The climacteric in late victorian Britain and France: A reappraisal of the evidence

The paper investigates the question of whether the trend rate of growth of GDP slowed down in Britain or France in the nineteenth century. We establish that real GDP belongs to the trend-stationary process class of time-series in each case rather than the difference-stationary process and using Kalman filter techniques, analyse trends in a model incorporating time-varying parameters without specifying breakpoints in advance. We find, contrary to the literature, that neither country experienced a climacteric. Our results suggest that economic historians have been prone to exaggerated views of variations in trend economic growth.     

Productivity, convergence and policy: a study of OECD countries and industries

This paper analyses trends in labour productivity and its underlying determinants in a panel of OECD countries from 1979 to 2002. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is used to estimate a Malmquist measure of multifactor productivity (MFP) change. We decompose the growth in labour productivity into (i) net technological change (ii) input biased technical change (IBTC) (iii) efficiency change and (iv) capital accumulation. We analyse the effect of each of these factors in the transition towards the equilibrium growth paths of both labour productivity and per capita GDP for the OECD countries, controlling for the effects of different policies and institutions. The results indicate that on average gaps in productivity or income levels are narrowing down although there is no evidence to suggest that the entire OECD area comprises a single convergence “club”. Using kernel estimation methods we find that that labour productivity and per capita GDP are settling toward a twin peak (bimodal) distribution. Panel unit root tests over an extended (1960–2001) period provide general support for the convergence hypothesis. Analysis of the contributions of productivity growth within industries and sectoral composition changes show that aggregate productivity change is predominantly driven by ‘net’ within sector effects with very little contribution emerging from sectoral shifts (the ‘in-between’ static or dynamic effects resulting from higher or above average productivity industries gaining employment shares or low productivity industries losing shares).     

财政购买性支出激励与经济持续增长——兼论确立服务型政府的合理性

本文建立了政府支出创新激励经济增长的理论模型,模型表明政府支出对经济增长的效应取决于预算、投资生产率和支出结构.借助VAR实证模型,中国的经验实证分析表明:公共花费是公共投资的基础,也是GDP增长的主要影响变量;公共投资不一定能促进GDP增长.为此,我们提出政策建议:必须转变政府职能,由投资型政府变为服务型政府,以促进经济持续增长.     

经济增长、全要素生产率与GDP核算误差

全要素生产率是技术进步的一个替代性指标.从全要素生产率及其变化的角度,反观GDP及其增长率是否真实或可信这一逻辑是否成立,依赖于技术进步的性质.如果技术进步是一个相对稳定而且缓慢的演化过程,那么,作为技术进步替代性指标的全要素生产率,在正常情况下,即在没有面临重大自然灾害或天赐良机的情况下,就不会在短期内发生急剧的变化;如果没有非正常情况发生而全要素生产率却发生了急剧变化,一般而言,是产出测量或投入测量出现了问题.但如果恰好面临技术革命或根本性制度变迁时期,则全要素生产率会发生漂移性变化,即从这一时刻起全要素生产率会发生永久性水平的变化.本文利用DEA模型实证性地研究了中国X省经济增长、全要素生产率与GDP核算误差之间的关系,并对相关现象进行了理论分析.     

基于时变参数的我国全要素生产率估计

本文应用时变参数状态空间模型,利用1953~2005年中国宏观经济数据,估计了样本区间内我国的全要素生产率(TFP),并与传统的索洛残差方法的计算结果进行了比较。分析表明:时变参数方法得到的TFP增长率计算结果由于不包含方程误差,比索洛残差方法的结果精确;TFP增长率的变化趋势,基本和GDP的增长趋势相同,只是有所滞后,滞后期一般为一年。     

Assessing output and productivity growth in the banking industry

This paper assesses the evolution of output and productivity in the Greek banking industry for the period 1990–2006. Three main categories of bank output were estimated based on modern theoretical approaches, while for the estimation of output and productivity (partial and total factor) we relied on the index number method (Tornqvist index). We also considered the effect of labor quality on banks’ productivity and the contribution of total factor productivity to bank output growth. Bank output and labor productivity outpaced considerably the respective GDP growth and labor productivity of the Greek economy during the period under examination. Capital and total factor productivity have also improved remarkably mainly since 1999, due to the structural changes that took place within the industry, capital (mainly IT) investments and improvement in the quality of human capital.     

