A simple theory and evidence on the determinants of firm R&D

This paper derives a simple, but informative, model of firm R&D to figure out key factors that determine firm R&D effort. The model suggests a demand-pull, technology-push theory of R&D by showing that a firm's profit-maximizing R&D expenditure is determined jointly by both demand-side factors and technology-side factors. The former includes demand size (firm sales) and consumer preference over quality and price and the latter includes R&D cost structure or the production-cost effect of product R&D and firm-specific technological competence. In addition, the model shows that other things being equal, the stock of exogenous technological knowledge, including the firm's previously accumulated technological knowledge, relevant to current R&D which is negatively related with current R&D effort. An empirical analysis of firm R&D intensities and technological capabilities of more than 1600 firms in nine industries across six countries provides supportive evidence for the theory. Further, the theory implies that R&D intensity or the R&D-to-sales ratio is independent of firm size unless firm size affects technological competence and that given consumer preference and R&D cost structure facing all firms in the same industry, the distribution of firm-specific technological competence among firms determines the distribution of firm R&D intensities within the industry.     

Spillovers,product innovation and R&D cooperation: a theoretical model

ABSTRACT

We analyze the impact of post-innovation knowledge spillovers on firms’ decisions to invest and cooperate in R&D, forming a research joint venture (RJV). We study the case of two potential investors involved in a non-tournament stochastic competition for developing a new but imitable product. We propose a theoretical model where cooperation may emerge as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a three-stage game. In the first stage, firms decide whether to cooperate; in the second, they decide whether to invest; and in the third, they compete. We show that firms cooperate in R&D when the spillovers are high enough and the fixed costs associated with R&D activities are low enough; however, our analysis suggests that forming an RJV may not always be socially optimal, and subsidizing R&D cooperation may not be efficient. We propose an optimal scheme of subsidies, which should be designed according to the intensity of the spillovers, the level of the R&D costs, and the probability of innovation success. Finally, we show that in the case of mergers the private incentive to invest is maximized, and firms may not need public subsidies to cooperate. When subsidies are costly, not hindering mergers may be the second-best solution.     

The Evolution of Cooperation in Patent Races:Theory and Experimental Evidence

In a dynamic patent race model we analyze the formation and breakup of joint ventures in relation to: (a) the relative as well as absolute position of the firms in the race; (b) the degree of competition in the ex post market. Fudenberg et al. (1983) studied the main features of a patent race when firms compete in R&D, showing that firms in the same position compete fiercely, dissipating the rent from innovation. By contrast, we show that if firms can cooperate or compete in R&D, and if they start in the same position, they cooperate at the outset but break their agreement in the last stage if they will be serious competitors in the downstream market, while, if they can collude in the ex post market, they cooperate from the outset and they innovate jointly. When the firms are lagged by one step, cooperation does not take place, except in the case the value of the race is negative and the cost saving due to cooperation is large. However, cooperation never occurs if the leader is more than one step ahead. Finally, when the firms cooperate in R&D they proceed to the discovery at low speed. We test these conclusions via experiments on the incentive to cooperate during the course of a race. The results of a sample of 86 races support our theoretical conclusions, although the experimental findings are less clear-cut than the theoretical ones.     

Product differentiation, process R&D, and the nature of market competition

We investigate the relationship between process and product R&D and compare the incentives for both types of R&D under different modes of market competition (Bertrand versus Cournot). It is shown that: (i) process R&D investments increase with the degree of product differentiation and firms invest more in product R&D when they can do process R&D than when they cannot; (ii) Bertrand firms have a stronger incentive for product R&D whereas Cournot firms invest more in process R&D; and (iii) cooperation in product R&D promotes both types of R&D relative to competition whereas cooperation in both types of R&D discourages R&D relative to cooperation in just product R&D.     

