Research Joint Ventures with Asymmetric Spillovers and Symmetric Contributions

The paper proposes a new type of R&D cooperation between firms endowed with asymmetric spillovers, which we call symmetric Research Joint Venture (RJV) cartelization, based on reciprocity in information exchange. In this setting, firms coordinate their R&D expenditures and also share information, but such that the asymmetric spillover rates are increased through cooperation by equal amounts. It is found that this type of cooperation reduces R&D investment by the low spillover firm when its spillover is sufficiently low and the spillover of its competitor is sufficiently high. But it always increases the R&D of the high spillover firm, as well as total R&D (and hence effective cost reduction and welfare). A firm prefers no cooperation to symmetric RJV cartelization if its spillover rate is very high and the spillover rate of its competitor is intermediate. The profitability of symmetric RJV cartelization relative to other modes of cooperation is analyzed. It is found that symmetric RJV cartelization constitutes an equilibrium for a very wide range of spillovers, namely, when asymmetries between spillovers are not too large. As these asymmetries increase, the equilibrium goes from symmetric RJV cartelization, to RJV cartelization, to R&D competition, to R&D cartelization.     

Union structure and firms' incentives for cooperative R&D investments

Abstract .  We investigate the impact of alternative unionization structures on firms' incentives to invest on cost-reducing R&D and to form Research Joint Ventures (RJVs), in the presence of R&D spillovers. We show that if firms invest non-cooperatively and spillovers are low, R&D investments are higher under centralized rather than under decentralized wage-setting. In contrast, investments are always higher under decentralized wage-setting in the case of RJVs. Firms' incentives to form an RJV are stronger under centralized wage-setting if and only if spillovers are low enough. Finally, centralized wage-setting may hinder the formation of costly RJVs and their potential welfare benefits.     

Information sharing and the stability of cooperation in research joint ventures*

The model studies information sharing and the stability of cooperation in cost reducing Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). In a three-stage game-theoretic framework, firms decide on participation in a RJV, information sharing along with R&D expenditures, and output. An important feature of the model is that voluntary information sharing between cooperating firms increases information leakage from the RJV to outsiders. It is found that RJVs representing a larger portion of firms in the industry are more likely to share information. It is also found that when sharing information is costless, firms generally don't choose intermediate levels of information sharing: they share all the information or none at all. The size of the RJV is found to depend on three effects: a coordination effect, an information sharing effect, and a competition effect. Depending on the relative magnitudes of these effects, the size of the RJV may increase or decrease with spillovers. In response to an increase in leakages, RJV members reduce their R&D spending. In addition, they either increase the RJV size while maintaining information sharing unchanged (when leakages are low), or they reduce both information sharing and RJV size (when leakages are high).     

DEFECTING FROM R&D COOPERATION

This paper introduces defection into the strategic R&D model. In defecting, a firm cheats by choosing its R&D expenditures to maximise its own profits, instead of maximising the joint profits of the cooperating firms. Two cooperative environments are considered: R&D cartelisation, where firms coordinate R&D activities; and RJV cartelisation, where firms coordinate R&D activities and share information. Under R&D cartelisation, defection entails an increase (decrease) in R&D and effective spillovers for low (high) spillovers; whereas under RJV cartelisation, defection always entails a decrease in R&D and effective spillovers. Under R&D cartelisation, consumer surplus and total welfare increase (decrease) with defection when spillovers are low (high). Whereas consumer surplus and welfare always decrease with defection under RJV cartelisation. Under R&D cartelisation, the incentives for defection first decrease then increase with spillovers; they also increase with the size of the market, but decline with production costs and R&D costs. Moreover, the incentives for defection are higher under RJV cartelisation. With low spillovers under RJV cartelisation, a firm prefers to be subject to defection by the other firm, to not cooperating at all. Punishment for defection is considered, under the form of abstaining from information sharing.     

