知识产权、技术标准与平台生态系统竞争力研究

现代企业之间的竞争逐渐演化成商业生态系统之间的竞争,而平台生态系统是应用最为普遍的一种商业生态系统。平台生态系统竞争的本质在于创新,以创新为基础的知识产权和技术标准成为决定平台竞争力的关键要素。在界定知识产权和技术标准内涵的基础上,从设计方法视角阐述平台生态系统竞争力形成过程,揭示知识产权和技术标准对于平台生态系统竞争的影响,分析两者对平台生态系统的作用机理。研究表明,知识产权和技术标准是形成平台竞争力的源泉,影响平台网络外部性,其中知识产权是建立技术标准的基础,技术标准是推动知识产权创造的动力,二者之间的互动和演进构成平台生态系统外部竞争力。     

考虑港口收费管制的进出口贸易竞争研究

考虑港口的收费管制因素,建立了进出口贸易竞争模型。该模型由一个出口国和两个进口国组成,且各国都拥有一个港口,位于出口国的两家公司均向两个进口国销售商品,并在各个进口国展开市场竞争（古诺竞争或伯川德竞争）,各贸易国的港口根据其是否存在价格管制确定港口收费。针对进出口公司的每种竞争模式,得到了不同的港口收费管制组合下各贸易国的港口收费、港口利润和社会福利,并将竞争均衡结果进行了比较。研究发现： （1）在进出口公司古诺竞争模式下,若三个贸易国的港口都无收费管制（有收费管制）且进出口产品的差异较大 （小）时,各贸易国的社会福利和港口利润均更高; （2）在进出口公司伯川德竞争模式下,若进出口产品的差异较大 （小）,则出口国的港口利润主要取决于港口收费 （贸易量）,而进口国恰好相反; （3）当进出口产品的差异较大 （小）时,进出口公司在古诺 （伯川德）竞争模式下各贸易国的社会福利、港口利润以及港口使用费都更高。     

同质化竞争下集群企业旧标准锁定与新标准采纳研究

从企业标准到产业集群标准是实现技术标准推广和扩散的关键一步,集群企业间同质化竞争对集群企业的新技术标准采纳有何影响十分值得研究。在考虑旧技术标准网络外部性、新技术标准优越性、新标准许可费、集群企业兼容策略的基础上,分析了产业集群内同质化竞争对企业采纳新技术标准意愿的影响。通过数理模型和实证分析发现：在不同情景下,集群企业间的同质化竞争对新技术标准采纳存在截然相反的影响,但总体来说集群企业间的同质化竞争降低了新技术标准采纳意愿;除此之外,集群企业间竞争还作为调节变量,调节了旧技术标准网络外部性、新技术标准优越性、新技术标准许可费与新技术标准采纳意愿之间的关系。     

各国政府支持电动汽车发展的最新举措和动向

在能源安全和气候变化问题日益严峻的今天,很多国家的政府均把电动汽车作为优先发展的重点,采取各种举措支持其发展。其采取的最新举措包括:出台国家战略,设立电动汽车发展目标;加强对电动汽车研发的财政支持,以实现关键技术的突破;制定电动汽车标准,抢占未来竞争的制高点;通过基础设施建设、补贴以及税收减免来推广和普及电动汽车。     

产业集群环境下企业技术标准扩散模式及路径研究

技术标准是当今世界各国企业竞争的焦点,是企业赢得市场主动权的关键。从区域产业集群角度出发,采用比较分析法和案例分析法,对产业集群企业技术标准扩散模式及扩散路径进行研究。提出产业集群环境下企业技术标准扩散的两大主要模式及4种扩散路径,从政府主导、市场自发两方面对产业集群技术标准扩散模式进行了探讨,并提出企业在不同条件下的模式选择,在此基础上进一步阐述了产业集群技术标准扩散4个主要路径以及企业的路径选择问题。研究结论对于区域产业集群企业技术标准扩散的理论及实践具有重要指导和借鉴意义。     

专利联盟与技术标准的一体化分析——基于公共产品提供的视角

从公共产品的私人提供角度阐述了高技术产业中出现专利联盟与技术标准的一体化现象.在高技术产业中政府或公共组织没有能力无偿提供技术标准,而只能借助私人来提供.而专利联盟是私人提供作为公共产品的技术标准的一种有效的方式,技术的复杂化、市场的全球化、以及技术标准的竞争性也促使专利联盟的方式被更多地采用.专利联盟与技术标准的一体化,给高技术产业的发展带来深刻的影响,它表现为专利联盟的常态化、产业竞争的阵营化、产业分工的层级化、以及层级和技术路径的锁定.在发展高技术产业时应格外注重技术标准的建立及标准间的竞争,鼓励国内企业和科研机构积极利用专利联盟争取竞争优势,同时应认清产业的发展阶段、竞争格局及自身的状况,避免盲目地追求不可能的层级跨越或技术路径的突破.     

