies). The paper also provides new evidence on the effects of corporate failure and the persistence of the big four and mid-tier auditor premiums across the public and private corporate sectors. After controlling for firm size, audit risk and complexity, we find that quoted and unquoted public limited companies have significantly higher audit fees than their private limited counterparts. Our estimates imply that relative premiums for market/corporate form are as follows: Main Market over AIM, 6.8%; AIM over Ofex, 19.5%; Ofex over unquoted plc, 15.5%; and unquoted plc over private, 16.7%. However, despite indications in prior US research to the contrary, we find no evidence that insolvent firms that failed were charged higher audit fees in the year preceding failure. A positive relationship is also found between audit and consultancy fees – a result that persists using an instrumental variables approach to control for endogeneity.     

对外直接投资、控制风险与上市公司审计费用

本文在国家实施"走出去"战略的背景下,研究企业对外直接投资对审计费用的影响。研究以2007~2018年我国A股上市公司为样本,发现进行对外直接投资的企业,审计费用显著高于没有对外直接投资的企业,说明审计师能够识别因企业对外直接投资导致的审计风险的上升和审计成本的增加,并通过增加审计费用的方式予以补偿;且此差异不因产权性质和企业所在地市场化水平而异;采用改变样本量、PSM及多时点DID等进行稳健性检验后,研究结论保持不变。进一步分析发现,如果企业内部控制质量较高,控制风险水平较低,则对外直接投资与审计费用之间的关系会弱化,表明控制风险在对外直接投资与审计费用之间起到调节作用,且此作用仅在非国有控股及市场化水平较高地区的企业中显著。     

Female audit committee members and their influence on audit fees

We test the relationship between female representation on the audit committee and audit fees for 624 Australian companies in the year 2011. A positive relationship is found, leading to the conclusion that female presence on audit committees influences the quality of the external audit. Further, we find that gender is the significant audit committee characteristic in predicting audit quality and that women on the audit committee strengthen the positive relationship between firm size and audit fees, and between risk and audit fees. Conversely, we find that female representation dampens the positive relationship between complexity and audit fees.     

Audit pricing, quality of earnings and board independence: The case of the Athens stock exchange

Prior research has pointed to the importance of the determinants of audit pricing. This paper examines empirically the effect of both audit independence and earnings management on the audit pricing by companies listed on the Athens Stock Exchange. This test is performed in an institutional setting with excessive earnings management and poor corporate governance mechanisms. The results based on a sample of 97 Greek companies for a five-year period (2000-2004), show that there is a positive association between audit independence and auditing pricing. Our results also indicate a positive association between audit pricing and earnings management for the small size companies. Taken together our results suggest that strong governance is related to increased needs for quality assurance services and that the relation between earnings management and audit pricing might indicate potential red flags. Finally, limitations, suggestions for further research and policy implications for regulatory agencies are offered.     

Corporate governance and disclosures on the transition to International Financial Reporting Standards

For reporting periods ending on or after 30 June 2004, Australian companies were required to disclose the expected impact of applying Australian equivalents of International Financial Reporting Standards effective from 1 January 2005. The objective of this paper is to examine the association between the level of disclosure and corporate governance quality. Using a sample of listed companies with 30 June balance dates, we find that the quantity of disclosure was positively related to some aspects of superior corporate governance, such as the frequency of board and audit committee meetings and the choice of auditor.