University patents,R&D competition,and social welfare

Although university patenting has increased dramatically over the past three decades, debates persist regarding the broad economic implications of the phenomenon. This article examines the social welfare implications of university patenting in a model of R&D competition in which firms develop innovations on the basis of the disclosure of a university invention. When such disclosure does not preempt the patenting of downstream innovations, university patenting enhances social welfare only if a regime of open access to university inventions is characterized by excessive aggregate R&D from the viewpoint of social welfare. When the university invention disclosure preempts patenting on firms’ innovations, the nature of the open access equilibrium in the R&D market depends on the threat of imitation ex post. Only when the threat of imitation is sufficiently strong firms will not invest in downstream R&D in the open access regime. In this case, university patenting promotes R&D investment and increases social welfare.     

R&D strategy and innovation performance: the role of standardization

Firms now increasingly recognise the important role of R&D strategy in building technological advantage. However, few attempts have linked standardisation with specific R&D strategies in explaining innovation performance. To bridge this gap, this study empirically examines the relationships between R&D strategies, standardisation, and firms’ innovation performance. Based on a sample of 371 firms in China, we use structural equation modelling (SEM) and find that novelty-oriented R&D strategy generates greater accumulation of standardisation knowledge and standards diversity, while R&D openness only positively relates to this standardisation knowledge accumulation. Moreover, standardisation knowledge accumulation is positively related to both administrative and technical innovation performance, while a greater variety of standards only leads to higher administrative innovativeness. More importantly, our results reveal that accumulation of standardisation knowledge mediates the relationships between R&D novelty and administrative and technical innovation performances. Both the theoretical and practical implications that arise from these findings are discussed.     

Advertising and R&D: theory and evidence from France

Advertising and innovation are two engines for firms to escape competition and improve profits. We propose a model that encompasses both the static and dynamic interactions between R&D, advertising and competitive environment. It provides three main predictions. First, for a given competitive environment, quality leaders spend more in advertising in order to extract maximal rents; thus, lower costs of ads may favor R&D. Second, the inverted-U relation between competition and R&D still holds with the introduction of advertising. Third, more competition is associated with on average more advertising expenditures. Empirical evidence from a large panel of 59,000 French firms over 1990–2004 supports these three properties.     

Cooperation or competition in R&D when innovation and absorption are costly

This article analyzes cost-reducing R&D investments by firms that behave non-cooperatively or cooperatively. Firms face a trade-off between allocating their R&D investments to innovate or to imitate (absorb). We find that the non-cooperative behavior not only induces more imitation (absorption) but also, for the most part, more innovation investments. Only the cooperative behavior, however, ensures that R&D investments are allocated efficiently to innovation and to imitation (absorption) in the sense that any given amount of industry-wide cost reduction is obtained for the minimum overall R&D costs.     

The impact of R&D subsidy on innovation: evidence from New Zealand firms

This study examines the impact of government subsidy through R&D grants on innovation output for firms in New Zealand. Using a large database that links administrative and tax data with survey data, we find that R&D grants have a stronger effect on more novel innovation (e.g. applying for a patent or introducing new products to the world) than on incremental innovation (e.g. any product innovation) and that larger, project-based grants are more effective at promoting innovation than smaller, non-project-specific grants. There is little evidence that R&D grants have differential effects between smaller (<50 employees) and larger firms.     

R&D policy in a vertically related industry

In this paper, we analyze the effectiveness of public policy aimed to stimulate business-performed R&D in a vertically related market. We examine the role of an R&D active upstream supplier in a four-stage R&D model, where we incorporate public funding. The considered policy instrument is direct funding of firms’ R&D efforts. We calculate the optimal policies and show that they have a positive impact on firms’ R&D investments. From a welfare point of view, it is optimal to differentiate the subsidy rates between the upstream and the downstream markets. Competition in the product market leads to a higher subsidy rate to the upstream supplier than to the downstream firms. When concentration is high in the downstream market, the optimal solution is an R&D subsidy for these firms, otherwise the optimal solution is an R&D tax for the downstream firms.     

A computational analysis of R&D support programs

We compare two common government R&D support programs, R&D tax credits and direct R&D grants. To study their effectiveness and the extent to which their design matters, we analyze these programs within a dynamic equilibrium model of imperfectly competitive industries. Adopting comprehensive welfare measures that take into account government, producer and consumer surpluses, we find that both schemes exhibit positive social returns. Mid-range R&D-intensive sectors exhibit higher social returns than either high or low R&D-intensive sectors. Both incentive schemes generate positive measures of R&D input additionality of magnitudes consistent with empirical R&D research. However, R&D grants that require firms to allocate subsidy funds to R&D spur less R&D than a more flexible R&D tax credit. Subsidy schemes can even induce competing firms to over-spend on R&D, generating negative producer surplus and possibly negative social returns.     

