演化经济学视角下政府治理创新与区域智造产业协同发展研究

地方政府治理体系创新给区域智造产业带来了全新的机遇与挑战。基于演化经济学理论，以珠海、深圳临港经济区先进制造产业集群为研究对象，利用173家规模以上智能制造企业2015-2017年政府治理创新前后的工业经济指标数据，运用SIENA模型，从动态演化视角对大数据监管下的政府治理创新与区域智造产业协同发展路径进行实证研究。结果表明：运用大数据监管创新政府治理对区域智造产业发展的促进效果显著，且在发展周期上表现为治理创新、工业经济发展与地方社会贡献的协同演化稳定性。据此，给出有利于政府现代治理创新与区域智造产业协同发展的政策启示。     

后金融危机时期我国钢铁产业安全评价研究——基于公司治理视角

论文从公司治理视角分析后金融危机时期我国钢铁产业安全问题。从方法运用来看，模糊综合评价法是分析企业行为影响产业安全的合适方法。从实证结果来看，第一，以2008年为基期，2009年至2012年我国钢铁产业安全情况呈逐年上升趋势；第二，各年份的企业拥有大股东状况、经理人市场的竞争程度、下游市场的竞争程度和政府推动产业内并购力度等对产业安全影响效果的促进作用基本是逐渐提高的；第三，企业共同拥有大股东状况和政府推动产业内并购力度两个指标在企业竞合行为对产业安全影响方面起着至关重要的作用。最后，论文从两个方面对未来提升钢铁产业安全和加强钢铁企业治理建设提出政策建议。     

Corporate governance and default prediction: a reality test

Default prediction has commanded the attention of researchers for at least 50 years. This paper addresses several testable hypotheses regarding the relations between corporate governance and default prediction. We employ the conventional logistic regression to provide empirical evidence from U.S. default data over the period of 2000 to 2015. Empirical results are consistent with the following notions: First, default firms are associated with high ownership concentration, low shareholder rights, low financial transparency and disclosures, and less board effectiveness. Second, in-sample and out-of-sample tests support the incremental contribution of corporate governance information on default prediction, when compared with the models involving just financial information.     

金字塔结构下股权激励的双重效应研究——来自我国上市公司的经验证据

在金字塔结构下,股东与经营者之间以及控股股东与中小股东之间的两类治理关系普遍存在,对于上市公司治理问题的研究也从单一治理关系分析框架向两者权衡分析转变。在双重治理关系视阈下,股权激励成为利益主体之间博弈的重要工具。本文在提出双重治理关系分析框架的基础上,运用2006～2009年我国上市公司面板数据对股权激励的双重效应及其与控股股东之间的关系进行实证检验。研究发现,股权激励对于第一类代理问题具有显著的治理效应,但对第二类代理问题的治理效应并未显现,这与控股股东对其存在显著的抑制作用有关,股权性质能够对股权激励与控股股东不同效应的体现以及两者关系产生影响。     

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP IN TERMS OF CORPORATE COHERENCE

Abstract

Corporate governance and the governance of knowledge were for a long time distinct fields of analysis. Reasons for this incompatibility are linked to the restricted vision of corporate governance supported by shareholder value which essentially refers to information rather than knowledge. In this paper, we argue that other visions of corporate governance exist which are also closer to knowledge dynamics and knowledge governance problems. We elaborate thus on the possible reconciliation between corporate governance and the governance of knowledge. We sustain that each key actor (the manager and the investor) embodies a piece of diversified and localized knowledge related to his/her specific domain and field of experience, and these different modules of knowledge have to be recombined by an appropriate mode of corporate governance that stimulates corporate development. In this perspective, the reconciliation really appears essential since managers, by defining and selecting innovative processes, and investors, by determining the money that is invested to sustain these processes, both take part in the creation and governance of new knowledge by the firm. We show that this reconciliation can be based on the notion of corporate coherence of the cognitive firm that allows replacing the conventional conflicting vision of corporate governance by a new vision based on cooperation between managers and investors that collectively contribute to corporate development and coherence.     

独立董事制度与公司治理目标

目前在我国公司制企业，为了约束大股东侵占中小股东的合法权益，引入了独立董事制度。我们认为在中国这种二元制公司股权结构模式下，引入独立董事制度并不是一定能保证选出真正代表中小股东利益的代理下，并且重要的是这种模式并不能保证实现公司治理的目标－股东财富最大化。为实现公司治理目标，则要大力发展基金业，通过基金业的发展来优化公司股权结构，把大股东与中小股东之间的“利益群体”与“准群体”的冲突改善为“利益群体”间的冲突，以此形成一种权利相互制衡的格局，从而保证公司治理水平的不断提高。     

公司治理理论的现代演变——从股东利益最大化到相关利益者理论

全球的公司治理模式简要分为两类:股东模式和相关利益者模式。以最大化股东利益为目标的股东模式在董事会、大股东和公司控制权市场这些内部和外部治理机制上都存在明显的缺陷或失败。相关利益者理论的发展导致了公司治理理论的现代演变。相关利益者理论认为,公司治理从本质上说是各相关利益者之间制衡关系的有机整合,其目标是最大化整个公司的财富创造。相关利益者公司治理成为可替代股东模式的公司治理形式。     

