The NBA, Exit Discrimination, and Career Earnings

The purpose of this article is threefold. First, it complements the many wage discrimination studies by examining exit discrimination in the NBA using a decade's worth of data (the 1980s). White players have a 36 percent lower risk of being cut than black players, ceteris paribus , translating into an expected career length of 7.5 seasons for an apparently similar player who is white and 5.5 seasons for the same player who is black. Second, the career earnings effect of exit discrimination in the 1980s is larger ($808,000) than the career earnings effect of wage discrimination ($329,000). Third, our data are consistent with the hypothesis that customer racial discrimination is the reason for the observed exit discrimination.     

Residential-Mortgage Lending Discrimination and Lender-Risk-Compensating Policies

The Boston Federal Reserve study ( Munnell et al. 1996 ) concluded that illegal discrimination is a statistically significant contributor to the observed gap between white and minority residential-mortgage rejection rates. The Boston study speculated that discrimination arises because lenders do not equally apply risk compensation or mitigation policies for imperfect loans. Using the same 1990 Boston loan application data, our study specifically examines the relation between compensating policies and discrimination. Since compensating policies are encouraged by secondary-mortgage-market sale guidelines, we model both the lender's origination decision and its loan sale decision. Using a rule-based artificial-intelligence technique applied to each lender, we infer compensating policies (rules) that equally apply to all races and explain lending decisions. A minority-race indicator loses its statistical significance when an indicator of compensating-policy violations appears in the loan accept–reject equation. This result reflects the fact that the risk levels of marginal minority loans tend to be more extreme than those of marginal white loans. However, the result does not necessarily reject the existence of discrimination. Equally applied policies may be empirically indistinguishable from unfairly applied policies. In addition, equally applied policies may fail the adverse-impact doctrine if they do not serve a business necessity (such as profits). The industry's move away from discretionary, rule-based decisions to mortgage scoring answers the need for a decision framework that rigorously uses loan performance to evaluate all loan applicants fairly.     

Annual Income, Hourly Wages, and Identity Among Mexican-Americans and Other Latinos

This article examines heterogeneity and income inequality among Hispanic Americans. Two processes that influence Hispanic heterogeneity include acculturation and labor market discrimination because of skin shade/phenotype. I focus on Hispanics because of their variation in phenotype, color, nativity, and language usage and also because of their recent large-scale integration into a society that historically has been characterized by bipolar racial categories that are putatively based on phenotype. This process provides a natural experiment for appraising the relative importance of acculturation, discrimination, and income inequality. I use data from two periods, 1979 and 1989, to determine the stability of identity formation among Mexican-Americans and other Hispanics. I find strong incentives favoring acculturation among Mexican- and Cuban-Americans. Americans of Mexican and Cuban descent but less so Puerto Ricans are able to increase annual income and hourly wages by acculturating into a non-Hispanic white racial identity. However, neither the abandonment of Spanish nor the abandonment of a specifically Hispanic racial self-identity is sufficient to overcome the penalties associated with having a dark complexion and non-European phenotype.     

Occupational Stereotypes and Gender‐Specific Job Satisfaction

Using representative data containing information on job satisfaction and workers’ gender‐specific prejudices, we investigate the relationship between stereotyping and job satisfaction. We show that women in stereotypically male jobs are significantly less satisfied with their work climate and job content than in stereotypically female jobs but more satisfied with their income in those same jobs. Our findings indicate that women trade off their higher income satisfaction against the negative consequences of stereotyping. As long as we take into account that stereotypically male jobs are physically more demanding than stereotypically female jobs, men are generally more satisfied with stereotypically male jobs.     

Race and Gender Wage Gaps in the Market for Recent College Graduates

Using a large sample of recent college graduates, the study tests the hypothesis that observed race and gender wage differentials reflect between-group differences in the type and quality of education attained rather than labor market discrimination. After controlling for narrowly defined college major, college grade point average, and the exact educational institution attended, white male and Hispanic male graduates earn 10 to 15 percent more per hour than comparable female, black male, or Asian male graduates.     

