Unionisation structures, productivity and firm performance: New insights from a heterogeneous firm model

This paper introduces collective bargaining at the firm and at the sector level into the heterogeneous firm model of Melitz and Ottaviano (Melitz, M. J., Ottaviano, G. I. P., 2008. Market size, trade, and productivity. Review of Economic Studies 75 (1), 295-316). It then analyses how the two bargaining regimes change aggregate industry productivity and firm performance relative to a competitive labour market. While sector-level bargaining forces the least productive firms to exit and thus increases average productivity relative to the competitive benchmark, firm-level bargaining allows less productive firms to stay in the market and thus reduces average productivity. Sector-level bargaining also results in higher average output and profit levels than either firm-level bargaining or a competitive labour market. The paper also shows that the choice between sector- and firm-level bargaining can involve a trade-off between product variety and product prices: Not only the average price level but also product variety tends to be lower under sector-level bargaining than under firm-level bargaining.     

Bargaining for change1

In discussing the evolution of the “bargaining for change” movement, the authors throw light on change bargaining in the workplace, its significance in productivity bargaining, and its relationship with voluntarism.     

The de-collectivisation of pay setting in Britain 1990–98: incidence,determinants and impact

What were the causes and consequences of declining collective bargaining coverage in Britain? The demise of collective bargaining did not lead to a greater use of individualised payment mechanisms, ‘high-involvement’ practices or productivity gains. Wage inequality rose as a result of the decline. However, workplaces that abandoned bargaining created more jobs. Overall, these results raise questions about Britain’s labour market performance during the 1990s because they suggest that falling unemployment as a result of weaker trade unions came at the price of slower productivity growth and widening male wage inequality.     

Flexible collective bargaining agreements: Still a moderating effect on works council behaviour?

We analyse the interaction between different labour market institutions in Germany, namely, industry‐level bargaining and firm‐level codetermination by works councils. In particular, we are interested in the moderating effect of flexibility measures on the link between the existence works councils and collective agreements on wages and productivity. In presence of institutional changes, the question is whether works councils in covered plants still generate rather than redistribute rents, given recent decentralisation processes in the German system of industrial relations. We augment a theoretical model to provide hypotheses, which are then tested using empirical analysis of representative German plant level data. We find that the existence of flexibility provisions in collective bargaining agreements does not alter the effect of works council on firms' wages. We find, however, that with flexibility provisions works council presence is associated with higher productivity levels than without such provisions. These findings, however, depend on the level of collective bargaining: they can only be observed in plants covered by industry‐level contracts, but do not hold in plants covered by firm‐level contracts.     

Firm heterogeneity and wages in unionised labour markets: Theory and evidence

In many countries wages are set in two stages, where industry-level collective bargaining is followed by firm-specific arrangements determining actual paid wages as a mark-up on the industry wage floor. What explains the wage set in each of these stages? In this paper we show that both the industry wage floor and the average wage cushion are systematically associated with the degree of firm heterogeneity in the industry: The former (latter) is negatively (positively) associated with the productivity spread. Furthermore, since the response of the wage floor dominates that of the wage cushion, workers in more heterogeneous industries tend to get lower actual paid wages. These conclusions are reached in a model of Cournot oligopoly with firm productivity heterogeneity and a two-tiered wage setting system. They are then confirmed by administrative data covering virtually all workers, firms and collective bargaining agreements of the Portuguese private sector for the period 1991–2000.     

Conflict for Mutual Gains?*

abstract This paper adopts Walton and McKersie's Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations to examine the outcomes of industrial relations negotiations to implement teamworking. Negotiations from 21 departments across two integrated steelworks are classified into four negotiation patterns, each producing different outcomes from teamworking for managers and employees. Managers secured lower manning and increased productivity in negotiations both in departments characterized throughout by cooperation and those characterized by conflict. However, mutual gains were secured only where union negotiators pursued conflict tactics during bargaining. In those departments where union negotiators adopted more conflictual bargaining tactics, more employees reported pay increases and greater satisfaction with teamworking agreements, compared with employees in more ‘cooperative’ departments. ‘Mixed’ bargaining approaches in other departments were less successful, particularly for union negotiators.     