公司治理影响债务期限结构的统计分析

实证结果表明,独立董事比例和管理层薪酬水平均对公司债务期限结构具有显著影响,第一大股东持股比例虽然与债务期限负相关,但并不显著。实证结果说明,公司治理在一定程度上影响公司债务期限的选择,良好的公司治理结构能够使公司获得更多的长期债务,进而优化现行的公司资本结构。因此,公司决策者应尽可能地协调各利益主体之间的关系,完善公司治理机制,更好地发挥公司治理对债务期限结构乃至资本结构的优化功能。     

西部地区上市公司内部治理结构对资本结构影响的实证研究

法人治理机制和大股东治理机制对上市公司资本结构的选择没有影响;而少数大股东联盟机制对资本结构呈显著负相关关系;高管人员治理机制同资本结构呈显著负相关关系;独立董事治理机制同资本结构呈显著正相关关系;同时联立方程实证结果显示,四种内部治理机制同资本结构没有互动性关系。     

全球失衡下中国参与全球经济治理研究：基于SWOT分析框架

目前全球经济失衡问题日益严重,主要发达经济体陷入经济困境,财政政策空间缩小,常规经济政策失效。各种经济保护主义政策,如贸易保护、汇率干预、资本流动管制等在世界范围内蔓延。全球经济治理的关键是重组全球产业分工和贸易金融体系,但是由于中国长期存在巨额贸易顺差和外汇储备,因此解决中国的双顺差现象被发达国家视为全球经济治理的核心议题之一,而中国参与全球经济治理的能力亟需提升。本文尝试运用SWOT战略分析框架,对中国参与全球经济治理展开实证分析,分析中国的比较优势、劣势、机遇、威胁以及核心竞争力,进而为中国参与全球经济治理提供决策依据和理论支持,实现国家利益和战略意图。     

韩国财阀改革的政治经济学：以小股东运动为例

正如自由放任非自然形成，韩国财阀的形成也是一个政治的产物。除了政府的金融和产业等政策支持。不少韩国财阀直接源自韩国国有企业和公共资产的贱价私有化。以财阀为中心的经济增长也成为了当下韩国资本主义的不稳定力量之源。为了拯救处于困境中的韩国财阀资本主义，作为一种社会运动和公司治理的方式，股东积极主义被引介到韩国。过去十多年里，韩国小股东运动在抵制财阀力量扩张、改善公司治理、促进经济民主等方面取得了一些成就，但也面临着不少挑战。处于十字路口的小股东运动及财阀改革是理解当下韩国资本主义的极好注脚。     

大股东减持作为一种支持行为之探析

＂掏空＂和＂支持＂行为对公司来说是两种作用对称的行为。大股东减持作为＂掏空＂行为之一已有研究,作为支持行为还未见研究报道,然而大股东减持是能够作为支持行为的。大股东减持既可能用套现获得的资金直接支持上市公司,也可能是通过引进战略投资机构、优化公司的股权结构提升公司治理效率实现支持。两个案例的分析进一步说明了大股东在公司处于财务困境时减持可能是大股东支持行为之一,但这还有待于对大股东减持与其支持行为关系进行实证研究。     

银行负债、制度环境与控股股东代理成本

债权人对控股股东的制衡力量在学术界一直鲜有人关注。文章就企业的银行负债对控股股东代理成本的影响进行了理论分析与实证检验,在此基础上进一步检验了产权性质对二者关系的调节作用,以及内部治理机制和法律环境与银行负债的交互作用。利用中国A股房地产上市公司2003-2011年的面板数据,研究表明:企业的银行负债显著降低了控股股东代理成本;产权性质对二者关系具有调节作用,公司内部治理机制、法律环境与银行负债存在交互作用。文章所得出的研究结论既丰富了委托代理、资本结构等相关理论,又对银行与国有企业产权改革以及企业融资决策具有较强启示意义。     

Board effectiveness in Chinese fund management companies

With a generally weak investor protection environment and no governance voice in the fund management companies (FMC) to which their investment is entrusted, fund investors in China are left with the internal governance mechanisms to safeguard their interest. Using a panel data of 288 firm‐year observations covering more than 98% of FMC in China from the period between 2006 and 2010, the present paper examines the corporate governance challenges confronting the fledging Chinese fund management industry by analysing how key governance settings affect the performance of the board of directors in protecting the interest of fund investors. The results show that board effectiveness can be enhanced if a listed company is the controlling shareholder. In addition, having a female CEO or board chairperson and a small‐sized board may help to reduce investors’ fees. Other internal corporate governance mechanisms, such as shareholder concentration, having state‐owned financial companies as controlling shareholders and board independence, are found to exhibit no significant impact on the effectiveness of FMC boards.     

