A comparison of shareholder identity and governance mechanisms in the monitoring of CEOs of listed companies in China

This paper compares the relative effectiveness of two measures by which the Chinese government attempted to improve the monitoring of listed companies: shifting the ownership of state shares from government agencies (GAs) to the corporate form of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and strengthening corporate governance through statutory regulations and guidelines. The results show that SOEs are better able than GAs to monitor top executives, as indicated by a higher sensitivity of top executive turnover to firm performance. However, corporate governance mechanisms have no significant impact on the sensitivity of top executive turnover to firm performance. This study suggests that incentives for controlling shareholders are more important than governance mechanisms in replacing executives due to poor performance in a transitional economy such as China's, where institutions that support governance mechanisms are still being developed.     

最终控制人、机构投资者与信息披露选择——基于业绩预告的视角

论文以2001至2009年我国A股上市公司为研究对象,选取业绩预告这一公司具有较大自由选择余地的预测性盈余信息作为研究对象,考察治理特征对信息披露准确程度的影响.研究结果表明:国有控股上市公司在发布业绩预告时呈现出较为明显的保守特征;机构投资者持股比例越高越有利于增加业绩预告的准确程度,具体表现为降低预测误差并有效地抑制业绩预告中的激进和保守倾向.     

Corporate governance and the cost of public debt financing: Evidence from Japan

This paper explores the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the cost of public debt financing in Japan. Using a sample of corporate bonds newly issued in Japan during the period 2005–2008, I find that CEO ownership is associated with higher yield spreads after controlling for other governance, bond, and firm characteristics. Founding family ownership is also positively related to yield spreads. In contrast, firms with large corporate shareholders enjoy lower yield spreads. These results are robust to various alternative specifications. Overall, my results indicate the importance of corporate governance mechanisms in Japanese corporate bond markets.     

国有企业改革中的公司法人治理结构问题研究

我国国有企业改革始于1978年,至今已有30年的历史。长期以来,我国实行的是一种缺乏制衡、效率低下的企业治理结构。国有企业在公司化改组进程中,由于其股东的特殊性,使公司制在国有企业中发生了异化,并未收到预期的效果。如何完善我国国有企业的法人治理结构对于提升我国国有企业的活力与绩效至关重要     

上海区属国有企业法人治理结构的现状分析

上海区属国有企业公司治理、特别是董事会的建设还刚刚起步.文章根据上海区属国有企业的问卷调查,对上海区属国有企业的行业分布情况、所有权情况和法人治理结构中董事会与监事会建设的现状给予了比较全面的描述.同时,文章通过与OECD要求的比较,着重对区属国有企业董事会建设中的问题和成因进行探讨分析.     

国有企业混合所有制改革、金融化程度与全要素生产率

为推动混合所有制改革实现国有企业高质量发展,解决低效率和金融化的问题,文章选择国有制造业上市企业2008-2017年间的样本数据,考察了国有企业混合所有制改革与金融化程度对全要素生产率的交互影响机制。研究发现,引入非国有资本提高了国有企业全要素生产率,却加剧了企业金融化对全要素生产率的挤出效应,在规模较小、盈利能力较弱或市场化水平较低的国有企业中挤出效应更明显。在国有企业混合所有制改革过程中,非国有股东会基于套利目的,带动金融化程度的提升。基于上述研究结果,文章建议进一步完善混合所有制改革制度,改变企业资源配置方式,矫正资源误配格局,在帕累托改进的路径中推进改革,保证国有企业高质量发展。     

从公司治理结构的核心比较两种国企改革思路及建议

在两权分离条件下,现代企业制度的核心是将企业的评价和对经理人员的约束和奖惩由充分竞争的市场机制来完成。公司治理结构的设计和国企改革的重点是为了有效选择和监督经理。产权改革和建立公平竞争市场环境的两种改革思路,都是为了创造有效的竞争,达到合理选择和监督经理的     

Quantifying the vulnerabilities of China’s corporate sector with contingent claims

