Product market competition and the cost of bank loans: Evidence from state antitakeover laws

The extant literature documents a positive relationship between a firm’s takeover vulnerability and its agency cost of debt. Using state antitakeover laws as an exogenous measure of variation in takeover vulnerability, I investigate whether product market competition has a disciplinary effect that can lower a firm’s cost of bank loans. After taking into account the industry composition of borrowers, I find that banks charge higher spreads to borrowers that are vulnerable to takeovers, but only in concentrated industries. In the absence of disciplinary competitive pressure, the effect of takeover vulnerability on the cost of bank loans is mitigated for larger firms, firms followed by analysts, firms with existing credit ratings, non-family firms, and for borrowers with shorter maturity loans or loans with covenants and collateral in place. Taken together, the results suggest that the effect of governance on the cost of financing is not homogenous across all industries, and that concentrated industry firms may need to use supplementary governance mechanisms to mitigate debt holder agency problems.     

Co-opted directors,covenant intensity,and covenant violations

This study investigates how the level of board co-option might affect a borrowing firm's ex ante covenant intensity and ex post covenant violations. As the fraction of co-opted directors (those who joined the board after the CEO assumed office) increases, creditors include more covenant restrictions in their loan contracts, indicating that more co-opted boards are considered as weaker monitors. The results remain robust to various approaches accounting for endogeneity, and are not driven by alternative explanations such as CEO tenure, director inexperience, or CEO's involvement in the nominating committee. Ex post tests reveal that firms with more co-opted boards are more likely to violate loan covenants after controlling for covenant intensity. Non-co-opted independent directors appear to be the most effective monitors in mitigating covenant violations among revolving loans and loans to unrated borrowers.     

Decoupling the distressed banks and their clients,and coupling the distressed firms and their lending banks

This paper simultaneously investigates the responses of stock prices of the related banks and the client firms when one of them is in distress. Two effects are examined. The distressed bank effect, which claims that the stock price of client firms are coupled to that of their related distress banks, and the distressed firm effect, which claims that the related banks are negatively affected when their client firms are in distress. We collect the detailed information of individual transaction loan data to find the relationship between banks and their client firms. Asymmetric responses are reported in this paper. Our results reject the distressed bank effect but, by contrast, cannot reject the distressed firm effect. We propose the fund diversification hypothesis and the leverage hypothesis, and argue the decoupling effect of the distressed bank and their listed firms, owing to the diversified choice of clients' financing channel.     

Do Declines in Bank Health Affect Borrowers’ Voluntary Disclosures? Evidence from International Propagation of Banking Shocks

I examine whether declines in banks’ financial health affect their borrowers’ disclosures. Prior studies indicate that, in relationship lending, banks and borrowers rely on private communication, rather than public disclosures, to resolve information asymmetries. When banking relationships are threatened, borrowers must turn to new funding sources, inducing them to reconsider their disclosure policies. This paper predicts that borrowers, whose banking relationships are threatened by declining bank health, change their public disclosures of forward‐looking information. Using the emerging‐market financial crises in the late 1990s as shocks to the health of certain U.S. banks, I find that affected banks’ U.S. borrowers increase both the quantity and informativeness of their management forecasts following these shocks compared to borrowers of unaffected banks. The results are similar using conference calls or the length of the Management's Discussion and Analysis section as alternative proxies for voluntary disclosure. Overall, these results provide new insights into the impact of availability of relationship lending on firms’ disclosure choices.     

Cross-ownership and collateral in lending

Information asymmetry is a major obstacle in both formal and informal loan markets. However, when a borrower and a lender are connected via cross-ownership, this obstacle can be significantly reduced. Cross-ownership enables lenders to collect more concrete and precise information about borrowers, and this lowered information asymmetry reduces the likelihood that the lender will require the borrower to provide collateral. Using a data set of 1091 intercorporate loans from China, we find strong support for the prediction that cross-ownership between lenders and borrowers lowers the collateral requirements by more than 50%. This relation is more pronounced for informationally opaque borrowers and for lending firms with a controlling stake in the borrowing firms.     

