Contracting for tacit knowledge: the provision of technical services in technology licensing contracts

Recent research on the economic payoff from new technology has emphasized the importance of tacit knowledge or know-how. This paper shows that arm's length contract can overcome the problems in contracting for know-how by bundling complementary inputs with know-how in a technology package, and leveraging the superior enforceability of contracts over the latter. In the empirical part of this paper, the relationship between bundling and transfer of know-how is analyzed, using Indian data. The results imply that tied sales of inputs may increase the efficiency of contracts involving the transfer of know-how. A striking result, in the context of the current North-South debates on intellectual property rights, is the packaging of patents with know-how.     

Contractual implications of international trade in tacit knowledge

This article searches for evidence on the additional difficulty the parties have in contracting for the transfer of know-how relative to the transfer of patented technology. A sample of contracts for the acquisition of technology Spanish firms in 1991 is analysed to find a positive relationship between contract duration and the likelihood of transferring know-how in unaffiliated transfers. It is also found that technical assistance is bundled together with the transfer of know-how, suggesting that the parties try to mitigate opportunistic behaviour on the licensor's side.     

‘To sell or not to sell’: Licensing versus selling by an outside innovator

We study various modes of technology transfer of an outside innovator in a spatial framework when the potential licensees are asymmetric. In addition to different licensing options, we also look into the option of selling the property rights of innovation and find the optimal mode of technology transfer. For licensing we find the optimal policy is to offer pure royalty contracts to both licensee firms when cost differentials between the firms are relatively small compared to the transportation cost, otherwise offer a fixed fee licensing contract to the efficient firm only. Interestingly, we show the innovator is always better-off selling the innovation to any one of the firms who further licenses it to the rival firm. The result holds irrespective of the size of the innovation (drastic or non-drastic) and the degree of cost asymmetry between the licensees. Social welfare is greater under selling than licensing.     

Tariff induced licensing contracts,consumers’ surplus and welfare

We construct a duopolistic trade model with technology transfer and consider two-part tariff licensing contracts. We show that a tariff on foreign products can influence the licensing strategy of the foreign firm. There is a trade-off between a tariff and a royalty license in affecting the product price. We show in particular that a tariff can be chosen so as to induce fee licensing and maximize both consumers’ surplus and domestic welfare. This resolves the so-called conflict between these two objectives in respect of the choice of a tariff. The paper provides a number of testable hypothesis.     

Optimal patent licensing—Two or three-part tariff

We look into technology transfer by an insider patentee in a spatial duopoly model under three types of licensing contracts—(i) two-part tariff with fixed fee and per-unit royalty, (ii) two-part tariff with fixed fee and ad-valorem royalty and (iii) general three-part tariff with fixed fee, per-unit and ad-valorem royalties. Under two-part tariff contracts, the licenser is better off with the per-unit royalty contract but the general contract does better than the other contracts. In contrast to the existing literature, all three licensing contracts may make the consumers worse-off compared to no licensing, with the lowest consumer surplus achieved under the general licensing contract. Welfare under the general licensing contract is equal to the welfare under two-part tariff with ad-valorem royalty and it is higher than the welfare under no licensing but lower than the welfare under two-part tariff with per-unit royalty. Hence, the general three-part licensing contract is privately optimal but not socially optimal. Similar conclusions hold also under a nonspatial linear demand model with differentiated products.     

专利联营对外许可冲突：焦点、国际化解经验及改善路径

专利联营是国家技术转移体系基础架构的有机组成部分,也是高新技术产业的重要技术来源。随着技术进步和创新主体的多样化发展,专利联营核心专利组合的市场价值能否实现已经成为专利联营对外许可冲突的焦点。以专利联营对外许可冲突焦点为研究对象,建立合作博弈模型,得出被许可人获得许可后的经济利益净增值、专利联营的对外许可费底线和被许可人缴纳的许可费底线是影响专利联营核心专利组合市场价值实现的3个重要关联因素。通过借鉴国际活跃专利联营的先进经验,指出核心专利质量不高、对外许可效率低下是本土专利联营核心专利组合市场价值无法实现的主要障碍。在此基础上,立足专利联营供给侧角度,从自主创新能力、政产学研合作和人力资源建设3个方面提出本土专利联营满足被许可人需求、化解对外许可冲突的有效路径。     

Foreign subsidiaries as a channel of international technology diffusion: Some direct firm level evidence from Belgium

The use of foreign direct investment as a channel of international spillovers is by now fairly established in the empirical literature on innovation and growth. It is often argued that subsidiaries of foreign multinational enterprises are a mechanism through which technological know-how flows across borders. For foreign subsidiaries to be channels of international spillovers, these subsidiaries need to source know-how internationally and transfer their know-how to the local economy. Using direct firm level evidence from the Belgian Community Innovation Survey on the occurrence of technology transfers, we find that foreign subsidiaries are indeed more likely to acquire technology internationally. But after controlling for the superior access to the international technology market that foreign subsidiaries enjoy, we find that these firms are not more likely to transfer technology to the local economy as compared to local firms.     