This paper measures and analyzes the default risk and debt sustainability of China’s non-financial corporate sector both on an aggregate level and within a sector by employing the contingent claims approach (CCA). Our results suggest that the vulnerabilities of Chinese firms are heterogenous in terms of investment source, ownership group, corporate form, industry type, and geographic unit etc. First, foreign capital enterprises have a lower default risk than domestic capital enterprises. Within domestic capital enterprises, state-owned firms have the lowest default risk, whereas private and collective firms are most unsustainable despite that they have the highest returns on assets. Second, state-controlled firms, private stock limited firms, and Chinese foreign cooperative firms are least vulnerable in the state-owned corporate sub-sector, the private corporate sub-sector and the foreign corporate sub-sector, respectively. Third, all industries except the coal industry are sustainable by industry type. Fourth, the vulnerabilities of local state-owned sub-sectors are diverse across China’s administrative regions. Moreover, we provide robustness tests which support our findings. In Sum, our study shed key light on ensuring the soundness of China’s non-financial corporate sector and thereby maintaining the stability and sustainability of the Chinese economy.     

多个大股东对企业环保投资的影响

企业作为环境治理的责任主体,其环保投资水平直接影响国家的可持续发展。而在企业的环保投资决策中,公司的治理结构发挥了关键作用。作为一种特殊的股权结构,多个大股东可能会影响企业环保投资。以2009—2020年中国A股上市公司为样本,对多个大股东股权结构与企业环保投资的关系进行检验。研究表明,多个大股东的股权结构会抑制企业环保投资规模,同时多个大股东越多、持股比例之和越高,越不利于企业进行环保投资。最后进行稳健性检验,结论仍然成立。对二者关系的分析可为多个大股东的股权结构与企业环保投资进一步的研究提供相关启示。     

From State to State: Quasi-privatization and Firm Performance

This paper uses a sample of Chinese listed companies whose controlling shareholders have changed from government agencies to state-owned enterprises＇ （SOEs）, to examine whether reducing government intervention while maintaining government＇s ultimate control could improve firm performance. The results show that the overall performance of these firms improves after the transfer of their controlling shareholders, due to improvements in both operating and non-operating performance. When we separate all samples into solely SOEs and other SOEs based on the controlling shareholder, we find that operating performance improved significantly in the solely SOE group, whereas non-operating performance improved significantly in the SOE group. In addition, we identify sources of performance improvement from two perspectives： corporate governance and related party transactions. The results imply that the Chinese Government should continue to decentralize control and, at the same time, continue to monitor firm operating efficiency.     

Post‐IFRS Revaluation Adjustments and Executive Compensation

International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) allow firms to record adjustments (gains or losses) from the revaluation of investment properties in their income statements. After Hong Kong adopted IFRS in 2005, property companies were required to move their revaluation gains and losses (RGL) from equity to income. We find RGL to be a significant determinant of executive compensation in these firms after 2005, but not before. We further find evidence that the RGL‐compensation association is driven by firms with relative weak corporate governance structure, such as firms in which the controlling shareholders own a relatively small percentage of shares, firms in which the controlling shareholders have control rights that exceed ownership rights, and firms that are no longer run by their founders.     

从自我履约协议看股东权益保护

近年来的研究发现世界上大部分国家的企业股权并不分散而是相当集中的,公司治理的主要问题是大股东与小股东之间的代理问题。本文从自我履约协议的视角探讨了股东之间的利益冲突问题,提出利用可回售股份来建立重复博弈的机制,解决大股东侵害的问题。     

The effects of corporate governance and ownership on the innovation performance of Chinese SMEs

We investigate the degree to which corporate governance and ownership affect the innovation performance of firms in China with a particular focus on privately owned small and medium enterprises. Using the appropriate theoretical frameworks, we derive hypotheses regarding the impact of ownership concentration, board size and composition, and the background of the CEO on innovative activity. These hypotheses are tested using a unique sample of 370 mostly private and relatively small Chinese firms in Zhejiang province, for the period 2004–2006. Using two measures of innovation, invention patents and new product sales, and a variety of estimation methods appropriate to each measure, we find limited evidence that corporate governance affects innovation performance, but the results do depend on the measure of innovation. In general, the results suggest that for this sample, corporate governance and ownership affect innovation activity more strongly when innovation is measured by patenting activity, rather than new product sales. We conclude with a discussion about why this might be.     