Do banks price environmental transition risks? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China

This paper assesses the risk arising from transition toward a low-emission economy and examines its transmission channels within the financial system. The environmental dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (E-DSGE) model shows that tightening environmental regulation impairs firms' balance sheets in the short term, as it enforces firms to internalize the pollution costs, which consequentially escalates the risks facing the financial system. For the empirical analysis, we employ the Clean Air Action that the Chinese government launched in 2013 as a quasi-natural experiment. The analysis on a unique dataset containing more than one million loans indicates that the default rates of high-polluting firms rose by around 80% along their environmental policy exposure. Further analysis shows those joint equity commercial banks with lower degree of government intervention and better corporate governance structure were able to appropriately manage their exposure to transition risks, while the state-owned banks failed to factor in such risks when extending credit to the borrowers targeted by the environmental regulation.     

Who monitors opaque borrowers? Debt specialisation,institutional ownership,and information opacity

In this study, we suggest that the level of information opaqueness determines the propensity of publicly listed firms to have debt financing from only a few debt types (i.e., debt specialisation). Using accruals quality as a proxy for information opaqueness, we find that the degree of debt specialisation is lower for firms with high-quality accruals. This result is consistent with the notion that information collection and monitoring costs are higher for firms that have higher informational opacity, explaining the tendency towards debt specialisation. We further argue that creditors need not monitor borrowers so closely when they are monitored by institutional owners. The empirical findings support this argument and show that firms with more stable institutional ownership are likely to have less specialised debt types. The empirical evidence is also consistent with the expectation that stable institutional ownership is likely to reduce the demand for monitoring over accruals management. Using S&P 500 membership as an exogenous event driving institutional ownership changes, we further document that debt specialisation is decreasing in accruals quality when institutional investors are expected to have an influence.     

How important are small banks to small business lending?: New evidence from a survey of small firms

Typically, small banks lend a larger proportion of their assets to small businesses than do large banks. The recent wave of bank mergers has thinned the ranks of small banks, raising the concern that small firms may find it difficult to access bank credit. However, bank consolidation will reduce small business credit only if small banks enjoy an advantage in lending to small businesses. We test the existence of a small bank cost advantage in small business lending by conducting the following simple test: If such advantages exist, then we should observe small businesses in areas with few small banks to have less bank credit. Using data on small business borrowers from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finance, we find that the probability of a small firm having a line of credit from a bank does not decrease in the long run when there are fewer small banks in the area, although short-run disruptions may occur. Nor do we find that firms in areas with few small banks are any more likely to repay trade credit late, suggesting that such firms are no more credit constrained than firms in areas with many small banks.     

Do Banks Value Innovation? Evidence from US Firms

This study evaluates how innovation within companies alleviates the information asymmetry problems in relationship lending. We hypothesize that patenting activities could reveal favorable private information and, hence, reduce the information asymmetry between innovative borrowers and banks. Using a sample of US patenting firms from 1987 to 2004, we show that borrowers with higher innovation capability (revealed by having more patent applications, higher research & development (R&D) productivity, or higher‐quality patents) enjoy lower bank‐loan spreads and better nonprice‐related loan terms. Our evidence further suggests that the information benefits of patenting activities on loan spreads is more pronounced for small or less R&D‐intensive firms.     

The effect of principles-based standards on financial statement comparability: The case of SFAS-142

This study examines the effects of a prominent principles-based standard (SFAS-142, Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets) on financial statement comparability. Using non-goodwill-intensive firms as our control group, we implement a difference-in-differences research design to examine how SFAS-142 affects comparability among goodwill-intensive firms (i.e. a treatment group), and comparability between goodwill-intensive firms and non-goodwill-intensive firms (i.e. another treatment group). We find that SFAS-142 decreases comparability among goodwill-intensive firms, as well as comparability between goodwill-intensive and non-goodwill-intensive firms. We also find that these reductions in comparability are less severe when the verifiability of net assets is higher. Overall, the results suggest that principles-based standards may reduce comparability, particularly when the accounting items entail high uncertainty and verifiability is low.     

