Local land supply and fiscal incentives for R&D: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China

Whereas numerous studies have evaluated the effects of public research and development (R&D) support programs and R&D tax incentives on private R&D, little is known about local governments' fiscal incentives for R&D. In this study, we build a conceptual framework to clarify the critical role of local land supply in relation to fiscal expenditure on R&D. We treat the establishment of China's nine Land Supervision Bureaus in 2006 as a quasi-natural experiment, and run a difference-in-differences regression to identify causality. The results show that local governments allocate more fiscal expenditure to R&D in response to land-use supervision, which monitors illegal land granting behaviors, and this effect is stronger in cities where leaders have higher political career incentives and cities with greater fiscal decentralization. Moreover, we find that land-use supervision increases the probability and scale of firms' access to government subsidies for R&D; thus, enhancing regional innovation capacity. Our findings document that China's land resource is a curse for its innovation-driven growth as it impedes local governments' fiscal incentives for R&D.     

Local Governments' Fiscal Pressure and the Dependence on Polluting Industries in China

Using a large, unique county‐level panel dataset for China from 1998 to 2006, this paper investigates the relationship between local governments' fiscal pressure and their preference for developing polluting industries. The results show that there exist fiscal pressure effects; namely, a positive link between the fiscal pressure faced by a county and its industrial tax dependence on polluting industries. We also investigate the heterogeneity of the fiscal pressure effects and find that fiscal pressure effects are significant only when local fiscal pressure is sufficiently high up to a certain point, and when there are more earmarked transfers. In contrast to the situation in east China, fiscal pressure effects in central and west China are more pronounced. Therefore, when dealing with environmental problems, policy‐makers need to take local governments' fiscal conditions into account.     

How Has Rural Tax Reform Affected Farmers and Local Governance in China？

Using nationally representative data, the present paper examines the impact of China's ongoing rural tax reform on farmers. The difficulties in further local governance restructuring are also discussed. It is argued that the issues associated with rural taxation and local governance in China result from inherent tension between an increasingly liberalized economic system and a still centralized political system. Although rural tax reform has helped to reduce farmers' tax burdens in the short term, the establishment of an effective local governance regime requires coordinated reforms to downsize local bureaucracy by providing social security for laid-off cadres, to strengthen local accountability by granting higher local formal tax autonomy, and to promote meaningful participation by expanding local democracy.     

Fiscal decentralization and local expenditure policy in China

Since the tax-sharing reform in 1994, the Chinese fiscal system has exhibited a marked vertical fiscal imbalance—a mismatch between expenditure and revenue assignments—at the local levels, which may cause the common-pool problem in local governments' behavior. Using a large fiscal dataset at the county level from 1997 to 2006, this paper studies the effects of fiscal decentralization on local expenditure policy and analyzes how the vertical fiscal imbalance shapes these effects. The estimation results show that expenditure decentralization increases government spending and leads to a fund allocation with a larger weight on capital construction and smaller weights on education and administration. In contrast, revenue decentralization has little influence on local government expenditures. We show that the differences in the effects of expenditure and revenue decentralization can be attributed to the distortionary effects caused by the vertical fiscal imbalance and, thus, offer support to the importance of the common-pool problem at the county level of China's fiscal system.     

Environmental regulation and responses of local governments

In 1998, China approved the setup of two control zones and implemented stringent environmental regulation in these zones. This policy enables us to use the difference-in-difference method to investigate local governments' responses to environmental regulation. We find that tough environmental regulation increases tax rate but does not affect local government expenditure. Among the mechanisms through which environmental regulation positively affects tax rate are the negative effects of environmental regulation on investment of fixed assets, number and total profits of above-scale industrial firms in dirty industries of TCZ cities. In addition, the effect of environmental regulation on tax rate is positively related to policy strength and proportion of the secondary industry. Moreover, tough environmental regulation increases the shares of revenue from enterprises and agricultural taxes in budgetary revenue, but decreases the share of value-added tax in budgetary revenue. These findings highlight additional cost of environmental regulation (aside from those mentioned in literature), including increased burdens of the private sector that would lead to large distortions, and aggravated unfair distribution of taxes. The additional cost should be considered when evaluating the environmental policy.     

Assessing Local Government Debt Risks in China: A Case Study of Local Government Financial Vehicles

Strong credit expansion in China after the recent global financial crisis has brought local government financial vehicles (LGFV) into the spotlight. Rapid growth of LGFV has triggered concern about local government indebtedness, banks' asset quality and, more broadly, China's medium‐term financial stability and sovereign risk. This paper constructs a unique firm‐level dataset to evaluate the country's local government debt. We find an uneven distribution of LGFV, which are concentrated in the coastal areas, and a deterioration of their debt repaying ability from 2010 to 2012. We use principal component analysis (PCA) along with multivariate discriminate analysis (MDA) to identify the credit risk of LGFV based on conventional financial variables as well as local governments' fiscal status. We also estimate the safe boundaries of debt bearing at the provincial government level. The estimations reveal more severe local government debt risks in the middle‐western provinces and higher risks associated with LGFV at the municipal and county levels. Although it is very unlikely that there will be a national debt crisis in China, the high risk of LGFV should be noted and effectively controlled by improving the fiscal transparency of local governments and reforming the fiscal system.     

INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS AND DECENTRALISATION IN INDONESIA

A fundamental restructuring of intergovernmental relations involving decentralisation and expanded autonomy for provincial and local governments is under way in Indonesia. This paper explores the intergovernmental financial system that preceded the new General Allocation Fund (DAU), with particular attention to the old Inpres development grants. Like Inpres, the DAU attempts to address national development objectives, and can be seen as a logical consequence of reform efforts in intergovernmental finance that began long before the demise of the New Order government in 1998. The use of earmarked Inpres grants enabled the central government to ensure that key sectors such as roads, public health and education received adequate attention throughout Indonesia's diverse regions. Local governments' experience with Inpres should help in implementation of the DAU, yet Law 25/1999which restructures fiscal relations between the various levels of governmentmay actually have increased local reliance on the central government.     

The effect of China's agricultural tax abolition on rural families' incomes and production

This paper uses the rural household panel data collected by Research Center for Rural Economy to evaluate the impacts of China's agricultural tax abolition during 2004–2005 on farmers' income and production behavior. We find that the abolition of agricultural tax did not significantly affect agricultural production. The effects on input use and productivity are also found statistically insignificant. All these are consistent with the lump-sum property of the tax and imply little effect of the tax abolition on relaxing credit constraints to farmers. Finally, we find that the tax abolition did not increase farmers' net income significantly.     

Fiscal Decentralization or Centralization: Diverging Paths of Chinese Cities

If fiscal decentralization promotes growth, why do some regions decentralize more than others? This article identifies the growing divergence of fiscal centralization among Chinese cities and explains it in a public finance framework. It argues that fiscal decentralization and its economy‐liberalizing effect entail significant short‐term fiscal risk. The more a locality relies on uncompetitive business ownership for fiscal revenue, the less likely fiscal decentralization is to occur. This article compiles a dataset of 20 provincial capitals between 1999 and 2016 to test for the connection between a city's tax base and its fiscal centralization level. It then pairs two “most similar” cities to trace how fiscal security concerns drove their fiscal and economic policies apart. This article adds a micro‐level perspective to the literature on fiscal federalism. By pointing out the fiscal constraints confronting local governments, it offers a new angle to understand the different growth paths of Chinese cities.     

Experimental Evidence of Market Reactions to New Consumption Taxes*

Abstract. Consumption taxes of various forms are of increasing importance worldwide. This study employs a laboratory market design to investigate differential market reactions to three consumption tax forms while holding all other factors constant. Ten laboratory markets were conducted, each involving nine volunteer participants. Market participants were randomly assigned to roles analogous to wholesalers, retailers, or consumers of a market good. The three tax forms were (1) a sales tax imposed on retail consumers of a commodity, (2) a gross-receipts tax imposed on retail sellers, and (3) a value-added tax imposed on sellers at two levels of production. At least three markets were conducted under each tax regime as a basis for experimental comparison. The tax rates used in each structure were chosen so that a competitive model would predict different equilibrium prices but the same tax burdens (the sum of explicit and implicit taxes) across the three tax regimes. Results generally support these predictions, with somewhat stronger support for equivalent tax revenues (explicit taxes collected) than for equivalent tax incidence (distribution of tax burdens after price adjustments). Observed tax incidence differences suggest that market agents who are called upon to explicitly pay taxes actually bear relatively lower tax burdens after implicit tax price adjustments. In general, however, price shifting is consistent with the competitive model, supporting the economic dictum that the choice among alternative designations of taxpaying agents is more a question of form than of economic substance. Résumé. Les taxes à la consommation revêtant diverses formes augmentent en importance à travers le monde. Les auteurs ont conçu un modèle de marché expérimental dans le but d'étudier les différentes réactions du marché à trois formes de taxe à la consommation, tout en maintenant constants l'ensemble des autres facteurs. Dix marchés expérimentaux ont été créés, chacun d'eux faisant intervenir neuf participants volontaires à qui étaient attribués aléatoirement des rôles analogues à ceux de grossistes, de détaillants ou de consommateurs d'un marché de produits. Les trois formes de taxe étaient les suivantes: (1) une taxe de vente s'appliquant aux consommateurs d'un bien sur le marché de détail, (2) une taxe sur les encaissements bruts s'appliquant aux détaillants et (3) une taxe sur la valeur ajoutée s'appliquant aux vendeurs, à deux échelons de production. Au moins trois marchés sous chaque régime fiscal ont servi de base de comparaison expérimentale. Les taux utilisés dans chaque structure ont été choisis de telle sorte qu'un modèle concurrentiel arrive à des prix d'équilibre différents mais à une fardeau fiscal identique (la somme des taxes explicites et implicites) sous les trois régimes. Dans l'ensemble, les résultats obtenus confirment ces prédictions, plus encore dans le cas des recettes fiscales équivalentes. Les différentes incidences fiscales observées donnent à penser que les agents du marché de qui l'on réclame explicitement des taxes supportent, en réalité, un fardeau fiscal relativement moins élevé, une fois opérés les ajustements de prix relatifs aux taxes implicites. De manière générale, cependant, les variations de prix sont conformes au modèle concurrentiel, ce qui corrobore cet axiome économique selon lequel le choix des agents à qui doit être attribué le rôle de contribuable est davantage une question de forme que de substance économique.     