谈色彩偏见在服装和纺织品中的应用

由于人们的生活环境、文化背景、个人生理的差异产生了对色彩的不同审美观点,这种差异我们可称为色彩偏见,不同的色彩偏见直接或间接地影响人的心理活动,设计师可以利用色彩的这一特性为我们创造出更舒适健康的生活。本文从色彩心理和色彩文化两个方面探讨了色彩偏见在服装和纺织品领域的影响及其应用。     

Privatization, City Residency, and Black-White Earnings Differentials: Evidence from the Public Transit Sector

Becker's theory on the economics of discrimination suggests that enhanced competition creates a business environment that discourages employers from paying racial earnings differences. This study tests this hypothesis by examining black-white earnings differentials for public transit bus drivers for pre- and post-privatization periods. The findings reveal an erosion of the racial earnings differential in the post-privatization period which is consistent with the Becker hypothesis. Public transit black union drivers earned more than their white counterparts prior to privatization. City residency accounts for 36 percent of this premium. However, the city-residency earnings advantage and the black-white union premium declinedappreciably in the post-privatization period.     

Race Discrimination and Union Voice

This work reports patterns of complaints about racial discrimination that appear consistent with the social mechanism of "voice." Black union members are subject to less racial discrimination but are no less likely to identify themselves as victims of discrimination than black nonunion members. Indeed, black women members are more likely to claim discrimination than their nonunion counterparts. White union members are much more likely to identify themselves as victims of discrimination than non-members even controlling for the erosion of typical racial wage differentials. These findings remain robust across a variety of specifications and suggest that there is something unique about the union setting that encourages complaints.     

Multi-dimensional price discrimination

We examine the profitability and welfare implications of price discrimination in a multi-dimensional model. First, when firms price discriminate on one and the same dimension, uniform price lies in between discriminatory prices and price discrimination raises profits relative to uniform pricing. This is in contrast to common findings in existing one-dimensional models featuring best-response asymmetry, suggesting that price discrimination can have qualitatively different implications in one- and multi-dimensional models. Second, price discrimination on one and the same dimension is the likely outcome when price discrimination decisions are endogenized using a two-stage discrimination-then-pricing game. Correspondingly, an observation of one-dimensional price discrimination in practice does not necessarily indicate that the underlying model should be one-dimensional.     

Racial Discrimination in the Workplace: Does Market Structure Make a Difference?

For some time, social scientists have debated whether market competition reduces racial discrimination. The failure to recognize that racial discrimination may be practiced not only in hiring but also in many different ways has led to analyses that are less than complete. Workers may be discriminated against at the hiring stage and in wages, raises, promotions, and other more subtle forms of discrimination once on the job. Using the structure of the firms' product market as the measure of concentration, I find that increased competition has no impact on the number of discrimination reports, racial wage discrimination, or the racial demographics of the workforce. Business competition cannot be relied on to reduce or combat racial discrimination, as some have insisted.     

INPUT PRICE DISCRIMINATION WHEN BUYERS OPERATE IN MULTIPLE MARKETS*

This paper revisits third‐degree price discrimination when input buyers serve multiple product markets. Such circumstances are prevalent since buyers often use the same input to produce different outputs, and even homogenous outputs are routinely sold through different locations. The typical view is that price discrimination stifles efficiency (and welfare) by resulting in price concessions to less efficient firms. When buyers serve multiple markets, price discrimination leads to price breaks for firms in markets with lower demand. When lower demand markets also have less competition, price discrimination can provide welfare gains by shifting output to less competitive markets.     

The Reliability of Fair Housing Audits to Detect Racial Discrimination in Rental Housing Markets

Racial discrimination against black Americans continues to exert a pervasive influence on all aspects of American life. This paper investigates the reliability of two techniques currently used by local fair housing groups to measure the extent of racial discrimination in the rental housing market: in-person audits and telephone audits. When we do not control for the presence of vacancies, we observe a moderate rate of reliability between the in-person audits and the telephone audits. When we control for the presence of vacancies, we observe a much higher degree of reliability between the two methods used to detect racial discrimination in rental housing markets. We conclude that these techniques are useful devices to detect racial discrimination in housing markets.     

