Do liquidity or credit effects explain the behavior of the BKBM–LIBOR differential?

This paper examines the evolution of the relationship between the onshore and offshore benchmarks for New Zealand dollar funding during the global financial crisis. In August 2007 the BKBM–LIBOR differential switched from positive to negative and then widened considerably following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, before narrowing gradually as the turmoil in financial markets subsided. Our structural regression model and decomposition analyses show that changes in liquidity, proxied by bid/ask spreads, largely explain the changes in the BKBM–LIBOR differential over this period and that credit risk factors only played a minor role. However our analysis also shows that bid/ask spreads in the offshore market price information regarding counterparty credit risk, suggesting that our initial results could understate the role played by credit risk factors.     

Credit spread interdependencies of European states and banks during the financial crisis

We investigate the interdependence of the default risk of several Eurozone countries (France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and their domestic banks during the period between June 2007 and May 2010, using daily credit default swaps (CDS). Bank bailout programs changed the composition of both banks’ and sovereign balance sheets and, moreover, affected the linkage between the default risk of governments and their local banks. Our main findings suggest that in the period before bank bailouts the contagion disperses from bank credit spreads into the sovereign CDS market. After bailouts, a financial sector shock affects sovereign CDS spreads more strongly in the short run. However, the impact becomes insignificant in the long term. Furthermore, government CDS spreads become an important determinant of banks’ CDS series. The interdependence of government and bank credit risk is heterogeneous across countries, but homogeneous within the same country.     

Evaluating corporate credit risks in emerging markets

Corporate leverage among emerging market firms went up considerably after the 2007–09 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). We investigate how the increased emerging market corporate leverage in the post-GFC period (2010–15) impacted the underlying credit risk, compared to the pre-GFC (2002–2006) and GFC (2007–09) periods. Using firm-level credit risk, financial, and balance sheet data for 350 firms in 23 emerging markets, we find that leverage growth leads to a significant increase in corporate credit default swap (CDS) spreads only in the post-GFC period, and the incremental effect is mainly evident among risky firms (firms with high leverage and idiosyncratic volatility). In contrast, emerging market CDS spreads during the GFC period are mainly driven by global market risk factors. The post-GFC corporate debt vulnerability is mitigated for high growth prospect firms and firms domiciled in countries with high net capital inflows and superior governance. While corporate leverage growth impacts aggregate corporate credit risk, there is no evidence that it increases sovereign credit risk. Our paper contributes to the recent literature on potential sources of default risk in emerging markets.     

Understanding liquidity and credit risks in the financial crisis

This paper develops a structured dynamic factor model for the spreads between London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and overnight index swap (OIS) rates for a panel of banks. Our model involves latent factors which reflect liquidity and credit risk. Our empirical results show that surges in the short term LIBOR-OIS spreads during the 2007-2009 financial crisis were largely driven by liquidity risk. However, credit risk played a more significant role in the longer term (twelve-month) LIBOR-OIS spread. The liquidity risk factors are more volatile than the credit risk factor. Most of the familiar events in the financial crisis are linked more to movements in liquidity risk than credit risk.     

A re-examination of Libor rigging: a time-varying cointegration perspective

Using a time-varying cointegration framework, this paper examines the alleged manipulation of the London interbank offered rate (Libor) during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Bank quotes are found to be poor indicators of their financing costs in the crisis period. The aberration in the estimated values of the cointegrating and error correction parameters governing the long-run equilibrium relationship between bank quotes and the final Libor suggests banks were submitting lower quotes. Further analysis which controls for an individual bank’s credit risk, market wide credit and liquidity risks, and a common market factor, demonstrate possible evidence of Libor rigging during the crisis period.     

Asset reliability and security prices: evidence from credit markets

We assess the relation between asset reliability and security prices. Concerns about asset reliability are increasing with the move to fair value accounting in general purpose financial reports. We provide pertinent evidence from credit markets. A key benefit of using credit market data to explore the capital market implications of asset reliability is the theoretical basis of Duffie and Lando (Econometrica 69(3):633–664, 2001). They show that asset reliability (measurement) concerns should be concentrated in short-term credit spreads. Thus a focus on credit term structure can facilitate a cleaner identification of the impact of asset reliability on security prices. We find that asset reliability issues, attributable to SFAS 157 disclosures of Level 2 and, especially, Level 3 financial assets for a set of US financial institutions over the period of August 2007 to March 2009, are a significant determinant of short-term credit spreads and the shape of the general credit term structure. Our findings are robust to a variety of control variables and research design choices.     

Understanding the market reaction to shockwaves: Evidence from the failure of Lehman Brothers

The spectacular failure of the 150-year-old investment bank Lehman Brothers on September 15th, 2008 was a major turning point in the global financial crisis that broke out in the summer of 2007. Through the use of stock market data and credit default swap (CDS) spreads, this paper examines investors’ reaction to Lehman's collapse in an attempt to identify a spillover effect on the surviving financial institutions. The empirical analysis indicates that (i) the collateral damage was limited to the largest financial firms; (ii) the institutions most affected were the surviving “non-bank” financial services firms; and (iii) the negative effect was correlated with the financial conditions of the surviving institutions. We also detect significant abnormal jumps in CDS spreads that we interpret as evidence of sudden upward revisions in the market assessment of future default probabilities assigned to the surviving financial firms.     

