Performance Information, Accountability and Executive Agencies

The growth of executive agencies in the UK has been rapid. The first agency was established in 1988 and, by October 1997, over 75% of civil servants were working in such organizations. They were created to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the delivery of central government services. Accountability was widened, and an emphasis was placed on the need to develop performance measurement and performance reporting systems. This article discusses the importance of performance information for accountability by agencies, and, through a time-series study of annual reports, examines changes over time. While highlighting the increasing use of performance information in external reporting, the article identifies significant weaknesses.     

Financial Accounting Research,Practice, and Financial Accountability

Financial accounting is essential to financial accountability, which is essential to a prosperous society. There are many examples of how improvements to financial accounting, supported by research, have enhanced financial accountability. Such research requires a strong relation between accounting academics and practice; this relation has ebbed and flowed during the life of Abacus. The relation seems to ebb when accounting academics embrace related fields and flows when the relevance to accounting practice emerges. Economics and finance have provided new perspectives and meaningful insights about the information investors need to make informed decisions. Regardless, there are many intriguing and open questions awaiting accounting research that can provide insights into how financial accounting—and thus financial accountability—can be improved. The future is bright for financial accounting researchers who do research relevant to accounting practice and want to contribute to a prosperous society.     

Efficiency wages as gift exchange: Evidence from corporate innovation in China

This paper investigates the impact of rank-and-file employees on corporate innovation. We show that paying higher relative wages to rank-and-file employees promotes better innovation outcomes in terms of patent quantity and quality. This effect is more significant among firms with large proportions of skilled employees, industries with high levels of R&D intensity, provinces with competitive local labor markets, and non-SOEs. Further analyses reveal that efficiency wages can serve as an underlying economic channel that fosters innovation by retaining and attracting valuable human capital and stimulating their working enthusiasm. Finally, we show that technological innovation is a mechanism through which rank-and-file employees affect productivity growth and thereby affect the economy.     

问责机制与内部控制制度的有效实施

新制度经济学认为制度是依靠相应的惩罚机制而被有效执行的。问责制作为一种惩罚机制 ,能保证内部控制制度的有效实施。设计内部控制制度时将问责制的思想和具体措施贯彻其中 ,必将大大提高内部控制制度落实的深度、广度和效度。     

Public Satisfaction and the Capability,Integrity, and Accountability of Financial Regulators

Strengthening the accountability of government officials to achieve public satisfaction in democratic countries has been a crucial issue. We study the issue empirically using the concept of national governance based on a case study of the key Taiwanese financial regulator, namely, the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC). This paper integrates theories of resource-based views, trust, and corporate governance to motivate the empirical analysis. The findings show that accountability is positively related to public satisfaction. Capability and integrity have a positive relation to the accountability of the regulator, suggesting that one of the most effective ways to get public satisfaction is to recruit staff with capability and integrity.     

增强责任性与改善绩效——政府绩效审计的目标剖析

增强政府责任性与改善政府绩效是政府绩效审计的目标追求,但是,二者之间存在着明显的差异。本文分析在不能兼顾政府责任性与绩效的情况下,政府绩效审计更适合追求什么目标。文章指出,就政府绩效审计而言,它对标准的热衷、过程的关注及其从传统审计中沿用的查错途径,使得它在提高政府的责任性方面具有先天优势;然而,政府绩效审计对绩效标准的看重及其使用的绩效归因方法,却在一定程度上阻碍绩效审计实现改善绩效的目标。在这样的背景下,更为现实的政府绩效审计目标应该是力求提高政府责任性,而非兼顾两者。     

Political Accountability and Fiscal Federalism

In a model with democratic institutions and three jurisdictions, we study the allocation and welfare in a one-level (unitary) and a two-level (federal) government, given that the central government finds it optimal to discriminate in favor of two jurisdictions and against the third. Favored jurisdictions are at least as well off in a unitary structure as compared to a federal one, while this may not be so for the jurisdiction discriminated against. We finally show that jurisdiction-specific electoral uncertainty is consistent with both equitable as well as discriminating allocations.     

Accountability and the debt crisis

The international debt crisis is viewed here as only a symptom—its underlying causes have resulted from a crisis in management among the major actors in the development process, namely commercial banks, recipient countries and development assistance agencies. The cumulative effect has been a lack of accountability that puts the development objectives themselves into jeopardy. This article proposes that all actors should write off their debt for failed projects, that the development assistance system be redesigned, and that a strategy be developed to help countries design and manage development programmes appropriate to their unique circumstances.     

Relationships, Accountability and Responsibility in the National Offender Management Service

Questions of relationships, accountability and responsibility received little attention in the original proposals for the National Offender Management Service (NOMS). They now need to be examined, and some awkward and complex issues need to be resolved, before legislation is introduced. This article considers some of those issues, and the factors on which the success of NO MS is likely to depend.     

Accountability and the New Commercial Agenda

Accountability is examined in the light of an emerging commercial agenda. Specific to this agenda are new business strategies which involve a loosening of accounting controls. It is this loosening of accounting controls which presages some shift away from hierarchical accountability and opens up the opportunity for lateral accountability. However, the authors show how hierarchical accountability orientates managers towards surveillance of "decisions" within a dyadic structure of superior-subordinates. It is argued that, given this orientation, managers are likely to subvert practices which develop in the name of lateral accountability into acting as a "supplement" for more intensive surveillance. To guard against this danger the authors explore an "image" of business drawn from concepts of community, affiliation and self-audit to replace the prevailing "stakeholder-decisions" model.     

时间压力、责任与审计判断绩效:一项实验研究

近年来,我国注册会计师面临的时间压力和责任日益增加,而时间压力和责任都是影响审计判断绩效的重要环境因素。本文采用实验研究方法,以我国注册会计师为被试,研究了时间压力和责任对我国注册会计师审计判断绩效的影响。研究发现,时间压力显著降低了注册会计师的审计判断效果,但同时提高了判断加工速度,责任能显著提高审计判断效果但对判断效率和判断加工速度没有显著影响。在高责任的情况下,审计判断效果不受时间压力的影响,高责任抑制了高时问压力带来的审计判断效果下降。     

公共受托责任:政治效应、经济效率与有效的政府会计

本文基于公共选择理论和委托代理理论提出政府会计建设对政治体制改革也具有根本性的影响 ;有效的政府会计应该能够有效界定政府的公共受托治理责任、正确诱导政府的公共选择、促进政治体制改革、深化和完善政府机构改革 ;它是政府高效治理、廉政透明和实现相应的政治效应和经济效率的基石。在构建政府会计过程中应对相关理论的特殊性加以重视 ,与政府会计体系相配套的预算制度也应作相应的调整。     

公共财务受托责任、绩效评价与政府财务报告改革

公共财务受托责任的归宿在于绩效评价,政府财务报告是绩效评价所需绩效信息的重要来源.这就要求以绩效评价为导向,从目标、主体、基础、报表体系和报表内容等方面推进政府财务报告改革,使政府财务报告能够提供可靠、相关的绩效信息,来合理评价政府的公共财务受托责任.     

关注责任,完善治理,促进民主与法制

中国经济与社会的发展,离不开完善的治理,公司需要治理,国家也需要治理,国家审计是国家治理的工具,并在国家治理过程中发挥着不可替代的作用,而连接国家审计和治理之间的桥梁就是当前审计必须予以关注的"责任".本文就关注责任提出了让承担责任成为公司治理的起点;让落实责任成为国家治理的关键;并指出了关注责任是国家审计本质的客观要求,也是国家审计发展的必然趋势.