四螺旋参与度对技术转移及其效率的影响研究

从科研院所-政府-企业-中介平台四螺旋体系的角度研究了技术转移的效率问题。定义四螺旋在技术转移活动中的资源投入为四螺旋参与度,采用CCA/DEA方法研究了四螺旋参与度与技术转移产出效益的关系。研究表明,四螺旋参与度与技术转移产出效益显著正相关;整体水平上,四螺旋技术转移体系效率未达到最优规模效益,政府与企业的R&D经费投入存在浪费现象;科研院所的发明专利申请和科技论文产出对技术转移的促进作用最大;我国区域技术转移效率有待提高。最后,针对问题提出了相关改进措施。     

三螺旋互动下专利联营促进成果转化的许可优势研究

在世界产业竞争格局下,基于许可进行成果转化的专利联营日渐成为高新技术产业竞争和发展的主导范式。传统的纵向结构专利联营由于必要专利权人来源单一,已经出现了许可困境,不利于必要专利的转化,而基于大学-产业-政府三螺旋互动创新的专利联营有利于合理配置资源,有效促进必要专利的转化。对三螺旋互动下专利联营促进成果转化的许可优势进行研究发现,与纵向结构专利联营相比,三螺旋互动下专利联营具备促进成果转化的许可动力优势、许可契约优势和许可市场优势等多维优势,具体表现在：多元来源的必要专利可持久的资本化特性保证了许可动力强劲,契约双方的合作共赢目标保证了许可契约的顺利达成,容易形成事实标准保证了许可市场的有效占领。     

逆向选择条件下技术许可中非排他性价格契约研究

通过经典的委托代理理论的应用,文章揭示了一类逆向选择条件下的技术许可中非排他性价格契约理论的内在机理。文章认为,通过针对差的类型的技术使用者的包含可变费用的契约和对好的类型的技术使用者的纯固定费用的契约,可以达到有效的排他性技术许可的目的;但为了有效的激励,技术所有者事前要对好的类型的技术使用者转移一定的信息租。     

考虑革新程度认知差异的新产品技术授权研究

建立博弈模型，探讨技术革新认知差异情形下，外部技术创新者向寡占竞争格局的生产企业授权生产新产品专利的最优决策问题。研究发现，创新授权者关于新产品市场的认知劣势使固定收费契约不具备完全优于特许权收费契约的绝对优势；在双重收费契约下，专利人授权对象选择因认知差异影响，由排他性授权向非排他性授权决策转变；认知差异性削弱了创新企业市场势力，从而提高特许权收费契约优势，而拍卖、股权投资等有助于创新企业克服认知劣势。据此，建议创新企业明晰创新专利长期回报，综合搭配应用多种授权契约；以非排他性授权策略配合特许权收费、双重收费和股权投资等契约模式，实现技术交易产业链激励共容下的利润最大化，促进技术创新传播应用，提高社会福利水平。     

Regulation or Markets? The Case of Employment Contracts

Regulation of the employment contract is both wide spread anddiverse. The diversity of regulation is surprising because itsuggests that there is little consensus regarding optimal interventioninto the labor market. This paper discusses several economicreasons why it may be efficient for employers and employeesto enter into long term contracts that make employee dismissalexpensive. This analysis suggests that employment contractscan be expected to be complex in practice, and hence can beviewed as part of the technology of exchange. Given that knowledgeof a technology requires skill and know-how, one cannot expectall employee-employer matches to discover and use the most efficientcontract terms possible. It is suggested that the regulationof the employment relationship might be improved with the creationof a market for contracts, similar to the one that currentlyexists in the United States for construction projects.(JEL J300,J410, K310)     

技术竞争对企业专利许可行为的影响

知识经济时代，知识产权的重要性愈加凸显。基于海量的中国企业专利许可数据，就多种竞争情境对企业对外许可行为的影响进行研究。实证分析发现，随着竞争密度增大，技术市场扩张厚度增加，企业倾向于对外许可其技术，但技术提供数量与专利许可率之间存在倒U型关系，中国仍远未达到拐点；许可过程中科研实力起到决定性作用，实力较强的竞争者对许可行为具有显著的抑制作用，反之，则具有促进作用。当被许可人是同行竞争者时，并没有拒绝或者延迟对外许可。另外，在对外许可中，国有企业的竞争反应较弱，私营企业较敏感。最后，结合中国市场情况提出相应对策建议。     

License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers

This paper revisits the licensing of a non-drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed-fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two-part tariffs. The key features are that royalty contracts are auctioned and that losers of the auction are granted the option to sign a royalty contract. Remarkably, combining royalties for winners and losers of the auction makes the integer constraint concerning the number of licenses irrelevant.     