Systemic Risk,Financial Crisis,and Credit Risk Insurance

Differing from conventional insurance firms whose underwriting business does not contribute to systemic risk, credit risk insurance companies providing credit protections for debt obligations are exposed to systemic risk. We show that credit risk insurers (CRIs) underperformed conventional insurance companies during the 2007–2009 financial crisis, and such underperformance is attributed to the greater systemic risk of CRIs. We also find that the credit spreads of insured bonds increase significantly after their insurers are downgraded or put in the negative watch list. We control for alternative factors affecting bond credit spreads and the result is robust.     

Pricing Sovereign Credit Risk of Poland: Evidence from the CDS Market

We analyze the market assessment of sovereign credit risk using a reduced-form model to price the credit default swap (CDS) spreads, thus enabling us to derive values for the probability of default (PD) and loss given default (LGD) from the quotes of sovereign CDS contracts. We compare different specifications of the models allowing for both fixed and time-varying LGD, and we use these values to analyze the sovereign credit risk of Polish debt throughout the period of a global financial crisis. Our results suggest the presence of a low LGD and a relatively high PD during a recent financial crisis.     

The chicken or the egg? A note on the dynamic interrelation between government bond spreads and credit default swaps

This note provides the first empirical assessment of the dynamic interrelation between government bond spreads and their associated credit default swaps (CDS). We use data for the Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) that found themselves with a problematic public sector in the dawn of the recent financial distress. We find that CDS prices Granger-cause government bond spreads after the eruption of the 2007 sub-prime crisis. Feedback causality is detected during periods of financial and economic turmoil, thereby indicating that high risk aversion tends to perplex the transmission mechanism between CDS prices and government bond spreads.     

Daily pricing of emerging market sovereign CDS before and during the global financial crisis

In this paper, we study the determinants of daily spreads for emerging market sovereign credit default swaps (CDSs) over the period April 2002–December 2011. Using GARCH models, we find, first, that daily CDS spreads for emerging market sovereigns are more related to global and regional risk premia than to country-specific risk factors. This result is particularly evident during the second subsample (August 2007–December 2011), where neither macroeconomic variables nor country ratings significantly explain CDS spread changes. Second, measures of US bond, equity, and CDX High Yield returns, as well as emerging market credit returns, are the most dominant drivers of CDS spread changes. Finally, our analysis suggests that CDS spreads are more strongly influenced by international spillover effects during periods of market stress than during normal times.     

The influence of government intervention on the trajectory of bank performance during the global financial crisis: A comparative study among Asian economies

The global financial crisis that started from 2007 onwards spread around the world and impacted the performance of banks in major economies. Many governments have used a variety of intervention policies to recover their financial systems. By examining the dynamic changes in bank performance before and after government intervention, this study demonstrates the use of the piecewise latent trajectory model. We used the data collected from Bloomberg for banks of five major Asian economies, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, over the eleven-quarter period from the 4th quarter of 2007 to the 2nd quarter of 2010 on six financial performance indicators reflecting solvency, credit risk and profitability. The change patterns of bank performance before/after government intervention during the global financial crisis have been compared among the five economies. Our empirical results indicate that, on average, the bank performance in terms of solvency, credit risk, and profitability improves after government intervention. Moreover, the influence of government intervention on bank performance depends on the evaluative financial indicator, the economy, and whether banks are internationalized. South Korea and Hong Kong have been identified to be the economies with stronger bank performance after government intervention. Policies demonstrated useful in South Korea and Hong Kong have been summarized and discussed.     

Bond market investor herding: Evidence from the European financial crisis

During the recent financial crisis, numerous EU officials, market participants and the media suggested that irrational herding was a key factor for the financial turmoil and the soaring yield spreads. In this paper we test for evidence of herd behavior in European government bond prices and, overall, we find no evidence of investor herding either before or after the EU crisis. We do find, however, in an original contribution to the bond market literature, strong evidence that during the EU crisis period, macroeconomic information announcements induced bond market investor herding; a finding that confirms the notion of ‘spurious’ herding proposed by Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) for bond markets. Further tests reinforce this finding and also indicate the existence of herding spill-over effects.     

Are credit default swaps still a sideshow? How information flow between equity and CDS markets has changed since the financial crisis

We examine the information flow between equity and credit default swap (CDS) markets using firm-level returns data before and after the global financial crisis. Before the crisis, the information flow was unidirectional, with equity returns leading CDS returns. While equity returns continue to lead CDS returns after the crisis, we find that the speed of adjustment of the CDS market to equity markets has increased during this period. We also find evidence of a bidirectional flow of information between these markets, with equity returns responding to credit protection returns in the postcrisis period. The quicker response of CDS spreads to equity returns during the postcrisis period primarily occurs among entities with lower credit ratings. In contrast, the response of equity returns to lagged CDS returns during the postcrisis period is observed among firms across different credit rating categories; however, the magnitude of the response is higher among those with lower credit ratings.     

