The value of information in a sealed-bid auction

In this paper, we explore bidders' incentives to gather information in auctions, when there is one bidder with only public information and another with some private information. We find that the bidder with only public information makes no profit at equilibrium, while the bidder with private information generally makes positive profits. Moreover, the informed bidder's profits rise when he gathers extra information, and the increase in greater when the information is collected overtly than when it is collected covertly. When the uniformed bidder can observe some of the better-informed bidder's information, he prefers to make his observations covertly. If the seller has access to some of the better-informed bidder's information, or if he has affiliated information of his own, he can raise the expected price by adopting a policy of making that information public. However, there are cases where a policy of publicizing his information would lower the expected price. The distinguishing feature of these latter cases seems to be that the seller's information is complementary to the information of the better-informed bidder.     

Rational expectations equilibrium and the strategic choice of costly information

This paper studies costly information acquisition in one-good production economies when agents acquire private information and prices transmit information. Before asset markets open, agents choose the quality of their private information. After this information stage, agents trade assets in sequentially complete markets taking into account their private information and the information revealed by equilibrium prices (rational expectations equilibrium, (Radner, R., 1979. Rational expectations equilibrium: generic existence and the information revealed by prices, Econometrica 47, 655–678.)). An overall equilibrium in asset and information market is defined as a Nash equilibrium of the information game in which agents’ actions are information choices and their utility payoffs are the ex-ante expected utilities of the corresponding rationale expectations equilibrium. This paper shows that for a generic set of economies parameterized by endowments and productivity shocks, an overall equilibrium in information and asset market (a Nash equilibrium of the induced information game) with costly information acquisition and fully-revealing prices exists. In other words, informational efficiency is in general consistent with costly information acquisition.     

会计信息披露的效率与公平问题——基于会计信息产权和会计外部化的思考

会计信息披露的效率与公平关系到资本市场的效率与公平。基于会计信息产权和会计外部化,会计信息披露可以实现效率与公平的兼顾。职能回缩后的企业会计只提供强制性原始会计信息,维护会计信息披露公平;会计中介机构购买企业的非强制披露会计信息和其它信息,向信息用户有偿提供个性化知识会计信息,以实现会计信息披露效率。     

信息化与标准化

简述信息化、国家信息化、信息技术及信息技术标准化的概念与含义 ,针对地方标准情报部门 ,提出做好信息标准化工作的建议。     

论信息处理在个人发展中的作用

当今社会可谓是一个信息社会,信息爆炸以及信息污染这两种现象就是对这一时代的有力诠释。生活在信息环绕之中的个体,如何处理信息,对于自身发展具有重要的影响作用。本文就信息处理的重要性、信息处理的差异性以及如何有效地进行信息处理以推动个人发展三个方面进行了简要论述。     

E时代旅游信息服务人员的信息素质探讨——基于面向旅游者的旅游信息服务的分析

随着计算机技术与通信技术的飞速发展和不断融合,以及在互联网的普及应用,信息的处理与传递突破了时空的局限,人类随之步入E时代。E时代对旅游信息的质量提出了更高的要求,同时,E时代的旅游信息服务也表现出了不同于以往的诸多新特点。综合考虑上述两方面因素,提出E时代旅游信息服务人员的信息素质主要包括信息意识、信息道德、信息责任、信息知识、信息能力和信息技能,并进一步探讨了信息素质的内容和要求。     

Information asymmetry,sentiment interactions,and asset price

We develop an asset pricing model with sentiment interactions between institutional and individual investors under the condition of information asymmetry. Our model considers private information and investor sentiment, two imperfections in securities markets, and integrates them into a theoretical model to investigate the role of the interaction between information asymmetry and investor sentiment in asset pricing. We show that the joint effect of private information and investor sentiment deviate the price of risky assets and efficiently explains anomalies in the stock market. Investor sentiment changes the effect of information on the equilibrium price relative to a world where all investors are completely rational. Private information changes the effect of investor sentiment on the equilibrium price in comparison with a scenario with symmetric market information. In addition, the individual investors’ learning and the disclosure of information both allow private information to be better integrated into the price and simultaneously changes the effect of investor sentiment on the equilibrium price.     

Investment decisions and debt financing under information uncertainty

This study examines how information uncertainty influences investment decisions. In contrast to prior studies, which assume no information uncertainty, our model includes a discrepancy in valuing debt between shareholders and debtholders at the time of debt issuance. We derive the values of corporate securities and the optimal investment threshold and coupon under information uncertainty. We show that compared with the absence of information uncertainty, debtholders value debt less than shareholders do, and hence, shareholders should contribute more investment funds. Debt financing restraints due to information uncertainty lead to delayed investment. We find that information uncertainty plays a mitigating role in shareholder-debtholder conflicts over investment policy. Moreover, the information uncertainty costs that shareholders incur increase sharply with the level of information uncertainty.     

Value of supply disruption information and information accuracy

In this paper, we examine the factors that influence the value of supply disruption information, investigate how information accuracy influences this value, and provide managerial suggestions to practitioners. The study is motivated by the fact that although accurate disruption information creates benefits, fully accurate disruption information may be difficult and costly to obtain. Furthermore, inaccurate disruption information can decrease the financial benefit of prior knowledge and even lead to negative performance. To perform the analysis, we adopt a newsvendor model within a single product setting where the focal firm can source from a supply network and has a given resilience capacity. The results show that information accuracy, specifically information bias and information variance, plays an important role in determining the value of disruption information. This influence varies at different levels of disruption severity and resilience capacity, and our results imply that higher amounts of resilience capacity actually may be detrimental to a firm without accurate information about a disruption's influence. Thus, for companies with a high resilience capacity, obtaining quality information is critical for effectively coping with disruptions.     

Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions

In an independent, private values, second-price auction with entry fees we discuss the way in which a seller should optimally spread costly information among the bidders. We find that marginal gross revenues do not generally behave monotonically in total information release. In the two bidder case, essentially, any asymmetric allocation of information dominates the symmetric information allocation. Even the bidder who gets less information is willing to pay a higher entry fee for asymmetric information allocations than for the symmetric one. His entry fee coincides with that of the better informed bidder. Losses from allocating an amount of information non-optimally can be substantial.     

信息集成环境下的会计决策支持系统构建

信息集成能够消除信息孤岛,实现企业信息资源共享。应用数据库和数据仓库技术创建信息集成环境,并以此为基础构建会计决策支持系统,能为企业各级管理者提供决策相关信息,提升会计信息系统的应用层次。本文分析了产生信息孤岛的原因,阐述了信息集成对会计信息系统的重要影响,并且详细论述了基于数据仓库技术的会计决策支持系统的构建方法。     

Information Sharing in Contests

We study the incentives to share private information ahead of contests, such as markets with promotional competition, procurement contests, or research and development (R&D). We consider the cases where firms have (i) independent values and (ii) common values of winning the contest. In both cases, when decisions to share information are made independently, sharing information is strictly dominated. With independent values, an industry‐wide agreement to share information can arise in equilibrium. Expected effort is lower with than without information sharing. With common values, an industry‐wide agreement to share information never arises in equilibrium. Expected effort is higher with than without information sharing.     

Is there valuable private information in credit ratings?

Credit rating agencies (CRAs) contend their ratings contain a quantitative assessment based on hard information, and a qualitative adjustment based on private information. We study if the qualitative portion of ratings, generated with the companies’ own private information, contains valuable information for equity investors. We generate predicted ratings based on hard information alone and form portfolios of stocks based on the difference between observed and predicted ratings. Over a sample from 1998 to 2018, we find that stock portfolios formed on the basis of private information generate 2% to 4% in annual risk-adjusted returns. We also find that companies with positive private information have better future accounting performance. Our results suggest that CRAs bring valuable information to the market and investors could benefit from it.     

A note on the evaluation of information in zero-sum repeated games

Two players play a zero-sum repeated game with incomplete information. Before the game starts one player receives a private signal that depends on the realized state of nature. The rules that govern the choice of the signal are determined by the information structure of the game. Different information structures induce different values. The value-of-information function of a game associates every information structure with the value it induces. We characterize those functions that are value-of-information functions for some zero-sum repeated game with incomplete information.     

提高毕业生就业服务信息采集和利用的有效性探索

本文在分析高校毕业生的就业服务信息采集和利用工作的重要性基础上,针对当前的就业信息采集工作中存在的问题,指出就业信息的采集可从深入挖掘主管部门的就业信息、紧密联系人才市场、合理运用各种人际资源、培养学生的信息素质能力等渠道进行,构建立体的综合信息采集网络。同时要合理利用各类信息发布平台,迅速及时发布各类就业信息,注意信息发布的反馈,提高信息利用的有效性。     

Adverse selection and costly information acquisition in asset markets

We develop an asset exchange model with adverse selection and costly information acquisition incentives. A seller of an asset knows the true value of the asset, while a buyer can obtain information about the asset’s quality at a cost. An equilibrium offer is pooling, but a buyer can purchase only good assets after producing the costly information about the asset’s quality. When the probability that the seller holds good assets is above the threshold value, a trade can occur with and without information acquisition, depending on the information acquisition cost, and the trade volume and social welfare are higher in equilibrium without information production than in equilibrium with information production. When the probability of facing good assets is below the threshold value, a trade occurs only after screening the quality of assets, and, hence, the market collapses if the information acquisition cost is sufficiently high. As the information acquisition cost increases, social welfare can increase or decrease depending on the probability of facing good and bad assets.     

信息学院实习方式的思考

信息管理与信息系统专业人才培养的特色是它的应用性和创新性,实习在全面提高学生的素质,培养具有创新意识,实践能力强的复合型人才方面有着极其重要的作用[1]。通过我校信息管理与信息系统实习的必要性和开展信息管理与信息系统实习条件的分析,联系我校的实际提出信息管理与信息系统实习实施方案的几点思考。     

信息技术对人力资源管理模式的影响

随着信息技术的不断发展,信息技术已经渗透到社会的各行各业,对社会经济管理的影响包括人力资源管理的影响也越来越大。本文从信息技术的信息处理和分析的本质出发,探讨信息技术对人力资源管理模式的影响,并构建了信息技术支撑下的现代人力资源管理的闭环模式。本文同时分析了信息技术支撑下的现代人力资源管理闭环模式的效果,以及未来对信息技术应用提出的要求,旨在帮助人们从信息技术应用的角度理解人力资源管理。     

An information diffusion model for momentum effect based on investor wealth

We propose a private information diffusion model to explain the momentum, which considers different amounts of investor wealth and uses the proportion of informed investors’ wealth to measure information diffusion speed. Different distributions of investor wealth can lead to different information diffusion processes, and the speed of information diffusion is positively correlated with the concentration of investor wealth. Our empirical results reveal the relationship between momentum return and information diffusion speed by the S&P 500 stocks in two periods of the upmarket. The results show that stocks with faster information diffusion speed gain higher time-series momentum returns, especially under short holding period strategies. These results provide new evidence for the correlation between information diffusion and the momentum effect.     

信息咨询服务企业运行方式探讨

在信息资源巨大丰富的时代,信息咨询及服务行业面临大的发展机遇。文章针对信息服务型企业的特点,从经营角度分析专业信息服务企业的运行方式,提出了培育发展信息服务企业的建议。