The Role of the Real Estate Sector in the Structural Dynamics of the Chinese Economy: An Input–Output Analysis

Market‐oriented housing reforms and the rapid urbanization process have led to spectacular growth in the Chinese real estate sector (RES). However, the changes in the role played by this sector in the structural dynamics of the Chinese economy have not been examined sufficiently. Accordingly, we analyze the intersectoral structural changes to the Chinese RES, its linkages with the rest of the economy, and its growth sources, using four Chinese input–output tables from 2002 to 2017. We depart from existing work on the RES by using the causative matrix approach and structural decomposition analysis, and obtain three main results. First, the RES, which received little non‐RES feedback during the 2002–2007 period, has subsequently received much more substantial feedback. Second, the impact of the RES on China's economic growth stems mainly from its forward linkages. Third, the growth in the RES has been driven mainly by domestic demand expansion. Our results highlight that the Chinese RES, which plays a key role in value chains, is highly dependent on its own final demand and a fall in its demand would impede economic development. An important implication of these results is that developing the national economy by stimulating the RES would not be as effective as developing the RES through stimulating the national economy.     

Tracing value added in gross exports of China: Comparison with the USA,Japan, Korea,and India based on generalized LMDI

This study first traces value added in gross exports of China during 2000–2014 to four components, namely domestic value added absorbed abroad (DVA), domestic value added return home (RDV), foreign value added (FVA), and pure double-counted terms (PDC), then compares these four components in China's exports with those in exports of the USA, Japan, Korea, and India. Second, this paper proposes a generalized logarithmic mean Divisia index (GLMDI) method and combines additive and multiplicative decomposition to decompose DVA gaps between China and the other four countries into value added coefficient effect, input-output structure effect, domestic scale effect and foreign scale effect. The aggregate value added coefficient effect is then attributed to sectoral level. Results show that DVA always occupied the largest share in the gross exports of China, which ranged from 74.60–82.84% during 2000–2014. Before 2011, DVA share of China's exports was generally the second smallest among five countries; since 2011, DVA share of China's exports increased, and China had the largest DVA share in 2014 (81.39%). Sectors having a large FVA share in China's exports usually had a large DVA share, such as “Mining” (MIN), “Computers, Electronic and Optical” (CEO), and “Basic Metals” (BAS). Additive and multiplicative decomposition analyses indicate that value added coefficients had a negative and increased effect on DVA gaps between China and the other four countries. Attribution analysis revealed that CEO sector had the largest negative value added coefficient effect in comparison between China and the USA, Japan, and Korea and its effect increased in comparison between China and the other four countries. Policy implications derived are finally discussed.     

What are China's real gains within global value chains? Measuring domestic value added in China's exports of manufactures

This paper aims to investigate China's gains of participating in global value chains (GVCs) in terms of GDP in exports (DVA - domestic value added) and the factors affecting China's gains. The paper decomposes the gross exports of China so as to get the components that make up total GDP in the exports of the country, namely the value-added exports and DVA that are returned from abroad. Then the two components are measured to obtain the scale of GDP in China's exports both on country and sector level. The results show that, firstly, both value-added exports and the GDP in China's exports are less than the traditional gross trade statistics, indicating that there is a gap of real trade gains under GVCs. Secondly, comparing whether the proportion of DVA in total exports, the proportion of DVA in exports of manufactures or the proportion of RDV in total DVA, the gaps between China and the developed countries such as the United States, Germany and Japan do exist. Especially, considering the RDV of China, the proportion is significantly lower than that of major developed countries such as the United States and Germany, indicating that China lags far behind developed countries in the capabilities of supplying high value-added intermediate goods. Lastly, the empirical results suggest that DVA in China's exports has progressively increased in response to the productivity enhancement; research and development (R&D) inputs and capital formation, and the synergies between R&D and vertical specialization affect China's DVA growth in exports positively.     

