Corporate taxation, incumbency advantage and entry

It is the purpose of this paper to show that corporation tax may affect industrial structure. Analyzing the effects of corporation tax, we demonstrate that it tends to favour incumbents over entrants. We further show that the effect of this advantage on an incumbent's output depends on his profit or loss history. An incumbent with a past profit is likely to produce a greater output, thereby partially or fully crowding out an entrant's output. In contrast, an incumbent with a past loss is more likely to produce a smaller output, making entry easier.     

Entry and Competition in the Postal Market: Foundations for the Construction of Entry Scenarios*

This paper presents a model of entry and imperfect competition, which is inspired by the product differentiation literature and incorporates facts pertaining to the postal sector. There are two operators: incumbent and potential entrant. The entrant offers only one of the products (commercial mail) with a specific technology and delivers only to part of the addressees (located in low cost areas). Its degree of coverage is viewed as a quality attribute; it affects demand and hence market share. The incumbent faces a USO while the entrant is an unregulated profit maximizing firm. To illustrate the potential applications of our approach, we provide some numerical simulations of entry scenarios.     

Entry Deterrence in a Unionized Oligopoly

We investigate wage determination between an incumbent firm and its labour union under threat from another firm entering its product market. In equilibrium, it may be optimal for a labour union of the incumbent firm to lower its wage demand. This may make it possible for the incumbent firm to maintain a higher employment level, in that the lower wages can help the firm deter the entry of a rival firm. This will yield a higher profit for the incumbent firm and a lower utility level for the labour union compared with those in an equilibrium with no threat of entry.
JEL Classification Numbers: J51, L10     

RJV FORMATION AND STRATEGIC ENTRY ACCOMMODATION*

This article examines the relationship between cost reduction and public goods effect of research joint ventures (RJVs) and strategic entry deterrence. R&D is process innovation à la Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992 ) and R&D cost sharing between the incumbent and the entrant in a RJV can be asymmetric per Long and Soubeyran (2002 ). It is found that conforming with the conventional wisdom, the incumbents prefer to form RJV to deter entry when the entrant is very inefficient. However, if the entrant is moderately inefficient, it is a better choice for the incumbent to accommodate entry by forming a RJV with it. In contrast, if the entrant is very efficient, then the equilibrium RJV structure depends on the magnitude of spillover effect: it is better to deter entry in the case of high spillover effect.     

Does an incumbent monopolist have an incentive to invite new entry through granting a free patent license?

We examine whether an incumbent monopolist has an incentive to invite a new entry. In particular, we demonstrate the condition of a profit-raising entry effect in the presence of network externalities. Here the incumbent monopolist grants a free patent license for a perfectly compatible product for a new firm when it can choose the level of compatibility.     

Adoption of network technologies in the presence of converters

In many high-tech industries, the emergence of new digital technologies allows companies to develop converters to overcome technology incompatibility. In this paper, we analyze the effects of converter introduction on the adoption process of competing, incompatible technologies in the presence of network externalities. Converter introduction may accelerate, extend or reverse the technology lock-in process. We determine which conversion options are profitable for weak as well as for dominant incumbents, depending on the timing of converter introduction and the degrees of conversion. We find that the optimal strategy for weak incumbents is to introduce full one-way converters early. For dominant incumbents, the optimal conversion option is to provide two-way converters with partial compatibility for the users of the competing network at a later introduction time. We illustrate our analytical results with numerical examples.     

Entrepreneurial overconfidence and ambiguity aversion: dealing with the devil you know,than the devil you don't know

Various empirical studies find that entrepreneurs are systematically overconfident in their venture's probabilistic chances of success. Yet, entrepreneurs often face an ambiguous future that precludes them from making such probabilistic judgements. A theoretical framework based on ambiguity aversion is developed to explain an entrepreneur's overconfidence under complex and novel conditions of ambiguity. Unlike optimistic explanations, this ambiguity-averse form of overconfidence offers a non-probabilistic approach to entrepreneurial judgements of uncertainty.     

