Competition,Welfare and Macroeconomics: A Classical/Sraffian Perspective

The paper reflects on two phenomena seen by orthodoxy as key defining characteristics of imperfect competition: product differentiation and restricted mobility of resources. Product differentiation is first considered in terms of its significance within a Sraffian price model. This in turn allows one to consider the ‘welfare’ effects—considered here in terms of the impact on output per worker—of a degree of monopoly power, to the extent this is conferred on producers by product differentiation. Restricted mobility of resources on the other hand is considered in terms of its impact on the level and pattern of sectoral profit rates and via this on income-expenditure multipliers and hence aggregate output per unit of autonomous demand. Both parts of the analysis suggest that, at least from a Sraffian standpoint, no hard and fast conclusions can be drawn about the welfare effects of product differentiation or restricted mobility of resources; in turn casting doubts on more orthodox claims about the welfare impacts of imperfect competition.     

Salience and horizontal differentiation

I study a horizontal differentiation model in which one of two attributes of a product, product fit and price, is more salient for a consumer than the other and different consumers can find a different attribute salient. The attribute that is more salient is determined by relative differences between the two products and is determined endogenously as a result of firms' pricing strategies. High (low) marginal costs soften (toughen) price competition between firms. Pass-through rates are greater than 1 for some parameter values. Both industry- and firm-level cost increases may be beneficial for firms.     

Price Competition and Product Differentiation when Goods have Network Effects

Abstract. The objective of our approach is to develop a model that captures horizontal product differentiation under environmental awareness with price competition whereby environmentally friendly products are costlier to produce. As an example, we refer to automobile producers offering cars with a gasoline-powered engine and one with a natural gas-powered engine. The network of petrol stations provides the complementary good. We use a two-stage game in prices and characteristics to analyse the market structure. In order to find out whether a private decision on the type of engine coincides with a socially optimal product differentiation, we determine the position of the two types of engine by a welfare-maximizing authority.     

The complexion of dynamic duopoly game with horizontal differentiated products

In this paper, firms are considered on the hypothesis of having incomplete rationality expectation and incomplete information of the market to get the dynamic development of price competition behavior in the Hotelling model (Hotelling, 1929). Under the assumption of the heterogeneous expectations of two firms, we have observed that the Nash equilibrium price can be a dynamic equilibrium to realize when the speed of price adjustment is lower. However, the numerical simulation shows that the system may present a periodic and chaotic status when the speed of price adjustment is higher. The effect of the degree of horizontal differentiation on the stability of Nash equilibrium of the system is also discussed. We have a different conclusion from Lucino Fanti and Luca Gori's (2012); that is the greater the degree of product horizontal differentiation is, the more stable the Nash equilibrium of the system is.     

A difficulty with the address models of product differentiation

Summary. In models of product differentiation and location models it is implicitly assumed that consumers can afford to buy the differentiated goods in the market. I show that with income heterogeneity there are severe existence problems of a price equilibrium in models of horizontal product differentiation with unit demand because some consumers are income-constrained. The result generalizes to other models of product differentiation, search, and switching costs. I present an alternative specification of variable individual demand in which this kind of existence problem cannot arise. Received: October 17, 1997; revised version: February 20, 1998     

Markets with technological progress: pricing,quality, and novelty

New and old products differ in two respects: quality and newness. Whereas a higher quality of a new product always benefits consumers, the newness itself benefits some consumers, but not others, and for some, it is even a disadvantage. We capture these features in a Hotelling model of OverLapping Innovators (HOLI model), entailing a sequence of static Hotelling games of horizontal product differentiation (newness), that we extend by vertical product differentiation (quality). In this model, the firms compete on quality and price.     

Price dispersion in the private health insurance industry: The case of Catalonia

This paper presents a vertical and horizontal product differentiation model that explains price dispersion among different kinds of health care insurance firms. Our model shows large insurance firms engaging in price competition with small mutual organizations that serve only a local area and charge lower premiums. We found that, although the market allows the entry of an excessive number of firms, the presence of local insurance companies increases social welfare by increasing the range of products available to consumers. Our conclusions are applicable to OECD countries in general although we rely on Catalonia's data.     