Shifting sands? trade unions and productivity at Rover Cars

This article examines the impact of trade unions on productivity at Rover Cars. Intra-organisational variables which influence productivity levels at Rover are also considered. It concludes that the positive approach by both management and unions to collective bargaining in the late 1980s yielded significant gains in performance. This endorses the view of the Harvard School of economists who argue that unionism can be a force for greater economic efficiency.     

Do labor market institutions matter for business cycles?

Using panel data of 19 OECD countries observed over 40 years and data on specific labor market reform episodes we conclude that labor market institutions matter for business cycle fluctuations. Spearman partial rank correlations reveal that more flexible institutions are associated with lower business cycle volatility. Turning to the analysis of reform episodes, wage bargaining reforms increase the correlation of the real wage with labor productivity and the volatility of unemployment. Employment protection reforms increase the volatility of employment and decrease the correlation of the real wage with labor productivity. Reforms reducing replacement rates make labor productivity more procyclical.     

Wages,implicit contracts,and the business cycle: Evidence from a European panel

We study the joint behavior of hours and wages over the business cycle in a unique panel of 13 European countries, and document significant history dependence in wages. Workers who experience favorable market conditions during their tenure on the job have higher wages, and work fewer labor hours. Unobserved differences in productivity, such as varying job quality, or match-specific productivity are not likely to explain this variation. The results instead point to the importance of contractual arrangements in wage determination. In economies with decentralized bargaining practices, such arrangements resemble self-enforcing insurance contracts with one-sided commitment (by the employer). On the other hand, in countries with strong unions and centralized wage bargaining, wage behavior is better approximated by full-commitment insurance contracts. The co-movement of hours and wages further confirms a contractual framework with variable worker hours. Despite the strong prevalence of contracts in Europe, however, the elasticity of labor supply is considerably smaller compared to the U.S. labor market.     

Mixing the princes and the paupers: Pay and performance in the National Basketball Association

We investigate how team and individual performances of players in the National Basketball Association respond to variations in intra-team pay inequality. By breaking down team dispersion into conditional and expected components, we find that expected pay dispersion has a positive effect on team and individual performance. We find that team and individual performances are essentially orthogonal to conditional pay inequality, counter to the hypotheses of fairness and cohesion proposed in the literature both for sports and general occupations. A change in collective bargaining regime in 1996 had little impact on either team or player productivity.     

Seniority wages and establishment characteristics

A representative linked employer-employee panel and an innovative two-step estimation strategy are used to show that large and profitable establishments as well as establishments with a highly qualified workforce pay high seniority wages. Also collective bargaining coverage, works councils and reduced working time for older employees are positively correlated with seniority wages, the share of foreigners, females as well as initial wage levels for job entrants are negatively correlated. These results support an agency based motivation for seniority wages with older employees' wages set higher than their productivity.     

The Green Revolution,agrarian productivity and labor

The use of Green Revolution inputs has been responsible for higher levels of agrarian productivity in India. This is both because of the biological structure of high-yield varieties of seeds themselves and because of the structure of the agrarian political economy in the country. But the question is: have the laborers benefited from the rise in productivity made possible by the use of these inputs? I have shown, both conceptually and empirically, that laborers do gain from higher productivity, but not uniformly over space. They gain more where they are more organized. This means that the relation between productivity and wages is, in part, a political relation, and the strength of this relation is characterized by ‘spatial inconstancy’. I have also discussed how the Green Revolution has tended to undermine the relations of personal dependence between the landed and the laborers, and this seems to have helped labor organization to some extent. Labor organization is also affected by the structure of land/asset distribution. In particular, whether or not laborers possess some land/asset makes a difference to the effectiveness of laborers’ bargaining power with landowners over wages, and therefore, to the actual level of wages being paid.     

The commuting time paradox

We examine the conditions for the ‘commuting time paradox’ which states that the average commuting time does not vary between different periods. We develop therefore an equilibrium job search model with endogenously chosen commuting costs. Presuming wage bargaining between workers and firms, the optimally chosen maximum commuting costs jointly maximise the worker's and firm's payoffs. We demonstrate that when productivity levels increase over time, average commuting costs and average wages both increase, which affects the optimally chosen commuting time. We establish the conditions under which the paradox holds.     