Environmental regulation and love for variety

Using a model of monopolistic competition, we examine the relationship between intra‐industry trade and environmental regulation. The decisions on emission standards set by each country show strong strategic interactions. In closed economies regulations act as strategic substitutes, and in equilibrium there is under‐regulation relative to the cooperative outcome. Trade liberalization may lead to stricter or laxer environmental standards, depending on the consumers’ preference for product variety. In addition, we show that with open trade environmental regulations may act as strategic complements and countries may set environmental standards that are as strict (or stricter) than those in the cooperative outcome.     

劳工标准与我国国际竞争力

劳工标准已经成为我国不可回避的问题,我们迫切需要弄清楚劳工标准与中国国家竞争力的关系。本文首先对劳工标准的内涵进行了探讨,界定劳工标准为国际劳工组织中核心劳工标准和劳动力价格或成本;在对国家竞争力的内涵进行探讨后,界定国家竞争力为竞争结果和影响因素两方面;然后对我国劳工标准与国家竞争力的关系进行了实证研究,并在此基础上提出了提高我国国际竞争力的对策。     

Competition with Congestible Networks

We analyse competition between two network providers when the quality of each network depends negatively on the number of customers connected to that network. With respect to price competition we provide a sufficient condition for the existence of a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Comparative statics show that as the congestion effect gets stronger quantities will decrease and prices increase, under both Bertrand and Cournot competition. In an example with endogenous capacities it turns out that equilibrium capacities are at first increasing and then decreasing in the strength of congestion. Furthermore, capacities are higher under Cournot competition. Welfare comparisons between Bertrand and Cournot competition are unambiguous for fixed capacities, but may turn around for endogenous capacities.     

技术标准的产业技术政策工具分析

技术标准在产业发展中的作用日益突出,成为产业技术发展的创新平台、技术锁定和控制市场的工具以及实施贸易保护的重要手段。作为产业技术政策工具,技术标准的优点在于可灵活掌握对产业(产品)的干预方式、精确作用于特定产品以及在研发和市场准入方面具有较好的操作性。建议以自主创新为基础、标准联盟为依托、高新技术为重点、统筹协调为保障,充分发挥技术标准在我国产业技术政策中的作用。     

技术标准形成机理实证研究

技术标准的作用已远远超越技术问题本身,已经成为决定竞争规则的关键性因素。针对技术标准的形成机理展开研究,旨在为提高我国的技术标准整体水平,进而为提升我国的自主创新能力提供理论参考和借鉴。技术标准的形成以技术为基础,以经济为动力,同时受到规制主体的影响,技术标准正是在这三方面因素的综合作用下建立、发展和替代的。在此基础上,以TD-SCDMA标准的形成为例,实证研究了技术—经济—规制路径对该标准建立的影响。     

The Economics Of Compatibility Standards: An Introduction To Recent Research 1

This paper surveys the contributions that economists have made to understanding standards-setting processes and their consequences for industry structure and economic welfare. Standardization processes of four kinds are examined, namely: (1) market competition involving products embodying unsponsored standards, (2) market competition among sponsored (proprietary) standards, (3) agreements within voluntary standards-writing organizations, a18d (4) direct governmental promulgation. The major trajectories along which research has been moving are described and related to both the positive and the normative issues concerning compatibility standards that remain to be studied.     

国际标准竞争中产品兼容激励和政府行为研究

产业标准的国际竞争是国际协调型产业政策的重要内容之一。本文通过构建一个产业标准国际竞争模型,确立以下观点:与其他产品相比,政府对产业标准的国际竞争具有采取更大力度的支持措施的内在动力;标准的成长路径遵循先国内、后国外的发展模式;相比之下,生产较小网络效应产品的厂商更希望产品兼容;在不同兼容模式下,厂商的兼容激励可能会与社会激励不一致,政府要根据具体情况采取转移支付或政府间合作等方式引导厂商行为。     

Permit Trading and Credit Trading: A Comparison of Cap-Based and Rate-Based Emissions Trading Under Perfect and Imperfect Competition

This paper compares emissions trading based on a cap on total emissions (permit trading) and on relative standards per unit of output (credit trading). Two types of market structure are considered: perfect competition and Cournot oligopoly. We find that output, abatement costs and the number of firms are higher under credit trading. Allowing trade between permit-trading and credit-trading sectors may increase welfare. With perfect competition, permit trading always leads to higher welfare than credit trading. With imperfect competition, credit trading may outperform permit trading. Environmental policy can lead to exit, but also to entry of firms. Entry and exit have a profound impact on the performance of the schemes, especially under imperfect competition. We find that it may be impossible to implement certain levels of total industry emissions. Under credit trading several levels of the relative standard can achieve the same total level of emissions.     