A yield spread perspective on the great financial crisis: Break-point test evidence

We use a simple partial adjustment econometric framework to investigate the effects of financial crises on the dynamic properties of yield spreads. We find that crises manifest themselves in the form of substantial disruptions revealed by changes in the persistence of the shocks to spreads as much as by in their unconditional mean levels. Formal breakpoint tests confirm that in the U.S. the Great Financial Crisis has been over approximately since the Spring of 2009 and provide a conservative dating centered around the August 2007–June 2009 dates. However, some yield spread series point to an end of the most serious disruptions as early as in December 2008. Some symptoms of an impending crisis re-appear instead in the second half of 2011. We also uncover evidence that the LSAP program implemented by the Fed in the U.S. residential mortgage market has been effective, in the sense that the risk premia in this market have been uniquely shielded from the disruptive effects of the crisis.     

A tale of fragmentation: Corporate funding in the euro-area bond market

Corporations of different euro-area countries faced noticeably different costs of funding in the bond market during the prolonged period of financial instability which started in 2007. We identify the determinants of corporate bond yield spreads in order to isolate country-specific effects, as indicators of market fragmentation. Our evidence hints at a disorderly process of reassessment of corporate credit risk since 2007 with country-specific spreads vis-à-vis Germany becoming strongly positive for issuers located in other euro-area countries (Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, in particular). After the introduction of the non-conventional monetary policy tool named OMT, the spreads declined considerably, but fragmentation disappeared only in the latest period characterised by the expectations and the actual deployment of the ECB quantitative easing.     

Price discovery of credit spreads in tranquil and crisis periods

In this paper we investigate the price discovery process in single-name credit spreads obtained from bond, credit default swap (CDS), equity and equity option prices. We analyse short term price discovery by modelling daily changes in credit spreads in the four markets with a vector autoregressive model (VAR). We also look at price discovery in the long run with a vector error correction model (VECM). We find that in the short term the option market clearly leads the other markets in the sub-prime crisis (2007–2009). During the less severe sovereign debt crisis (2009–2012) and the pre-crisis period, options are still important but CDSs become more prominent. In the long run, deviations from the equilibrium relationship with the option market still lead to adjustments in the credit spreads observed or implied from other markets. However, options no longer dominate price discovery in any of the periods considered. Our findings have implications for traders, credit risk managers and financial regulators.     

The role of managerial risk‐taking in the ‘rise and fall’ of the CDS market

Since the innovation of credit default swaps (CDSs) in 1997, the market for CDSs grew dramatically to $62 trillion in 2007 (ISDA 2010). However, this market declined significantly with the onset of the GFC, prompting the question, ‘What lies behind the phenomenal growth and the eventual collapse of the CDS market?’ Using CDS spread data from 319 bank and non‐bank financial institutions across 33 countries over the period 2001–2010, I provide evidence of the determinants that affect risk‐taking by financial institutions, proxied by CDS spreads, and argue within an agency theoretical framework that managerial risk‐taking contributed to the ‘rise and fall’ of the CDS market.     

Pricing factors in multiple-term structures from interbank rates

This article analyzes the reward for the risk embedded in interbank derivatives, seeking to characterize the size and economic sources of the components of this risk premium in interbank spread quotes. The basis swap (BS) spreads – floating-to-floating interest rate swaps – are employed as a vehicle used by investors to express their views concerning the risk of borrowing on the interbank market. Our results show that the size of the risk premium ranges from 20 to 60 basis points, depending on the tenor, during periods of financial distress. Moreover, the evolution of this risk premium increases dramatically after August 2007, primarily due to the evolution of credit variables such as sovereign and financial sector risks. Finally, we also document important sources of commonality between risk premiums at different tenors. An analysis of the determinants of risk premia reveal that investors’ compensation relates to financial sector credit and liquidity uncertainty, and risk aversion.     

Credit risk transfer activities and systemic risk: How banks became less risky individually but posed greater risks to the financial system at the same time

A main cause of the crisis of 2007-2009 is the various ways through which banks have transferred credit risk in the financial system. We study the systematic risk of banks before the crisis, using two samples of banks respectively trading Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and issuing Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs). After their first usage of either risk transfer method, the share price beta of these banks increases significantly. This suggests the market anticipated the risks arising from these methods, long before the crisis. We additionally separate this beta effect into a volatility and a market correlation component. Quite strikingly, this decomposition shows that the increase in the beta is solely due to an increase in banks’ correlations. Thus, while banks may have shed their individual credit risk, they actually posed greater systemic risk. This creates a challenge for financial regulation, which has typically focused on individual institutions.