Does the Domestic Value Added Induced by China＇s Exports Really Belong to China？

Since 2001, the exports of foreign‐invested enterprises (FIEs) have accounted for more than 50 percent of China's total exports. As foreign capital occupies a high proportion of the total capital of FIEs, most FIEs' capital gains are foreign factor income. Although these gains are calculated as a part of China's GDP, they do not belong to China's national income. To determine the real contribution of exports to China's welfare, the present paper analyses the impact of exports on China's national income using a non‐competitive input–output model capturing processing trade. The results show that every US$1000 of China's exports generates US$506.8 of national income. The real contribution of exports to China's welfare is much smaller than what we expected. This suggests that China should endeavor to improve the gains from international markets or find another engine to maintain its economic growth.     

Understanding China's demand for resource imports

Is China's demand for resources driven predominantly by domestic factors or by global demand for its exports? The answer to this question is of interest given the highly resource-intensive nature of China's growth, and is important for many resource-exporting countries, such as Australia, Brazil, Canada and India. This paper provides evidence that China's (mainly manufacturing) exports have been a significant driver of its demand for resource commodities over recent decades. First, it employs input–output tables to demonstrate that, historically, manufacturing has been at least as important as construction as a driver of China's demand for resource-intensive metal products. Second, it shows that global trade in non-oil resource commodities can be described by the gravity model of trade. Using this model it is found that, controlling for other determinants of resource trade, exports (and the manufacturing sector more generally) are a sizeable and significant determinant of a country's resource imports, and that this has been true for China as well as for other countries.     

Trade and the structure of South African production, 1984-97

With the onset of trade liberalisation, fears have been raised concerning the impact of trade on manufacturing output, employment and growth. Using an input–output methodology, this article decomposes South African output growth between 1984 and 1997 into final demand expansion, trade flows and technology. There are two main findings. First, trade liberalisation has not deindustrialised the manufacturing sector. Although import penetration has risen, export growth has matched and exceeded the potential import-induced losses in domestic production. South Africa's response thus conforms closely to international evidence. Secondly, a combination of strong growth in capital-intensive exports and import penetration in ultra-labour-intensive sectors has aided the structural shift in production towards capital-intensive sectors. However, capital-biased supply-side policies, as well as endemic problems within ultra-labour-intensive sectors, suggest that domestic factors and not trade liberalisation lie behind this shift.     

The energy efficiency advantage of foreign-invested enterprises in China and the role of structural differences

In this paper, we use a unique input–output table that distinguishes trade mode and firm ownership to discuss the relative advantage of foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) in Mainland China. It is found that FIEs outperform Chinese owned enterprises (COEs) in terms of total energy intensity by 16.97%, 14.97% and 42.89%, respectively, for the processing, non-processing and overall production in the industrial sector. Further decompositions show that structural differences across industries (and trade mode) contribute positively and account for 65.33%, 26.28% and 81.93% of the relative advantage of FIEs for processing, non-processing and overall production. Failure to capture heterogeneity across trade mode may lead to distortion of the picture of how final demand structure differences influence the energy efficiency advantage of FIEs over COEs in China.     

Rebalancing China's Economy: Domestic and International Implications

This paper considers interactions between China's domestic and external imbalances and their global implications. We present scenarios detailing how a rebalancing of China's growth pattern from investment‐driven growth towards more consumption‐driven growth may occur in practice. Using input–output tables for 2012, we illustrate the knife‐edged nature of Chinese rebalancing, the linkages between expenditure‐side and production‐side rebalancing, and how an internal rebalancing could exacerbate external imbalances. A policy implication for China is that for rebalancing to be fast, consumption must be exceptionally resilient and the efficiency of investment must increase sharply. If rebalancing is too slow, the capital‐to‐output ratio will rise to potentially unsustainable levels and consumption will fail to attain levels of contemporary upper middle‐income economies by 2030. Global input–output tables (1995–2011) suggest that the patterns of Chinese rebalancing considered in our scenarios may generate substantial headwinds for exports to China by its trading partners.     