Strategic timing in R&D agreements

We study the endogenous formation of R&D agreements in a R&D/Cournot duopoly model with spillovers where also the timing of R&D investments is endogenous. This allows us to consider the incentives for firms to sign R&D agreements over time. It is shown that, when both R&D spillovers and investment costs are sufficiently low, firms may find difficult to maintain a stable agreement due to the strong incentive to invest noncooperatively as leaders. In this case, the stability of an agreement requires that the joint investment occurs at the initial stage, thus avoiding any delay. When spillovers are sufficiently high, the coordination of R&D efforts becomes a profitable option, although firms may also have an incentive to sequence noncooperatively their investment over time. Finally, when spillovers are asymmetric and knowledge mainly leaks from the leader to the follower, investing as follower may become extremely profitable, making R&D agreements hard to sustain unless firms strategically delay their joint investment in R&D.     

Infra-industry spillovers and R&D cooperation: Theory and evidence

We analyse both the theoretical and the empirical side of the issue of R&D spillovers. Each firm's R&D costs are increasing in the amount of information transmitted to other firms, and we account for the possibility that firms control spillovers. We consider both Cournot-Nash and Cournot-Stackelberg behavior. The empirical analysis suggests that (i) firms' control on spillovers is relatively low; (ii) the cost-saving effect associated to joint ventures or R&D cartels is confirmed for industries where firms rely mainly upon own R&D as a source of innovation; (iii) R&D cooperation may increase information sharing, thereby enhancing spillovers.     

Research joint ventures in an international economy

D'Aspremont and Jacquemin's model is extended to study alternative configurations of research agreements in a two-country integrated world economy. Under unambiguous conditions on spillovers, we show that: (1) allowing national firms to cooperate in research and development (R&D) confers them an advantage over foreign rivals, an effect similar to R&D subsidies. (2) In a policy game, each government would allow national cooperative agreements. (3) Contrary to other trade policies which lead to a “prisoners' dilemma” result, welfare in both countries increases when they both allow R&D cooperation. (4) Welfare is even higher if a generalized (international) coalition is formed.     

Vertical R&D Spillovers,Cooperation, Market Structure,and Innovation

This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries. Four types of R&D cooperation are studied: no cooperation, horizontal cooperation, vertical cooperation, and simultaneous horizontal and vertical cooperation. Vertical spillovers always increase R&D and welfare, while horizontal spillovers may increase or decrease them. The comparison of cooperative settings in terms of R&D shows that no setting uniformly dominates the others. Which type of cooperation yields more R&D depends on horizontal and vertical spillovers, and market structure. The ranking of cooperative structures hinges on the signs and magnitudes of three "competitive externalities" (vertical, horizontal, and diagonal) which capture the effect of the R&D of a firm on the profits of other firms. One of the basic results of the strategic investment literature is that cooperation between competitors decreases R&D when horizontal spillovers are low; the model shows that this result does not necessarily hold when vertical spillovers are sufficiently high, and/or when horizontal cooperation is combined with vertical cooperation.     

Organization Design and Information-Sharing in a Research Joint Venture with Spillovers

The paper presents a non-tournament model of process innovation with spillovers in the R&D process when firms engage in Cournot competition in the product market. It is shown that careful modelling of information-sharing and coordination of research activities leads to the conclusion that a Research Joint Venture (RJV) will economize on scarce R&D resources. There is an analysis of the effects of R&D cooperation, in the form of an RJV, on the organization of R&D, i.e. the efficient number of research labs. R&D expenditure, which precedes production, results in lower unit costs. R&D is modelled as a two-stage process: in the first stage, firms incur expenditure that will generate new knowledge, while in the second stage this knowledge is employed to reduce unit costs. A distinction is made between single and complementary research paths. It is shown that the RJV will operate one lab in the case of a single research path exploiting its coordination advantage. In the case of complementary research paths the number of labs the RJV will operate crucially depends on the stage of the R&D process at which diminishing returns occur: it will operate both labs when diminishing returns occur at the first stage (creation of knowledge), while it will be indifferent as to the number of labs, one or two, when diminishing returns occur in the second stage (cost reduction).     