Competing eco-labels and product market competition

I examine the impact of competition between eco-labeling programs in a market where eco-labels that communicate information about product's environmental quality (a credence attribute) are also strategic variables for competing firms. Specifically, I consider a dynamic setting where an industry-sponsored eco-labeling program and a program sponsored by environmental NGOs compete strategically in setting the labeling standards, before price-setting firms make strategic choices of which eco-label (if any) to adopt; adopting firms not presently meeting the labeling standards undertake costly quality improvement to comply with them. I find that the competition between eco-labeling programs may lead to the same high environmental benefit as when there exists only the NGO program. I also find that the competition may yield higher social welfare.     

Trade liberalization gains under different trade theories: a case study for Ukraine

We analyze the deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA) between Ukraine and the EU using a multi-regional general-equilibrium simulation model. Three alternative trade structures are implemented: (a) a standard specification of perfect competition based on the Armington assumption of regionally differentiated goods; (b) monopolistic competition among symmetric manufacturing firms; and (c) a competitive selection model of heterogeneous manufacturing firms. Across these structures the DCFTA indicates relatively large gains for Ukraine of more than 3 percent. We show, however, that the gains for Ukraine are lower when we consider monopolistic competition in manufacturing. This is attributed to a movement of resources into Ukraine’s traditional export sectors to the EU, which produce under constant returns. While there is little danger of deindustrialization dominating the overall welfare gains, we do observe substantially lower gains when we consider monopolistic competition. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical confirmation of the theoretic predication that the relative gains from trade in monopolistic competition models might be lower than under perfect competition in the context of a numeric simulation of economic integration. Under the popular heterogeneous-firms monopolistic competition theory we find significant firm selection effects indicating welfare impacts for Ukraine that are less than under the Armington structure but above those found under symmetric firms and monopolistic competition. These results are important considerations for Ukraine’s overall development strategy.     

Technology adoption in a differentiated duopoly: Cournot versus Bertrand

This paper shows that the cost as well as the effectiveness of technology has a differential impact on technology adoption under two alternative modes of competition. If the cost of the technology is high, Bertrand competition provides a stronger incentive to adopt technology than Cournot competition unless the effectiveness of the technology is very low. On the contrary, if the cost of the technology is low, Cournot competition fares better than Bertrand competition in terms of technology adoption by firms. This demonstrates that the commonly subscribed assumption of ‘positive primary outputs’ restricts (inflates) the scope of higher degree of technology adoption under Bertrand (Cournot) competition. Moreover, in contrast to standard welfare ranking, it shows that Cournot competition leads to higher social welfare than Bertrand competition under certain situations.     

Labor standards, labor-management bargaining and international rivalry

Using the labor union's bargaining power as an indication of government policy on labor standards issues, we analyze the competition between a domestic (North) firm and a foreign (South) firm, and their relationship with optimal labor standards (LS). First, we show that the optimal level of LS is higher when labor unions are employment-oriented than when they are not. Second, it is higher under free trade than under the optimal tariff system if labor unions are employment-oriented. Third, ‘a race to the bottom’ of LS occurs in the case of wage-oriented unions. Fourth, the North's imposing a tariff to force the Southern government to raise its LS is effective only if the Southern union is wage-oriented. In order to raise Southern LS, both countries may need some deeper form of economic integration, if the North does not want to abandon its free trade system.     

On Environmental Regulation of Oligopoly Markets: Emission versus Performance Standards

By specializing Montero’s (J Environ Econ Manag 44:23–44, 2002) model of environmental regulation under Cournot competition to an oligopoly with linear demand and quadratic abatement costs, we extend his comparison of firms incentives to invest in R&D under emission and performance standards by solving for a closed form solution of the underlying two-stage game. This allows for a full comparison of the two instruments in terms of their resulting propensity for R&D and equilibrium industry output. In addition, we incorporate an equilibrium welfare analysis. Finally, we investigate a three-stage game wherein a welfare-maximizing regulator sets a socially optimal emission cap under each policy instrument. For the latter game, while closed-form solutions for the subgame-perfect equilibrium are not possible, we establish numerically that the resulting welfare is always larger under a performance standard.     

Industry equilibrium under random demand

The paper deals with the characterization of long-run industry equilibrium under random demand, for the two polar cases of perfect competition and pure monopoly. Contrary to the basic theorem of welfare economics for the standard (deterministic) case, it is shown that perfect competition does not in general lead to an optimal (efficient) outcome. Perfect competition is optimal if and only if firms display risk-neutrality with respect to profits. Surprisingly enough, when risk preferences are non-neutral, one could by means of price regulation lead monopoly to behave optimally, whereas this is impossible for competition.