Estimation of China's disaggregate import demand functions

We estimate the disaggregate import demand functions for three basic classes of goods as defined in the System of National Accounts (SNA): capital goods, intermediate inputs, and final consumption goods, and use the findings to shed light on the effects of China's economic growth on its current account. The results showed that as China switches from exports to domestic demand as a key driver for economic growth, China's trade surplus would be expected to shrink rather quickly.     

Estimation of China＇s Embodied CO2 Emissions during 2000-2009

The problem of CO₂ embodied in international trade has attracted increasing attention in China. To analyze this issue, the present paper directly calculates emission factors for 15 industries in 2002, 2005 and 2007. We then examine a consumption‐based system and a single‐region input–output model to estimate China's embodied emissions during 2000–2009. Our results show that, when a consumption‐based system is adopted, China's emissions are lower than those reported by some international organizations. The rapid growth in China's exports is a key determinant of China's rising total emissions. All countries should strengthen their cooperation in improving their current greenhouse gas inventories. Furthermore, China needs to encourage trade in low‐carbon products and technology.     

An empirical analysis of China's aggregate import demand function

This study uses the cointegration concept to analyze the long-run relationship of China's aggregate import demand function for the period 1970–1999. The conventional specification for the import demand function reveals that the volume of imports demanded responds to domestic activity and relative prices. This study considers four definitions of domestic activity, namely gross domestic product (GDP), GDP minus exports [IMF Staff Pap. 45 (1998) 236], “national cash flow” [Econ. Lett. 74 (2002) 265], and final expenditure components [Appl. Econ. 21 (1989) 957]. The empirical results indicate a long-run equilibrium relationship between these measures of domestic activity and China's import demand. Overall, domestic activity and relative prices are inelastic in the long run. This study also highlights some policy implications.     

China： Unscathed through the Global Financial Tsunami

This paper investigates the reasons behind the resilience of China＇s economy to the global financial tsunami. China ＇s economy is lowly leveraged in its banking, household, public and external sectors and, therefore, is less plagued by the global deleveraging than most developed economies. Chinese domestic sectors have improved significantly over the past decade, giving them larger capacity to cope with external shocks than during the Asian financial crisis a decade ago. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that China＇s economic growth is highly dependent on exports, we find that the main growth engine for China is domestic demand. Destocking, rather than falling exports, was the main cause of the sharp economic slowdown in China in late 2008 and early 2009. Therefore, the global economic slowdown should have limited impact on China＇s economy. We forecast a sustained eeonomic recovery in China in 2009-2011, with real GDP growth exceeding 10 percent in 2010.     

Revaluation of the Chinese Yuan and triad trade: A gravity assessment

The literature had paid little attention to the endogenous nexus between exchange rates and bilateral trade. In this paper, I use a gravity model to investigate the two-way causality between exchange rates and bilateral trade with data from China, Japan, and the United States during the 2002–2007 period. After controlling for the simultaneous bias between exchange rates and bilateral trade, the extensive empirical evidence shows that the revaluation of the Chinese Yuan against the dollar significantly reduced China's exports to the United States but had no significant effects on China's exports to Japan. These findings are robust to different measures, econometric methods, and period coverage.     

How much did China's emergence as “the world's factory” contribute to its national income?

Over time, China upgraded its capabilities to such an extent that it requires less imported materials, components, and services to maintain its central role in the global production network. Consequently, the domestic value added content of its exports has increased over time. Still, value added includes profits, which are partly earned by foreign capital owners, many of whom have set up operations in export processing zones. Such profits can be repatriated, and do not directly enhance the living standards in China. This paper will focus on the extent to which China's exporting activities have contributed to its Gross National Income (GNI), which is a better indicator of economy-wide living standards than GDP. Our results, based on input-output analysis, show that the increase in the share of Chinese GNI of a yuan of Chinese exports from 2002 to 2007 was modest, despite a marked growth of Chinese GDP contained in such a yuan of exports. From 2007 to 2017, however, the continued increase of domestic value added per yuan of exports did actually translate into considerably higher contributions of exports to GNI. Decomposition analyses show that changes in the commodity composition of China's export bundle and changes in the shares of national income in value added were the main cause of the different patterns before and after the financial crisis.     