On the Absence of Directional Price Discrimination in the U.S. Airline Industry*

Certain forms of price discrimination in oligopoly markets can lead to more aggressive competition and lower profits, yet few empirical studies examine how extensively such strategies are used. I consider one such strategy, testing whether airlines charge different prices on the same flights to passengers that originate from different endpoints. Using fare quote data I formulate a new approach to measure discrimination while controlling for cost heterogeneity and find that carriers within the U.S. domestic market do not engage in directional price discrimination despite frequently using other similar pricing strategies that are unlikely to enhance competition.     

Third-Degree Price Discrimination With Interdependent Demands

This paper analyzes the price, output, and welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination for a monopolist who sells in two interdependent markets. The case where the two goods sold by the monopolist are complements is analyzed as well as the more typical case where the two goods are substitutes. The economic effects of price discrimination are shown to depend on the type and strength of demand interdependence, the curvature of the demands and the slope of marginal cost. The circumstances under which price discrimination causes both market prices to either rise or fall are also analyzed.     

Sex Discrimination in Job-Related Training

Women and men have unequal chances of obtaining training. Estimates of market discrimination in access to training are obtained using the 1984 Labour Force Survey. These show that young women suffer considerable discrimination, their chances of receiving training being reduced by a third or more, and their chances of receiving job-specific training being reduced by one-half or more, in comparison with young men. By contrast, older women either suffer much less discrimination or are even slightly favoured in comparison with older men.     

PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN STACKELBERG COMPETITION*

We examine the effects of price discrimination in the Stackelberg competition model for the linear demand case. We show that the leader does not use any price discrimination at all. Rather, the follower does all price discrimination. The leader directs all of its first mover preemptive advantage to attract the highest value consumers who pay a uniformly high price. We observe that profits and total welfare are larger and consumer surplus is smaller than those of the standard Stackelberg competition model.     

Wage Discrimination Against Workers with Sensory Disabilities

We link information on occupation‐specific job demands to data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation to provide first‐ever estimates of wage discrimination against workers with sensory disabilities. Estimates are derived from wage models that control for job demands related to sensory abilities, and interactions between job demands and workers' sensory limitations. Results indicate approximately one third (one tenth) of the male (female) disability‐related wage differential is potentially attributed to discrimination. The results differ from estimates of discrimination against workers with physical disabilities obtained with similar methods, underscoring the importance of accounting for heterogeneity of the disabled population in discrimination studies.     

Pricing with customer recognition

This article studies the dynamic effects of behaviour-based price discrimination and customer recognition in a duopolistic market where the distribution of consumers' preferences is discrete. Consumers are myopic and firms are forward looking. In the static and first-period equilibrium firms choose prices with mixed strategies. When price discrimination is allowed, forward-looking firms have an incentive to avoid customer recognition, thus the probability that both will have positive first-period sales decreases as they become more patient. Furthermore, an asymmetric equilibrium sometimes exists, yielding a 100–0 division of the first-period sales. As a whole, price discrimination is bad for profits but good for consumer surplus and welfare.     

Third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly with endogenous input costs

This paper examines the output effect of third-degree price discrimination in symmetrically differentiated oligopoly. We find that when the sellers’ input costs are chosen endogenously by an upstream supplier with market power, as opposed to being fixed exogenously, long-standing qualitative conclusions about the effect of price discrimination on aggregate output can be reversed. In contrast to previous findings (e.g., by Holmes, 1989), more intense competition in the strong market than in the weak market can make it less likely that price discrimination raises aggregate output. For linear demand functions, we establish necessary and sufficient conditions under which the output effect changes sign when input costs are endogenized.     

Anote on second degree price discrimination and its implications

This paper develops the analytical solution to the standard problem of second degree discrimination and shows that, as the number of discrete prices increases, the market output approaches that of pure competition or perfect price discrimination in the same manner as Cournot oligopolies converge to competitive outcomes. This solution is subsequently compared with that of Third degree discrimination in light of recent contributions of Coase and Varian. This comparison reveals that-1-neither type of discrimination, in its pure form, is empirically likely;-2- actual price discrimination will involve elements of both types;-3- therefore, the analytical solution to second degree discrimination is, contrary to Pigouvian tradition, no less important than that of third degree discrimination.