Government grants,private R&D funding and innovation efficiency in transition economy

Although the development of the high-tech industry is part of the national agenda of many countries, particularly transition economies, few studies have analysed innovation efficiency in countries with environments unfavourable to high-tech industry development. This study explores the relationships of government grants, private R&D funding and innovation efficiencies of the high-tech industry in China. We use a stochastic frontier analysis model to study the roles of government and market mechanisms in high-tech industry innovation from 1995 to 2008. Findings show that government grants do not crowd out private funding, but stimulate private R&D expenditure. Private R&D funding has positively influenced innovation in the Chinese high-tech industry, and efficiency potentials are widely under-exploited. Additionally, government grants are observed to negatively impact innovation by large firms in the Chinese high-tech industry. Furthermore, we reveal that human capital can promote the innovation performance of high-tech firms, excepting those of medium scale. The findings provide insightful perspectives on China's high-tech industry.     

Strategic R&D policy under multiproduct duopoly and quality-price competition

This paper analyses strategic R&D policy in a third-country trade model where multiproduct firms with different production technologies compete in a vertically differentiated market. I show that the optimal R&D policies for both countries are subsidies when the product market is under price competition.     

Vertical R&D Spillovers,Cooperation, Market Structure,and Innovation

This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries. Four types of R&D cooperation are studied: no cooperation, horizontal cooperation, vertical cooperation, and simultaneous horizontal and vertical cooperation. Vertical spillovers always increase R&D and welfare, while horizontal spillovers may increase or decrease them. The comparison of cooperative settings in terms of R&D shows that no setting uniformly dominates the others. Which type of cooperation yields more R&D depends on horizontal and vertical spillovers, and market structure. The ranking of cooperative structures hinges on the signs and magnitudes of three "competitive externalities" (vertical, horizontal, and diagonal) which capture the effect of the R&D of a firm on the profits of other firms. One of the basic results of the strategic investment literature is that cooperation between competitors decreases R&D when horizontal spillovers are low; the model shows that this result does not necessarily hold when vertical spillovers are sufficiently high, and/or when horizontal cooperation is combined with vertical cooperation.     

Knowledge spillovers and R&D subsidies to new,emerging technologies

Is knowledge spillover a rationale for supporting R&D on new, emerging technologies more than R&D on other technologies? In this paper, I analyze whether innovation externalities caused only by knowledge spillovers differ between technologies of different maturity. I show that R&D should not be subsidized equally across industries when the knowledge stocks differ. This is because knowledge spillovers depend on the size of the knowledge stock and the elasticity of scale in R&D production. R&D in the emerging technology should be subsidized more when the elasticity is smaller than one. However, R&D in the mature technology should be subsidized more when the elasticity is larger than one.     

Assessing the influence of differentiation strategy and R&D subsidies on R&D cooperation

This paper explores the R&D cooperation determinants of the innovative companies belonging to the Spanish manufacturing sector. Our findings suggest that the variable R&D subsidy is endogenous, significant, and has a strong positive influence on R&D cooperation. This is a clear indication that the achievement of public aid is often conditioned by the obligation for companies to cooperate in R&D. We have also found that the differentiation strategy variable is significant and has a negative influence on R&D cooperation. Companies positioned in a differentiation strategy probably own and use some different knowledge from other companies. Consequently, they will not have much interest in taking advantage of the spillovers generated by other companies. It is therefore logical that they are reluctant to establish cooperation agreements on R&D. Therefore, companies positioned in the differentiation strategy need public policies to support R&D that are not conditioned to the establishment of cooperation agreements.     

Effect of proximity on recombination innovation in R&D collaboration: an empirical analysis

Recombination innovation is a process of creatively combining different knowledge domains in an invention. Recombination innovation in R&D collaboration – joint recombination process, which is integration of the organisation’s internal knowledge with the partner’s new knowledge, serves as the stepping stone of the knowledge search in the technological space. This paper tries to illuminate how different dimensions of proximity of the collaborating partners affect the probability of the collaborative innovation to be recombination innovation. Our result shows that technological proximity has a negative effect on joint recombination innovation. Geographical proximity has an inverted U-shaped effect on joint recombination innovation. The positive effect of organisational proximity on joint recombination innovation is not supported.     

R&D and productivity: evidence from large UK establishments with substantial R&D activities

ABSTRACT

We use Office for National Statistics' micro data for large UK establishments in the production industries in the period 1997–2008 to study the relationship between their productivity and the presence of substantial R&D activities, either at the production unit itself, or at other UK reporting units owned by the same enterprise group. We estimate that total factor (revenue) productivity is on average about 14% higher at the establishments which have substantial R&D themselves, compared to those with no R&D. Among the establishments with no R&D themselves, we estimate that productivity is on average about 9% higher at those which belong to enterprise groups which do have substantial R&D elsewhere in the UK in the same sub-sector. For the establishments with substantial R&D themselves, we also estimate a significant positive relationship between current productivity and past R&D expenditure using dynamic specifications which allow for both establishment-specific ‘fixed effects’ and a serially correlated error component.     