Forecast in detail

November's Budget was framed by some sizeable, unfavourable, revisions to the Office for Budget Responsibility's (OBR's) forecasts for economic growth and borrowing. With the OBR having taken a more downbeat view of prospects for productivity growth, their forecast showed the level of GDP just over 2pp lower in 2021 than their March 2017 projection.     

Asia’s Miracle: They Think It’s All Over – It Need Not Be Yet

In this article Nicholas Crafts reports that the crisis in East Asia is essentially a financial crisis and, as such, reflects failures of regulation and macroeconomic policy rather than a slowdown in underlying growth potential. In the past the Tigers have been very good at factor accumulation but less strong in the effective use of investment and in productivity growth. GDP/hour worked is still well below European levels. Accordingly there remains considerable scope for strong growth based on further catch up provided that the financial crises are resolved satisfactorily. History suggests that this is quite likely. Nevertheless, the leading tigers will need to improve their productivity performance if they are to sustain rapid growth and the example of Japan shows that this is not automatic and may not be easy.     

一种基于劳动生产率的就业人口预测方法——以深圳为例

基于劳动生产率视角,构建一个既综合微观层面各产业劳动生产率变化发展态势,也涵盖宏观层面城市及全国未来经济增长速度等多因素的弹性体系,以此探究产值、劳动生产率和就业人口规模等变量之间灰色联系,从而实现对动态的城市就业人口规模进行预测的目的;界定适用此方法进行就业人口规模预测的一般城市特征,并应用此方法对深圳市2013-2020年就业人口规模进行预测,据此提出相关政策建议。     

An Implicit Törnqvist Index of Real GDP

Recently much attention has been devoted to superlative indexes in the context of the national accounts. In this paper we advocate the use of the implicit Törnqvist quantity index to measure real GDP. This index, which has been proposed by Diewert and Morrison (1986), has never received serious consideration in the literature. Yet, compared to the better-known Fisher index, the implicit Törnqvist index of real GDP has a number of advantages. Thus, it can be shown to be exact for the Translog GDP function, it allows for a complete multiplicative decomposition of nominal and real GDP, and it is consistent with state-of-the-art measures of total factor productivity that typically rely on the Törnqvist aggregation. Estimates for a sample of 26 countries are reported. We find that the Laspeyres quantity index still used by the statistical agencies of most countries tends to underestimate real growth. Over the 1960–1996 period, the cumulated shortfall was as much as 13.4% of GDP in the case of Japan.     

Information technology and U.S. productivity growth: evidence from a prototype industry production account

The rapid productivity growth in the US during the Information Age, prior to the dot-com bust in 2000, and the large contribution of the IT producing sector, is well known. Less known are the sources of the surprisingly rapid TFP growth during the slow growth period after 2000. We construct an account of US economic growth by aggregating over detailed industries using a new data set based on the NAICS classification. We find that, post 2000, TFP originating from the IT-Producing sector decelerated relative to the IT boom, but still accounted for 40% of aggregate productivity growth. This deceleration was counterbalanced by the contribution from IT-Using sectors, which buoyed aggregate TFP growth to almost the same rate as the 1995–2000 period. For aggregate GDP, the contributions to the growth rate of 2.8% during 2000–2007 were: capital input (1.7% points), labor input (0.4) and TFP (0.7).     

Scenarios for long‐term world growth

• In the second of two articles on long‐term world growth, we present a set of stylised scenarios for world growth in the next decade. Our baseline forecast, which sees growth edging down, is compared to scenarios based on ‘lost decades’ in China and India, lower productivity and investment growth and a bigger drag from excess debt. The more likely of these scenarios could cut world growth by around 0.5 percentage points per year, rising to a 1.5 percentage point cut for the most extreme scenario.
• Our baseline forecast assumes productivity and investment grow at a similar pace in the next decade to the past ten years. But there are downside risks to productivity growth, especially in Emerging Markets (EMs). And with investment in China and in commodity exporters slowing, our investment forecast relies on a significant rebound in the major economies.
• Demographic factors are a significant downside risk to our forecast. The negative impact of demographic changes on growth in Japan since the 1990s was not generally foreseen. This risk exists in the US and Europe but also in emerging Asia, a particular concern given that the latter region accounted for over 50% of world growth in 2000–14.
• Growth in commodity‐exporting economies could undershoot our current predictions. Historical evidence suggests a danger that the drop in commodity prices could extend for several more years. Even with zero real growth in commodity prices, aggregate GDP growth in the main commodity exporters might only be around 2.5% per year.
• Another risk area is debt. International evidence suggests debt ratios above certain thresholds slow growth. We find that countries accounting for 44% and 31% of world GDP respectively exceed these estimated public and corporate debt thresholds. But the share is lower, and has dropped, for household debt, thanks to deleveraging in the G7.