Licensing to a durable-good duopoly in patent litigation

Incorporating patent litigation into a durable-good duopoly model, we revisit the optimal licensing contract on a cost-reducing innovation. We find that both the optimal licensing contract and the innovator's licensing revenue are closely related to the patent's strength, i.e., the probability it would be found valid if tested in court. It is shown that, for a relatively weak patent (patent's strength is low), it's optimal for the innovator to charge the royalty rate as high as possible coupled with a negative fixed fee. But for a relatively strong patent (patent's strength is high), contract involving the combination of a medium level royalty rate and a positive fixed fee is optimal. We also discuss how the patent's strength affects the social welfare of a patent. Finally we present two policy suggestions that may alleviate the social welfare loss raised by the licensing of weak patents.     

Commercialization,renewal, and quality of patents

One of the major reasons why inventors are awarded patents by governments is they encourage R&D investments and commercialization of inventions. If the patent holder commercializes his/her invention, he/she has stronger incentives to retain the patent. The purpose here is to empirically analyze the relationship between commercialization and the renewal of patents. At the same time, I take into account defensive patent strategies (e.g. deterring competitors from utilizing the patent) and pointedly ask if there are any third factors (quality of the patent) that affect the commercialization and renewal decisions. Using a detailed database of Swedish patents, I utilize a survival model to estimate how commercialization influences the patent renewal decision. Basic results show not only that commercialization and defensive strategies increase the probability a patent will be renewed, but also that quality influences commercialization and renewal decisions. When controlling for the endogenous commercialization decision, there is still a strong positive relationship between commercialization and renewal of patents. Thus, given the quality of the patent, if the owner decides to commercialize the patent on the margin, this leads to longer survival of the patent. With regard to commercialization modes, there is some evidence that licensed patents and patents commercialized in original and new firms – but not acquired patents – survive longer than non-commercialized patents. Looking more closely at the contracts of acquired and licensed patents, contracts with both variable and fixed fees – but not contracts with either variable or fixed fees – survive longer than non-commercialized patents. However, the analysis about modes and contract terms does not take into account the endogeneity problem.     

道德风险条件下高校产学研合作中价格契约研究

利用技术许可中价格契约的基本理论,对高校产学研合作中存在于企业的道德风险问题的价格契约治理机制进行了分析。分析结果表明,在产学研合作中,当企业存在道德风险问题时,一个次优产学研合作的价格契约是一个纯固定费用的价格契约;同时,高校为了对企业进行有效激励,将对企业进行一定的信息租的转移。     

Technology Transfer,Quality Standards,and North–South Trade

This paper examines the economic consequences of technology transfer through licensing in a North–South model of vertical product differentiation, based on a product‐line pricing framework. With its limited technological expertise, the southern firm cannot export to the northern market without purchasing the northern firm's “clean” and low‐cost technology. With North–South cost‐asymmetry, we conclude that the transfer of technology through licensing promotes trade, product variety and improves global welfare. However, without government intervention, the private levels of product quality chosen by firms tend to be lower than the socially optimal levels. This finding helps to explain why developed countries often set quality standards for imported foreign products.     

专利技术许可中不质疑条款的法律规制

专利技术许可中的不质疑条款可能掩盖了无效专利的存在,使得被许可人为无效专利支出了不合理的许可费,并可能产生阻碍技术市场竞争和创新的后果,但不质疑条款的存在也可能产生降低许可费、促进专利技术许可和运用等积极后果。法律不应对不质疑条款作出禁止性规定,应将其视为合同法上的可撤销条款。对不质疑条款的规制一般应运用专利法和合同法,而当不质疑条款产生非法限制竞争、阻碍技术进步后果时,则应运用反垄断法对其进行规制。     

外国直接投资、技术许可与技术创新

本文以经济全球化条件下 ,以包括中国在内的发展中国家努力向发达国家通过FDI(国外直接投资 )和LICENSING(技术许可 )的渠道进行技术引进以达到自主技术创新从而推动本国经济持续增长的目标为背景 ,建立了一个技术引进与经济增长的扩展模型。本文的主要结论是 :对于包括中国在内的发展中国家 (LDC)而言 ,技术许可比FDI所带来的技术外溢更有效 ,LDC或者依赖FDI,或者依靠技术许可作为其技术引进的主要来源。没有相应管制时倾向于依赖FDI。考虑制定何种政策以达到社会福利的最优化时 ,人力资本的水平起到了决定性作用。