分税制改革、城市偏向与中国农业增长

分税制改革因导致中央和地方政府之间财权和事权的不匹配而增加了地方政府的财政压力,从而深刻地改变着地方政府的行为模式。当农业税费全归地方财政收入,农业对经济增长的贡献不断下降而经济增长又成为地方官员政治晋升的主要指标时,面临财政压力的理性地方政府会强化其城市偏向程度,从而损害农业增长。本文运用1978至2009年中国省级面板数据进行的实证分析表明:分税制下的地方财政压力对农业增长特别是粮食增长产生消极影响;非本级财政收入因缓解地方财政压力而有助于农业增长;地方政府对预算外资金的依赖则不利于农业增长。历史和经验证据支持了分税制改革强化地方政府城市偏向的观点。     

分税制改革20年对民族地区社会经济的影响

我国从1994年开始实行的分税制改革增强了中央政府的宏观调控能力,但却使地方政府承担了更多的支出责任。虽然分税制改革增强了民族地区地方政府的财力,增加了民生支出,使得民族地区基本公共服务均等化功能不断增强,居民收入水平不断提高,但同时民族地区仍然存在财力不足、中央与地方政府财权与事权划分不合理、转移支付制度不完善等问题。因此,本文认为应转变政府和财政职能,优化财政支出结构;合理划分各级政府事权范围,进一步明确各级财政支出职责;建立转移支付的激励约束机制;加强县级政府提供基本公共服务的财力保障。     

Has Fiscal Federalism Worked for Macroeconomic Purposes？ The Chinese Experience 1994-2003

China＇s central government undertook major tax regime reform in 1994 that was characterized by fiscal federalism. In hindsight, this reform might be viewed as being more emphatic towards the revenue side than the expenditure side. The reform has resulted in certain success both for revenue shifting and inflation fighting purposes. However, the reform and its subsequent follow-ups have not addressed some fundamental issues pertaining to China＇s government finance system, such as the overhauling of the function of government finance and redrawing lines between the central and regional governments with regard to their fiscal responsibilities and duties. Moreover, fiscal federalism might have actually increased fiscal burden on the economy, especially on domestic sectors of the economy. However, coupled with enhanced policy support for China＇ s external development, fiscal federalism might have helped to further accelerate resource shifts toward the external sector, thus resulting in an unprecedented rapid expansion in China＇ s exports since the mid1990s.     

The Reform of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in China*

This paper looks at the impact of China's fiscal decentralization on the central government's ability to use fiscal policy to achieve macroeconomic objectives. It is argued that, under the fiscal contract system introduced in the early 1980s. the localities effectively controlled the tax rates and tax bases. Due to the lack of fiscal resources and policy instruments, the central government found it increasingly difficult to achieve its goals of macroeconomic stabilization and regional equalization. The adoption of the tax-assignment system in the 1994 fiscal reform was an important step taken by the central government to address these difficulties. Nevertheless, a number of elements in the current tax-assignment system may work to make this system unsustainable in the long run.     

Perspective on Local Governance Reform in China

I. Introduction The difficulty of improving local governance in contemporary China has recently aroused a great deal of attention from both academics and policy-makers. Among the many issues needing to be addressed, inefficiency in the work of local administrative agencies andshortcomings in the delivery of public services rank as the most significant. Many Chinese farmers, especially those in less developed regions, have been plagued by excessive tax burdens, insecure land property rights an…     