Vertical R&D Spillovers,Cooperation, Market Structure,and Innovation

This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries. Four types of R&D cooperation are studied: no cooperation, horizontal cooperation, vertical cooperation, and simultaneous horizontal and vertical cooperation. Vertical spillovers always increase R&D and welfare, while horizontal spillovers may increase or decrease them. The comparison of cooperative settings in terms of R&D shows that no setting uniformly dominates the others. Which type of cooperation yields more R&D depends on horizontal and vertical spillovers, and market structure. The ranking of cooperative structures hinges on the signs and magnitudes of three "competitive externalities" (vertical, horizontal, and diagonal) which capture the effect of the R&D of a firm on the profits of other firms. One of the basic results of the strategic investment literature is that cooperation between competitors decreases R&D when horizontal spillovers are low; the model shows that this result does not necessarily hold when vertical spillovers are sufficiently high, and/or when horizontal cooperation is combined with vertical cooperation.     

How do different motives for R&D cooperation affect firm performance? – An analysis based on Swiss micro data

The starting point of our analysis is the empirical fact that firms pursue different goals when getting engaged in R&D collaborations, often more than one goal at the same time. Given that firms are driven by different motives for R&D cooperation, the aim of this article is to investigate the differences related to different motives with respect to the impact of R&D cooperation on firm innovativeness and firm productivity. Not only R&D cooperation in general but also cooperation driven by each of the seven motives considered in this paper correlate positively with the sales share of innovative products. With respect to innovativeness, the characterization of cooperation by the driving motive did not add much more than could be gained through the overall variable ‘R&D cooperation yes/no’. Technology-motivated collaborative activities show a weaker tendency to positive direct effects on productivity than cost-motivated cooperation. In this case, the distinction of several cooperation motives yields some additional insights as compared to the overall cooperation variable. On the whole, distinguishing various cooperation motives appears to be fruitful because it allows more differentiated insights that would remain hidden behind the overall variable “R&D cooperation yes/no”.     

In-house R&D,external R&D and cooperation breadth in Spanish manufacturing firms: is there a synergistic effect on innovation outputs?

ABSTRACT

This study explores the nature of relationship between in-house R&D, external R&D and cooperation breadth and their joint impact on patent counts as well as technological, product and process, innovations in Spanish manufacturing firms. With regards to patent counts, empirical findings from a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator suggest a complementarity effect of internal and external R&D activities conditional on the breadth of R&D cooperation. Concerning technological innovation, results from dynamic random-effects probit models indicate no synergistic effects. In addition, we find evidence of persistence of all three innovation output measures. Our results suggest policy implications in relation to strengthening firms’ absorptive capacity that could have long-run effects.     

Absorptive capacity and innovation: when is it better to cooperate?

Cooperation can benefit and hurt firms at the same time. An important question then is: when is it better to cooperate? And, once the decision to cooperate is made, how can an appropriate partner be selected? In this paper we present a model of inter-firm cooperation driven by cognitive distance, appropriability conditions and external knowledge. Absorptive capacity of firms develops as an outcome of the interaction between absorptive R&D and cognitive distance from voluntary and involuntary knowledge spillovers. Thus, we offer a revision of the original model by Cohen and Levinthal (Econ J 99(397):569–596, 1989), accounting for recent empirical findings and explicitly modeling absorptive capacity within the framework of interactive learning. We apply that to the analysis of firms’ cooperation and R&D investment preferences. The results show that cognitive distance and appropriability conditions between a firm and its cooperation partner have an ambiguous effect on the profit generated by the firm. Thus, a firm chooses to cooperate and selects a partner conditional on the investments in absorptive capacity it is willing to make to solve the understandability/novelty trade-off.     

R&D expenditures and firm growth – is small beautiful?

ABSTRACT

This paper examines how efficiently different groups of firms use their R&D expenditures. To this end, it investigates how the empirical relationship between firms' R&D expenditures and their sales growth varies with different values of firm size, firm age, and the number of firms in the respective industry. Using panel data for Switzerland ranging from 1995 to 2012, the paper finds that smaller, more mature firms show a more positive relation between R&D expenditures and sales growth than both relatively larger or younger firms. The paper argues that, on the one hand, these firms can benefit from various small size advantages in the R&D process, such as more motivated researchers, caused by a stronger connection to the firm's fate. On the other hand, these firms can also benefit from a well-established R&D department that allows absorbing the latest technological developments. The paper further finds that industries consisting of many small firms show a more positive relation between R&D expenditures and sales growth than industries consisting of only a few large firms. The intuition behind this result is that industries consisting of many small firms imply more independent innovative trials, which then together result in a higher probability of discovering successful innovations. In sum, the paper finds that groups consisting of a large number of small, more mature firms spend their R&D in the most efficient way.     