     

Global growth to 2024: reversion to which mean?

• We expect global GDP growth to average 3.5% per year (at PPP exchange rates) over the next ten years. This is lower than the 3.8% recorded in 2000–14 though not dramatically so. There will be a modest recovery in advanced economy growth ‐ but not to pre‐crisis rates. Emerging market (EM) growth will slow but remain faster than growth in the advanced economies. And with EM's share in world GDP much increased from 10–15 years ago, EMs will continue to provide a large proportion of world growth.
• EM growth is expected to run at around 4.5% per year in 2015–24, well down on the 6% seen in 2000–14. This includes a slowdown from around 10% to 5–6% in China ‐ but China's share in world GDP has risen so much that China's contribution to world growth will remain very substantial.
• Advanced economies are forecast to grow by 1.9% per year in 2015–24, a big improvement from the 1% pace of 2007–14 (which was affected by the global financial crisis) but below the 1990–2014 average. Indeed, the gap between forecast G7 GDP and GDP extrapolated using pre‐crisis trends in potential output will remain large at 10–15% in 2015–24.
• Global growth will remain relatively strong compared to much longer‐term averages: growth from 1870–1950 was only around 2% per year. But a return to such low growth rates looks unlikely; China and India were a major drag on world growth until the 1980s but are now fast growing regions.
• Our forecast is relatively cautious about key growth factors; the contribution of productivity growth is expected to improve slightly, while those from capital accumulation and labour supply fall back. Demographics will be a more severe drag on growth from 2025–40. Overall, risks to our long‐term forecasts look to be skewed to the downside.

     

陕西省教育投资的外溢效用研究

文章运用Feder模型测算陕西省教育投资的外溢效应,从分析结果中得出,教育部门每增加一个百分点,非教育部门会增加0.5841个百分点,同时生产总值会增加7.7531个百分点,由此可见教育投资对经济增长有巨大的促进作用,另外教育部门的边际生产力低于非教育部门。     

Determinants of total factor productivity in former Soviet Union economies: A stochastic frontier approach

This paper investigates the process of GDP generation in former Soviet Union (FSU) economies to provide an understanding of the impact of technology channels on countries’ efficiency. We apply a stochastic frontier approach to 15 FSU economies over the period 1995–2008 and find that FDI and human capital improve countries’ technical efficiency. Furthermore, we show that these factors also have a positive impact on total factor productivity (TFP), which, in turn, improves real GDP growth. Hence, our results suggest that FSU countries should promote public policies that provide incentives to attract foreign investment and enhance domestic education in order to improve their economic growth. Additionally, our empirical evidence argues against the resource curse hypothesis. We also show, by computing efficiency change and technological change indices at the country level, that FSU economies benefit more from exploiting technological progress than from catching up to the best practice frontier.     

The Returns to Education: Macroeconomics

We offer an extensive summary and a critical discussion of the empirical literature on the impact of human capital on macro‐economic performance, with a particular focus on UK policy. We also highlight methodological issues and make recommendations for future research priorities.
Taking the studies as a whole, the evidence that human capital increases productivity is compelling, though still largely divided on whether the stock of education affects the long‐run level or growth rate of GDP. A one‐year increase in average education is found to raise the level of output per capita by between three and six percent according to augmented neo‐classical specifications, while leading to an over one percentage point faster growth according to estimates from the new‐growth theories. Still, over the short‐run planning horizon (four years) the empirical estimates of the change in GDP are of similar orders of magnitude in the two approaches. The impact of increases at different levels of education appear to depend on the level of a country's development, with tertiary education being the most important for growth in OECD countries. Education is found to yield additional indirect benefits to growth. More preliminary evidence seems to indicate that type, quality and efficiency of education matter for growth too.     

