Which hat to wear? Impact of natural identities on coordination and cooperation

As the workforce becomes increasingly diverse, motivating individuals from different backgrounds to work together effectively is a major challenge facing organizations. In an experiment conducted at a large public university in the United States, we manipulate the salience of participants' multidimensional natural identities and investigate the effects of identity on coordination and cooperation in a series of minimum-effort and prisoner's dilemma games. By priming a fragmenting (ethnic) identity, we find that, compared to the control, participants are significantly less likely to choose high effort in the minimum-effort games, leading to less efficient coordination. In comparison, priming a common organization (school) identity significantly increases the choice of a rational joint payoff maximizing strategy in a prisoner's dilemma game.     

基于“囚徒困境”博弈的防范工程招投标合谋研究

提出一种防范工程招投标中招标代理与投标人合谋的新策略,即同时派出两个招标代理审查投标人,使两个招标代理陷入"囚徒困境"博弈中以保证其报告真实。进而针对该策略成本太高的缺点,通过使两者处于不对称信息环境下,进一步改进了该"囚徒困境"博弈。据此,只要招标人设定适当的奖励和惩罚机制,就能在一定程度上阻止招标代理与投标人合谋。     

Annual Index

The authors present a constructivist approach for teaching game theory, on the basis, in part, of Axelrod's research approach. Using the Axelrod tournament multi-user system (ATMUS) software, students create strategies for a repeated prisoner's dilemma (RPD). Later, these strategies are matched with those of their classmates' in a classroom tournament while the instructor interactively and graphically demonstrates the behavior of the strategies. A two- to three-week instructional implementation strategy is provided to highlight effective use of the ATMUS software, according to constructivist learning principles, to ensure that students are engaged in critical thinking regarding RPD.     

产品开发中企业引入消费者参与的时机决策：一个基于消费者偏好信号传递的分析

针对“企业可以在产品开发的不同阶段引入消费者参与”的实践观察,本文构建消费者与企业之间的不完全信息动态博弈模型来研究“在何种条件下,企业选择产品开发前端（后端）引入消费者参与,从而激励消费者真实传递其偏好信息”这一问题。研究表明：存在外生参数（消费者讨价还价能力和参与净效用表征）,使得前端和后端引入消费者参与均（或二者中只有一个）能够实现消费者真实传递其偏好信息的分离均衡;前端参与时,分离均衡要求企业通过新产品价格分担（攫取）消费者的负（正）参与净效用,而后端参与不需要这种分担（攫取）机制;在前端和后端参与均能实现消费者真实传递其偏好时,前者优于后者的条件是参与净效用为正。     

The absent-minded prisoner

If one of two rational players is absent-minded for at least three rounds, cooperation in a prisoners’ dilemma with a finite number of repetitions is possible. If both players are absent-minded, even two rounds of absent-mindedness can be enough for cooperation in these rounds and all rounds before. Sufficient conditions for the existence of a cooperative equilibrium are derived, a plausible interpretation of absent-mindedness in the case of many repetitions is given.     

防范国企经营者合谋：不对称信息的“囚徒困境”博弈

如何防范国企经营者和主管部门官员之间合谋侵占国有企业的生产剩余,一直是政府部门和学术界关注的焦点问题。本文根据Laffont和Martimort等在委托-代理框架下提出的分权制思想,构建了防范国企经营者合谋的\"囚徒困境\"博弈模型。但由于基于\"囚徒困境\"博弈所构建的双重审核机制可能产生过高的审查成本,且其实施受到主管官员有限责任的限制,因此通过引入不对称信息进一步改进了\"囚徒困境\"博弈,使不合谋的均衡结果能在更宽松的条件下实现。     