Equilibrium unemployment and wage formation with matching frictions and worker moral hazard

This paper combines the shirking and the matching approaches of equilibrium unemployment in order to endogenize the wage formation process as a function of labour market conditions. The steady-state equilibrium can take two forms depending on whether the no-shirking condition is binding or not. It is demonstrated that the efficiency wage approach is relevant when the unemployment rate is above a certain threshold. Furthermore, an efficiency wage is more likely when the disutility of effort is high, recruiting costs and workers' bargaining power are low, inspections are unlikely and the workers' productivity is weak.     

Household debt and labor market fluctuations

The co-movements of labor productivity with output, total hours, vacancies and unemployment have changed since the mid 1980s. This paper offers an explanation for the sharp break in the fluctuations of labor market variables based on endogenous labor supply decisions following the mortgage market deregulation. We set up a search model with efficient bargaining and financial frictions, in which impatient borrowers can take an amount of credit that cannot exceed a proportion of the expected value of their real estate holdings. When borrowers' equity requirements are low, the impact of a positive technology shock on the marginal utility of consumption is strengthened, which in turn results in lower hours per worker and higher wages in the bargaining process. This shift in labor supply discourages firms from opening vacancies, reducing the impact of the shock on employment. We simulate the effects of an increase in both the loan-to-value ratio and the share of borrowers in total population. Our exercise shows that the response of labor market variables might have been substantially affected by the increase in household leverage in the US in the last twenty years.     

Industrial Relations, Manipulative or Democratic?

Summary: Three historical periods of motivating workers toward increasing productivity still "coexist" today: negative incentives, external rewards, forms of workers' participation in industry. Varying modes of joint consultation at top levels existing in many countries are contrasted with American industrial research emphasizing workers' participation on the workshop level. The problems of "common goals" and "manipulation" in industry are considered as contributing factors to the gap between those two levels. To fill it, industrial sociologists should follow Mayo and others in the use of 'clinical' research to find new institutional forms for a democratic work process based on collective bargaining.     

Seniority Profiles in Unionized Workplaces: Do Unions Still have the Edge?*

The focus of this study is to distinguish the different paths seniority earning profiles follow depending on whether the individual is employed in a workplace where trade unions and collective bargaining are present, or not. Within this framework, two propositions are set. In the union sector seniority should be an important determinant of wages, while in the non‐union sector productivity, proxied by occupational experience, should have a key role on earning profiles. The empirical analysis verifies both propositions. Seniority earning profiles appear to be steeper in the union sector, while occupational expertise is estimated to have a more significant role in non‐union jobs.     

Trading bargaining weights

We consider a model, in which two agents are engaged in two separate bargaining problems. We introduce a notion of bargaining weights (bargaining power), which is basically given by asymmetric versions of the Perles–Maschler bargaining solution. Thereby, we view bargaining power as ordinary goods that can be traded in an exchange economy. With equal initial endowment of bargaining power there exists a Walrasian equilibrium in this exchange economy such that the utility allocation in equilibrium coincides with the Perles–Maschler bargaining solution of the aggregate bargaining problem. Equilibrium prices are given by the primitives of the two bargaining problems.     

Trading bargaining weights

We consider a model, in which two agents are engaged in two separate bargaining problems. We introduce a notion of bargaining weights (bargaining power), which is basically given by asymmetric versions of the Perles–Maschler bargaining solution. Thereby, we view bargaining power as ordinary goods that can be traded in an exchange economy. With equal initial endowment of bargaining power there exists a Walrasian equilibrium in this exchange economy such that the utility allocation in equilibrium coincides with the Perles–Maschler bargaining solution of the aggregate bargaining problem. Equilibrium prices are given by the primitives of the two bargaining problems.     

Performance Pay,Union Bargaining and Within‐Firm Wage Inequality*

Theory predicts that performance pay boosts wage dispersion. Workers retain a share of individual productivity shocks and high‐efficiency workers receive compensation for greater effort. Collective bargaining can mitigate the effect of performance pay on wage inequality by easing monitoring of common effort standards and group‐based pay schemes. Analyses of longitudinal employer–employee data show that the introduction of performance‐related pay raises wage inequality in non‐union firms, but not in firms with high union density. Although performance‐related pay appears to be on the rise, the overall impact on wage dispersion is likely to be small, particularly in European countries with influential unions.