Cooperative R&D and Commitment to A Policy of Know-how Trading

In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework to investigate the impact of adopting a strategy of know-how trading on the degree of research and development (R&D) cooperation. We show that the consequences of cooperation in know-how sharing under the conditions of the model are similar to a policy of cooperation in R&D investments in areas with large spillovers. An industry-wide policy of cooperation among competitors with respect to R&D investment and sharing would simply result in maximal joint profits. This cooperative R&D outcome could be generalized to any degree of spillover other than 100%. In this paper, the commitment to a policy of know-how trading by the participants in an industry is explained by the firm’s attempt to induce the equilibrium of a single industry-wide cooperative research joint venture. In a repeated game framework, we show that pre-commitments by non-cooperative firms to disclose their own know-how to the industry can be effective in inducing cooperative R&D investments by the participants.     

COOPERATION, COOPTATION, AND REBELLION UNDER DICTATORSHIPS

Dictatorships are not all the same: some are purely autocratic but many exhibit a full panoply of seemingly democratic institutions. To explain these differences, we develop a model in which dictators may need cooperation to generate rents and may face a threat of rebellion. Dictators have two instruments: they can make policy concessions or share rents. We conclude that when they need more cooperation dictators make more extensive policy concessions and share fewer rents. In turn, when the threat of rebellion is greater, they make larger concessions but also distribute more spoils. Assuming that policy concessions require an institutional setting of legislatures and parties, we test this prediction statistically for all dictatorships that existed between 1946 and 1996.     

澳门与珠江三角洲的经济合作关系

我国改革开放后澳门与珠江三角洲形成了密切的经济合作关系,但合作的层次有待提高。高层次合作的前景和方向在于：基础设施的配合与协调;加强技术合作,促进两地工业结构的调整与升级;加强第三产业特别是旅游业、金融业、咨询和信息业的合作;加强澳门与香港及珠江三角洲主要城市的经济合作,从而增强珠江三角洲和澳门经济发展的后劲,促进经济可持续发展。     

Cooperative R&D and strategic trade policy

Abstract.  In this paper three different cooperative R&D arrangements in a strategic trade policy model are examined. A policy game between two governments is analysed, where each government chooses a particular cooperative R&D policy in order to maximize national welfare. Allowing cooperation in R&D is also compared with the use of R&D subsidies. It is jointly optimal for both governments to allow their firms to participate in the same type of cooperative R&D, and allowing cooperation in R&D can be superior to the use of R&D subsidies. JEL Classification: F13, L24     

A New Kind of Arctic Power? Russia's Policy Discourses and Diplomatic Practices in the Circumpolar North

The aim of this article is to examine what the geopolitics of the Arctic look like as seen from the largest Arctic state. How are narratives about the development of the region received, reworked and produced in a Russian context? We find that Russian policy actors distance themselves from discourses of Arctic conflict and geopolitical competition, and examine how this approach may serve some of Russia's key interests in the region. We further argue that the key tension in the Arctic region is not along the conflict/cooperation axis, but rather lies in the tricky process of delineating between international cooperation and national sovereignty in tackling Arctic problems. In attempting to illustrate the various voices, ideas and interests that shape Russia's policy understanding of the Arctic and its challenges and opportunities, we draw upon a media analysis and a set of qualitative interviews with representatives of the five Arctic states.     

四荒资源可持续开发利用的难点与对策

四荒资源的可持续开发利用需要克服目标协同与使用权市场发育两大难点，为此优惠政府应实现由启动开发转向目标协同，市场建设应实现由一级市场转向二级市场，开发规则应实现由政策指导转向法律规范。     

Monetary policy games and international migration of labor in interdependent economies

"In this paper we incorporate the possibility of international migration into a monetary policy game played by governments in unionized interdependent economies. We show that contrary to usual presumptions, established by earlier studies that ignore the possibility of international migration, inter-government cooperation in the monetary field may well turn out to be advantageous. This has important implications for the European economies, since it suggests that measures taken towards encouraging international migration within EU [the European Union] will not only harmonize the European labor markets but will also make monetary policy cooperation within Europe, as required by the Maastrict Treaty, more advantageous."     