Product quality,advertising intensity and market size

We develop a model of product differentiation in which firms strategically compete in product quality and advertising intensity. Products exhibit a combination of vertical and horizontal differentiation. A consumer’s utility has a stochastic relationship with quality, but they are more likely to prefer a higher quality good. Consumers face a trade-off between higher quality goods and price. Increased competition leads to less advertising, but may result in higher or lower quality products offered in the market.     

标准专利许可中可变价格的社会福利效应:基于产品差异化的视角

技术标准在产品生产过程中的使用越来越广泛,标准专利许可定价形式问题关系到技术标准所有者和产品生产者的收益,有待拓展研究。通过构建古诺竞争模型,从产品差异化角度对标准专利许可中可变价格形式的社会福利效应进行分析,得到的主要结论为:当产品市场达到均衡,且标准专利许可采用的价格形式是可变价格时,社会总福利随着产品差异化程度的提高而增加,随着差异化产品市场中标准专利使用者数量的增加而增加,随着可变价格中可变费用比率的提高而降低;均衡产量随着产品差异化程度的提高而增大,随着可变价格中可变费用比率的提高而降低;均衡价格与产品差异化程度呈现出倒“U”型关系,临界点为特定的市场规模;标准专利使用者的均衡利润随着产品差异化程度的提高而增大。由此可见,标准专利许可的可变费用比率下降有利于激励技术标准使用者生产更多的差异化产品,提升社会总福利。     

差异化产品价格战的产生与扩散机制分析

本文基于消费者的"0-1"购买特征和产品的纵向差异化特征,建立了一个新的价格战模型。通过应用数学证明和数值模拟的方法发现:(1)合谋体系、背叛体系以及价格战体系的均衡结果均与需求冲击无关;(2)差异化产品厂商的背叛动机以及产品链条的合谋稳定性也与需求冲击无关;(3)产品的差异化程度是影响合谋稳定性的重要因素,差异化程度越大,合谋越稳定;(4)合谋集团对背叛厂商的惩罚策略存在着"误伤效应",这种效应在一定条件下能够自我抑制,表现为产品链条上的价格战和合谋共存,在其他条件下,这种效应不能自我抑制,价格战一旦发动就会迅速扩散到整个产品链条。     

Can product differentiation mitigate conflicts of interest between principal stakeholders? A cournot-bertrand comparison

This paper aims to investigate the impact of product differentiation on the extent of conflict of interest between principal stakeholders (shareholders, employees, and consumers), which is one of the most important concerns of stakeholder-oriented corporate governance. We consider a differentiated duopoly competing either in price or quantity after the wages of employees are negotiated with a labor union. We find that price competition and quantity competition have drastically different implications on whether product differentiation mitigates stakeholders' conflicts. Specifically, product differentiation can mitigate stakeholders' conflicts when firms compete in price, but not when they compete in quantity. Therefore, the product differentiation effect in mitigating stakeholders' conflicts differs across markets characterized by price competition versus quantity competition.     

Foreign market entry,upstream market power,and endogenous mode of downstream competition

In a differentiated duopoly model of trade and FDI featuring both horizontal and vertical product differentiation, we examine whether globalization and trade policy measures can generate welfare gains by leading firms to change their mode of competition. We show that when a high-quality foreign variety is manufactured under large frictions due to upstream monopoly power, a foreign firm can become a Bertrand competitor against a Cournot local rival in equilibrium, especially when the relative product quality of the foreign variety is sufficiently high and trade costs are sufficiently low (implying higher input price distortions due to double marginalization). Our results suggest that such strategic asymmetry is welfare improving and that the availability of FDI as an alternative to trade can make welfare-enhancing strategic asymmetry even more likely, especially when both input trade costs and fixed investment costs are sufficiently low and trade costs in final goods are sufficiently large.     

Nesting Horizontal and Vertical Differentiation with Location Choices

This study solves a location‐then‐price game in which horizontal and vertical differentiation are combined using an asymmetric distribution of consumers’ taste. Boundary locations are robust when the taste disparity of the population is not large and out‐of‐market locations are not allowed. Firms may have incentives to move either inside or outside the market in other situations, so the equilibrium prices are never differentiated. The restrictions of vertical differentiation under this framework are further examined. A model with the entrance of a vertically differentiated product is also discussed.     