Who Benefits from Inconsistent Multinational Tax Transfer‐Pricing Rules?*

This paper uses a strategic tax compliance model to examine taxpayer reporting and tax authority audit strategies in an international setting with two tax authorities. The setting features both information asymmetry between the taxpayer and the tax authorities and inconsistent tax transfer‐pricing rules. The latter creates the possibility of each country trying to tax the same income. We study the effect of the probability of transfer‐price rule inconsistency on the strategies and payoffs of the taxpayer and the tax authorities. We find that an increase in the probability of transfer‐price rule inconsistency induces more aggressive auditing by governments. It therefore deters taxpayers from shifting income to the country with the lower tax rate in situations in which the transfer‐pricing rules are consistent, and can either increase or decrease the income reported to the low‐tax‐rate country in cases in which the transfer‐pricing rules are inconsistent. We find that an increase in transfer‐price rule inconsistency could either increase or decrease the taxpayer's expected tax liability and could either increase or decrease the deadweight loss from auditing. Our results call into question the conventional wisdom that the prospect of double taxation due to transfer‐price rule inconsistency increases a firm's expected tax liability and governments' expected audit costs.     

Environmental (de)centralization and local environmental governance: Evidence from a natural experiment in China

It is of great importance for government to design effective incentive mechanisms in environmental governance. This paper investigates the causal effects of environmental (de)centralization on local governments' environmental governance. Based on stragged establishments timing of regional Supervision Centers for Environmental Protection (SCEPs) in China, we introduce a unique government administrative dataset on firm pollution in order to conduct gradual intensity difference-in-differences estimations. We present strong evidence that establishing the SCEPs significantly prompt firms to reduce emission pollution. Since the establishment of the SCEPs brings more effective information collection and supervision, promoting local firms reduce pollutant generation and increase investment in pollution control. Moreover, the SCEPs could coordinate adjacent provinces' incentives on reducing firms' emissions around provincial boundaries. Besides, this study provides clear policy implications that when fiscal decentralization carries the risk of aggravating environmental pollution, vertical management structures in environmental governance could effectively strengthen incentives and coordination.     

Policy choice and economic growth under factional politics: Evidence from a Chinese Province

This paper investigates how political elites make policy choices that have bearing on an authoritarian regime's economy, from the perspective of factional politics. A local leader makes policies primarily to secure his political survival, which is contingent on the support from either his higher-level patrons or his local grassroots constituents. Using a simple model, we show that a local politician with close factional ties to high-level patrons will invest more in sending loyalty signals to the latter to receive their protections, while a poorly-connected politician will make more effort to spur a broad-based economic growth that economically benefits his local constituents. Using a unique county level data on the factional politics of Zhejiang Province, China, we find that counties with weaker (closer) factional ties have lower (higher) tax burdens per capita, while spending more (less) on local public goods provision. The results are stable after various robustness tests.     

FISCAL ILLUSION AT THE LOCAL SPHERE: AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE FLYPAPER EFFECT USING SOUTH AFRICAN MUNICIPAL DATA1

While South Africa operates a relatively decentralised governance and administrative structure, an important feature of the country's intergovernmental fiscal relations system is the gap that exists between the expenditure responsibilities of sub‐national authorities and their assigned revenue bases. The resulting vertical fiscal imbalance is mainly addressed via significant intergovernmental transfers to provinces and local governments. This factor presents strong a priori grounds for assuming that in the South African context, the heavy dependence of many local governments on intergovernmental transfers may generate fiscal illusion. Despite this, there have not been many empirical studies of fiscal illusion in South Africa's intergovernmental transfer system. This paper extends existing literature on fiscal illusion by using the fiscal year 2005/06 financial and expenditure data from 237 local government authorities in South Africa to evaluate the flypaper variant of the fiscal illusion hypothesis. Empirical results indicate that the marginal effects of municipal own‐source revenues on local expenditure exceed those of intergovernmental transfers. No statistical evidence in support of the flypaper hypothesis within the context of municipal expenditures in South Africa is found.     

Land finance in China: Analysis and review

China's land finance system has been a key contributor to the country's “economic miracle” over recent decades. While there is much existing research on different components of the land finance system, this paper, based on both an academic literature review and data analysis, provides an integrated understanding of how these parts function in tandem around the pivotal role of profitability in the system. First, we summarize the essentials of China's land finance system by providing a framework to understand the self-reinforcing cycle between local governments' financing and spending activities based on urban land-use rights (LURs). We also quantify the magnitude of profits generated by the cycle and its contribution to China's urban development. Second, we investigate the institutional underpinnings of the system, which empower local governments as the monopoly supplier of urban LURs. We also document the rising temporal trend in land prices in most cities. Both these institutional and market factors facilitate the profitability of land finance. Finally, we shed light on the sustainability of the system. Local governments' strong incentives to maximize the profitability of land finance have resulted in increasing economic and social costs/risks. Meanwhile, the feasibility of the system increasingly is coming into question, as both ongoing institutional reforms and recent urban land market cooling raise potentially fundamental challenges to the profitability of land finance.