Dual-track interest rates and capital misallocation

The control-track interest rate and the market-track interest rate constitute China's dual-track interest rates. A theoretical model of dual-track interest rates and financial frictions is studied. In the model, bank loans are provided to state-owned enterprises with the control-track interest rate, private enterprises resort to shadow banking with the market-track interest rate. The interest rate wedge between these two interest rates distorts capital allocation, even driving a sector out of production. Full interest rate liberalization which eliminates the interest rate wedge alleviates cross-sector capital misallocation. However, the net effect on aggregate TFP is ambiguous due to the within-sector effect. Under calibrated parameters, full interest rate liberalization improves aggregate TFP moderately, unless the financial reform aimed to have SOEs and POEs face the same degree of financial frictions is also implemented.     

Evaluating monetary policy when nominal interest rates are almost zero

The non-negativity constraint on nominal interest rates may have been a major factor behind a putative structural break in the effectiveness of monetary policy. To check for the existence of such a break without making prior assumptions about timing, and to enable comparison between pre- and post-break monetary policy, we employ an identified Markov switching VAR framework. Estimation results support the existence of a structural break around the time when the de facto zero nominal interest rate policy was resumed and the effectiveness of monetary policy is seen to weaken since then although slightly positive effects from monetary easing still exist. J. Japanese Int. Economies 20 (3) (2006) 434–453.     

On the conduct of monetary policy in Vietnam

Vietnam has the highest inflation rate in Southeast Asia (over 20 per cent year‐on‐year in 2011). This paper examines the extent to which inflation in Vietnam is due to its conduct of monetary policy. It is argued that, had the central bank implemented policy on a more timely basis, inflation would not have been as high as it was, but the more fundamental problem is that the central bank does not have the tools it needs to conduct monetary policy effectively. Monetary policy is further complicated by Vietnam's exchange rate policy. By choosing to peg the currency and maintain fairly free capital mobility, the country has all but given up the ability to pursue an independent monetary policy. As a consequence, the central bank is forced to attempt to sterilise its foreign exchange interventions, which it is ill‐equipped to do. The paper argues that financial sector liberalisation is needed not only to promote growth but also to maintain macroeconomic stability.     

利率市场化对我国货币政策有效性的影响

利率只有在市场经济体制的大环境中才有可能走向市场化。换句话说，利率的市场化要由市场经济体制为其提供最基础的条件。为什么在过去的很长一段时间内，我们并没有提出利率市场化的问题，原因就在于，过去实行的是计划经济体制，利率只是计划管理的工具，利率的影响作用被严格限制在一定的范围内，利率市场化与计划管理是对立的。后来，我     

Tax policy,regulated interest rates,and saving

The paper evaluates tax policy options designed to reduce distortions to savings behavior that occur when administered interest rates are set beneath market equilibrium levels. While the removal of controls on interest rates might be the best option, political, legal or institutional circumstances might well preclude this solution. It suggests that consumption (or sales) taxes can be designed so that, in the short term, the rate of return to saving can be changed to approximate the market-determined interest rate. The main advantage of the measure is that it can provide (a) time to develop appropriate legal and institutional structures for financial deregulation, and (b) an additional policy instrument that allows the burden of adjustment, in a stabilization policy setting, to be distributed over more than one instrument.     

The money supply mechanism and monetary policy in China

One of the main difficulties of analyzing the macroeconomic condition in The People's Republic of China is the lack of information of its money supply mechanism. The present paper tries to provide a systematical analysis of the Chinese money supply process from both the theoretical and empirical points of view. It shows that the economic reform in the 1980s caused profound changes in the structure of the banking system in the following ways, (a) The establishment of the central bank paved the foundation of the money creation process through the monetary base and a multiplier effect, (b) Consequently, the money supply and credit condition are controlled, at least partially, by economic instruments such as the monetary base, required reserve ratio, and interest rates, (c) The old money supply system is far from being phased out yet. As a matter of fact, it is the mixture of a central bank system and an administrative command driven centrally planned system that constitutes the money supply mechanism with the “Chinese characteristics”. The successes and failures of the monetary policies in the late 1980s and early 1990s reflect the central bank's ability to control the macroeconomic condition of the economy. They also indicate that at the beginning of the 1990s, after a decade of economic reforms, the money supply mechanism in China is still, by and large, controlled by the central government through administrative orders rather than economic leverages.     

