Knowledge disclosure as intellectual property rights protection

We consider the problem of an inventor who discloses knowledge under the threat of a rival who may patent a competing idea. Disclosure diminishes the probability that the rival has of receiving a patent (legal externality) but it also decreases the rival’s marginal R&D cost (knowledge externality). Our results reveal that: (i) when the knowledge externality is ‘large’ (‘small’) relative to the legal one, an increase (decrease) in the patentability standard leads to higher disclosure and promotes R&D and (ii) if subsequent research creates positive external effects, the patentability standard should be set to promote further disclosure and R&D in equilibrium. The impact on the equilibrium configuration of changes in market profits is also examined.     

Do innovative firms rely on big secrets? An analysis of IP protection strategies with the CIS 4 survey

Innovative companies have a variety of instruments at their disposal to protect themselves from imitators, and this paper investigates the determinants of the protection choices with a focus on highly innovative respondents. While the patent system's aim is that firms apply to patent their innovations, especially the most important ones, theoretical results in the existing literature suggest that large innovations will rather be protected by secrecy because of the legal uncertainty surrounding intellectual property rights. In line with the predictions of their model, our probit analysis conducted using data from the Community Innovation Survey 4 shows that, in the intermediate goods industry, small innovations are patented while secrecy is used to protect large ones. For very innovative small firms, the share of innovative sales in total sales has a negative effect on patent application. These findings support the view that many innovative firms regard patent filing as no more secure than secrecy, which therefore limits the diffusion of knowledge.     

Using patents to mislead rivals

Abstract.  Firms claim they do not rely heavily on patents. Yet they patent, as indicated by the large number of patents that are granted. This paper offers a possible resolution to this puzzle. It takes a simplified version of a duopoly innovation race and studies the patenting decision of an innovator who has private information about the improvability of her innovation. It is shown that a firm may use the patenting decision to mislead her rival. Under symmetric information, research can be stimulated but not disclosed. However, under asymmetric information, disclosure is more likely, even though research incentive may be weakened. JEL Classification: 031, L1     

MISINFORMATION*

A candidate for political office has private information about his and his rival’s qualifications. A more informative positive (negative) campaign generates a more accurate public signal about his own (his rival’s) qualifications, but costs more. A high type candidate has a comparative advantage in negative campaigns if, relative to the low type, he can lower the voter’s belief about his rival more effectively than he can raise her belief about himself and vice versa. In equilibrium, this comparative advantage determines whether the high type chooses a positive or negative campaign. Further, competition helps the high type separate.     

机密还是专利?

在传统社会中,为保护创新成果,人们通常只能将其保留为技术机密或他人无法共享的私有知识,这不但降低了创新效率,也会增加技术的失传风险。有识于此,本文将专利看做政府向创新者提供的一种机密交换契约,并借此论证了引入"事后"专利保护的合理性:人们为了要获得排他性的专利保护,就必须将其私有知识公开披露,而这消除了技术失传风险。但只有当专利利润高于商业机密利润时人们才会申请专利,故专利保护会导致更大的垄断扭曲。社会最优专利期限就是在机密失传风险和垄断定价扭曲之间权衡的结果,只要存在技术失传风险,事后最优专利期限就必须是正的。     

Determinants of patent value: Insights from a simulation analysis

This paper contributes to understanding the determinants of patent value. By drawing on a real options approach, we develop a theoretical model of patent value, which explicitly considers the uncertainty about future value. On this basis, we rely on Monte Carlo simulations with data from a case study in a large chemical firm to estimate patent value according to our model. In the simulation analyses, we compare an R&D project with patent protection and the same project without patent protection. The difference of the values of the two projects is the surplus in profit that may be expected from having a patent covering the project. This surplus is regarded as the value that is directly attributable to the patent. The results of the simulation analyses indicate that the development costs and expected net cash flows of a patent-protected project are higher than of an unpatented project. The higher net cash flows outgrow the increased development costs, and patent value is positive. However, this value is smaller than the overall project value of the patent-protected R&D project.     

论默示许可原则对标准必要专利的规制

我国《专利法》第四次修改明确了标准必要专利权人违反披露义务的默示许可责任,由此引发了理论和实务专家的热议。透析其正当性发现,适用默示许可原则规制标准必要专利,不仅能通过与相关标准专利政策的有效衔接规制标准必要专利“劫持”,还有助于实现专利权人与标准实施者之间的利益平衡,保障标准的顺畅运行。标准必要专利默示许可规则的顺利实施,需要在厘清默示许可与披露义务、FRAND承诺以及禁令救济关系的基础上,完善相关法律规制体系。因此,建议在完善《专利法》修订草案第85条的同时,明确标准必要专利权人违反FRAND承诺及相关许可义务的默示许可责任,并进一步明确标准必要专利默示许可规制下禁令救济的适用条件。     