R&D subsidies in a model of growth with dynamic market structure

This paper presents the effects of an R&D subsidy in a Schumpeterian general equilibrium model with rich industry dynamics. R&D subsidies raise the long-run growth rate, but they also raise the level of industry concentration. In the model firms compete for market share through process R&D endogenously determining the market structure within and across industries. Endogeneity of the market structure allows for analysis of changes in the moments of the firm size distribution in response to policy. R&D subsidies primarily benefit large incumbent firms who increase their innovation rates creating a greater technological barrier to entry. Concentration increases with fewer firms and a higher variance in the market shares. In general equilibrium, the greater distortions in the product market cause the wage rate to fall which leads to increased turnover rates. In addition, the analysis demonstrates that the model captures a large number of empirical regularities described in the industrial organization literature, but absent from most endogenous growth models. These features, such as entering firms are small relative to incumbents, the hazard rate of exit is negatively related to firm size, and large firms spend more on R&D than small firms play important roles in understanding the impact of R&D subsidies on the economy.     

Subsidizing cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers

Comparing the effect on private R&D investments of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D with that of providing R&D subsidies reveals that in general the latter policy is more effective than the former in promoting R&D activity. Analyzing the implementation of both policies simultaneously reveals that subsidizing cooperative and noncooperative R&D leads to the same market outcome. The preferred R&D-stimulating policy is to subsidize optimally an agreement according to which firms only share the outcomes of their independent research.     

Role of human resource practices in absorptive capacity and R&D cooperation

This paper reconceptualises absorptive capacity as a strategic human resource construct and analyses its role in determining R&D cooperation and innovation in firms. In spite of widespread consensus on the role of absorptive capacity in innovation, the literature has so far concentrated only on traditional R&D and human capital based indicators of absorptive capacity. Furthermore, most firm-level studies investigating this relationship are cross-sectional in nature and there is need for longitudinal evidence. Employing the IAB Establishment Panel Survey on about 1200 private sector establishments in Germany during 2007–2011, we apply a structural model that links firms’ human resource practices, R&D collaboration strategies and finally their innovation outcome. Findings from the first stage of the empirical analysis suggest that adoption of employment practices positively affects horizontal, institutional and consulting-based R&D cooperation, while compensation programs positively affect only horizontal R&D cooperation. In the second stage, the effect of cooperative R&D conditioned upon human resource practices on innovation performance is examined. Results indicate that firms having institutional and consulting-based R&D cooperation relationships are more often associated with higher incremental product, process and new-to-market innovation, whereas the effect is relatively weaker in case of horizontal R&D cooperation.     

What are good R&D investment strategies for leaders and followers?

Research and development (R&D) investment affects the growth of firms in the same industry differently according to their technological positions. This study empirically investigates differences in how R&D investment influences firm growth between technological leaders and followers. Additionally, this study investigates the moderating effects of complementary assets and market competition on the relationship between R&D investment and firm growth. Using a sample of 2322 observations from 492 firms in the U.S. chemical and allied products industry for the period 2000–2009, we show that an increase in R&D investment leads to greater firm growth for technological followers than for technological leaders. We also find that the moderating effects of complementary assets and market competition vary depending on whether a firm is a technological leader or follower.     

Open innovation and intellectual property strategy: the catch-up processes of two Chinese pharmaceutical firms

We explore the interaction of open innovation and intellectual property (IP) in two Chinese latecomer pharmaceutical firms in their catch-up process. Studying archival data, documentation, and interviews, we found that the two firms exhibited five periods that were characterised by different open innovation activities and R&D capabilities. In their early stages, the two firms lacked R&D functions; thus, they imported technologies and pursued production-oriented strategies. As they gradually entered into collaborations and established their R&D departments, open innovation and IP protection played important and dynamic roles in this process. Thus, a catch-up process involves not only acquiring technological capabilities and innovative competencies but also transforming a firm's capacity to strategies.     