How dependent is the Chinese economy on exports and in what sense has its growth been export-led?

This paper studies the interaction between foreign trade and domestic demand and supply in China's economic transformation. It compares China's export dependency with other economies using input–output analysis. The paper also conducts econometric analysis of provincial level data to examine causality between the growth of foreign trade and components of domestic demand, and causality between the growth of foreign trade and total factor productivity. The main message is that China's export dependency is significantly lower than implied by the headline exports-to-GDP ratio. Moreover, the contribution of export to economic growth in China came mainly from its impact on total factor productivity growth from a supply perspective rather than its multiplier effect from a demand perspective. This relationship was found to be stronger in the more developed coastal areas than in the less developed inland areas.     

Has China's Housing Production Peaked?

China's real estate has been a key engine of its sustained economic expansion. This paper argues, however, that even before the COVID‐19 shock, a decades‐long housing boom had given rise to severe price misalignments and regional supply–demand mismatches, making an adjustment both necessary and inevitable. We make use of newly available and updated data sources to analyze supply–demand conditions in the fast‐moving Chinese economy. The imbalances are then compared to benchmarks from other economies. We conclude that the real estate sector is quite vulnerable to a sustained aggregate growth shock, such as COVID‐19 might pose. In our baseline calibration, using input–output tables and taking account of the very large footprint of housing construction and real estate related sectors, the adjustment to a decline in housing activity can easily trim a cumulative 5–10 percent from the level of output over a period of years.     

THE DETERMINANTS OF EMPLOYMENT: A SECTORAL ANALYSIS FOR TURKEY

This paper analyzes the effects of wages, openness, and demand on employment in the private manufacturing industry in Turkey based on panel data for the period of 1973–2001. The wage elasticity of employment increases after trade liberalization. Nevertheless, output elasticity of labor demand is higher than wage elasticity in the total manufacturing sector for the whole estimation period, and in the high- and medium-skilled sectors in the post-1980 period. Trade effects, after controlling for output, seem to have a low economic significance. The positive effects of exports on the labor intensity of production are low or are offset by labor saving effects of foreign trade, particularly in the high- and medium-skilled sectors. On the other hand, there is some evidence of a negative import effect in the low-skilled sectors, whereas in the high- and medium-skilled group a complementary relation between domestic labor and imported inputs dominates the effects.     

Effects of China's Structural Change on the Exports of East Asian Economies

The Chinese economy is slowing down and is in the midst of a structural transformation from export‐led and investment‐led growth to domestic demand‐led and consumption‐led growth. While there are widespread concerns among China's trading partners about the effect of the slowdown in China's growth on their exports, China's structural changes are also likely to have a significant impact: for example, China will import fewer machines and more cosmetics. The central objective of the present paper is to empirically examine the effect of China's structural transformation on the exports of East Asian economies, which have close trade linkages with China. We find that economies that have failed to increase the share of consumption goods in their exports to China have suffered larger declines in their quantities of exports to China. In addition, economies that have suffered losses in their shares of China's parts and components imports have faced reductions in their shares in China's total imports.     

Trade in factor income and the US-China trade balance

US multindoational enterprises sell considerable amounts of products to China's domestic consumers that are “made” in either China or other countries. However, these sales are not counted as US exports to China. To account for this, we propose a beyond-borders approach to measuring trade flows that explicitly considers firm ownership, termed “trade in factor income (TiFI),” that defines the US-owned factor income induced by China's final demand as US exports to China. Applying this approach to OECD data, we find that on average from 2005 to 2016 in TiFI terms, US exports to China were 20.34% and 8.21% greater, China's exports to the US were 1.64% and 16.04% less, and the US trade deficits with China were 17.4% and 32.0% less than the trade figures reported in value added and gross terms, respectively. The concept of TiFI transforms trade measures from a territory-based “made in” label to a factor income-based “created by” label.