PRICE FLOORS AND QUALITY CHOICE

This paper studies effects of price floors in a simple model of vertical product differentiation. We find that even non‐binding price floor (i.e., minimum price set below the lowest Nash equilibrium price in the baseline model) can increase quality on the market, if the cost of quality is sufficiently low. Where a binding price floor does not increase the equilibrium quality, it makes consumers worse off. There is also a possibility of over‐investment into quality as a result of the binding minimum price.     

Product differentiation,price discrimination and collusion

The existing literature which analyses the relationship between the product differentiation degree and the sustainability of a collusive agreement on price assumes that firms cannot price discriminate, and concludes that there is a negative relationship between the product differentiation degree and the critical discount factor. This paper, in contrast, assumes that firms are able to price discriminate. Within the Hotelling framework, three different collusive schemes are studied: perfect collusion on discriminatory prices; perfect collusion on a uniform price; collusion not to discriminate. We obtain that the critical discount factor of the first and the third collusive scheme does not depend on the product differentiation degree, while the critical discount factor of the second collusive scheme depends positively on the product differentiation degree. Moreover, we show that imperfect collusion is more difficult to sustain than perfect collusion.     

Product customization

The advent of the Internet has revolutionized the way companies advertise, develop and distribute products. Firms can now customize their advertising messages and products to the particular characteristics and needs of customers. Customers themselves can create their own products. We investigate investments by firms in product-customization capabilities within a duopoly model of horizontal product differentiation. We find that (i) if brand name effects are not too strong, one firm emerges as a leader in product customization—firms make asymmetric investments in product-customization technologies in order to reduce price competition, (ii) if brand name effects are strong, both firms make extensive investments in product customization, and (iii) the possibility of product customization can raise industry profits if brand names are weak, but not when they are strong.     

产品差别化、价格战与合谋

随着中国市场化改革的不断深入,价格战成为各行各业企业间不断上演的舞台剧。文章旨在从产品差别化与企业间合谋的相互关系出发,来分析企业频繁选择价格竞争而难以进行合谋的原因,即产品垂直差别水平的降低将使合谋难以维持,价格战容易爆发。因此,解决价格战的途径之一是中国企业应该加大自主创新的能力,提高产品垂直差别化程度。     

The perverse effect of environmental regulation on emissions: The role of product-mix changes

We study the effect of environmental regulation (taxation) on emissions when the only available abatement method consists of product-mix changes. Firms choose to produce one or both varieties of a product—a pollution-intensive (dirty) and a non-pollution-intensive (green)—and compete in a differentiated Cournot duopoly. We characterize the equilibrium market structure as a function of the tax rate and show that increases in the tax can promote product-mix changes that lead to a jump in emissions for some tax range, an effect we call the perverse effect of taxation. Our work emphasizes the key role horizontal product differentiation in this process and shows that the perverse effect does not require the presence of vertical product differentiation. Further, the perverse effect of taxation is especially strong in the presence of incomplete regulation, that is, when only one of the markets is subject to taxation.     

Location choices and third‐degree spatial price discrimination

This paper studies how firms choose their product differentiation levels when they engage in third‐degree price discrimination in the following product market competition in a location‐price model. We show that firms will not choose to locate at the two endpoints if different consumer groups have similar sizes. Hence, the principle of maximum differentiation does not hold, resulting in a more intense product market price competition. Only if the size of one group of consumers is sufficiently larger than that of the other group, would firms make their products as differentiated as possible by choosing the two endpoints as their locations.     

Price competition in markets with customer testing: the captive customer effect

We introduce product differentiation into the analysis of price competition in markets where suppliers test customers in order to assess whether they will pay for received goods or services. We find that, if the degree of differentiation is sufficiently high, suppliers may improve the average probability that their clientele will pay by charging higher prices. This helps suppliers to sustain high prices in equilibrium. Moreover, endogenizing locations in product space, we demonstrate that the high price level can be implemented in a pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium with a high degree of differentiation. This is in contrast to the original Hotelling model with linear travel costs where a pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium fails to exist.