The productivity effects of local R&D outsourcing: the moderating role of subsidiary mandate and internal R&D

This study examined the moderating effects of two kinds of internal R&D (parent R&D and subsidiary R&D) on the relationship between local R&D outsourcing and subsidiary productivity as internal R&D challenges the collaborative relationships in the local environment. Due to the specific feature of a subsidiary mandate, we further investigate whether two distinct kinds of internal R&D have different moderating effects between exploitation-oriented subsidiaries and exploration-oriented subsidiaries, based on a sample of longitudinal data set of 263 Taiwan-based manufacturing subsidiaries over the period 2006–2009. The empirical results show that for exploitation-oriented subsidiaries parent R&D plays a significant and negative moderating role on the impact of local R&D outsourcing based on local collaboration, while a positive moderating role is observed with parent R&D and subsidiary R&D for exploration-oriented subsidiaries.     

Spillovers,product innovation and R&D cooperation: a theoretical model

ABSTRACT

We analyze the impact of post-innovation knowledge spillovers on firms’ decisions to invest and cooperate in R&D, forming a research joint venture (RJV). We study the case of two potential investors involved in a non-tournament stochastic competition for developing a new but imitable product. We propose a theoretical model where cooperation may emerge as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a three-stage game. In the first stage, firms decide whether to cooperate; in the second, they decide whether to invest; and in the third, they compete. We show that firms cooperate in R&D when the spillovers are high enough and the fixed costs associated with R&D activities are low enough; however, our analysis suggests that forming an RJV may not always be socially optimal, and subsidizing R&D cooperation may not be efficient. We propose an optimal scheme of subsidies, which should be designed according to the intensity of the spillovers, the level of the R&D costs, and the probability of innovation success. Finally, we show that in the case of mergers the private incentive to invest is maximized, and firms may not need public subsidies to cooperate. When subsidies are costly, not hindering mergers may be the second-best solution.     

Into thin air: using a quantile regression approach to explore the relationship between R&D and innovation

Applying quantile regression to 760 Finnish firms, we show that the relationship between R&D and firm performance is less straight forward than so far assumed. OLS regression analysis fails to capture the effect of R&D expenditure at different locations on the performance distribution. We reveal that R&D matters, especially on the medium quantiles, while regressing against the upper quantiles of the economic gains from innovation distribution exhibit decreasing returns scale in R&D. Our results confirm that Gaussian statistics fail to capture the most interesting part of the distribution – namely the extreme observations located in the tails.     

R&D organization,monitoring intensity,and innovation performance in chinese industry

This paper examines the relationship between organizational design and technological innovation in Chinese industry. In a principal-agent model, monitoring intensity is an endogenously determined input to innovation production. A recursive system of an innovation production function and a monitoring intensity equation, where the latent monitoring intensity is indicated by the existence of an R&D organization, is estimated with a nonlinear two-stage estimator for a sample of large- and medium-sized Chinese state-owned enterprises. It is the first knowledge production function estimate for China's enterprises. I find that R&D organization affects innovation performance positively and significantly.     

A comparative analysis of the change in R&D efficiency: a case of R&D leaders in the technology industry

This paper measures the cumulative change in research and development (R&D) efficiency of globally leading R&D companies in the technology industry. We use Data Envelopment Analysis /Malmquist index to analyse 49 such companies. The change in R&D efficiency is analysed by decomposing the Malmquist index into ‘catch-up’ and ‘frontier shift’ indices, and by comparing cumulative indices to those at the starting period. Those cumulative indices are obtained at both a firm and an industry level. Results indicate that the overall R&D efficiency of these globally leading R&D companies declined slightly during the period 2007–2013. At a firm level, this study determines in detail how the trend of each firm in R&D activities differs from other companies.     

International R&D Rivalry with Spillovers and Policy Cooperation in R&D Subsidies and Taxes

Abstract

We have investigated non-cooperative and jointly optimal R&D policies in the framework of Spencer & Brander (1983) in the presence of R&D spillovers. When R&D activities are strategic substitutes and the R&D game exhibits a positive externality, the result of Spencer & Brander (1983) reverses: the non-cooperative policy is a tax while the jointly optimal policy is a subsidy. Moreover, when R&D activities are strategic complements, the usual result of the prisoners' dilemma in the strategic subsidy game does not hold, implying that a welfare intervention is preferable over laissez-faire. When spillovers are sufficiently large, the joint welfare increases with subsidies being higher than those under non-cooperation.