Strategic Rivalry With Spillovers Within Segmented Versus Integrated Markets

We consider a two-stage game with firms investing in R&D in the first stage while competing [a] la Cournot in the second stage. The firms are located in two countries, which are either segmented or integrated. R&D spillovers occur between firms located in the same country as well as between firms located in different countries.

We first examine the consequences of market integration on the impact of national and international R&D spillovers on innovative efforts, effective R&D, profits and total welfare. Comparing the resulting equilibrium levels, we subsequently conclude that market integration always leads to higher R&D investments and output if international R&D spillovers are limited, while the welfare consequences are ambiguous. Finally, we also analyze the welfare maximization problem of a ‘constrained social planner who can only decide on the level of R&D spillovers.     

Dynamic efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand competition: input versus output spillovers

We consider the efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a duopoly with substitutable goods where firms invest in process R&D that generates input spillovers. Under Cournot competition firms always invest more in R&D than under Bertrand competition. More importantly, Cournot competition yields lower prices than Bertrand competition when the R&D production process is efficient, when spillovers are substantial, and when goods are not too differentiated. The range of cases for which total surplus under Cournot competition exceeds that under Bertrand competition is even larger as competition over quantities always yields the largest producers’ surplus.     

The effectiveness of R&D subsidies

In this paper, the effectiveness of R&D subsidies is analyzed in an oligopolistic model that we apply to the cases of international R&D competition and cooperation. We find that the existence of asymmetric information among firms on whether a rival (or partner) is being subsidized or not may play a key role in explaining whether subsidies are effective or not in increasing R&D investments. In particular, it is shown that if the existence of the subsidy is made public (e.g. because strict information release regulation about R&D subsidies is enforced) and depending on the strategic relationship between the firms’ R&D efforts, an R&D subsidy could even hurt the subsidized firm.     

Environmental Research Joint Ventures under Emission Taxes

The effect of environmentalpolicy depends crucially on the strategicbehavior of firms. Firms can undertakepollution abatement innovation cooperativelythrough environmental R&D joint ventures(RJVs). Environmental RJVs have not onlyenvironmental but also economic impacts. Threetypes of environmental RJV are discussed inthis paper: R&D cartelization in which firmschoose R&D efforts to maximize the jointprofit, RJV competition in which firms sharethe R&D fruits to maximize their own profits,and RJV cartelization in which firms share R&Dfruits and maximize the joint profit. An R&Dcartelization minimizes output quantities,maximizes the total emission, and minimizes thesocial surplus. An RJV cartelization with asufficiently high spillover coefficientmaximizes R&D efforts, minimizes the totalemission, and maximizes the social surplus.     

Product differentiation, process R&D, and the nature of market competition

We investigate the relationship between process and product R&D and compare the incentives for both types of R&D under different modes of market competition (Bertrand versus Cournot). It is shown that: (i) process R&D investments increase with the degree of product differentiation and firms invest more in product R&D when they can do process R&D than when they cannot; (ii) Bertrand firms have a stronger incentive for product R&D whereas Cournot firms invest more in process R&D; and (iii) cooperation in product R&D promotes both types of R&D relative to competition whereas cooperation in both types of R&D discourages R&D relative to cooperation in just product R&D.     

Relocation and investment in R&D by firms

The literature on foreign direct investment has analyzed corporate location decisions when firms invest in R&D to reduce production costs. Such firms may set up new plants in other developed countries while maintaining their domestic plants. In contrast, we here consider firms that close down their domestic operations and relocate to countries where wage costs are lower. Thus, we assume that firms may reduce their production costs by investing in R&D and likewise by moving their plants abroad. We show that these two mechanisms are complementary. When a firm relocates it invests more in R&D than when it does not change its location and, therefore, its production cost is lower in the first case. As a result, investment in R&D encourages firms to relocate.     