要素重置、经济增长与区域非平衡发展

研究目标：要素错配对经济增长和区域非均衡发展的影响。研究方法：运用提出的测算框架将经济增长分解为部门全要素生产率、要素禀赋和资源配置效率,并通过构建反事实框架重点探讨要素错配如何影响区域经济的非平衡发展。研究发现：2000~2013年要素再配置仅能解释中国经济增长的9.2%,中国经济增长主要依赖于要素积累和部门全要素生产率;部门全要素生产率、要素错配和要素禀赋分别可以解释区域非平衡发展的56.5%、30.7%和12.8%;要素完全有效配置将使得人均真实收入年均增加31.4%,但提升空间趋于缩小。研究创新：拓展传统经济增长分解方法并构建反事实框架研究要素错配的经济效应。研究价值：有助于深入理解要素配置在经济增长和区域非平衡发展中的重要性。     

International Leadership in Productivity at the Aggregate and Industry Level

Since many policies affect specific parts of economies differently, it is useful to decompose GDP per capita differences across countries into differences across smaller and smaller parts of economies. In this paper, we summarize recent contributions in this area and fit them together into a decomposition procedure for GDP per capita differences. The overall finding is that the U.S. is the productivity leader for the most of the economy. Moreover, international productivity differences at the aggregate level of the economies are in most cases translated into differences in the productivity of industries, at least compared to the productivity leader U.S. The variability of productivity differences at the industry level is, however, substantially higher than any differences at the aggregate or sector level. For the manufacturing sector alone the U.S. and Japan share the leadership on the industry level. In contrast, France, U.K., and Germany exhibit almost no leadership in productivity at the industry level. Hence, nation-specific factors appear to be dominant in the comparison of European countries with the U.S. Finally, mix differences do not play a very large role for big countries. For Germany, however, the mix effect can help to reconcile relative high productivity for the market economy and lower productivity at disaggregated levels.     

Soaring corporate debt is a risk to global growth

• ▀ Corporate borrowing is accelerating as a result of the coronavirus crisis. In part, this is a healthy development as firms look to ride out a period of low or even zero sales. But it also brings potential risks to growth, especially in the longer term, including via lengthy balance sheet restructuring that hurts investment and productivity growth.
• ▀ In the advanced economies, we estimate the aggregate corporate debt/GDP ratio could rise as much as 10ppts in 2020, to 95% of GDP - well above the 2009 peak. Debt service ratios may also rise into risky territory despite low interest rates. Risks look especially elevated in France and Canada.
• ▀ Evidence for both advanced and emerging economies suggests high corporate debt levels can damage growth. Highly indebted firms tend to invest less in both the near and medium terms, and some estimates suggest the rise in aggregate debt this year could cut GDP growth by up to 0.2% per year.
• ▀ The coronavirus crisis may also crystallise some pre-existing risks in corporate debt. Despite government assistance, defaults by low-rated firms have started to rise and commercial real estate prices are falling.
• ▀ Sectoral concentrations of risk may also be intensified and new ones created in industries hit hard by the virus like energy and consumer discretionary sectors.
• ▀ Emerging market corporate debt is also on the rise - sharply in some cases. In some economies, this mostly reflects exchange rate effects. But negative balance sheet effects of this kind are also a risk to growth.

     

Forecasting GDP growth with NIPA aggregates: In search of core GDP

In addition to GDP, which is measured using expenditure data, the U.S. national income and product accounts (NIPAs) provide a variety of measures of economic activity, including gross domestic income and other aggregates that exclude one or more of the components that make up GDP. Similarly to the way in which economists have attempted to use core inflation—which excludes volatile energy and food prices—to predict headline inflation, the omission of GDP components may be useful in extracting a signal as to where GDP is going. We investigate the extent to which these NIPA aggregates constitute “core GDP.” In an out-of-sample forecasting exercise using a novel real-time dataset of NIPA aggregates, we find that consumption growth and the growth of GDP excluding inventories and trade have historically outperformed a canonical univariate benchmark for forecasting GDP growth, suggesting that these are promising measures of core GDP growth.