声誉效应与科研团队成员报酬契约的关系研究

文章探讨了声誉对科研团队成员报酬契约的影响。首先．分析了科研团队成员效用函数的组成，将声誉这个隐性激励约束因素引入科研团队成员的效用函数，随后，建立了信息不对称下科研团队成员的报酬激励模型，分析了声誉系数和职业生涯时间对契约中各要素的影响．说明了科研团队管理者可以利用科研团队的声誉效应和职业生涯时间来设计更加有利的报酬契约，最后给出了主要结论。     

声誉的隐性激励效应分析

由于雇佣关系双方契约的不完备性,合同本身不可能穷尽所有情况,雇员本身的质素、努力程度等私人信息,雇主无法从契约甚至从雇员前期的职业经历中获得,因而劳动雇佣契约双方履行职责是基于相互信任,而相互信任的基础是多次重复博弈,这样,长期信任就逐渐形成了声誉。对雇员来说,这种声誉是获得长期收益的前提。即便在显性激励较小情况下,雇员为了获得声誉,也会付出较高的努力水平。声誉成为重要的隐性激励手段。     

西方企业激励理论的最新发展

本文介绍了西方企业激励理论的最新发展 ,主要分析了激励和风险的正向关联关系、业绩型报酬方案产生的若干效应、声誉机制跨越职业生涯的激励作用、对竞赛理论合理性的反思以及重复博弈条件下团队生产的最优激励问题     

基于后悔规避的供应链回购契约协调

由于市场的不确定性，致使零售商的营销状况存在一定风险，从而会导致零售商出现后悔情绪并对其决策产生影响。为此，研究了在市场需求不确定情况下由一个理性供应商和一个后悔规避零售商组成的二级供应链的回购契约协调问题，并通过算例进一步分析了后悔规避程度对零售商最优订货量和供应链最优回购价格的影响。结果表明，即使考虑了零售商的后悔情绪，只要参数取值恰当，基于后悔规避的回购契约也能够实现二者间的协调。后悔系数对零售商最优订货量和供应链最优回购价格的影响依赖于零售商对缺货后悔和剩余后悔的偏好程度。     

企业集群的契约治理机制研究

企业集群内洽了契约属性,集群成员之间的契约指向是对集群剩余的控制与分配。由于契约的不完备性,集群成员往往会采取机会主义行为。集群治理的直接目标就是通过一系列激励机制和约束机制,降低集群成员的机会主义倾向,使得成员之间有序竞争,维持企业集群的稳定存在和持续发展。集群剩余是集群治理的物质基础和激励根源,其市场化分配过程形成对集群成员的有效激励;而"声誉"则构成企业集群约束机制,限制集群成员机会主义倾向。     

高层管理团队特征对企业技术创新投入影响的研究——激励的调节效应

文章以2009-2011年信息技术行业和生物制药行业的210家企业为样本,依据高层梯队理论和委托代理理论,实证研究了高管团队激励在高管团队同质性、异质性与企业技术创新投入之间的调节作用。研究表明,股权激励不能使成员年龄普遍较大的高管团队增加创新投入,但能使成员任期普遍较长和任期差异较大的高管团队增加创新投入;薪酬激励能使成员年龄普遍较大和教育程度普遍较高的高管团队增加创新投入,不能使成员年龄、任期、教育程度和职业背景差异较大的团队增加创新投入。     

基于心理契约的大学生创新团队的创建

本文从心理契约的角度探讨大学生创新团队的创建,着重研究大学生创新团队心理契约的内涵,强调大学生创新团队创建时要考虑团队成员的个性和共性,以满足团队成员的心理期望,提高团队的绩效.     

业务外包机会主义行为分析与控制初探

机会主义行为是外包过程中委托商面临的主要风险之一。文章结合现代企业理论,通过对外包过程中决策和执行阶段的机会主义行为进行分析并提出规避控制策略。首先。在决策阶段：要进行充分的事前调查;认真进行契约设计;其次,在外包的执行阶段：建立评估团队;适当增长外包合同期限。最后,建立激励和惩罚机制。     

职业声誉资本化视角下的员工敬业机制构建

文章通过回顾和梳理文献发现,活力、奉献和专注是测量员工敬业的主流维度,对工作价值、安全和资源可用性的感知是员工敬业的心理条件。员工敬业机制是学术界研究的重点,不少学者从组织和个体层面构建了员工敬业机制,但是理性的跨层次制度诱因很少受到关注。基于声誉理论和资本化理论提出的观点是,职业声誉资本化是激励员工敬业的理性的跨层次制度诱因。在职业声誉资本化的视角下以员工敬业为主线建构了新的机制,三个节点是职业声誉构建、职业声誉资本化和职业声誉维护。开展员工敬业管理可以帮助员工构建职业声誉,工作机会的增加和市场价值的提高可以实现职业声誉资本化,职业声誉资本化可以为员工敬业提供理性的跨层次制度性激励。     

企业团队合作激励的博弈分析

文章建立了企业团队合作激励博弈模型.在企业团队生产中,计件工资率、团队总产出的分享和奖金差距有利于提高成员的努力水平;最优合作水平与计件工资率无关,与团队总产出的分享成正比,与奖金差距成反比.而拆台倾向的大小也与计件工资率无关,与奖金差距成反比,与团队总产出的分享成反比.并简要分析了奖金差距对拆台倾向、合作水平的影响程度以及相应的团队剩余.     