Development Theory and the Cold War: The Influence of Politics on Latin American Structuralism

This paper analyzes the origins of economic development theory by focusing on the work of Raúl Prebisch. When Prebisch put forward his theoretical framework, he was faced with the challenges of creating a foundation for development policies in the context of the Cold War. Moreover, Prebisch was immersed in a determined mentalité; he was part of a social network and institutional setting that transformed his ideas into an influential theory. The objective is to highlight that economic theories do not rely on natural laws, and rather result from a historical and social context and that economists are not passive, isolated theoreticians; they are socialized and directly impact the issues on which they theorize. To strengthen the argument, archival research on the Prebisch Papers at the UN Archives as well as interviews from the UN Oral History Project are included.     

Innovation and imitation under imperfect patent protection

The paper develops a model in which the spillover of R&D is a consequence of a rational investment in imitation. The model incorporates the innovator's choice between patenting and secrecy as a protection device. The analysis demonstrates that an increase in patent breadth always discourages resorting to secrecy, whereas the influence of increased patent life is the opposite with large spillovers. An increase in patent life can also reduce innovative activity with large spillovers. Under endogenous imitation, short patents are socially optimal.     

Exclusion via Non‐Exclusive Contracts

We establish that non‐linear vertical contracts can allow an incumbent to exclude an upstream rival in a setting that does not rely on the exclusivity of the incumbent's contracts with downstream firms or any limits on distribution channels available to the incumbent or rival. The optimal contract we describe is a three‐part quantity discounting contract that involves the payment of an allowance to a downstream distributor and a marginal wholesale price below the incumbent's marginal cost for sufficiently large quantities. The optimal contract is robust to allowing parties to renegotiate contracts in case of entry.     

Enhancing Vertical Efficiency Through Horizontal Licensing

This paper examines the role of patent licensing in the age of outsourcing. When firms rely on outsourced inputs, a patent holder’s decision to license has both competitive and supplier pricing effects. By issuing a license, the firm increases competition in the product market. At the same time, the need to make royalty payments “weakens” the firm’s rival, making it more sensitive to supplier pricing. The supplier responds by softening pricing terms, and the firm benefits by siphoning some of these gains via the license fee. Not only can the licensor gain, but all other parties (the licensee, supplier, and consumers) can also benefit. This role of licensing presents additional considerations for regulators shaping patent laws. We thank Michael Crew, John Fellingham, Sharon Oster, David Sappington, Doug Schroeder, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. Anil Arya acknowledges support from the John J. Gerlach Chair.     

专利保护宽度和累积创新竞赛中的信息披露

该文将专利保护宽度定义为累积创新厂商之间的许可比率,考察其对累积创新竞赛中厂商信息披露决策的影响.我们发现:强的专利保护宽度有利于信息披露,但其对社会福利和技术进步率的影响却呈近似的倒U型,故在不同的情况下都存在一个专利保护宽度的最优取值区间.与事后许可相比,事前许可能在反托拉斯法的框架下导致社会福利的帕累托改进.如果双方对专利诉讼的结果具有相同的预期,则专利保护宽度的确定和实施就是无成本的.     

Patent disclosure requirements and benefit sharing: A counterfactual case of Morocco's argan oil

This article uses the seemingly promising case of Morocco's argan oil to assess the value of patent disclosure requirements (PDRs) as a policy instrument aimed at improving the sharing of biodiversity benefits. After introducing the disclosure requirements debate and discussing relevant features of the argan oil case, I construct a simple counterfactual by asking: “How would PDRs have changed benefit sharing in the argan oil case?” From this case, three practical considerations emerge that shed a realistic, if cautious, light on the marginal value of PDRs as a benefit sharing mechanism: (1) PDRs require an accompanying national biodiversity regime but their relative value is inversely proportional to regime strength (2) PDRs should be assessed based on the additional compliance incentives they provide and median, not blockbuster, patent values and (3) the alternative to no PDRs and no regime is not zero benefits. While these considerations are inherently country-specific, PDRs should generally be assessed at the margin rather than in vague conceptual and aggregate ways.     

