HORIZONTAL MERGERS IN A DIFFERENTIATED COURNOT OLIGOPOLY

Using a standard differentiated goods quantity competition setting, we show three facts about horizontal two‐firm mergers that are not true for a homogeneous goods Cournot market. First, merger of two firms is profitable for the merging firms provided that goods are sufficiently distant substitutes. Second, merging of two firms can lead to more two‐firm mergers. Third, an initially non‐profitable two‐firm merger can occur in anticipation of subsequent mergers. These facts imply that mergers are more likely to occur in differentiated goods markets than in homogeneous goods markets.     

Sequential mergers and competition policy under partial privatisation

We examine optimal merger and privatisation policies in a partially privatised oligopoly with differentiated goods. We first show that under the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, sequential mergers either emerge completely or do not emerge at all. Given this outcome, we derive the following policy implications. First, the level of social welfare can be U‐shaped with respect to the number of merged firm pairs. That is, given that there are some mergers that have already taken place, further mergers may actually lead to welfare improvement. However, these welfare‐improving mergers may not be privately profitable, implying that merger‐friendly policies are appropriate. Second, policymakers can halt privatisation in order to diminish the private incentive for further sequential (welfare‐deteriorating) mergers and improve welfare. Third, full nationalisation is never optimal unless the goods are homogeneous or independent. Our results are applicable to the Japanese life insurance industry and the partial privatisation of Japan Post Insurance.     

Horizontal Mergers and Merger Waves in a Location Model

We consider sequential mergers in a spatial model with Cournot competition. This model is suitable for explaining the behaviour of some industries where several brands of the same product are delivered by plants. The automobile and oil product industries are examples. To discuss sequential mergers, we use the method of Nilssen and Sørgard (1998). We show that if the transportation cost per length is large relative to market size, a merger wave occurs. In addition, it might improve social surplus. On the other hand, if the transportation cost per length is relatively small, a merger wave does not occur even though firms would be better off with sequential mergers.
We also compare our model to that of Levy and Reitzes (1992) who consider horizontal mergers with spatial price competition. We show that in a merger of neighbouring firms the merged firm's profit decreases. This result is opposite to that of Levy and Reitzes (1992).
Finally, we consider how a regulator affects sequential mergers. When each merger occurs, the regulator assesses each merger. In this case, there is a possibility that the existence of the regulator deters welfare-improving sequential mergers.     

Comparing Horizontal Mergers Under Cournot with Bertrand Competitions

Taking the product substitutability into account, this paper considers the horizontal mergers under Cournot with Bertrand competition. Firstly, the big market size indicates non‐intention to merge. Secondly, independent goods indicate indifferences between the quantity competition and price competition. Finally, firms under quantity competition are more willing to merge than under price competition. The antitrust authority is more inclined to approve the merger under quantity competition than that under price competition.     

A Theory of Mergers and Merger Waves

We consider a sequential merger game between Cournot firms with homogeneous product and quadratic cost. A large slope of the marginal cost function or a small slope of inverse market demand are both predicted to increase the incentive to merge. The profitability of any merger increases with the number of mergers having already taken place. Thus, mergers tend to occur in waves in industries that have experienced exogenous shocks affecting firms’ cost or demand. We also show some mergers that are not profitable for merged firms in the short-run may take place in the early stage of a wave.     

TESTING MODELS OF DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS MARKETS: CONSOLIDATION IN THE CABLE TV INDUSTRY

Research on differentiated products markets often uses structural demand/supply models to identify firms' marginal costs as product‐level cost data are unavailable. Using unique demand and cost data from cable TV, I evaluate a differentiated products model's ability to identify marginal costs. I find firms systematically price below profit‐maximizing levels, leading to biases in the model's marginal cost estimates. I study the implications for merger simulations and find that these biases compromise estimates of merger‐related cost efficiencies, yet do not prevent these models from generating useful predictions of the price and nonprice effects of mergers.     

信息不对称条件下企业跨国并购的动因探析

信息不对称是促使企业跨国并购的重要原因。跨国Cournot垄断竞争模型考虑产出协调和信息分享两方面。非对称信息下并购发生的可能性超过对称信息情形,外国企业总倾向于与一国内企业分享信息,并购的发生取决于需求波动程度及产品异质性程度。     

Mergers,multiperiod Cournot competition,and Coasian dynamics

Under the simplifying conditions of product homogeneity, linear demand, symmetric and constant marginal costs, the static Cournot–Nash equilibrium predicts that exogenous horizontal mergers generate losses for the participants if the participants represent less than 80% of the firms in the industry. I successfully challenge the applicability of this well-known merger paradox to markets for durable goods by introducing Coasian dynamics to the quantity competition, while maintaining all other simplifying conditions. I demonstrate that exogenous mergers with a relatively small number of insiders in industries with a relatively large initial number of firms can be profitable as long as the common discount factor is sufficiently high and the decision-making horizon is sufficiently long. Unlike previous research on mergers in durable-goods industries, the significance of the decision-making horizon is emphasized; mergers that are unprofitable in a short-horizon version of my model for all values of the discount factor can prove profitable in a long-horizon version provided that agents are sufficiently patient.     

