Ownership structure,corporate governance and analyst following: A study of French listed firms

This study investigates the effects of some characteristics of the French corporate governance model – deemed to foster entrenchment and facilitate private benefits extraction – on the extent of analyst following. The results show that analysts are more likely to follow firms both with high discrepancy level between ownership and control and those controlled through pyramiding. These findings provide empirical support to the argument that minority shareholders value private information on firms with high expropriation likelihood, asking thence for more analyst services. Additional findings show that analysts are reticent to follow firms managed by controlling family members. This is, in part, explained by these firms’ reliance on private communication channels rather than public disclosure, producing a poor informational environment.     

Voluntary disclosure,ownership structure,and corporate debt maturity: A study of French listed firms

This study examines the effect of voluntary disclosure on corporate debt maturity and the role of ownership structure in this effect. For a sample of 440 French listed firms from 2007 to 2013, the empirical results indicate that firms with greater voluntary disclosure have more long-term debt, suggesting that companies benefit from extensive disclosure through greater access to long-maturity debt. This finding is consistent with the evidence that voluntary disclosure provides an efficient monitoring mechanism in firms where long-term debt could insulate firms from lender scrutiny for long periods. The results also show that the positive association between voluntary disclosure and long-term debt is relevant only when the control rights of the controlling shareholders are significantly in excess of cash-flow rights. This finding supports recent work showing that better disclosure policies are viewed more positively by the market in environments where the risk of wealth expropriation by dominant shareholders is higher.     

Ownership structure and debt maturity: new evidence from Spain

Companies can use supplier financing as a source of short-term finance. The main objective of this paper is to extend the literature on the determinants of accounts payable and to test whether the accounts payable follow a model of partial adjustment. To do this, we use a sample of 3,589 small and medium sized firms in the UK. Using a dynamic panel data model and employing GMM method of estimation we control for unobservable heterogeneity and for potential endogeneity problems. The results reveal that firms have a target level of accounts payable. In addition, we find that larger firms, with better access to alternative internal and external financing and with a lower cost, use less credit from suppliers. Moreover, firms with higher growth opportunities use more trade credit for financing sales growth.     

Ownership structure and dividend policy: Evidence from Italian firms

Abstract

This paper reports on empirical investigations into the relationship between dividend policy and ownership structure of firms, using a sample of 139 listed Italian companies. Ownership structure in Italy is highly concentrated and hence the relevant agency problem to analyse seems to be the one that arises from the conflicting interests of large shareholders and minority shareholders. This paper therefore attempts to test the rent extraction hypothesis by relating the firm’s dividend payout ratio to various ownership variables, which measure the degree of concentration in terms of the voting rights of large shareholders. The hypothesis that other non-controlling large shareholders may have incentives to monitor the largest shareholder is also tested. The results of the empirical analysis reveal that firms make lower dividend payouts as the voting rights of the largest shareholder increase. Results also suggest that the presence of agreements among large shareholders might explain the limited monitoring power of other ‘strong’ non-controlling shareholders.     

Ownership structure and divestiture decisions: Evidence from Australian firms

Divestitures create shareholder value by helping firms to optimize their portfolio of assets. However, firms may forego value enhancing divestitures because of agency problems. More specifically, large controlling shareholders may prefer to retain the assets in order to extract private benefits of control at the expense of minority shareholders. In this paper, we explore the role that other blockholders play in constraining the largest shareholder's influence. The results indicate that divestiture activity decreases with the ownership of the largest shareholder. The presence of another significant blockholder appears to curb this negative bias towards divestitures. Our findings provide an economic rationale for the higher performance of firms characterized by more balanced ownership structures. Involvement of family owners also appears to provide similar benefits.     

Family values: Ownership structure,performance and capital structure of Canadian firms

This study examines how family ownership affects the performance and capital structure of 613 Canadian firms from 1998 to 2005. In particular, we distinguish the effect of family ownership from the use of control-enhancing mechanisms. We find that freestanding family owned firms with a single share class have similar market performance than other firms based on Tobin’s q ratios, superior accounting performance based on ROA, and higher financial leverage based on debt-to-total assets. By contrast, family owned firms that use dual-class shares have valuations that are lower by 17% on average relative to widely held firms, despite having similar ROA and financial leverage.     

Determinants of the floating-to-fixed rate debt structure of firms

We analyze the effects of managerial incentive, firm characteristics and market timing on floating-to-fixed rate debt structure of firms. We find that chief financial officer's (CFO's), not chief executive officer's (CEO's), incentive has a strong influence on firm's debt structure. When CFOs have incentives to increase (decrease) firm risk, firms obtain volatility-increasing (-decreasing) debt structure. These effects are present only for CFOs who are not subject to high monitoring by board members, CEOs, or corporate control market. Our findings suggest that agency problems at the level of non-CEO executives could be an important driver of various corporate decisions.     