Process R&;D and Product Line Deletion by a Multiproduct Monopolist

Relative to single-product firms, a multiproduct monopolist can internalize the negative externalities of its R&D investments (the ``cannibalization effect') in two ways: (1) To lower R&D investment for each product; and (2) To delete some of its product lines so as to enlarge the market size for the remaining lines. It is shown that line deletion is profitable if products are close substitutes. If products are not close substitutes, the multiproduct monopolist keeps all product lines and invests less in cost-reducing R&D than single-product firms engaging in Cournot competition with product differentiation. However, it invests more in R&D than single-product firms if there are significant economies of scope in R&D, or if the oligopolistic firms can cooperate in their R&D decisions.      

Sharing R&D investments in cleaner technologies to mitigate climate change

This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to international cooperation on GHG emission reductions. It is assumed that when countries cooperate they coordinate their investments so as to minimize the agreement costs of controlling emissions. Further it is assumed that in such cases they also pool their R&D efforts so as to fully internalize the spillover effects of their investments in R&D. In order to analyze the scope of cooperation, an agreement formation game is solved in three stages. First, countries decide whether or not to sign the agreement. Then, in the second stage, signatories (playing together) and non-signatories (playing individually) select their investment in R&D. Finally, in the third stage, each country decides on its level of emissions non-cooperatively. For linear environmental damages and quadratic investment costs, our findings show that the maximum participation in a R&D agreement consists of six countries and that participation decreases as spillover effects increase until a minimum participation consisting of three countries is reached.     

R&D Efficiency Gains Due to Cooperation

A theoretical and widely-quoted finding is that levels of cooperative R&D exceed noncooperative R&D levels when technological spillovers are relatively large, while the opposite holds for relatively small technological spillovers. We qualify this result by showing that for relatively small technological spillovers the comparison is not driven by the extent of technological spillover, but by the increase in technological spillover due to cooperation in R&D. In particular, an agreement to cooperate in R&D always raises R&D efforts if the post-cooperative technological spillover rate is high enough.     

Technological districts localized spillovers and productivity growth. The Italian evidence on technological externalities in the core regions

Technological R&D externalities are the effects on the technological capacity of each firm stemming from the complementary and interrelated activities of R&D activities of other firms that operate both in the same industry and in other industries. R&D technological externalities are specially influential at the regional level. Regional proximity enhances the circulation of information, the opportunities for external learning; the scope for capitalizing on potential complementarities among the variety of firms and the different R&D activities being carried out by each firm, and the opportunity for technological networking. The empirical evidence on core regions in Italy in the 1980s confirms that regional clustering of complementary and interrelated R&D activities facilitated the emergence of technological districts. Firms located within technological districts benefited enormously from the R&D technological externalities spilling out from the complementary and interrelated R&D activities of other firms localized in the same area. Consequently, firms localized within technological districts had fast rates of introduction of technological innovations which, in turn, made it possible for total factor productivity levels to be raised with comparatively low levels of intra-muros R&D expenses.     

Assessing the influence of differentiation strategy and R&D subsidies on R&D cooperation

This paper explores the R&D cooperation determinants of the innovative companies belonging to the Spanish manufacturing sector. Our findings suggest that the variable R&D subsidy is endogenous, significant, and has a strong positive influence on R&D cooperation. This is a clear indication that the achievement of public aid is often conditioned by the obligation for companies to cooperate in R&D. We have also found that the differentiation strategy variable is significant and has a negative influence on R&D cooperation. Companies positioned in a differentiation strategy probably own and use some different knowledge from other companies. Consequently, they will not have much interest in taking advantage of the spillovers generated by other companies. It is therefore logical that they are reluctant to establish cooperation agreements on R&D. Therefore, companies positioned in the differentiation strategy need public policies to support R&D that are not conditioned to the establishment of cooperation agreements.     

Multinationals,R&D and Endogenous Productivity Asymmetries

We analyze the influence of endogenous productivity asymmetries between firms, in terms of competitiveness and size, on multinational activity. In the model, productivity depends on cost-reducing R&D (research and development). We show that when firms differ on commitment power in R&D, the R&D leader, independently of being a multinational or a domestic firm, tends to invest more in R&D than the R&D follower. Because of these productivity advantages, the R&D leader can more easily become multinational. Therefore, in addition to the proximity-concentration trade-off, we identify another FDI (foreign direct investment) determinant: technological competition.