INSTABILITY AND THE INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTION

We investigate the relationship between corruption and political stability, from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. We propose a model of incumbent behavior that features the interplay of two effects: a horizon effect , whereby greater instability leads the incumbent to embezzle more during his short window of opportunity, and a demand effect , by which the private sector is more willing to bribe stable incumbents. The horizon effect dominates at low levels of stability, because firms are unwilling to pay high bribes and unstable incumbents have strong incentives to embezzle, whereas the demand effect gains salience in more stable regimes. Together, these two effects generate a non-monotonic, U-shaped relationship between total corruption and stability. On the empirical side, we find a robust U-shaped pattern between country indices of corruption perception and various measures of incumbent stability, including historically observed average tenures of chief executives and governing parties: regimes that are very stable or very unstable display higher levels of corruption when compared with those in an intermediate range of stability. These results suggest that minimizing corruption may require an electoral system that features some re-election incentives, but with an eventual term limit.     

Campaign War Chests, Entry Deterrence, and Voter Rationality

It is often claimed that the accumulation of "war chests" by incumbents deters entry by high–quality challengers in Congressional elections. This paper presents a game–theoretic analysis of the interaction between an incumbent, potential challengers, an interest group, and a representative (rational) voter, where the incumbent's "quality" (or "legislative effectiveness") is known to the interest group, but not to the voter or to potential challengers. Under certain conditions, a perfectly revealing equilibrium exists; the incumbent signals her quality by raising funds from the interest group to accumulate a war chest. The entry deterrence effect thus operates solely through the role of war chests in signaling incumbent quality.     

Incumbent organisations shaping emerging technological fields: cases of solar photovoltaic and electric vehicle charging

We explore how large incumbent organisations shape emerging technological fields while establishing a position and business opportunities for themselves during technological shifts. We draw from innovation studies that increasingly emphasise the ability of incumbent organisations to survive technological transformations and studies on emerging technological fields to identify ways in which incumbent organisations shape novel fields during their emergence. Through longitudinal case studies of two emerging fields, we examine how incumbents shape the emerging technological fields of solar energy and electric vehicles. We discuss the interlinked and cumulative business and discursive activities utilized by the incumbents as well as the mechanism through which they influence the legitimacy, expectations and field boundaries of the emerging technological fields. Our study draws attention to the fact that incumbents enter emerging fields at an earlier stage and in more diverse ways than has previously been noted.     

Natural monopoly and differential pricing

Under uniform pricing a monopolist cannot make a positive profit in equilibrium. I analyze how differential pricing can be exploited by a natural monopolist to deter entry when entry is costless. In a two-stage game with price competition before quantity competition I show that the incumbent firm can deter entry and make a positive profit in equilibrium. The incumbent sets two different prices, the low price to deter entry and the high price to generate profit. Entry is not possible because of scale effects. If dumping is allowed for all firms no positive profits are realizable, but welfare is reduced. I show that for some parameter values the incumbent is forced to engage in a stunt (i.e., set a negative low price) to keep entrants out.     

Demand reduction and preemptive bidding in multi-unit license auctions

Multi-unit ascending auctions allow for equilibria in which bidders strategically reduce their demand and split the market at low prices. At the same time, they allow for preemptive bidding by incumbent bidders in a coordinated attempt to exclude entrants from the market. We consider an environment where both demand reduction and preemptive bidding are supported as equilibrium phenomena of the ascending auction. In a series of experiments, we compare its performance to that of the discriminatory auction. Strategic demand reduction is quite prevalent in the ascending auction even when entry imposes a (large) negative externality on incumbents. As a result, the ascending auction performs worse than the discriminatory auction both in terms of revenue and efficiency, while entrants’ chances are similar across the two formats.     

Technical compatibility and the mode of foreign entry with network externalities

Abstract.  We examine the preferences of a foreign firm and a local government over two modes of foreign direct investment: de novo entry and acquisition of the domestic incumbent. Two crucial features of the model are network externalities and partial incompatibility between the domestic and the foreign technology. The relative welfare impact of the two entry modes depends on the degree of market competition and the strength of the network externality. The clash between the foreign firm's choice and the local government's ranking of the two entry modes can motivate limits on the degree of foreign ownership of the local firm.     

The welfare effects of entry: the role of the input market

In a successive Cournot oligopoly, we show the welfare effects of entry in the final goods market with no scale economies but with cost difference between the firms. If the input market is very concentrated, entry in the final goods market increases welfare. If the input market is not very concentrated, entry in the final goods market may reduce welfare if the entrant is moderately cost inefficient. Hence, entry in the final goods market is more desirable if (1) the input market is very concentrated or (2) the cost difference between the incumbents and the entrant is either very small or very large. It follows from our analysis that entry increases the profits of the incumbent final goods producers if their marginal costs are sufficiently lower than the entrant’s marginal cost.     