The response of long-term interest rates to news about monetary policy actions: Empirical evidence for the U.S. and Germany

The Response of Long-Term Interest Rates to News about Monetary Policy Actions. Empirical Evidence for the U.S. and Germany. — The authors reestimate the expectations theory of the term structure focusing on the question of how monetary policy actions indicated by changes in the very short rate affect long-term interest rates. Their main point is that the expectations hypothesis implies that very long rates should only react to unanticipated changes of the very short rate. In contrast to cointegration tests of expectations theory, this implication only requires rational expectations but not stationary risk premia. Therefore, its empirical test sheds new light on the importance of expectations theory for the determinants of the term structure of interest rates.     

Deposit market deregulation,implicit deposit rates,and monetary policy

Conclusion Previous analyses of the economic effects of deposit market deregulation generally have treated the gradual elimination of deposit rate ceilings and the effective removal of barriers to bank competition for deposits as separate issues. The key implication of the analysis utilized in this paper is that there are important interactions between these two forms of deposit market deregulation and their ultimate effects on market behavior and outcomes. One aspect of this interaction concerns the payment of implicit interest on deposit balances. Although implicit interest payments usually are viewed as a response to the imposition of ceilings on explicit deposit rates, the amount of implicit interest paid by banks in fact depends crucially upon the amount of monopoly power available to banks as a result of entry restrictions. Competition in deposit markets drives the implicit interest rate to 0 even if the explicit deposit rate is regulated, and the existence of imperfect competition in deposit markets makes the payment of positive implicit deposit interest a theoretical possibility even if the explicit deposit rate ceiling is removed.At a macroeconomic level, increased bank competition enhances the monetary and interest rate impacts of gradual relaxations of a binding deposit rate ceiling. If a ceiling on the explicit deposit rate is present, increased bank rivalry for deposits resulting from deregulation reduces monetary control whether the Fed targets a market interest rate or a reserve aggregate. When there is no ceiling on the explicit deposit rate, increased bank competition has ambiguous implications for monetary policy.The present trend in regulatory policy is pushing the U.S. financial system toward an environment in which explicit deposit rates are flexible, market determined variables and interbank rivalry for deposit funds is much more competitive. The thoretical analysis of this paper indicates that the likely results of these simultaneous developments are the demise of implicit deposit interest (marginal cost pricing of transactions services) and potential complications for the c onduct of monetary policy under either a reserve-oriented operating procedure or a procedure in which the Fed targets a market interest rate. However, the directions and magnitudes of the net impacts of those forms of deregulation ultimately are empirical issues that cannot be fully resolved.via a theoretical analysis.An earlier version of this paper was circulated by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's Office of Policy and Economic Research as Invited Research Working Paper No. 59. The author is grateful for comments received from Donald Bisenius, Michael Bradley, Richard Brown, George Kanatas, Kenneth Kopecky, Byungkyu Lee, Randall Merris, Douglas Mitchell, Steve Peterson, Richard Startz, Richard Sweeney, Bill Witte, and participants in the Indiana University Money and Banking Seminar. Views expressed in this paper do not necessarily correspond to those of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Any errors are the author's alone.     

Navigating the trilemma: Capital flows and monetary policy in China

In recent years China has faced an increasing trilemma—how to pursue an independent domestic monetary policy and limit exchange rate flexibility, while at the same time facing large and growing international capital flows. This paper analyzes the impact of the trilemma on China's monetary policy as the country liberalizes its good and financial markets and integrates with the world economy. It shows how China has sought to insulate its reserve money from the effects of balance of payments inflows by sterilizing through the issuance of central bank liabilities. However, we report empirical results indicating that sterilization dropped precipitously in 2006 in the face of the ongoing massive buildup of international reserves, leading to a surge in reserve money growth.We also estimate a vector error correction model linking the surge in China's reserve money to broad money, real GDP, and the price level. We use this model to explore the inflationary implications of different policy scenarios. Under a scenario of continued rapid reserve money growth (consistent with limited sterilization of foreign exchange reserve accumulation) and strong economic growth, the model predicts a rapid increase in inflation. A model simulation using an extension of the framework that incorporates recent increases in bank reserve requirements also implies a rapid rise in inflation. By contrast, model simulations incorporating a sharp slowdown in economic growth such as that seen in late 2008 and 2009 lead to less inflation pressure even with a substantial buildup in international reserves.     