Adaptive credit granting policies

We analyze here the optimal interest rate determination of a bank that learns about the repayment behavior of its customers from their past behavior. Optimal dynamic methods are first suggested for determining the interest rate for a bank that learns about the probability of default of its borrowers. It is shown that such a bank determines lower than or equal interest rates than a bank that does not adapt its probability of default according to its past experience. Similar results also obtain when the bank learns about the probabilities that its borrowers belong to each of K (K larger than 2) quality groups.     

Evidence on the Trade-Off between Risk and Return for IPO and SEO Firms

Do the low long‐run average returns of equity issuers reflect underperformance due to mispricing or the risk characteristics of the issuing firms? We shed new light on this question by examining how institutional lenders price loans of equity issuing firms. Accounting for standard risk factors, we find that equity issuing firms' expected debt return is equivalent to the expected debt return of nonissuing firms, implying that institutional lenders perceive equity issuers to be as risky as similar nonissuing firms. In general, institutional lenders perceive small and high book‐to‐market borrowers as systematically riskier than larger borrowers with low book‐to‐market ratios, consistent with the asset pricing approach in Fama and French (1993) . Finally, we find that firms' expected debt returns decline after equity offerings, consistent with recent theoretical arguments suggesting that firm risk should decline following an equity offering. Overall, our analysis provides novel evidence consistent with risk‐based explanations for the observed equity returns following IPOs and SEOs.     

Price Discovery and Dissemination of Private Information by Loan Syndicate Participants

We delineate key channels through which flows of confidential information to loan syndicate participants impact the dynamics of information arrival in prices. We isolate the timing of private information flows by estimating the speed of price discovery over quarterly earnings cycles in both secondary syndicated loan and equity markets. We identify borrowers disseminating private information to lenders relatively early in the cycle with firms exhibiting relatively early price discovery in the secondary loan market, documenting that price discovery is faster for loans subject to financial covenants, particularly earnings‐based covenants; for borrowers who experience covenant violations; for borrowers with high credit risk; and for loans syndicated by relationship‐based lenders or highly reputable lead arrangers. We then ask whether early access to private information in the loan market accelerates the speed of information arrival in stock prices. We document that the stock returns of firms identified with earlier private information dissemination to lenders indeed exhibit faster price discovery in the stock market, but only when institutional investors are involved in the firm's syndicated loans. Further, the positive relation between institutional lending and the speed of stock price discovery is more pronounced in relatively weak public disclosure environments. These results are consistent with institutional lenders systematically exploiting confidential syndicate information via trading in the equity market.     

Impact of ethical behavior on syndicated loan rates

This paper shows that borrowers’ ethical behavior leads lending banks to loosen financing conditions when setting loan rates. We advance the banking literature by stressing that the previous financing loosening is enhanced when there is similarity of lenders and borrowers along their ethical domain given that such similarity brings about familiarity and trust in non-opportunistic behavior between them, thereby contributing to lower information frictions. Unique data composed of 12,545 syndicated loan facilities from 19 countries for the period 2003–2007 indicate a 24.8% reduction in the mean spread associated with an increase of one standard deviation in the degree of borrowers’ ethical behavior from its mean value. Such reduction is enhanced to 37.6% when lenders also behave in an ethical way. Results withstand a battery of robustness tests including the use of alternative databases that capture the effect of the 2008 financial crisis, financing alternatives such as equity financing as well as nonparametric estimations.     