扶持农民专业合作社发展的财税政策研究

农民专业合作社是稳定和完善农村基本经营制度、进一步推进农村改革发展的重要举措,而当前财税政策扶持农民专业合作社发展却处于缺失状态.应制定专门的财税政策,推动配套改革,改善外部环境,以扶持农业专业合作社的建立和发展.     

Macroeconomic Linkages and Regional Monetary Cooperation: Steps Ahead*

There is a growing appetite for economic cooperation in East Asia. Although the region has forums to facilitate this, economic cooperation has focussed largely on discussion of issues and policies ? cooperative action is confined to functional cooperation in finance. There is scope for further cooperation in strengthening markets and institutions, with a view to accelerating convergence and stability in the region and deepening shared preferences about policy objectives, including on monetary and exchange rate issues. Although monetary policy in East Asia is generally focussed on controlling inflation, differences remain in economic structure and preferences about policy trade‐offs, markets, and institutions.     

Market collusion and the politics of protection

This paper investigates the relationship between trade and competition policy within a model where market collusion and protectionist lobbying are themselves related. Collusion and lobbying are modeled as joint products of the same collective effort of firms. In equilibrium, firms cannot achieve greater cooperation in one dimension without reducing it in the other. A trade agreement that limits the effectiveness of lobbying may cause firms to increase market collusion, thereby increasing the domestic price. Thus, international trade agreements may run counter to the goals of competition policy. On the other side, a more restrictive competition policy is shown to either reduce the domestic price or reduce import protection. Thus, competition policy tends to promote trade policy goals. The reason is that restrictive competition policy undermines collusion at the source—it decreases the per-firm benefit to collusion relative to the gains from deviating—reducing firm cooperation in both dimensions.     

Monetary Policy Cooperation May Not Be Counterproductive

This paper qualifies Rogoff's famous (1985) result that international monetary policy cooperation is counterproductive. In a model similar to his, it is shown that if wage-setters are non-atomistic and inflation averse — as policymakers are — cooperation leads to higher employment and possibly lower inflation.     

太阳能技术的合作专利分析及对策

低碳经济已经成为国际经济发展的新要求,因此,低碳技术开发日益受到世界各国的重视。太阳能技术是一种典型的低碳技术,我国经过10几年的发展,在太阳能领域取得了举世瞩目的成就,但因缺乏核心技术,目前面临着严峻的挑战。由于专利分析能客观地评价技术创新与合作水平,因此,为更好地促进我国太阳能技术的发展,基于专利分析法,对我国太阳能合作专利数据进行了分析。结果表明:我国太阳能技术的跨机构技术联系较少,"产学研"创新体系尚不成熟;政策扶持对于太阳能这种新兴低碳技术有较大的影响力;国内太阳能专利授权的技术领域主要集中在太阳能热利用,而在光伏领域的合作较少;太阳能合作专利存在较大的区域差异,应该进一步加强区域之间的技术合作和技术转移:应该加强国际技术合作。     

Taxing multinationals: The scope for enforcement cooperation

Policymakers seeking to raise more tax revenues from multinational enterprises have two alternatives: to raise tax rates or to devote more resources to improve tax compliance. Tougher tax enforcement increases the cost of profit shifting, and thus mitigates tax competition. We present a tax-competition model with two policy instruments (the corporate tax rate and the tightness of tax enforcement). In line with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project, we analyze the scope for enforcement cooperation among asymmetric countries, considering that taxes are set noncooperatively. We show that the low-tax country may fail to cooperate if asymmetry is large enough and that tax havens would never agree to cooperate. Then we identify two drivers for enforcement cooperation. The first driver of cooperation is the complementarity of enforcement actions across countries. This is because the efficiency loss from enforcement dispersion is greater under complementarity. The second driver of cooperation is tax leadership by the high-tax country, which acts as a level-playing field in the tax competition and reduces the extent of disagreement on enforcement.     