股权结构异质性与治理效率：前沿理论与实证研究评述

股权结构是公司治理制度安排对外部环境不确定性的一个动态反应过程,其异质性特征影响企业的治理行为,产生收益与成本。在经济转型背景下,基于股权结构的公司治理效应研究非常普及,通过影响和塑造公司治理行为选择而影响整个经济系统。本文以股权结构异质性为主线,对股权结构类型、非控制性大股东、股东合谋和终极股权四个维度,结合中国情境下的股权结构异质性的应用研究进行文献梳理与述评,以期为我国公司治理制度下发挥股权结构的治理效应提供借鉴与启示。     

外国所有权与银行治理演化

从银行公司治理的特征出发,探讨了外国所有权与国内银行治理制度演化的关系。结果表明,控股股东与非控股大股东之间的有效制衡关系是实现银行治理效率的最优安排;只要外国所有权的制度质量高,并且持股数量达到一定的比例,可以实现国内商业银行治理机制向国际先进的治理制度演化。为此,监管当局应增加外国股权投资者的制度质量评估,适当提高持股比例、延长持股年限,促使战略投资者与国内银行形成紧密的战略合作关系。     

建立法人股东为主导的股权治理模式

股权结构是公司治理结构的基础,其设置状况是否合理对公司治理结构的效率有着决定性的影响.文章针对当前上市公司股权治理的弊端,设计出一种股权持有者多元化、股权集中程度分散化的股权结构,并提出我国上市公司应建立以法人股东为主导的治理模式.     

均衡股权结构与松散的董事会治理机制研究——以厦门金龙股权纷争为例

国有股的股权比较集中,一股独大的股权结构成了严重治理问题的诟病,那么均衡的股权结构能够改善公司治理状况吗?在人们认为均衡股权结构可以改善公司治理状况时,厦门金龙的股权纷争案例却给出了相反的佐证。本文从对金龙股权纷争的案例来分析均衡股权机构治理存在的问题,结合公司治理理论对我国民营股权结构治理模式进行分析,以得到一些启示和思考,为我国的股权结构治理提供新的观点和思想。     

国有独资公司治理与股权多元化发展趋势探讨

国有独资公司治理是我国理论界、实务界关注的焦点,而股权结构是公司治理的基础。良好的公司治理能够提高国有独资公司的运营效率,同时也是国有企业改革、转变发展方式的重要制度安排。文章根据公司治理理论,针对我国国有独资公司治理的特征及其面临的挑战,提出了国有独资公司治理的股权多元化发展趋势及其整体上市的途径,为增强国有独资公司的价值创造能力、风险控制能力和制度创新能力提供些许建议。     

国有企业公司治理的制衡机制研究

建立现代企业制度、健全国有企业的公司治理结构与机制是国有企业改革和发展的核心,公司治理的不完善必然影响国有企业的发展。但从国有企业公司治理上看改革建制尚未到位,原有体制的许多矛盾和问题在新的机制形式下依旧存在,尚未建立规范的国家、企业、经营者等利益相关者之间的制衡机制,因此只有通过建立规范的制衡机制才能解决企业改制过程中出现的问题,促使国有企业获得更大的发展。     

关于新一轮国有企业改革的若干认识

以往的国有企业改革在取得成效的同时,产生了一些新的问题,国内外经济发展环境的变化也给国有企业的发展带来挑战,为更好地发挥国有经济的主导作用,深化国有企业改革势在必行。党的十八届三中全会对深化国有企业改革提出了系列要求,历经三十多年的国企改革进入了新的历史发展时期。新一轮国有企业改革应遵循的原则是,坚持社会主义基本经济制度,坚持市场化方向。改革路径主要包括积极发展混合所有制经济、放大国有资本功能;加强国有资本投资和运营公司建设、优化国有经济布局;继续完善公司治理结构、加快现代企业制度建设步伐等。