Ownership structure and acquirers performance: Family vs. non-family firms

This paper investigates the impact of family control on French acquirers' performance. We consider a sample of 239 acquisitions undertaken by French listed companies between January 1997 and December 2006. Comparing both, short-term and long-term performance, we find that family-controlled firms outperform non-family firms. We find that the relationship depends on the control level. The higher operating performance of family firms is statistically significant for an intermediate level of control. Around the announcement date, family firms with a high level of control outperform non-family firms. Using the calendar time approach, we find that long-term stock performance of family firms is positive and statistically significant. Robustness tests show that our findings seem to not be driven by the endogeneity problem. Finally, we find that family wedge, due to the use of the pyramidal structure and the double voting rules, has no statistical significant effect.     

Private market impact investing firms: Ownership structure and investment style

Impact investing and ESG investing are specific “ethical” investing types integrating social, environmental, and moral values with financial goals. Despite receiving heightened scholarly attention, the difference between impact and ESG investing is largely unexamined, and it is not clear how they differ from conventional investment. To explain the differences between ESG, impact, and conventional investing, this paper draws on a dataset of over 8000 private market investment (PMI) firms. It compares impact, ESG, and conventional investment across firm characteristics, investment preference, and ownership. Results show that impact investors are more likely to be owned by the government, focusing on agriculture, cleantech, and education while avoiding “sin” industries like gambling and tobacco.     

Ownership structure and collateral requirements: Evidence from China's listed firms

This paper examines the effect of ownership structure on collateral requirements using a sample of China's listed firms from 2007 to 2009. We find that compared to privately controlled companies, state-controlled companies are less likely to be required to pledge collateral, and such a difference is more pronounced for firms in troubled industries. The empirical results also show that the effect of state control on collateral requirements is weaker in companies with more foreign ownership. Moreover, the effect of state control on collateral requirements is weaker in companies with more third party guarantees. Finally, we find that the effect of state control on collateral requirements is more pronounced for firms operating in regions with more government intervention.     

Employee treatment and firm leverage: A test of the stakeholder theory of capital structure

We investigate the stakeholder theory of capital structure from the perspective of a firm’s relations with its employees. We find that firms that treat their employees fairly (as measured by high employee‐friendly ratings) maintain low debt ratios. This result is robust to a variety of model specifications and endogeneity issues. The negative relation between leverage and a firm’s ability to treat employees fairly is also evident when we measure its ability by whether it is included in the Fortune magazine list, “100 Best Companies to Work For.” These results suggest that a firm’s incentive or ability to offer fair employee treatment is an important determinant of its financing policy.     

Bankers on the board and the debt ratio of firms

We investigate the impact that bankers on the board have upon a firm's debt ratio, debt to total capital, 1 year subsequent to their appointment. We find that the presence of lending bankers on a firm's board negatively affects the debt ratio, while the impact of non-lending bankers varies with the firm's probability of financial distress. The results suggest that non-lending bankers provide expertise and certification for distressed firms while exercising a monitoring role for non-distressed firms. In contrast, the results suggest that lenders on the board exercise a monitoring role independent of the firm's financial distress. When combined with established findings in the literature, we conclude that there may be two ways to avoid conflict between a board-appointed banker's fiduciary responsibility and the interests of her bank. When the potential for conflict is high, lenders may forgo board positions, while non-lending bankers may merely alter their role on the board.     

Private benefits of control and firm leverage: An analysis of Korean firms

This paper investigates the leverage choices of an entrenched controlling party. If debt effectively curbs the private benefits of control, the controlling shareholder is given incentives to avoid debt. Using estimates of the private benefits of control and financial statement data from selected Korean firms, we find that a controlling party with large private benefits tends to lower debt. This relationship was concentrated after the Asian financial crisis. However, before the crisis, firms that affiliated with Korean conglomerates, chaebols, used more debt as private benefits increased. A financial reform program triggered by the crisis seems to have actuated the disciplining role of debt. JEL Classification G32, G34     

Blockholder leverage and payout policy: Evidence from French holding companies

This paper focuses on dominant owners’ use of leverage to finance their blockholdings and its relationship to dividend policy. We postulate that blockholder leverage may impact payout policy, in particular when earnings are hit by a negative shock. We use panel data for France where blockholders have tax incentives to structure their leverage in pyramidal holding companies and study the effect of the financial crisis in 2008/2009. We find no difference in payout policy and financial behavior during the 1999 to 2008 period between firms with levered owners and other firms. However, in the years 2009 to 2011 following the crisis, dividend payouts increase in proportion to pyramidal debt of dominant owners. We inspect pyramidal entities individually and find that on average only 60% of dividends are passed through to the ultimate owners, with the rest predominantly used to meet debt service obligations of the pyramidal entities.     