产业技术创新战略联盟稳定性影响机制研究 ——一个合作机制视角的多案例探索性分析

以3个产业技术创新战略联盟案例为样本,运用扎根理论的三阶段编码方法,从联盟合作机制视角,构建产业技术创新战略联盟稳定性影响机制模型,对联盟稳定性进行多案例探索性研究,得出以下命题：运行机制、控制机制、激励机制和整合机制共同构成产业技术创新战略联盟的长效合作机制,该四维机制作为联盟运行的机制保障,有助于提升产业技术创新战略联盟稳定性;政府政策能强化联盟合作机制对联盟稳定性的促进作用。结论可为战略联盟长效合作机制构建以及政府政策制定提供理论依据和参考。     

In-house R&D,external R&D and cooperation breadth in Spanish manufacturing firms: is there a synergistic effect on innovation outputs?

ABSTRACT

This study explores the nature of relationship between in-house R&D, external R&D and cooperation breadth and their joint impact on patent counts as well as technological, product and process, innovations in Spanish manufacturing firms. With regards to patent counts, empirical findings from a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator suggest a complementarity effect of internal and external R&D activities conditional on the breadth of R&D cooperation. Concerning technological innovation, results from dynamic random-effects probit models indicate no synergistic effects. In addition, we find evidence of persistence of all three innovation output measures. Our results suggest policy implications in relation to strengthening firms’ absorptive capacity that could have long-run effects.     

中国产学研合作发展现状及对策研究

产学研合作是国家创新体系的重要组成部分,对于促进科技成果转化,推动产业转型升级意义重大。通过对世界主要发达国家产学研合作政策的梳理,总结中国产学研合作发展现状及主要问题,提出将“产学研合作”政策提升为国策、设立国家产学研协作创新委员会、制定国家《产学研合作促进法》,提高中国产学研合作国际化水平等对策建议。     

A simulation study of an ASEAN monetary union

This paper analyzes some pros and cons of a monetary union for the ASEAN¹ countries, excluding Myanmar. We estimate a stylized open-economy dynamic general equilibrium model for the ASEAN countries. Using the framework of linear quadratic differential games, we contrast the potential gains or losses for these countries due to economic shocks, in case they maintain their status-quo, they coordinate their monetary and/or fiscal policies, or form a monetary union. Assuming for all players open-loop information, we conclude that there are substantial gains from cooperation of monetary authorities. We also find that whether a monetary union improves upon monetary cooperation depends on the type of shocks and the extent of fiscal policy cooperation. Results are based both on a theoretical study of the structure of the estimated model and a simulation study.     

Free software on the market-side: the failure-story of free software services companies in France

ABSTRACT

This article investigates two research funding policies in a cooperative and a non-cooperative R&;D setting: subsidising private research (Spr) and subsidising public research (Spu). We show that R&;D cooperation with subsidies (either Spr or Spu) always performs better than R&;D cooperation with no subsidy. Furthermore, the Spr policy leads to better performance than the Spu approach does in terms of overall net surplus whether the firms cooperate or not in R&;D. Nevertheless, comparing the two research funding policies for the same level of public spending shows that the Spu policy with R&;D cooperation is in some cases more effective than the Spr policy, the latter becoming too costly for the government when spillovers are high.     

Cooperative R&D and Strategic Trade Policy with Bertrand Competition

This paper uses a strategic trade policy model to analyze the welfare effects from allowing cooperation in R&D when firms compete in a price‐setting game in the product market. A policy game between two governments is analyzed, where each government chooses a particular cooperative R&D policy in order to maximize national welfare. At the Nash equilibrium to this game only one government allows cooperation in R&D. This equilibrium is both individually and jointly optimal. International cooperation in R&D is superior to no cooperation in R&D but is inferior to the Nash equilibrium of the government policy game.     

Cooperation In R&D With Spillovers And Delegation Of Sales ∗

Cooperation in several phases of the innovation process is viewed by antitrust authorities with suspicion. They face the dilemma between providing the right incentives for the appro-priability of returns to R&D and the risks of diminishing product market competition. The current legislation in the European Union and the United States gives special treatment to cooperation in R&D and the joint exploitation of results (extended cooperation).

We study several collusive regimes for a class of examples in which vertical relations are explicitly introduced. Regarding antitrust policy implications we fmd that: a) there is an ana-lytical justification to a ‘rule of reason’ treatment for extended cooperation in research joint ventures and, b) individual exemptions, though restrictive of competition, might be welfare improving.