Australian Company Mergers 1960-1970*

This study recorded 340 international mergers and 1992 domestic mergers in Australia in the period mid 1959-December 1970. In the 1,460 mergers for which price information was available, the total merger value amounted to $2,283.3 million. The merger movement was most intensive in the later years of the period, with $1,034.8 million being paid for 429 firms during 1968-1970. This compares with some 1,157 mergers transacted at a total cost of $558.4 million recorded by Mr Bushnell [2] in the period 1947-to mid 1959.²³ While mergers took place in almost all industries, they were not uniformly distributed. More than two-thirds of foreign take-overs occurred in manufacturing, compared with less than one-half of domestic mergers in manufacturing. Foreign companies have purchased the largest or leading Australian firms in their respective industries. Moreover, United States take-overs were important in basic chemicals and flour mill and cereal products; on the other hand, United Kingdom take-overs were prominent in beverages and malt, other industrial machinery and fabricated metal products. Among the foreign acquiring companies, merger activity was more concentrated in United Kingdom-based companies than among United States-based companies. For the period as a whole, domestic take-overs outnumbered foreign take-overs by more than 5·5 to 1. In examining the limited evidence for foreign take-over activity in the period 1946-59,²⁴ it is apparent that foreign firms have accounted for a much higher share of merger activity during the nineteen-sixties. In addition, mergers overseas have brought together the Australian subsidiaries of the merging companies. Mr Bushnell [2] rated the tax structure including all its ramifications as probably the single most important cause for mergers.²⁵ While tax factors have continued to play an important role in merger activity, it appears that, during the sixties, a far more important reason for mergers in many industries has been the so-called proliferation effect of mergers. As some firms, especially the multinationals, took over leading local companies making for cost and competitive advantages, invariably the smaller remaining independent firms were compelled to resort to mergers for defensive reasons. The owners of many of these firms, fearing a war of attrition, took advantage of avoiding risks by capitalizing future profits in the form of tax-free capital gains, by selling out before a situation emerged where their bargaining power would have been seriously eroded. Most of these firms disappearing into mergers, did so with partners closely related to their existing operations. Approximately three-fourths of domestic and foreign take-overs were of the broad horizontal class.     

Mergers in durable goods industries

This paper is concerned with the study of durability as an aspect of competition and market structure that contributes to determining the incentives for mergers. We find that relative to the incentives in industries that produce non-durable goods the durability of the good produced by an industry enhances the incentive for mergers in the presence of intertemporal consistency problems. Further, the analysis indicates that in durable good markets a good antitrust policy should combine a restriction to rent solely with a prudent merger policy.     

Cross-border mergers in vertically related industries

We construct a tractable model of an oligopolistic industry that allows us to capture the role of the vertical structure in the incentives for and implications of cross-border horizontal mergers. We show that vertical integration can increase the gains from cross-border mergers. We also demonstrate how market concentration interacts with costs in the decision of a relatively efficient foreign firm located in one country (source) to merge with a disintegrated or an integrated firm in another country (target) when the industry is vertically related. Absent any merger incentives in an autarkic equilibrium, we demonstrate that vertical integration can raise the incentives for diversification in production and add to the gains from cross-border horizontal mergers. Any additional gain from cross-border horizontal mergers, due to the existence of a vertically integrated production structure, is shown to be sensitive to the relative market concentration across countries. Cross-border mergers will be triggered by a relatively cost-efficient source taking over a disintegrated target when pre-merger competition among the disintegrated firms is relatively intense but, otherwise, the initial target will be a vertically integrated firm.     

Credence Goods,Misleading Labels,and Quality Differentiation

Due to differences in information disclosure mechanisms, consumer misinformation about the quality of many credence goods is more endemic at intermediate levels of the quality spectrum rather than at the extremes. Using an oligopoly model of vertical product differentiation, we examine how consumers’ overestimation of the quality of intermediate-quality products affects firms’ incentives to improve product quality. The firms non-cooperatively choose the quality of their product before choosing its price or quantity. Irrespective of the nature of second stage competition, Bertrand or Cournot, we find that quality overestimation by consumers increases profit of the intermediate-quality firm, and motivates it to raise its product’s quality. In response, the high-quality firm improves its product quality even further but ends up with lower profit. Overall, average quality of the vertically differentiated product improves, which raises consumer surplus. Social welfare increases when the firms compete in prices but falls when they compete in quantities.     