Cost stickiness and bank loan contracting

This study examines whether and, if so, how borrowers' asymmetric cost behavior (i.e., cost stickiness) is factored into the price and non-price terms of bank loan contracts. We provide strong and reliable evidence that ex-ante, the loan spread increases with cost stickiness after controlling for other known determinants of loan contract terms. Moreover, we find that the effect is more pronounced for borrowers with higher default risk and higher information risk. This is consistent with borrowers' asymmetric cost behavior increasing lenders' uncertainty about the liquidation value of assets, and hence, lenders need to be compensated ex-ante. Additionally, we conjecture that higher cost stickiness may increase the need for ex-post monitoring. Consistent with this conjecture, we find some evidence that lenders impose tighter non-price terms on firms with stickier costs. This study integrates cost stickiness research with the banking literature by showing that banks incorporate borrowers' asymmetric cost behavior into loan contracting terms.     

Liquidity management,operating performance,and corporate value: evidence from Japan and Taiwan

This study examines the relationship between liquidity management and operating performance, and that between liquidity management and corporate value for firms in Japan and Taiwan. We observe that the cash conversion cycle (CCC)–returns on assets (ROA) and CCC–returns on equity (ROE) relationships are commonly negative and sensitive to industry factors. Both Japanese and Taiwanese firms with q>1 have significantly lower CCC than firms with q⩽1. In addition, Japanese firms with q>1 have significantly higher ROA and ROE than firms with q⩽1. Overall, the findings indicate that aggressive liquidity management enhances operating performance and is usually associated with higher corporate values for both countries in spite of differences in structural characteristics or in financial system of a firm.     

Targeted by an activist hedge fund,do the lenders care?

Do banks worry about expropriation when an activist hedge fund targets their borrowers or are they reassured that their borrowers will perform better after such targeting? We study 1435 events during the 1996–2013 period in which an activist targeted a US corporation, to examine what happens to loan contract terms post-targeting. We present two new results. First, we show that when a firm is targeted by an activist hedge fund, the lenders of that firm charge a significantly higher rate on future loans and demand collateral more frequently than the loans made to risk- and industry-matched non-targeted firms. Second, we find that this increase in loan rate and the likelihood of collateral demand is limited only to those targets that experience a large positive announcement return when the news of an activist's involvement is first announced. We argue that higher interest rates and greater collateral requirements reflect the increased credit risk for these borrowers due, in part, to the possibility of wealth expropriation by the shareholders. Thus, we provide empirical evidence that an increase in equity value due to an activist's targeting may partially be due to wealth expropriation from creditors.     

Risky lending: Does bank corporate governance matter?

We study the effect of bank governance on risk-taking in commercial lending. Banks with more effective boards are less likely to lend to riskier borrowers. This effect is restricted to periods of distress in the banking industry and is stronger at banks with board-level credit committees. Banks with more effective boards are less likely to lend to riskier borrowers right after the Russian default, which exogenously imposed distress conditions on U.S. banks. Thus, value-maximizing banks appear to ration credit to riskier borrowers precisely when such firms might be credit-constrained, suggesting that bank governance regulations may have potential unintended consequences.     

Consistency in meeting or beating earnings expectations and management earnings forecasts

This paper provides evidence that firms that have consistently met or beaten analysts’ earnings expectations (MBE) provide more frequent “bad news” management forecasts than firms with no established string of MBE, particularly when existing analyst forecasts are optimistic. This suggests that firms with a consistent MBE record are more likely to guide analysts’ expectations downward to avoid breaking the consistency. Subsequent analyst forecast revisions following bad news management forecasts issued by these firms are dampened, implying that analysts suspect that these forecasts may be opportunistic. The relation between management forecasts and MBE consistency is stronger after Regulation FD.     

Bank Quality,Judicial Efficiency,and Loan Repayment Delays in Italy

Italian firms delay payment to banks weakened by past loan losses. Exploiting Credit Register data, we fully absorb borrower fundamentals with firm-quarter effects. Identification therefore reflects firm choices to delay payment to some banks, depending on their health. This selective delay occurs more where legal enforcement of collateral recovery is slow. Poor enforcement encourages borrowers not to pay when the value of their bank relationship comes into doubt. Selective delays occur even by firms able to pay all lenders. Credit losses in Italy have thus been worsened by the combination of weak banks and weak legal enforcement.