产品平台演化过程及影响因素分析

要研究产品平台产品族的发展演变规律,演化过程和影响演化的因素是关键。在产品平台生命周期理论的基础上,分析了产品平台两种过程演化方式,即需求拉动模式和技术推动模式,并提出了产品平台产品族的综合作用模式。根据演化的影响方式的不同,将产品平台演化因素归纳为基础因素、能动因素和约束因素,提出了产品平台演化过程与影响因素的关系整合模型。最后,通过案例作了证明。     

From Foster Mothers to Child Care Centers: A History of Working Mothers and Child Care in Sweden

The Swedish welfare state is usually considered "woman friendly." It treats mothers, including single mothers, as workers and offers them high quality public child care. Feminist typologies often use paid work as the lens through which to look at welfare states. Jane Jenson, however, proposes that we think seriously about care in typologies of welfare states. The aim of this article is to take the child care arrangements of working mothers seriously and the empirical concern is historical. While most people believe that the expansion of public child care in Sweden enabled mothers to become workers, it could also be argued- looking through the lens of care- that new public policies enabled women workers to become caregivers.     

When is the risk of cooperation worth taking? The prisoner’s dilemma as a game of multiple motives

This experimental article helps to understand the motives behind cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma. It manipulates the pay-off in case both players defect in a two-player, one-shot prisoner’s dilemma and explains the degree of cooperation by a combination of four motives: efficiency, conditional cooperation, fear and greed. All motives are significant but some become only significant if one controls for all remaining ones. This seems to be the reason why earlier attempts at explaining choices in the prisoner’s dilemma with personality have not been successful.     

Experimental study of repeated team-games

We report an experiment in which the Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game was contrasted with a structurally identical (single-group) Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). The games were played repeatedly for 40 rounds. We found that subjects were initially more likely to cooperate in the IPD game than in the PD game. However, cooperation rates decreased as the game progressed and, as a result, the differences between the two games disappeared. This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that subjects learn the structure of the game and adapt their behavior accordingly. Computer simulations based on a simple learning model by Roth and Erev (Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term, Games and Economic Behavior 8, 164–212, 1995) support this interpretation.     

利益相关者视角下校园公共产品困境研究──以某高校“小黄车”为例

公共产品的非排他和非竞争性使得其自身具有成为“公地悲剧”的较大可能性。校园公共产品具有公共品的特性,具有多方的利益主体,但相互间利益的不对等容易引发校园公共产品的提供与使用的混乱。从“某高校‘小黄车’损坏严重”的困境出发,以其涉及的相关利益者为视角,分析校园公共产品供求机制运行中存在的问题,构建多方利益主体间的博弈模型,探讨学校与学生之间管理与使用中出现“囚徒困境”的原因以及解决方法,从而试图为校园公共产品的有效管理提供对策。     

Measuring Motivations for the Reciprocal Responses Observed in a Simple Dilemma Game

A reciprocal action is an action meant to have a similar influence on another's payoff as another's action has on one's own. One hypothesis asserts that reciprocal action is triggered by the reciprocator's belief that another's action was good or ill intended. The other hypothesis says that the reciprocator is simply acting to implement fixed preferences over payoff allocations. We report on an experiment that allows us to study both positive (reward) and negative (punishment) reciprocal action in a single framework. Knowing the preferences for payoff allocations is sufficient to account for nearly all the reciprocal action we observe in our experiment.     

战略联盟不稳定性理论研究综述

20世纪90年代以来组织间关系发生了深刻变化，诸如价值链、供应链、知识链、集群等在内的涉及企业问长期协作关系的联盟组织模式已成为很多公司变革的战略选择。然而，理论研究和实证调查都已经注意到并开始揭示联盟中的合作风险和不稳定性情况，资料显示有一半以上是失败的。那么，是什么因素决定着联盟的不稳定性呢？如何才能维持联盟的成功和可持续发展呢？本文围绕资源基础理论、交易费用理论、博弈理论和社会困境理论四个方面对有关涉及联盟不稳定性的研究现状进行总结性说明，以期建立起一般性的分析框架，推进对企业联盟风险、联盟不稳定性的系统性研究。