Technology Transfer and Merger Activities with Trade and Tariffs

In order to better understand the effects of globalization on merger incentives this paper considers a set of commonly observed mergers whereby a restructured target (with improved managerial or technical capability) continues to supply the market. In contrast to the market‐concentrating merger literature it finds that trade barriers tend to encourage mergers, including potentially welfare‐reducing, tariff‐jumping mergers. Multilateral trade liberalization, however, encourages welfare‐improving mergers. Hence, and despite the skepticism of regulatory authorities towards the existence of cost synergies as a consequence of mergers, this paper suggests that in order to assess the impact of trade liberalization under the WTO on merger incentives, and consequently on prices, quantities, and welfare, accurate information on ex ante cost differences and the transferability of managerial and technical techniques is required.     

Privatization and Strategic Mergers across Borders

We present a theoretical model to capture the role of privatization in the incentives for and implications of cross‐border horizontal mergers. Absent any merger incentives in an autarkic equilibrium, we show that a decrease in the degree of privatization will lower the incentives for diversification of international production. The incentives for diversification for any given degree of privatization will fall when the private and public firms are allowed to move sequentially rather than simultaneously. The presence of the public firm also introduces a new source of asymmetry in the incentives for cross‐border mergers: a reduction in the degree of privatization at home will dampen the potential gains from a take‐over of a home firm by a foreign firm but magnify the potential gains from a take‐over of a foreign firm by a home firm.     

Mergers and innovation: evidence from a panel of US firms*

Mergers lead to larger firms and a less competitive market structure, but their effects on innovation are not clear. Mergers may improve innovation incentives by promoting economies of scope and scale, R&D activities, and increasing the ability to deal with uncertainties. However, mergers may also discourage innovation by reducing competition, increasing costs, and decreasing production and R&D efficiencies. In this study, we investigate merger impacts on innovation using a panel data consisting of four different data sets on publicly traded US manufacturing firms from 1980 to 2003. Our proxy for innovation is based on citation-weighted patent stocks. In our estimation model, we control for endogeneity using instrumental variables and factors such as market share, size, industry, and time. We find that mergers are positively and significantly correlated with firms’ innovation. Our findings also indicate that merger effect on innovation is heterogeneous across industries, increases with market share, and is greater in the long run. Our findings are robust to alternative measures of innovation.     

Product differentiation, cost‐reducing mergers, and consumer welfare

Abstract.  Cost synergies are an explicitly recognized justification for a two‐firm merger, and empirical techniques are now widely used to assess the impact of cost‐reducing mergers on prices and welfare in the post‐merger market. We show that if the merger occurs in a vertically product differentiated market, then the merger will lead to a reduction in product offerings that limits the usefulness of pre‐merger empirical estimates. Indeed, we further show that in such markets, two‐firm mergers will typically lead to higher prices regardless of the merger's cost savings. JEL classification: L10, L41     

Horizontal mergers,cost savings,and network effects

We consider a horizontally differentiated oligopoly and investigate the relationship between merger cost savings and network effects for the incentives of firms to merge and for the postmerger welfare outcomes. We show that it is more profitable to be an insider rather than an outsider of the merger, unless both cost savings and network effects are too low. Mergers can improve customer and total welfare provided both cost savings and network effects are high enough. We find that the possibility for network effects to lead to a Pareto improvement through merger is shown to depend on the number of outside firms.     

On the incentives for horizontal merger in an industry with dominant firms

The paper employs a variant of Perry and Porter's (1985) ‘oligopoly-fringe’ model to analyse the incentives for horizontal merger. We consider several ways in which mergers may form, and their impact upon the profits of both participating and non-participating firms. We investigate the alternative regimes of collusive and non-cooperative behaviour in order to highlight the often perverse results of apparently straightforward merger activities.     

Environmental taxation and mergers in oligopoly markets with product differentiation

We analyze the effect of mergers on optimal environmental taxation in a Cournot oligopoly market with product differentiation. Our result indicates that the adjustment in emission tax crucially depends on the post-merger output distortion and pollution intensities. Specifically, we find that the optimal emission tax increases post-merger as long as pollution intensity of firms is higher and output distortion smaller post-merger than pre-merger. Furthermore, our result suggests that there is no need to revise environmental policy in markets where pollution intensity of firms does not change post-merger and (i) products are completely differentiated, or (ii) there are many firms for any degree of product differentiation.     

What’s fit to print: The effect of ownership concentration on product variety in daily newspaper markets

This paper examines the effect of ownership concentration on product position, product variety and circulation in the US daily newspaper market. The effects of consolidation in differentiated product markets cannot be determined solely from theory. Because multi-product firms internalize business stealing, mergers may encourage firms to reposition products, leading to more, not less, variety. Using data on the assignment of reporters to topical areas at 706 newspapers in 1993, 1999 and 2004, results show that both differentiation and variety increase with ownership concentration. Moreover, greater concentration increases variety over a range of topics and does not reduce readership.