风险感知、认知偏差与激励合约的分选决策

基于行为经济学视角,通过现场实验观察了具有异质性偏好的代理人对不同激励合约的选择决策,旨在探讨风险感知、认知偏差与激励合约选择决策的关系.研究发现,在具有相同激励强度的两种可变激励合约下,个体生产力水平并没有显著差异,影响激励合约选择决策的重要因素是对风险的感知,激励合约用于调节不同主体间的主观感知风险配置.结果显示,感知自己是高生产力的代理人倾向于避免与搭便车者合作而带来的损失,而感知自己是低能力的代理人则倾向于选择与高能力者合作的激励合约而增加个体收益;而无论是高能力者还是低能力者,当面对环境的不确定性对收益的巨大扰动时,都不约而同的选择了团队激励合约,这种对合作的偏好会随着扰动的增大而增强.同时,实验进一步证明了,人们对搭便车风险的主观感知与真实的搭便车风险之间存在一定的认知偏差,且该对个人生产力抱持乐观态度的代理人更倾向于选择个体计件激励合约.当企业因面对绩效工具的准确性不高,或绩效结果不确定性较大而不得不采用团队计件时,可以通过调节认知偏差的方式来改变代理人的主观预期,从而强化激励合约的自选择.     

风险规避零售商基于双向期权的采购管理

以前景理论的效用函数为基础构建零售商的风险规避决策模型，研究双向期权下风险规避零售商的采购管理决策问题，比较风险中性与风险规避决策者的最优决策以及最优期望效用，分析风险厌恶水平以及相关契约参数对零售商的影响。研究结果以及数值仿真实验表明：风险厌恶水平的增加会改变零售商的订购组合，从而降低其期望效用；除此之外，期权购买价格以及看涨期权执行价格的增加都会降低零售商的期望效用，看跌期权执行价格的增加会增加零售商的期望效用。     

推进农业银行农户小额信贷发展的策略研究

农业银行发展农户小额信贷,是发展现代农业,建设社会主义新农村,完成小康社会建设中必须解决的重大课题。推进农业银行农户小额信贷发展,需要准确定位小额信贷业务、完善小额信贷制度;建立良好的信用环境,增强农户合作意识;组建信贷员队伍、完善激励机制;放开利率管制,发挥市场作用;完善风险评估体系,构建风险管理体系等策略。     

农地流转：历史、困境与制度创新

文章采用激励理论、合约理论的分析方法,探讨了中国农村土地流转发展缓慢的原因：农户土地转让激励不足、关系型合约限制了农地转让的发展。只有通过完善农户转让的激励机制,实现由关系型合约向规则型合约的转变,才能真正使农地流转起来。     

Contracts under Wage Compression: A Case of Beneficial Collusion

This paper considers a principal-agent model with adverse selection and limited wage discrimination. Under wage compression, an agent may have an incentive to free ride on other agents by manipulating his private information. When collusion among the agents is not possible, the principal distorts the output schedule to reduce information rent associated with the free-riding opportunity. Under collusion, however, the principal can reduce the information rent by inducing side contracts among the agents, thus partly removing the distortion in the output schedule. We show that side contracts among the agents take place in equilibrium and that the prospect of collusion is beneficial.     

Real Incentive Effects of Soft Information

Both soft, noncontractible, and hard, contractible, information are informative about managerial ability and future firm performance. If a manager's future compensation depends on expectations of ability or future performance, then the manager has implicit incentives to affect the information. We examine the real incentive effects of soft information in a dynamic agency with limited commitment. When long-term contracts are renegotiated, the rewards for future performance inherent in long-term contracts allow the principal partial control over the implicit incentives. This is because the soft information affects the basis for contract renegotiation. With short-term contracts, the principal has no control over the basis for contract negotiation, and thus long-term contracts generally dominate short-term contracts. With long-term contracts, the principal's control over implicit incentives is characterized in terms of effective contracting on an implicit aggregation of the soft information that arises from predicting (forming expectations of) future performance. We provide sufficient conditions for soft information to have no real incentive effects. In general, implicit incentives not controllable by the principal include fixed effects, such as career concerns driven by labor markets external to the agency. When controllable incentives span the fixed effects of career concerns, the latter have no real effects with regard to total managerial incentives—they would optimally be the same with or without career concerns. Our analysis suggests empirical tests for estimating career concerns that should explicitly incorporate noncontractible information.     