Hybrid Corporate Governance and its Effects on Innovation: A Case Study of AstraZeneca

This case study looks at the relationship between the UK/Swedish pharmaceutical firm, AstraZeneca, and its shareholders from the point of view of its effects on innovation. It uses a theoretical framework on corporate governance and innovation that differentiates sectors according to the novelty, visibility and appropriability of technological change. High novelty requires a corporate governance system with strong industry-specific expertise; low visibility requires good firm-specific perceptiveness. High appropriability favours shareholder supremacy as against stakeholder inclusion. The pharmaceutical industry appears to be high in all three, and this (according to accepted stereotypes) should favour the outsider-dominated corporate governance system of the UK as against the insider-dominated Swedish system. It is found that the corporate governance that resulted from the merger could indeed be described as hybrid, but that (following the building up of one major US shareholding) it was a UK/Swedish/US hybrid. In spite of the apparent similarity of the UK and US 'outsider-dominated' systems, the US element made a crucial difference, in giving engagement by a strong and well-informed shareholder who had some influence on other shareholders. This in turn helped to protect the firm to a significant extent from short-term pressures within the UK stock market, and thus to allow it to maintain its emphasis on long-term innovation.     

Hybrid Corporate Governance and its Effects on Innovation: A Case Study of AstraZeneca

This case study looks at the relationship between the UK/Swedish pharmaceutical firm, AstraZeneca, and its shareholders from the point of view of its effects on innovation. It uses a theoretical framework on corporate governance and innovation that differentiates sectors according to the novelty, visibility and appropriability of technological change. High novelty requires a corporate governance system with strong industry-specific expertise; low visibility requires good firm-specific perceptiveness. High appropriability favours shareholder supremacy as against stakeholder inclusion. The pharmaceutical industry appears to be high in all three, and this (according to accepted stereotypes) should favour the outsider-dominated corporate governance system of the UK as against the insider-dominated Swedish system. It is found that the corporate governance that resulted from the merger could indeed be described as hybrid, but that (following the building up of one major US shareholding) it was a UK/Swedish/US hybrid. In spite of the apparent similarity of the UK and US ‘outsider-dominated’ systems, the US element made a crucial difference, in giving engagement by a strong and well-informed shareholder who had some influence on other shareholders. This in turn helped to protect the firm to a significant extent from short-term pressures within the UK stock market, and thus to allow it to maintain its emphasis on long-term innovation.     

Identifying peers in international tax competition

Multinational companies (MNCs) have historically used corporate subsidiaries to isolate income earned in lower-taxed jurisdictions from tax in a higher-rate home country. This planning technique has been long accepted as a strategy to lower the MNC’s effective tax rate and maintain shareholder value. A recently study, however, demonstrates that this is an inefficient, and possibly inappropriate, strategy. This article conducts a comprehensive empirical benchmarking analysis by applying cluster analysis to empirically identify peer groups of MNCs operating in the pharmaceutical industry. We find that most firms consistently fall into the same cluster, providing evidence that income shifting can be benchmarked by industry sector. We also find special cases where firms should be excluded from the benchmark.     

上市公司股权制衡的混沌模型

上市公司股权结构问题一直是公司治理的焦点,目前的研究都运用线性研究方法,但其得出的结论往往很难解释呈现非线性的经济现象。本文的创新之处在于:运用新经济理论与混沌理论相结合的非线性思维的方法,利用最新的上市公司财务数据分析了大股东的最佳持股比例范围,设计了上市公司大股东持股的混沌模型,从而得出第一大股东持股比例范围在(0,19.21%)为佳,并在此基础上利用Logistic方程,构建了理想的上市公司股权制衡模型。     

公司治理与银行风险承担行为——基于我国上市商业银行的研究

以我国13家上市商业银行为样本,利用2001--2012年的半年度数据,采用非平衡面板模型对我国上市商业银行公司治理与风险承担行为之间的关系进行实证研究。结果表明,股权集中度与银行风险承担呈显著的倒u型关系;第一大股东的政府性质能够约束商业银行的冒险行为;高管人员薪酬越高时,银行的风险承担越小;而董事会规模和董事会独立性等董事会治理因素并没有对银行的风险承担行为产生显著影响。     

The Rise of Finance and the Decline of Organised Labour in the Advanced Capitalist Countries

The goal of this article is to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the impacts of finance and corporate governance reforms on organised labour since 1980. The argument is made that contemporary institutional and ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ as well as ‘Varieties of Unionism’ perspectives on labour market reform have overstated the power of states, institutions and organised interests in deflecting global economic pressures. Drawing on a range of recent Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) statistics and qualitative studies, it is claimed that current developments in finance and corporate governance mark a fundamental break with post-war developments. Capital has reasserted its power over organised labour and labour markets not only in the US and UK, but throughout Western Europe as well. In assessing how far this reversal has gone, the article focuses on three key political economic changes: i) the rise in finance and adoption of corporate ‘shareholder’ systems; ii) the expansion of mergers and acquisitions and their negative effects on unionisation and manufacturing jobs; and iii) the effects of financial pressures and corporate reform on collective bargaining and wages. This is the first study to report on comparative changes and qualitative reforms to both finance and labour in 13 OECD countries between 1980 and 2005.