Innovation,competition and firm size distribution on fragmented markets

This paper presents a simple model of firm and consumer behavior. We formulate a sub-market entry game, where boundedly rational firms decide on investing in R&D for inventing new products that will appeal to targeted groups of consumers. The success depends on the amount of resources available for the project as well as on the firm’s familiarity with market characteristics. Successful innovation feeds back into the firm size and (potentially into) market knowledge and increases the future R&D productivity. A new product decreases the market-shares of incumbents. However, this business stealing effect is asymmetric across incumbent population. We identify the section of parameter space where firms have an incentive to diversify horizontally. In this section, the model results in rich industrial dynamics. Firm size heterogeneity emerges endogenously in the model. Equilibrium firm size distributions are heavy tailed and skewed to the right. The heaviness of the tail depends on submarket specificity of firm’s market knowledge. This relationship is non-monotonic, emphasizing two different effects of innovation on industrial dynamics (positive feedback and asymmetric business stealing).     

Ex ante identification of disruptive innovations in the software industry applied to web applications: The case of Microsoft's vs. Google's office applications

This paper analyzes the question whether web applications pose a disruptive threat to incumbents or a disruptive growth opportunity for entrants in the application software industry using a novel method for ex ante identification of disruptive innovations in the software industry. Building on the theory of disruptive innovations, network effects and existing frameworks for the ex ante identification of disruptive innovations a new method of analysis is deduced. The analysis is based on a list of criteria that indicate a disruptive innovation and trajectory maps of the technologies' performance attributes. This method is applied to study the potential disruption of Microsoft's desktop office applications by Google's web-based office applications.The chosen method of analysis indicates a small likelihood for web applications to pose a disruptive threat to Microsoft, and by extension, to incumbents in the software industry. While web applications show a potential to satisfy market demand in established performance attributes, strong network effects in existing software products should give incumbents enough time to co-opt the innovation. The case illustrates how our new method to analyze disruptive potential in the software industry ex ante can help to apply the theory of disruptive innovation better for forecasting purposes and to provide novel strategic insights for the players involved.     

Incumbents as disruptor and their disruptive behaviour enabling disruptive innovation: case study of high performance and low cost CPU and foundry market

ABSTRACT

The ability and role of incumbents to enable and sustain disruptive innovation is underestimated so far, compared with new entrants. Thus, this research aimed to observe incumbents’ role as a disruptor and their disruptive behaviours to enable disruptive innovation in different market segments. Based on two case studies of CPU and foundry markets, it was observed that incumbents enabled disruptive innovation by adjusting disruptive window in the context of performance trajectories and discontinuous time, and they sustained their market leadership by having advantages through continuous cost reduction and accumulated technological knowledge in high performance and low cost market. This study has extended the theory of disruptive innovation by including incumbents’ role and their disruptive behaviours and has practical implications as well for incumbents and new entrants to establish competitive technology strategy at the organisation as well as national level.     

Technology investment and alternative regulatory regimes with demand uncertainty

A vertically integrated incumbent and an OLO (Other Licensed Operator) compete in the market for broadband access. The incumbent has the option to invest in building a Next Generation Network that covers all urban areas with similar demand structures. The investment return in terms of demand increase is uncertain. We compare the impact of different access regulation regimes – full regulation, partial regulation (only the copper network is regulated), risk sharing – on investment incentives and social welfare. We find that, when the alternative for the OLO is using the copper network rather than leaving the market entirely, exclusion of the OLO does not necessarily happen in equilibrium even when the incumbent is better in offering value-added services. Risk sharing emerges as the most preferable regime both from a consumer and a social welfare perspective for a large range of parameters.     

Compatibility,interoperability, and market power in upgrade markets

We examine the market power of a seller who repeatedly offers upgraded versions of a product. In the case of pure monopoly, the seller also controls compatibility across versions. In the case of an entrant who offers an upgrade, the incumbent seller also controls subsequent interoperability across versions. We argue that control of compatibility and interoperability does not allow an incumbent seller to charge a price premium relative to when such control is absent and, consequently, neither is a necessary source of market power.