遗传资源专利保护问题研究

中国利用专利制度保护遗传资源的立法设计有一定的进步性,也存在着缺陷。国外遗传资源立法的经验和教训值得我们吸收借鉴。在专利法律制度的框架下,构建遗传资源的保护制度,应当从扩大授予专利权客体范围、严格＂现有技术＂的认定、健全惠益分享机制、将来源披露作为专利授权的独立形式要件等方面展开,以最终达到保护中国遗传资源并合理利用的目标。     

Embracing invention similarity for the measurement of vertically overlapping claims

ABSTRACT

Clear and well-defined patent rights can incentivize innovation by granting monopoly rights to the inventor for a limited period of time in exchange for public disclosure of the invention. However, with cumulative innovation, when a product draws from intellectual property held across multiple firms (including fragmented intellectual property or patent thickets), contracting failures may lead to suboptimal economic outcomes. However, an alternative theory, developed by a variety of scholars, contends that patent thickets have a more ambiguous effect. Researchers have developed several measures to gauge the extent and impact of cumulative innovation and the various channels of patent thickets. This paper contends that mis-measurement may contribute to the incoherence and overall lack of consensus within the patent thickets literature. Specifically, the literature is missing a precise measure of vertically overlapping claims. We propose a new measure of vertically overlapping claims that incorporates invention similarity to more precisely identify inventive overlap. The measure defined in this paper will enable more accurate measurement, and allow for novel economic research on cumulative innovation, fragmentation in intellectual property, and patent thickets within and across all patent jurisdictions.     

Do firms with larger patent portfolios create more new plant varieties in the US agricultural biotechnology industry?

This article is an empirical analysis of the relationship between patent ownership and variety innovation for US agricultural biotechnology firms in the years 1976–1999. Counts of new varieties include corn, soybean, or wheat varieties protected by either patents or plant variety protection certificates, while patent portfolio size is defined as the count of a firm's gene and method patents. Negative binomial regression results indicate that firms with larger patent portfolios did not exhibit scale economies in variety creation nor did firms with wider technological diversity in their patent portfolios create significantly greater numbers of new varieties. However, firms experienced positive spillover effects from rival firms’ patent ownership, and patent ownership increases this effect. Sample firms that have merged in the past do not produce significantly greater numbers of new varieties after considering an increase in portfolio size and did not experience greater economies of scale in creating new varieties compared with firms that experienced no past mergers.     

知识披露策略:专利竞赛中的厂商策略性行为

专利竞赛是产业组织理论的重要内容。在专利竞赛中,披露研发知识是落后厂商常用的策略性行为,其目的通常是延长竞赛时间,为其追赶领先厂商提供机会。落后厂商的知识披露策略能够降低领先厂商在专利竞赛中获胜的概率,并迫使领先厂商与落后厂商进行合作研发。我国企业的研发力量尽管在某些技术领域比国外大型企业弱,但可采取知识披露策略,迫使国外厂商与我国企业进行合作创新。     

Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions

We analyze the value of being better informed than one's rival in a two bidder, second price common value auction. Standard models of these auctions do not pin down relative bidding postures, but we show that by adding small amounts of private value information, a unique equilibrium can be restored. Additional common value information affects a bidder's payoff both directly, by increasing his information rent, and indirectly, by shifting the relative bidding posture of his opponent. Although the latter effect need not be positive, we establish broad conditions under which bidders with more information do better than their rivals. We turn to information acquisition and release and show that the desire to influence relative bidding postures can lead sellers to create new information rents (by releasing information privately to only one bidder) and bidders to forego information rents (instead choosing to gather information that a rival already has).     

Entry and espionage with noisy signals

We analyze the effect of industrial espionage on entry deterrence. We consider a monopoly incumbent who may expand capacity to deter entry, and a potential entrant who owns an Intelligence System. The Intelligence System (IS) generates a noisy signal based on the incumbentʼs actions. The potential entrant uses this signal to decide whether or not to enter the market. The incumbent may signal-jam to manipulate the likelihood of the noisy signals and hence affect the entrantʼs decisions. If the precision of the IS is commonly known, the incumbent benefits from his rivalʼs espionage. Actually, he benefits more the higher is the precision of the IS while the spying entrant is worse off with an IS of relatively high quality. When the IS quality is private information of the entrant, the incumbent is better off with an IS of high expected precision while the entrant benefits from one of high quality. In this case espionage makes the market more competitive.     

Hayek and the Great Depression of 1929: Did he really change his mind?

The aim of this research is to establish whether, and if so in what way, Hayek changed his mind about the Great Depression of 1929.The work is divided into two parts. In the first part, I present the ‘early’ Hayek of the 1930s. Hayek was the great rival of Keynes. Both explained the Great Depression, applying opposing business cycle theories. For Keynes, the crisis was caused by an excess of saving over investment; for Hayek, on the contrary, by an excess of investment over saving. In the early 1930s, Röpke attempted a synthesis, positing that a recession due to overinvestment can degenerate, as in 1929, into a depression caused by oversaving. Hayek examined and rejected Röpke's theory. In the second part, I present the ‘later’ Hayek of the 1970s. After years of silence and solitude, Hayek was unexpectedly awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, precisely for the contribution he made in the 1930s to the theory of the business cycle. Hayek returned to his pursuit of the ghost of Keynes, debated with his friend and rival Friedman, re-examined Röpke's special case and, according to Haberler, changed his mind. In my conclusion, I attempt to resolve the dilemma.