Timing of innovation policies when carbon emissions are restricted: An applied general equilibrium analysis

This paper studies the timing of subsidies for emissions-saving research and development (R&D) and how innovation policy is influenced by a carbon tax. We develop a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with both general R&D and specific emissions-saving R&D. We find two results that are important when subsidizing emissions-saving R&D in order to target inefficiencies in the research markets. First, the welfare gain from subsidies is larger when the carbon tax is high. This is because a high carbon tax raises the social value of the emissions-saving technology and that this increase in value is not fully appropriated by the private firms. Secondly, the welfare gain is greater when there is a falling time profile of the rate of subsidies for emissions-saving R&D, rather than a constant or increasing profile. The reason is that knowledge spillovers are larger in early periods.     

R&D and foreign direct investment with asymmetric spillovers

This paper analyzes how firms’ R&D investment decisions are affected by asymmetries in knowledge transmission, considering different sources of asymmetry such as unequal know-how management capabilities and spillovers localization within an international oligopoly. We show that a better ability to manage knowledge flows incentivizes the firm to invest more in R&D. By introducing geographically bounded spillovers, we also find that one-way foreign direct investment (FDI) stimulates the multinational enterprise to raise its own R&D and that an FDI equilibrium is more likely to occur. Finally, spillovers localization leading to two-way FDI is welfare improving when compared with non-localized spillovers.     

Does R&D spending boost tangible investment? An analysis on European firms

This article investigates the relationship between firm’s R&D intensity, expressed as R&D expenditure over sales, and investment intensity in tangible assets. It is commonly acknowledged that R&D requires additional physical investment to be implemented. R&D increases a firm’s productivity and return to tangible investments, thus, providing to the firm incentives to bear high tangible capital costs and to invest more. This represents a crucial issue for a firm’s growth, particularly considering the strong interaction between physical capital accumulation and technological progress. The analysis is based on a large sample of manufacturing firms across seven European countries in the period 2007–2009. Since the sub-sample of firms performing R&D might not be random, there may potentially be an endogeneity issue. The analysis also considers that firms may decide to spend on R&D and investment in physical capital simultaneously. The questions of both endogeneity and simultaneity are dealt with by employing an instrumental variable two-step procedure. We find a positive and significant impact of R&D intensity on firms’ tangible investment intensity. The econometric results highlight the importance of financial factors, particularly with respect to firms’ internal resources. Exposure to international trade has a negative impact on investment, possibly depending on the time-span of the sample used.

Abbreviations: Technological Innovation and R&D; Investment Capital; Industry Studies; Firm Behavior; Empirical Analysis     

International R&D Networks

This paper considers the Goyal and Moraga‐Gonzalez (2001 ) model of strategic R&D collaboration networks in the open economy framework. The R&D is the d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988 ) process innovation and collaboration takes the form of research joint ventures (RJV) in which firms cooperate in R&D but compete in product markets. Countries decide whether to establish free‐trade links while firms decide whether and with whom to form RJVs. A double‐layer pairwise stability concept is introduced to characterize equilibrium network structures. In contrast with conventional wisdom, it is shown that global free trade generally reduces collaborative R&D levels. We give conditions for which pairwise stable R&D networks are welfare maximizing. Stability and efficiency are congruent when R&D cost is either too high or too low. A large public spillover effect is detrimental to an R&D network when trade networks are regional.     

Regulatory Protection When Firms Decide First on Technical Collaboration and R&D

We investigate the imposition of a horizontal technical barrier to trade (HTBT) in a symmetric, cross‐hauling duopoly. Tariffs and subsidies are ruled out, but, in the absence of a mutual recognition agreement, governments can impose HTBTs, so long as firms operate different technologies. With firms being first movers, this possibility may induce them to avoid technical collaboration, in order to tempt governments into creating national monopolies, unless spillovers in R&D are high. This exacerbates the costs of regulatory protection, compared to standard models without R&D or spillovers.