Tests of a signaling hypothesis: the choice between fixed-and adjustable-rate debt

We develop a model wherein the choice between adjustable- andfixed-rate debt can serve as a signal of firm quality. The natureof the signal depends on expected inflation volatility relativeto other risk parameters. Evidence from a matched sample ofdebt announcements over the period 1978 to 1986 shows a differenceof -2.05 percent between stock price reactions to adjustablerate and fixed rate announcements when expected inflation volatilityis above an estimated threshold. Below this threshold, the differenceis +0.98 percent. The evidence supports the hypothesis thatthe riskier debt choice serves as a favorable signal or firmquality.     

A test of the firm characteristics hypothesis for LIFO choice of Canadian firms

This paper examines whether characteristics of Canadian firms can explain the observed difference in the use of LIFO for valuing inventory between the U.S. and Canada. Characteristics that help explain the choice between LIFO and FIFO use in the U.S. are used to compare Canadian firms to U.S. LIFO users and FIFO users separately. If Canadian firms are characteristically similar to U.S. FIFO users, then the firm characteristics hypothesis would be supported and LIFO would be infrequently used in Canada because few firms are LIFO-like in their underlying characteristics. Univariate nonparametric tests are used to compare U.S. and Canadian firms in the same industries on both an unmatched and matched basis. The results of this comparison indicate that Canadian average cost firms have more characteristics in common with U.S. LIFO users than FIFO users and Canadian FIFO firms have characteristics like both U.S. FIFO and U.S. LIFO firms. Logit models were estimated using the U.S. firms. These models predict that between three and 28% of Canadian firms would use LIFO. Thus, the firm characteristics explanation for infrequent use of LIFO in Canada is not supported by the data. These results imply that several Canadian firms may use LIFO if the institutional setting in Canada was more like that in the U.S.     

Personal taxation of capital income and the financial leverage of firms

Tax competition for capital has led to a trend where many countries levy lower taxes on interest income, often introducing differential taxation between interest and business income. This study analyzes the effect on firm debt usage. We exploit Germany’s 2009 tax reform, which introduced a final withholding tax on interest income with a flat rate 18 percentage points below the unchanged tax rate on income from unincorporated businesses, as a quasi-experiment. The results, based on firm-level panel data, indicate that firms increase their leverage when the tax rate on interest income decreases, albeit to a small degree.     

Financial literacy,financial development,and leverage of small firms

This study examines the relationship between financial literacy and the leverage of small firms, specifically of the legal forms, sole proprietorships, and partnerships. Using a cross-section of 73,302 firms in 22 countries, we find that the leverage of small firms is negatively associated with financial literacy. Further, we explore the role of financial development, bankruptcy and transaction costs, and information asymmetry, in moderating the relationship. We find that the negative relationship is less pronounced in countries with lower financial development, high bankruptcy and transaction costs, and high information asymmetry environments, respectively. We contribute to the understanding of small firms' leverage and the literature on financial literacy, SMEs, finance, and entrepreneurship. This study offers policy implications for economies that promote SMEs for entrepreneurship training and development.     

The differential impact of leverage on the default risk of small and large firms

We analyse a sample of 6 million firm-year observations of large corporations and small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) spanning 6 European countries from 2005 to 2015, to determine the impact of leverage and different sources of funding on default risk. We find that financial leverage has a greater impact on the probability of default of SMEs than of large corporations. The difference in default probability between the top and bottom leverage quartiles is 1.24% for large firms and 2.87% for SMEs. This difference may be explained by the greater exposure of SMEs to short-term debt and their consequently higher refinancing risk. Indeed, we find that SMEs that recover from the state of insolvency may have similar leverage to defaulted SMEs; however their liability structure is significantly altered towards long-term debt and away from short-term debt. Our findings have important implications not only for bank regulators and policy-makers but also for credit risk modelling.     

事务所管理咨询业务中安全边际与营业杠杆原理的应用

会计师事务所管理咨询业务中,安全边际与营业杠杆的理论及其方法有着广泛的应用.会计师事务所在为企业提供管理咨询服务时,可以利用这一原理分析企业因技术装备水平高低、产品结构不同、安全边际与营业杠杆不同,导致在行业竞争中所处的优势和劣势,营业杠杆还从深层次上解释了企业利润增减率的变化往往更敏感于其销售水平增减率的变化原因.这有助于企业在市场竞争中做出正确的判断.