Asymétrie d'information,Litiges et Bien‐être social dans le cadre d'un contrat de Partenariat Public/Privé: Le cas de la construction d'infrastructures d'intérêt public en Afrique

Résumé: Dans cet article, nous analysons la structure des contrats optimaux de partenariat Public/Privé concernant la construction d'infrastructures d'intérêt public. Nous considérons une forme générale de contrat incitatif comportant un paiement ex‐post qui dépend du coût du projet observé et d'un prix fixe. Lorsque l'opérateur du projet peut influencer le résultat ex‐post par une action non observable par le partenaire public, il existe un risque de litiges concernant le coût observé ex‐post. On montre que, le contrat optimal réalise un arbitrage entre deux effets: aléa moral et partage du risque. Les mécanismes réalisables en présence ou en absence de litiges sont caractérisés. En cas de litige, le contrat à prix fixe peut être inférieur à un contrat à remboursement de coût. Ce résultat entre en contradiction avec le résultat bien connu selon lequel, en incitant l'agent à exercer un effort de réduction du coût, un contrat à prix fixe domine le contrat à remboursement du coût. Abstract: In this article, we analyzes the optimal structure of public/private partnership agreements, in cases where these contracts concern the construction of economic infrastructure. We consider a form of incentive contract stipulating rules of payment based on the ex post value, which are calculated based on the observed costs of the project and a fixed price. In cases where a private contractor can influence the final cost of a project by an action unobservable by the principal, there is a risk that a dispute will arise concerning the project's observable cost. We show that, the optimal contract establish a balance between moral hazard and risk sharing. We derive the feasible mechanisms, either in the presence or absence of litigation. In litigation contest, a fixed‐price contract may be inferior to a cost‐plus contract. This result stands in contrast to the well‐established finding that, in providing incentive for the agent to engage in cost‐reducing effort, a fixed‐price contract dominates a cost‐plus contract.     

Dual Labour Market Intermediaries in Italy: How to Lay off “Lemons”—Thereby Creating a Problem of Adverse Selection

Using longitudinal data from the Bank of Italy that cover the period from 2004 to 2014, this paper investigates the wage- and career implications of temporary jobs across the entire wage profile via unconditional quantile regression models and dynamic panel probit models. Building on Autor’s contributions, we consider temporary jobs to be a Labour Market Intermediary that deals with job-matching problems, such as information asymmetries, search cost reductions, worker-side adverse selection, and pay-productivity gaps. Assuming that wage is a proxy for workers’ productivity, we examine the chances that temporary workers who are located in different quantiles of wage distribution have of making the transition towards a stable employment position in the primary labour market. Results clearly indicate that temporarily employed individuals suffer significant wage- and career penalties. Not only are these individuals overly concentrated in the lowest decile of wage distribution, but the career penalty associated with temporary jobs also remains stable independently of the wage/productivity quantile to which the workers belong. If firms use FTC or TWA at all, they do so to remove less productive workers, whose work contract is not renewed once expired. In light of this evidence, it is clear that the hypothesis—proposed in the economic literature—that temporary employment contracts might serve as a screening tool to identify the most productive workers who would then be offered a stable position in the primary labour market does not hold in the highly dualised labour market of Southern Europe.     

双边道德风险条件下的收益激励与信息租金——基于有信息委托人的视角

文章特征化了一个在投资能力方面具有私人信息的委托人,和一个在努力水平上具有私人信息的代理人,在联合生产产品时所面临的双边道德风险问题。为研究结构性信息不对称对收益激励的影响,建立了双边道德风险奈件下的收益激励模型。研究结果表明,在风险中性的委托人和严格风险规避的代理人联合生产产品时,激励努力的次优契约可以达到,只是不能为代理人提供完全的保险;在双边道德风险条件下,隐藏信息不再是有信息的局中人的最优策略,而私人信息的交换与共享可以促成次优转移均衡的实现,这说明和单边的信息不对称造成的单边道德风险相比较,结构性的信息不对称并不一定使得双边道德风险问题更严重。     

The Implicit Incentive Effects of Horizontal Monitoring and Team Member Dependence on Individual Performance

This study examines the implicit incentive effects of horizontal monitoring and team member dependence for individuals working in teams but facing explicit incentives based solely on measures of individual performance. We combine proprietary performance data with survey data for 133 internal auditors. We show that the social influences of relatively high levels of both horizontal monitoring and team member dependence provide implicit incentives that motivate individual performance, making the provision of team rewards unnecessary to ensure individual and team productivity. We conclude that horizontal monitoring and team member dependence are complementary control mechanisms whose effectiveness helps explain the observed practice of organizing work into teams without explicit team‐based rewards.