Salient features of China’s monetary policy

The paper analyzes the objectives and instruments of China’s monetary policy. Until recently, China succeeded in handling the complicated problem of simultaneously curbing inflation and preventing the national currency from getting too strong in the context of a high active balance of trade. Russian monetary authorities, which are also facing the problem of surplus inflow of funds (petrodollars, loans, and investments), have been unable so far to find an effective solution. An analysis of the Chinese experience of monetary regulation and its comparison with the domestic practices suggests that the Russian monetary authorities should substantially revise their approach to maintaining a balance between the money market and the forex market. This revision would help to retard the strengthening of the ruble, to balance the pressure on prices, and to release budgetary investment resources.     

Transparency in monetary policy

The paper examines different aspects of transparency. Transparency serves democratic accountability by promoting public control. Specifically, the degree of transparency conditions inflation expectations, hence the central bank's scope for stabilization. Recent studies have put doubt on the notion that complete transparency is socially desirable. Here it is pointed out that the conclusion critically depends on an asymmetric modelling of stochastic preferences. The paper also reviews the pros and cons of revealing individual voting. A conclusion is that secrecy is to be prefered in monetary unions in order to shield governors from pressure by home governments. Presidential Address presented at the Fifty-Third International Atlantic Economic Conference, March 13–17, 2002, Paris, France.     

Uncertainty and monetary policy

The experience of monetary policy making in an uncertain environmenthas encouraged increased attention to the concept of model uncertainty,that is, uncertainty as to which is the best model. A particulardifficulty has been the need to operationalise the concept inorder to yield definitive policy recommendations. If this typeof uncertainty is unquantifiable, then a policy rule determinedby a single model may not in fact be the best approach; pluralismof method and the exercise of judgement offer a potential solution.A rigorous foundation for such an approach is available in Keynes'sphilosophical analysis of decision making under uncertainty.It is concluded that more analytical attention needs to be devotedto agents’ own model uncertainty, and to judgement. Butultimately the scope for synthesis between the model uncertaintyand Keynes uncertainty approaches rests on whether or not thesubject matter is such that knowledge of it is best representedby one formal model.     

Monetary policy shocks and interest rates: Further evidence on the liquidity effect

Monetary Policy Shocks and Interest Rates: Further Evidence on the Liquidity Effect. — This essay tests whether innovations in monetary policy are inversely linked with changes in interest rates. Using Mishkin’s efficient markets framework and the measures of policy innovations constructed by Boschen and Mills and Bemanke and Mihov, we find strong evidence that expansionary monetary policy shocks lower interest rates. We argue that the failure of most studies to find a significant liquidity effect is due to the endogeneity of the monetary aggregates which are used to measure policy shocks.     

Expansionary monetary policy and credit allocation: Evidence from China

We identify the impact of expansionary monetary policy in China during the 2008–2009 global financial crisis on the credit and investment allocation among firms. We obtain robust evidence that expansionary monetary policy led to the misallocation of bank credit to less productive firms after controlling for confounding factors. However, we find that investment increased more for more productive firms. Additional analyses show that this occurred partly because more productive firms hoarded cash before the crisis, and partly because less productive firms invested more in financial assets.     

Domestication of monetary policy

The article touches upon the issue of the independence of monetary policy, the impossible trinity, and the exchange-rate policy. It has been shown that independent monetary policy is possible and estimates of the limits of its independency have been given.     

中国债券市场货币政策传导有效吗

本文对我国债券市场货币政策传导有效性进行实证研究,首次将含有非平稳变量的Granger因果检验应用其中。结果表明:债券市场货币政策传导效率在第一阶段即基础货币与债券市场之间属于弱有效,在第二阶段即债券市场至实体经济货币政策传导作用上不能完全反映经济的基本情况。     

金融创新对货币政策传导效率的影响——利率与信用管道的比较研究

金融创新使实际投资对利率的敏感程度下降，使金融资产之间替代转换程度提高，交易成本降低，全融资产价格对利率变化的反应程度提高。从而提高了交易效率和速度：其结果是，IS曲线变得更加陡峭，LM曲线变得更加平缓，致使货币政策利率渠道和信用渠道的传导机制和效果减弱，但信用渠道仍具有比较优势。因此金融创新条件下的货币政策执行更应关注银行的改革与证券市场的发展问题，同时为稳定经济，不可盲目快速推进金融创新。